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ON "HAVING FUN AND RAISING HELL":




Professor Ann Catherine Scales was a dedicated and innovative
teacher, scholar, and lawyer who spent her career challenging liberal
legal shibboleths and working for actual, on-the-ground justice. Her life
was tragically and prematurely ended in June of 2012, after just sixty
years on the planet.' This Symposium, the print version of an event held
on March 30, 2013, at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
honors her work and her memory.
2
Scales was among the founders of the field of feminist legal theory
3
and the author of many influential works, including The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay4 and Legal Feminism: Activism, Law-
yering, and Legal Theory.5 She was also a lifelong lawyer, continuing to
litigate cases throughout her academic career, and an inspirational and
much-loved law professor.
t Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1. On June 24, 2012, Scales succumbed to brain injuries she had suffered from a fall down
the stairs in her home earlier that month.
2. 1 organized the Symposium, but it was very much a group effort. Thanks are due to: Sturm
College of Law Dean Martin Katz and the D.U. Workplace Law and Constitutional Rights and
Remedies Programs, for sponsoring the event; Edward Shaoul and Aaron Belzer, former and current
Editors in Chief of the Denver University Law Review, and their staffs, for embracing this unantici-
pated project; Stephanie Carroll, D.U. Administrative Director for Academic Programs, for stellar
event planning support; D.U. Visiting Professor Nicole Porter and Lalita Corman, D.U. Faculty and
Adjunct Support Specialist, for invaluable planning and organizing assistance; D.U. staff and student
volunteers too numerous to mention; and finally, all the speakers (including some who did not write
papers for this volume) who made the live Symposium such a moving and stimulating tribute to Ann
Scales.
3. Her first piece, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, Ann C. Scales, 56 IND. L.J. 375
(1981), wasn't the first article on the topic, although some say she coined the term. See, e.g., Will
Johnston, A 'Conversation with.. . 'Series to Host Author and Lawyer Ann Scales on Tuesday, Oct.
5, WAKE FOREST U. SCH. L. (Sept. 24, 2010), http://news.law.wfu.edu/2010/09/a-'conversation-
with-.... '-scries-to-host-author-and-lawyer-ann-scales-on-oct-5/. But it beautifully synthesized and
structured the swirling thoughts of the time, making her instantly famous among feminist law pro-
fessors. She was twenty-eight years old when it was published.
4. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373
(1986).
5. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY (2006).
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Raised in Oklahoma and North Carolina, Scales graduated from
Wellesley College6 and then attended Harvard Law School, where she
helped to found the Harvard Women's Law Journal.7 After graduating
from Harvard, she went to work for the firm of Hughes Hubbard and
Reed LLP, where she helped defend Ford Motor Company in the infa-
mous Ford Pinto case8 (about a car whose gas tank was subject to ex-
ploding during crashes).9 Years later, she described the epiphany that led
her to leave Wall Street: At a Ford-sponsored event, she received a party
favor that consisted of a cigarette lighter with a picture of the Pinto on it.
The irony was too much for her after all, it was an incendiary device!
Scales decided she had to quit. 
10
After practice, Scales moved into the "family business"-academia.
Her father, James R. Scales, had served as President of Oklahoma Baptist
University and then Wake Forest University, and her mother, Elizabeth
Ann Randel Scales, had also been a professor."' Scales spent eighteen
years on the faculty of the New Mexico School of Law before leaving to
begin a second stint in the world of practice (this time on her own
terms).12 In 2003, she returned to law teaching-and we were fortunate
that she landed here at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
13
Over the course of her career, she taught courses on Constitutional Law,
Civil Procedure, Appellate Advocacy, Family Law, Torts, Products Lia-
bility, Drugs and Devices, Jurisprudence, Gender and Law, and Civil
Disobedience (among others), as well as a seminar on Pornography and
6. She earned her B.A. in History and Philosophy in 1974. Bridget Crawford, In Memory of
Ann Scales 1952-2012, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (June 27, 2012),
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2012/06/memory-ann-scales-1952-2012/.
7. While at Harvard, Scales also pushed the administration to increase the number of women
in the law school. Here's how a friend and collaborator of hers, Fernande (Nan) Duffly, described
the impact of that effort:
[Ann] was an amazing force for change and good, and she emboldened others to fol-
low-including me. Seeing how few women and minorities were enrolled at Harvard, we
demanded to know why and were told by the administration that admissions were blind,
and more women and minorities needed to apply if we wanted to see more enrolled; so
we asked for and received funding to recruit. Several of us, travelling in teams, went to
colleges and universities around the country where we met with women and minority
students to encourage them to apply-Ann was passionate, eloquent[,] and convincing,
and I was happy to be on her team. It was a heady time, and it seemed possible that we
would change not just Harvard, but the profession. She was really a blazing thing [back
then], so bright and unstoppable.
E-mail from Femande R.V. Duffly, Assoc. Justice, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, to author (June
25, 2012, 2:33 PM) (on file with author).
8. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (Ford Pinto), 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981); Ann
Catherine Scales, Curriculum Vitae (on file with author).
9. Ford Pinto, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
10. Wakelawschool, Conversation with. Ann Scales, YoUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Flhw5-CdJsE&feature=youtu.be.
It. Ann C. Scales, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ann C. Scales (last modified
Oct. 25, 2013, 8:48 PM). Her mother also worked for many years with the Red Cross. Id.
12. Ann C. Scales (1952-2012), UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF LAW,




Hate Speech.14 In addition to teaching at New Mexico and Denver, she
served as a visiting professor at the University of Iowa College of Law,
Boston College Law School, the University of British Columbia, and the
University of North Carolina School of Law.
15
Scales was not only an influential scholar, but also a lawyer's law-
yer, litigating cases during her years as an academic as well as while in
private practice. Those efforts included a number of important cases in-
volving the rights of women and sexual minorities. She was lead counsel
on the landmark case of New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. John-
son, 1in which the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the state's re-
striction of abortion funding for Medicaid-eligible women violated those
women's equality rights.17 In R. v. Butler,18 a Canadian case in which she
was also involved, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the obscenity provisions of the Canadian Criminal Codes.1 9 An
ardent supporter of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
Scales also consulted on the gang rape case involving the University of
Colorado football program.20 And she represented feminists who helped
to bring the first women's marathon to the Olympics in 1984.1
As a number of papers in this Symposium describe, Scales's schol-
arship was greatly influenced by her instincts and experiences as a prac-
22
ticing lawyer. Concomitantly, the legal arguments she deployed as an
attorney were also deeply and organically grounded in feminist legal
theory. For those reasons, her work epitomizes the radical feminist com-
mitments to deconstructing false dichotomies (including that between
theory and practice);23 challenging abstract, decontextualized legal
rules;24and crafting workable solutions to help real people.
25
14. Ann Catherine Scales, Curriculum Vitae (on file with author).
15. Ann C. Scales (1952-2012), UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/ann-scales (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
16. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998).
17. Id. at 844. The case used an equality argument (based on the state's Equal Rights
Amendment to the state constitution), rather than the more traditional privacy argument, to hold that
poor women are entitled to state-funded abortions and that reproductive restrictions should be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 850-54, 858.
18. [1992] 1. S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
19. Id. at 490.
20. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). The case involved a
Title IX claim on behalf of women students alleging they were raped by C.U. football players and
recruits during a recruiting event. Id. at 1172. The university eventually settled for close to three
million dollars. Ann Scales, Student Gladiators and Sexual Assault A New Analysis of Liability for
Injuries Inflicted by College Athletes, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 205, 216 (2009).
21. Jean Strout, "I'm Only Gonna Tell you This One More Time: " Lessons from Ann Scales,
HARVARD J.L. & GENDER (July 28, 2012), http://harvardjlg.com/2012/07/im-only-gonna-tell-you-
this-one-more-time-lessons-from-ann-scales/.
22. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Raising Hell, Making Miracles The Everlovin'Legal Imagina-
tion of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2013).
23. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 96-100 (2003).
24. Scales insisted that legal rules be grounded in the lived experiences and concrete histories
of the individuals (and groups) those rules affected. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Law and Feminisms To-
2013]
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Yet her work definitely cannot be typecast. Scales was nothing if
not her own person, and her writings include frequent engagements with
race, class, and sexuality issues, in addition to gender issues. Moreover,
her dry and incisive wit (fueled by a razor-sharp intelligence) combined
with a conversational writing style to make her scholarship uniquely
clear and accessible.26 As one student reader put it, "She seems to be
speaking directly to you, even responding to your questions."
27
But Scales's plain-spokenness was as much a matter of political
commitment as personal style. She was a "small d" democrat about legal
scholarship, loving big ideas but adamantly maintaining that they didn't
require big words. And for her the life of the mind was also the life of
action; she had no patience for ideas that didn't have the potential to
change the world, or for people who spouted fancy prose without work-
ing to further justice.
As a law teacher, Scales brought to the classroom not only her
wacky sense of humor but also a litigator's intelligence and a passion for
fairness, inclusion, and equality. Watching a video of her teaching Torts
felt like being in a trial practice class. She constantly offered practice-
oriented vignettes to help students visualize her points-asking them to
imagine being the plaintiff's lawyer meeting with her client, the defense
attorney questioning a witness, the person who got hit by a hockey puck,
etc. And of course she acted out each role-play, to the delight of the on-
looking students. I seriously doubt anyone was ever bored in a Scales
class.
gether in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291,292 (2003) ("Legal feminism constantly reminds us that
law doesn't exist in a vacuum. Equality law, for example, must address whatever makes some groups
unequal, and that is-in a word-history. Amnesia is our worst enemy."); Id. ("Feminist method is
concrete. Even what we high-falutingly call 'feminist jurisprudence' follows entirely from real
women's accounts of actual oppression. Though Justice Holmes would likely disapprove of feminist
lawyers, he would have to admit that our theory fits the facts.").
25. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 589 (1986) (critiquing the Critical Legal Studies'
"critique of rights" for ignoring the utility of rights arguments in "illuminat[ing] the common experi-
ence of women" and "affirm[ing] a sense of collective identity," and concluding that "a focus on
rights cannot, by itself, achieve social reconstruction, but ... properly understood, rights discourse is
a necessary aspect of any political and legal strategy for change").
26. One representative example of her writing style:
I am told that the topic of feminism makes some lawyers and judges nervous. In particu-
lar, the term "feminist jurisprudence" sounds oxymoronic, simply repostulating the cen-
tral struggle of modem adjudication. This struggle is usually described as warring oppo-
sites: law vs. politics, objectivity vs. subjectivity, or judicial restraint vs. judicial activ-
ism. In the most apocalyptic terms, this is the struggle between principled decision-
making and that most feared of all evils, what the judge had for breakfast.
In order to advance the discussion, I think we must first be clear about what legal femi-
nism is not. Legal feminism is not "political correctness" or victimology or untrammeled
subjectivity or fluffy-headedness or anarchy or barnyard equity. Just as importantly, it is
not a practice that makes claim to objective, universal truth in the way that, for example,
some of the wilder versions of "law and economics" theory do.
Scales, supra note 24, at 291.
27. Strout, supra note 21.
FOREWORD
But Scales wasn't just popular and effective; more often than not,
she was adored.28 I asked her why the students loved her so much, figur-
ing I'd get a few helpful teaching tips. "I just give them lots of
handouts," she said. But that wasn't the reason, of course. The daughter
of academics,29 she had an old-school reverence for the pedagogical mis-
sion. She treated teaching as a sacrament, and described it as a "labor of
love"-and that wasn't hyperbole. Her devotion to teaching was so rev-
erent that it was as if it was a sacrament to her.30 Her goal was not only
to create experts in legal doctrine and argumentation-or even to intro-
duce students to feminist critiques of society and law. Rather, it was to
inspire them to think critically about everything, especially their own
assumptions, and to instill in them a confidence in both their personal
moral views and their ability to succeed as lawyers.31 As many testified
during a vigil held for her at D.U., just one office visit with Professor
Scales could mend a student's shattered confidence or turn a mediocre
paper into a great one. Even when delivering a strong critique, she made
clear to the students that she cared about and respected them.
Although the purpose of this Symposium is to honor Ann's work, I
know that many of the authors published here, as well as many potential
readers of this Issue, knew her personally. So I'd like to acknowledge for
a moment a few additional aspects of this truly amazing person.
Although I had known her through her work for much longer, I met
Ann only eight years ago when she joined the D.U. faculty. A bold and
caring colleague, she spent her time here nurturing junior scholars, badg-
ering the administration (only for principled reasons), and enthralling her
students. I can still hear her at visiting scholars' colloquia, asking one of
those questions that sounded simple and unassuming-until you realized
that it zeroed in on the key question needing to be raised about the paper
just presented. Or at faculty meetings-where she wasn't afraid to call
out the dean or anybody else if she thought an issue of fairness, equality,
or institutional integrity was at stake.
Many readers of Ann's work will have already gotten a sense of her
impish and irreverent sense of humor, and of course those who knew her
personally got to see it up close and personal. I imagine that each and
every friend and family member has a favorite example; mine was the
28. She was awarded "Outstanding Faculty Member" in 2006-2007, and hundreds of students
attended a vigil in her honor after her injury.
29. See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 11.
30. See E-mail from Ann Scales to confidential recipient (Apr. 1, 2005, 11:27 P.M.) (on file
with author).
31. As one commentator nicely put it, she was "a strong believer in finding a place for every
voice." Strout, supra note 21.
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bumper sticker she used to have on her car, which read: "Militant agnos-
tic: I don't know and you don't either."
32
Finally, Ann's absolutely genuine and unfiltered persona was a true
gift in the midst of the arid interpersonal climate of professional legal
culture (ivory-tower version), in which we law professors work and live.
I suppose some who knew her might have interpreted her casual vocabu-
lary, her occasional bursts of laughter in the midst of "serious" discus-
sions, and/or her whimsical sartorial style as indicating some sort of pro-
priety deficit. But to me they constituted intentional political interven-
tions-evidence of a committed and self-conscious resistance to a culture
where "witty repartee,33 often passes for friendship, where humor at oth-
ers' expense can be confused with camaraderie, and where behind-
closed-doors judgment too often stands in for collegiality and basic hu-
manistic respect. Shortly after arriving at the Big House (as she called it)
on a Tuesday morning to teach Torts, Ann would poke her head into my
office, wearing khaki pants and her bright red tennis shoes,34 to make
some sardonic comment about the day's events or the latest political is-
sue at the law school. And I knew that I could make it through another
day.
In the spirit of open and critical engagement by which Ann Scales
both wrote and lived, the pieces in this volume not only describe and
applaud, but also challenge, critique, and expand, her insights and as-
sumptions.
Catharine MacKinnon's essay, Raising Hell, Making Miracles: The
Everlovin' Legal Imagination of Ann Scales, a vividly evocative medita-
tion on Ann Scales as scholar, activist, and personal friend (first deliv-
ered at the memorial services held in Albuquerque and Denver), provides
an overarching introduction to the Symposium.35 The piece, by one who
knew her as few have, vividly captures Scales's personality and prose-
precisely because MacKinnon had the perspicacity to let Ann speak for
herself. In this homage to a good friend, peppered with what MacKinnon
32. Another contender was the poster in her office proclaiming, "Gravity: it's not just a good
idea; it's THE LAW."
33. "Witty repartee" is the name I have bequeathed to a particular form of verbal interaction
that I first encountered while an undergraduate at Yale. Many law professors will be familiar with
the phenomenon. It is characterized by clever, competitive, and rather content-less bantering that
initially seems fun and even challenging-until you realize that it also serves as a barrier to anything
resembling genuine human communication or connection. Those of us in my entryway (Yale's
version of a dorm floor) eventually agreed to stop doing it so we could actually get to know each
other.
34. A student told me she was known for calling them her "Friday shoes," so perhaps my
memory is off in thinking she ever wore them on Tuesdays.
35. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 13.
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calls "Scalesisms,' 36 Ann virtually jumps off the page-a hint of sadnessjust visible behind the mischievous glint in her eye.
The Outsider Within: The Radical, Not-So-Scary Feminist Jurispru-
dence of Ann Scales presents the remarks of the first of two keynoters
who spoke at the live Symposium, Kathryn Abrams.37 In this piece, the
author contrasts two quite different aspects of Scales's scholarship: her
position as "the consummate 'outsider[]'. . . . exhort[ing] her fellow trav-
elers to critical perspectives and transgressive behavior" and her role as
the "pragmatic insider," trying to convince legal actors, especially judg-
es, of the importance and utility of feminist legal theory.38 Abrams rec-
onciles these two sides of Ann Scales and her work by suggesting that
they reflect Ann's view of law as both complicit in the subjection of
women (and other outsider groups)39 and "always already amenable to
revision. In other words, Ann saw law both as hegemonic and as a
source of hope for transformation. This paper beautifully captures how
Scales's "resistant engagement'4 1 reflected a personality at once acutely
pained by human suffering and inspired by the power of the human spirit
to change the world.
In Taking a Break from Acrimony: The Feminist Method of Ann
Scales, the second keynoter from the live Symposium, Katherine Franke,
takes seriously Scales's call for scholars to apply feminist theory to con-
crete problems of real people.42 Examining how existing marriage law
might affect same-sex couples once they win the right to marry, Franke
suggests that, for both lesbians and gay men, "the law of marriage and
divorce imposes-if not imprints-status-based and gendered identities
on the parties in ways that clearly change how they might have seen
themselves had marriage law not been on the scene.4 3 In calling for a
more complex and individualized assessment of marital roles for same-
sex couples, Franke raises the question of whether heterosexual couples
would also benefit from a view of marriage that is severed from standard
gender roles.44
In Her Own Voice: Ann Scales as Philosopher, Storyteller, Femi-
nist, and Jurisprude, by Patricia Cain, takes the reader on a tour of Ann
Scales's traits and truisms, first explaining why she sees Scales in terms
of the four roles listed in her title and then going through her "top 10"
36. Id. at 16.
37. Kathryn Abrams, The Outsider Within: The Radical, Not-So-Scary Feminist Jurispru-
dence ofAnn Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 23 (2013).
38. Id. at 22.
39. ld. at 31-32.
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id. at 35.
42. Katherine Franke, Taking a Break from Acrimony: The Feminist Method ofAnn Scales, 91
DENV. U. L. REV. 41 (2013).
43. Id. at 46.
44. Id. at 48-49.
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45Scales quotes. Along the way, Cain shares her own thoughtful and en-
gaging reactions to Scales's ideas and quips. The result is a delightfully
entertaining, warm, and moving personal reminiscence that vividly cap-
tures Scales's mind and spirit-in her own voice.
In Ann Scales "Imagines Us ": From the Eco-Pornographic Story to
the Medusan Counternarrative, Jane Caputi explores Scales's concept of
"ecological pomography,"46 concretely illustrating this concept by con-
trasting parallel pairs of media depictions of women and the Earth-
depictions that reveal the sexualized abuse of women and the instrumen-
tal exploitation of nature to be closely associated in the U.S. cultural im-
agination.4 7 Deftly tying in Scales's thoughts on topics ranging from
touristic commodification of indigenous cultures to reproductive cancers
as environmental injustices, Caputi captures both Scales's tragic vision
of the pervasiveness (and connectedness) of social and environmental
injustices, and the spiritual commitments that spurred her not only to
continue to fight those injustices, but also to laugh and love while doing
it.
Jennifer Chac6n's Feminists at the Border engages Ann Scales's in-
sight that militarism affects judicial reasoning in doctrinal areas far re-
moved from military law.48 Taking off from Scales's discussion of the
immigration case, Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,
49
Chac6n proffers several other instances of "constitutional reasoning in
citizenship and immigration cases where the military is not necessarily
invoked, but where militarism is in evidence."50 Chac6n argues that the
national security and "border security" discourses undergirding current
immigration policies have caused the courts to defer greatly to Congress
in the immigration area (even when it violates rights that otherwise
would be constitutionally protected), producing a legal regime in which
"[m]ilitarism trumps equality.' Militarism in immigration policies, she
contends, both supports and increases sex and gender biases already pre-
sent in those policies.52
45. Patricia A. Cain, In Her Own Voice: Ann Scales as Philosopher, Storyteller, Feminist, and
Jurisprude, 91 DENY. U. L. REV. 53 (2013).
46. Jane Caputi, Ann Scales "Imagines Us ": From the Eco-Pornographic Story to the Medu-
san Counternarrative, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 65 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon
seeing Mount Rushmore in the Black Hills of South Dakota, Scales had described the monument as
pornographic: "Just as pornography portrays women as enjoying abuse, Mount Rushmore portrays
nature as being enhanced by being mutilated in the image of what white males think nature ought to
be and do." Id. at 68 (quoting Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 95
(1990)).
47. Id. at 70-71.
48. Jennifer Chac6n, Feminists at the Border, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 85, 89-96 (2013).
49. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
50. Chac6n, supra note 48, at 91.
51. Id. at 106-07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 107.
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Shannon Gilreath's Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in
Struggle explores "the role that feminist jurisprudence has to play in the
lives of gay men,,53 arguing that, despite its moniker, much poststructur-
alist "queer theory" is actually heteronormative and thus of little use to
the gay liberation project.54 The essay powerfully conveys the strong
emotions and firmly held intellectual commitments that have fueled
some of the debates within (and between) feminist and queer theory-
especially between writers who see themselves as poststructuralists and
those who identify as radical feminists-while nevertheless paying obei-
sance to the subtlety of the position Ann Scales staked out in these de-
bates and to her insistence that "[s]olidarity is possible.
55
Lynne Henderson's Flexible Feminism and Reproductive Justice:
An Essay in Honor ofAnn Scales catalogues the numerous current threats
to women's constitutional rights to abortion and contraception-rights
56that were supposedly "settled law" decades ago. Drawing on Ann
Scales's lifelong concern for reproductive justice, Henderson situates
today's issues within Scales's feminist frames of reference. Citing
Scales's flexible and nonjudgmental feminism, her rejection of false di-
chotomies, and her foundational concern with preventing harm, Hender-
son emphasizes that seeking coalitions across differences is an important
component of modem reproductive-rights work.57 This essay's compel-
ling review of how Supreme Court precedents have opened the door to
increased state regulation of abortions, as well as its discussion of current
issues about access to contraception under both the Affordable Care Act
and "Conscience Clause" statutes, provides ample evidence for Hender-
son's conclusion that continued and vigilant legal activism is imperative
in the reproductive area.
In "Stuck" on Love, Tamara Kuennen asks why scholars writing
about intimate partner violence don't consider the possibility that love
for a partner might sometimes be the primary reason why a battered
woman refuses to cooperate with a criminal prosecution, chooses to re-
main in the relationship, or both.58 Instead, Kuennen maintains, authors
often "[a]void and [a]pologize for [l]ove" as a motivator of battered
women's behavior.59 Drawing on Ann Scales's concept of places of
"stuckness" in feminist theory-and in particular on her identification of
53. Shannon Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DENV. U. L.
REV. 109, 113 (2013).
54. Id. at 115-29.
55. Id at 110 (quoting Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 395, 407 (Martha
Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009)).
56. Lynne Henderson, Flexible Feminism and Reproductive Justice: An Essay in Honor of
Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 141 (2013).
57. Id. at 164 ("[A]voiding abortion is optimal for all concerned, and we should not decline
alliances on some issues unless the risks of co-optation are high.").
58. Tamara L. Kuennen, "'Stuck" on Love, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 171, 173-75 (2013).
59. Id. at 173.
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false consciousness as one of those places-this essay raises important
questions about the distinction between, on the one hand, everyday com-
promises a woman might make because she loves her partner and values
their relationship and, on the other, choices that the law ought to consider
coerced, even if prompted by love.
How Masculinities Distribute Power. The Influence of Ann Scales,
by Ann McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper, focuses on group sexual as-
saults such as the alleged gang rape by University of Colorado football
players (and recruits)-discussed in Ann Scales's Student Gladiators and
Sexual Assault: A New Analysis of Liability for Injuries Inflicted by Col-
lege Athletes6 0-to illustrate how masculinities "distribute power,"61 In
addition to discussing the "boys will be boys" attitude that communities
often have towards such attacks, McGinley and Cooper also point out
that not all young men benefit from that attitude. They illustrate this
point through a discussion of constructions of black male masculinity
operating in the George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin case.62 Turning to
Scales's work on militarism, the authors argue that that work reveals
parallels between the ways masculinity distributes power in sexual as-
sault cases and in U.S. foreign policy. A local community might be in-
vested in the "reflected masculinity" provided by its football team in the
same way that a nation's identity might be invested in the strength of its
military.63 And the excuses provided for our military's aggressions are
not that different, McGinley and Cooper suggest, from the "boys will be
boys" narrative Scales condemns in sexual assault cases.
Last, but certainly not least, in On Surviving Legal De-Education:
An Allegory for a Renaissance in Legal Education, Robin Walker Ster-
ling presents a fictional depiction of the type of law school Ann Scales
would have embraced.64 Based primarily on Scales's 1990 piece, Surviv-
ing Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide,65 this hilarious, creative,
and at times inspirational narrative captures not only the substance of
Scales's critique of modem legal education but also the irreverent sense
of humor and deep commitment to humanistic education that permeate
her positive pedagogical vision.
60. Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, How Masculinities Distribute Power: The
Influence of Ann Scales, 91 DENy. U. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2013); Ann Scales, Student Gladiators
and Sexual Assault: A New Analysis of Liability for Injuries Inflicted by College Athletes, 15 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 205 (2009).
61. McGinley & Cooper, supra note 60, at 188.
62. Id. at 104-208. In that case, George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch captain, killed
unarmed black teenager Trayvon Martin. Id. at 204.
63. Id. at 200-02.
64. Robin Walker Sterling, On Surviving Legal De-Education: An Allegory for a Renaissance
in Legal Education, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 211 (2013).




Ann Scales's blazing intellect, as well as her uncompromising hu-
manism and boundless spirit, are all present in her scholarship, as the
pieces in this Symposium vividly reveal. It is my hope that these essays
will not only attest to and preserve the contributions her work has made
thus far, but also inspire a whole new generation of readers to explore the
wonderful and wacky world of Ann Scales.

RAISING HELL, MAKING MIRACLES: THE EVERLOVIN'
LEGAL IMAGINATION OF ANN SCALES
CATHARINE A. MACKINNONt
We are blessed, as our girl might have put it, that Ann Scales was
the writer she was, because we have her in her work. She herself is pre-
sent, right there-"all in" as in poker-in every line. None of it could
have been written by anyone else.
That inimitable, irreverent, ever-woman-identified voice speaks
from every page-fresh, sharp, playful, pungent, pithy, hilarious by
turns, with a certain towel-snapping quality. A true flamethrower, Scales
took no prisoners but no cheap shots, either, and somehow always man-
aged to be loving in her critical engagement, loving in the nonviolent
sense. There was gentleness to her edge even while pulling no punches.
Her 1985 analysis of Guido Calabresi on torts has all this, delivered with
signature rapier precision: "[His] failure to consider . . . political realities
renders the legal discussion almost whimsical."' So does her recent ri-
poste to Janet Halley's (at minimum premature) recommendation to
"[t]ake a [b]reak from [f]eminism."'2 Ann: "That which was never fully
understood or embraced cannot be abandoned.3
Coming to law through philosophy, she ranged supplely from the
elevated to the quotidian, dropping names of the big ones with perfect
deadpan aim. On the binary in games, for instance, she said of Wittgen-
stein, "I hate to rely on a dead white man[,] ... but I like his weird clari-
ty." 4 Accessible, unpretentious, imaginative, her writing is often layered
with unexpected meanings that ambush you, as in her observation that
t Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and (long-term)
James Barr Ames Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. With the addition of the long
block quotation, see infra text accompanying note 18, the text of this piece is essentially as delivered
at two remarkable, heartrending memorials to Ann Scales, one at the University of New Mexico Law
School on September 19, 2012, the other at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law on
September 21, 2012, each infused with her special spirit. Special thanks to Deborah Huerta for her
incomparable assistance with the footnotes, Gerald Torres for his perceptive suggestion, and Anne E.
Simon for her support and guidance.
I. Ann Scales, Tragic Voices, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 283, 292 (1985) (reviewing GUIDO
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985)).
2. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 10
(2006). If anyone is taking this "break," neither feminism nor those who do the real work of chang-
ing the world for women seems to have noticed.
3. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 3 (2006).
4. Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REV. 139,
154 (1990).
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Ronald Reagan was wise to consult an astrologer because he "needed to
be out of himself, to become one with his speckness."5
Trenchant and fearless, Ann had what my grandmother called
gumption. In this vein, treasure her 1990 analysis of the Supreme Court's
decision requiring universities disclose materials revealing their internal
processes in tenure challenges.6 "[This] should pose difficulties," she
opined, "only for institutions that still allow reliance on gossip, encoded
messages, and inarticulated (often inarticulable) standards."7 Well, if the
shoe fits...
Her plain-spoken downbeat punch lines were persuasive as hell, of-
ten with an "I dare you, I double-dare you to disagree with this" under-
tone. One talk at the University of Toronto in 1988, after an erudite ren-
dition of the fraught philosophical question of making multiplicity rather
than uniformity the standard of meaning, winds down with, "This is an
incredibly difficult challenge, but I suspect that women are up to it."
8
Along with capital-T Truth, Ann's takedown of sports metaphors in law
is equally on target, her facility with analogy likewise on display: "I am
sorry, sports fans, but law is just more serious than baseball or football.
Rape is not a game, racial violence is not a sport, and the deployment of
first-stike nuclear weapons portends no comic relief."9 The girl had
rhythm.
What she knew from life made its way into her work, making it real
that way. An early piece of intellectual autobiography gave us a hard-to-
imagine Annie "struck dumb" in law school.'0 "[A]dded to one's feeling
of incompetence," she recalled, "is self-hatred, the creepy sensation that
one is [on] a long slide through angst, through ennui, to selling out.""1
The system rewards your silence with power, she said.12 The silence and
sell-out of Ann Scales, then as later, the system would have to limp along
without. Her self-chosen "Pollyanna in Hell" posture was infectious and
served her critique, evident in her story of law as told in law school being
"the result of an ongoing white male encounter group," as being "what
happens when you take millions of white male subjectivities, compare
their responses to the challenges of being alive, write it all down, and
5. Ann C. Scales, Midnight Train to Us, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 710, 724 (1990).
6. See Univ. ofPa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
7. Ann C. Scales, University of Pennsylvania. v. EEOC and the Status of Peer Review: A
Symposium, ACADEME, May-June 1990, at 32.
8. Ann C. Scales, Remarks at the University of Toronto Legal Theory Workshop: The
Women's Peace Movement and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron? 64 (Feb. 26, 1988) (on
file with author).
9. Scales, supra note 4, at 151.
10. Id. at 140.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 141.
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work for centuries on hammering out the rough edges [to make] it all
seem inevitable."'
' 3
You feel her joy, her excitement at cracking the code, how much
fun she was having, as well as how exciting and fun and enlivening and
enlightening law school her way could be. Surviving legal de-education,
she said, called for "caretaking" and "a healthy infusion of grace."'4 Her
students got this unstintingly from her. In contrast with Scott Turow's
One L description of law students as "men and women drawn to the
study of rules... with a native taste for order,"' 5 she saw the day coming
when law students could be described as "women and men drawn to the
living of life, . . . with a native taste for survival, for diversity, and for
freedom."' 6 She knew and faced pain and sadness too, warning us against
the "self-hater talking[,] ... judging my insides by their outsides," insist-
ing we trust ourselves to tell why we are "undermined, ineffectual, and
unhappy."'
17
One extended meditation has it all: the highs and the lows, the
method, the madness, and the message.
Life for a woman in this society is about existential contingency.
In my case, the existential undermining is not constant. I live in a
sleepy southwestern community, and I have a comfortable life. Nev-
ertheless, existential torpedoes hit me with some regularity. I recently
got a letter from a guy who claimed that some of my mail mistakenly
had been delivered to his house. He inferred from a postcard that I
was a lesbian and inquired whether he and the woman with whom he
lived could engage in a menage 6 trois with me. He did not include
much information about his partner, but he told me everything about
his body. The letter was simply, and appropriately, signed "Randy."
Now here was a torpedo that caused a dilemma. For my own sani-
ty, I simply had to take it in stride. So, I told myself, hey, the misde-
livery of my mail was an honest mistake. The letter was pleasant
enough, except for the anatomical detail. Randy promised that he
would never bother me again if I did not call the telephone number
he enclosed. I did not and he has not. On the other hand, I spent the
next few days wondering how Randy got my mail, speculating
whether Randy had a violent streak, trying to discern if each passing
male might be Randy, and writing down the license numbers of cars
that seemed to be parked too long on my street. My energy was di-
verted, and I was a little crazy.
13. Id. at 139, 144.
14. Id. at 146.
15. ScoTr TUROW, ONE L 300 (1977).
16. Scales, supra note 4, at 164.
17. Scales, supra note 5, at 716, 720.
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This episode, however, was nothing compared to that endured dai-
ly by the women who lead less comfortable lives-women in pov-
erty, women in abusive relationships, women in the sex industry,
women in most employment situations. My anecdote is nothing com-
pared to what happens thousands of times each day on the streets, or
to what almost happens.
On my way to this Symposium, I stopped off to see my parents in
North Carolina. Consider this excerpt from the letters to the editor in
their hometown newspaper:
Rape is a horrifying experience that stays with a person for
the rest of her life....
In my files I have an article that estimates that 35 percent of
all females will be sexually assaulted in their lifetimes.
If this is true, why do so many women take such foolish
chances of being the next victim of rape? This past week I
was driving through a fairly well-lighted part of Winston-
Salem. It was 9 p.m., and hardly anyone was on the streets.
As I stopped at a red light, rounding a comer was an attrac-
tive young woman, I would say in her early 20s, wearing a
skin-tight aerobic outfit with bike pants. As I watched her
run I became increasingly angry and wanted to say some-
thing, but she was wearing a Walkman.
Then I thought I would throw the soft-drink can I had in my
hand at her to protest her foolishness.
But I immediately ruled that one out, figuring it to be a bit
too much....
I'm writing this letter in hopes that the jogger, or someone
like her, will read it and realize that instead of being some-
one concerned for her well-being, I could have been a rapist
and she my next victim.
I hereby nominate this letter as the lead item on the "No Shit
News." The author does not have to have been a rapist; he does not
have to have thrown the soft-drink can. He did not even have to write
to the newspaper. All he had to do, in order to fulfill his patriarchal
duty to control the night, was to blame the woman for existing and
looking great.
So we live with it. And, the law of the land is that we are obligated
to live with it.
18
18. Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 101-02 (1990) (omis-
sions in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Steven E. Kerhoulas, Letter to the Editor, Taking
Foolish Chances, WINSTON-SALEM J., Sept. 30, 1989, at 16 (emphasis added)).
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Here we get a glimpse of her own oppression-characteristically
minimized, laughing until she cried and vice versa-wrapped around one
of the classiest comings out in print ever. Read aloud for full effect.
Humble about law's limitations and her own, yet open to the limit-
less potential of human consciousness and action, Ann's response to the
direct action against nuclear arms by the Greenham Common Women's
Peace Camp'9 produced some of her most inspired writing. These women
made her question women's obligation to respect the authority of a law
that does not respect us.2° Compared with their unmediated activist rela-
tion to reality, Ann saw law as "a giant energy sponge.",2' Her illuminat-
ing 2006 book-one she had titled "Active Ingredients" but NYU Press
changed to the "boring and misleading" (her description) Legal Femi-
nism2 2-is accordingly divided into two parts: one, "Places of Stuckness"
in law and philosophy and two, the "Places [B]eyond Stuckness" offered
by feminist legal theory and, especially, practice.23
Knowing that law isn't everything did not lead her to think it is
nothing. Law according to Scales "can either provide a little breathing
room or tie plastic bags around women's heads.' 24 It was untying those
plastic bags that committed her to practice. As she put it at the end of her
book, "My loyalty to the rule of law depends on its being able to reach
through the grime of history and politics in order to achieve incremental
measures of dignity for real people in real life situations.... If that is
result-orientation, I'm proud of it."
25
The pornography struggle for civil rights inspired some of my fa-
vorite Scalesisms. One rejoinder to the opponents of the anti-
26pornography civil rights law has Ann's special genius for cutting things
down to size, together with her incomparable feel for the ridiculous: "It
is gross legal solipsism to assert that protecting the makers of School Girl
Zombies With Deep Throats from a civil rights action is necessary to
protect either the alleged independence of the fourth estate or the com-
19. For information, see generally ALICE COOK & GWYN KIRK, GREENHAM WOMEN
EVERYWHERE: DREAMS, IDEAS AND ACTIONS FROM THE WOMEN'S PEACE MOVEMENT (1983).
Bringing their voices to the United States, a group of the Greenham women litigated the Reagan
Administration's deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. The federal courts were unsympathet-
ic. See Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), afid, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
20. See Scales, supra note 8, at 8-10.
21. Id. at4.
22. E-mail from Ann Scales to author (July 3, 2006, 1:09 PM) (on file with author).
23. SCALES, supra note 3, at vii.
24. Scales, supra note 5, at 723.
25. SCALES, supra note 3, at 151.
26. See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 6, 6
n. 19 (1992). The anti-pornography civil rights law is a sex equality statute that makes proven harms
of pornography civilly actionable by their victims. See generally IN HARM'S WAY: THE
PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS (Cathaine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997)
(collecting hearings containing testimony of victims with versions of the proposed law).
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prehensiveness of our children's education.,27 That same debate pro-
duced one of her more enigmatic lines-"You are a strange bedfellow
when you sleep alone",28 -as well as my nomination for all-time greatest
Scales hit: "Mount Rushmore is ecologically pornographic."
29






12i my flaming tendrily
hair. Her, in retalia-
tion, I called "Rodeo
Gal" after her sheer
bounce, readiness to
jump onto anything,
ability to get up off




harking back to ro-
deo riding in her
younger years.
Her notes to me typi-
cally open with some
version of "Monster
Girl" or "Your mas-
sive snakeheaded-
Ann Scales c. 1955, copyright C Ann C. Scales Trust,
used with permission ess" and sign off"RG. ' 3  The mon-
strous honor of the Medusa moniker, from its conventional meanings to
Ann's own gloss, is laid out in her Disappearing Medusa:
By turning men to stone, she prevented "the male gaze," thus deny-
ing the possibility that women could be defined by men. ... Her
snakes represent unintimidatable self-possession. She had to be killed
because, by her very existence, she could expose the contingency of
the Law of the Fathers .... Her destruction required female complici-
27. Scales, supra note 26, at 14-15.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Scales, supra note 18, at 95.
30. See, e.g., E-mail from Ann Scales to author (Oct. 7, 2011, 3:42 PM) (on file with author)
("Here's hoping for a very snakeheaded birthday."); E-mail from Ann Scales to author (Nov. 15,
2009, 2:58 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Ann Scales to author (July 3, 2006, 1:09 PM) (on
file with author); E-mail from Ann Scales to author (Mar. 27, 2006, 6:42 PM) (on file with author).
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ty, which was amply rewarded.... Medusa symbolizes female poten-
tial . . . the unvarnished, undomesticated-and incomplete-
counternarrative to patriarchy ... the possibility of a transformatively
different consciousness.
31
It does give a person quite a lot to live up to, as well as reminds you to
get stuff done before they chop your head off.
We both identified, in the penetrating layered phrase of Andrea
Dworkin (who also died way too soon), as "a feminist, not the fun
kind."
32
You make me scream with laughter when you do your "feminist,
not the fun kind." The best part, of course, is how much fun you are.
How seriousness about changing the world is the last frontier of fun.
That's why our hearts ache for Andrea. She was so much fucking
fun.
33
With Ann you never had to ask if we were having fun yet.
Ann was warm-heartedly generous to colleagues, especially to me.
She deeply got what I say, ate it more than read it, went forward with it
incorporated, made her own, taken fully on board in her own way. The
analysis of sex inequality as biologically based in her earliest feminist
jurisprudence34 disappeared from her work after reading mine, a process
she chronicled.35 One precedent she established, that failure to cover
abortions under Medicaid is sex discrimination under New Mexico's
Equal Rights Amendment,36 was my theory and her practice. Ann also
correctly credited it to the judge: "Pam did good that day, didn't she. 37
Her warm celebration of my work was her last to appear in print during
38her lifetime.
Ann was sisterly most of all. Rereading years of correspondence
shows her giving you back to yourself like a well-written play. A few
years ago, I told her how much I had adored climbing up on Annapur-
31. Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 35 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
32. ANDREA DWORKIN, ICE AND FIRE: A NOVEL 110 (1st Am. ed., Weidenfeld & Nicolson
1987) (1986) (placing phrase in the mouth of a fictional character); see E-mail from Ann Scales to
author (July 3, 2006, 2:56 PM) (using Dworkin's phrase) (on file with author); E-mail from Cath-
arine MacKinnon to Ann Scales (July 3, 2006, 2:30 PM) (on file with author).
33. E-mail from Ann Scales to author (July 3, 2006, 2:56 PM) (on file with author).
34. Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 425 (1981) ("[The]
historical subjection of women is based upon biological differences between the sexes .... ").
35. See SCALES, supra note 3, at 84 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)) (noting that reading Sexual Harassment of Working
Women led her to think about equality in social terms).
36. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998).
37. Telephone Conversation with Ann Scales (Sept. 2007) (referring to Judge Pamela B.
Minzner in a discussion shortly after the judge's death).
38. See Ann Scales, The WorldAs She Found It, 46 TULSA L. REV. 7, 7 (2010).
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na.39 Me: "Annapurna is my kind of gal-elegant, eloquent, edgy.4 °
Ann: "My sense of it is that Annapurna was waiting to meet you."'
'4
Multi-regional, raised largely in the Southeast, educated in the
Northeast, Ann was a passionate Westerner with a special love for New
Mexico. Driving back from North Carolina after helping Margot, her
close friend of thirty-five years, fight (and later die) of cancer, Ann was
hit with serious health issues of her own and was barely able to drive. On
she forged as ever with grit, no whining, and much delectation.42 "I am
beside myself with glee: tomorrow morning, I'll be swooping into Tu-
cumcari, ... then across the very high plain, then crossing the Sandia
Mountains into Albuquerque. Viva Nuevo Mexico! It has been a long
year and a half, girl.",43 "[M]y eminent future is full of green chile-
God's Perfect Food."" Ouray, Colorado, she wrote, "may be the most
beautiful place in the world."' 5
She did not leave us adrift in moments like today either. "Ritual,"
Ann wrote,
can be an opening to the great forces in life .... We need to reclaim
ritual .... There has to be a way for us to say to ourselves and our
students and our clients, it is okay for us to be alive, we belong here,
this land is our land .... Here we are today, talking about all the
things we are talking about: sharing hope, passion, communion, a
new kind of ritual. It's a miracle.
46
She was that miracle. And now, as we open to the great forces in
life, she won't be telling us any of this even one more time.47
Hoping she wouldn't feel it too precious, I find myself thinking of
Ann as a butterfly: volatile, beautiful, fragile but strong (who knew how
strong), creatively distractible, energetically flying off after the next
flower or the next long lonely migration in the company of thousands. As
the butterfly of chaos theory, whose wing-beat in Brazil ultimately sets
39. E-mail from Catharine MacKinnon to Ann Scales (May 23, 2008, 3:24 PM) (on file with
author).
40. Telephone Conversation with Ann Scales (May 2008).
41. E-mail from Ann Scales to author (May 24, 2008, 2:57 PM) (on file with author).
42. See E-mail from Ann Scales to author (May 14, 2009, 7:32 PM) (on file with author); E-
mail from Catharine MacKinnon to Ann Scales (May 12, 2009, 11:40 PM) (on file with author); E-
mail from Ann Scales to author (May 12, 2009, 11:27 AM) (on file with author); E-mail from Ann
Scales to author (July 3, 2006, 2:56 PM) (on file with author).
43. E-mail from Ann Scales to author (May 14, 2009, 7:32 PM) (on file with author).
44. E-mail from Ann Scales to author (April 24, 2009, 11:49 AM) (on file with author).
45. E-mail from Ann Scales to author (July 10, 2009, 4:02 PM) (on file with author).
46. Scales, supra note 5, at 726.
47. This passage channels Ann. See SCALES, supra note 3, at 7 ("Ordinarily I resist the re-
quirement that every feminist on every occasion has to explain feminism again. I'm always tempted
to say, 'I'm only going to tell you this one more time.' But that is what I will do, shortly.").
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off that tornado in Texas.4 8 And now, as some peoples native to this landbelieve, as a messenger between this world and the next .
It's all there in her immortal gloss on "shit happens," which, accord-
ing to her, "is about embracing the mystery and the paradox that make
life worth living... acknowledg[ing] that we did not make this beautiful
world, can never understand it completely, and do not have the authority
to destroy it." 50 It is all there in her kiss-off to mortality in an email from
North Carolina: "[W]hen I was here ... for [Margot's] double mastec-
tomy, . . . her last words going into surgery were (stage direction-
LOUDLY): THEY'VE BEEN GREAT TITS, BUT IT'S TIME TO SAY
GOODBYE. That is the level on which we are interacting: life is really
THIS short. Let's live it."51
As we move along down our trail that she made her trail, reclaiming
our rituals, struggling beyond our stuckness, becoming one with our
speckness, Annie's spirit swooping about the Sandia gorged on green
chiles, how about we fly Rodeo Gal's flag and "[d]o everybody a favor,
raise some hell today. 52
48. See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 11-31 (2008). The con-
cept of the butterfly effect originated with Edward Lorenz. Id. at 329 (citing Edward N. Lorenz,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science: Pre-
dictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas? (Dec. 29,
1979)).
49. GENE KRITSKY & RON CHERRY, INSECT MYTHOLOGY 115 (2000) (discussing the image-
ry of moths and butterflies in Blackfoot, Hopi, and Goajiro culture).
50. Scales, supra note 18, at 116-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Email from Ann Scales to author (July 3, 2006, 2:56 PM) (on file with author).
52. Scales, supra note 4, at 163.
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ABSTRACT
In her aspirations for the law, in the methods by which she exhorted
readers to engender change, in her unique, transgressive, often outra-
geous voice, Ann Scales was the consummate "outsider." But she also
understood the importance of engaging those who could make change
possible. Thus Ann not only spoke truth to power, but also knew how to
communicate it in registers that legal decision makers could at least
sometimes apprehend. This Essay explores the work of Ann Scales in
both "outsider" and "insider" modes, and examines the ways her teach-
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INTRODUCTION
It is a bittersweet task to take stock of the wonderful, challenging
work of Ann Scales. It is hard not to feel sadness and anger about he
occasion of these reflections; someone who did the world as much good
as Ann did should have had 75, 80, 100 years in which to do her work.
But I have been energized by the opportunity this Symposium has given
me to return to some of this extraordinary work, and think about what it
means for all of us, and for the feminist and queer advocacy-and other
forms of contending for equality-that we will continue to do.
This task of figuring out "what the work means" is a little more
challenging with Ann than with some other feminist theorists because
there are different facets, orientations, and tones to her work. I will focus
t Herma Hill Kay Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
in this Essay on one tension that I have always found fascinating: Ann is
sometimes the consummate "outsider"rain the words of this Symposium,
"Raising Hell and Having Fun"-finding all kinds of interesting ways to
exhort her fellow travelers to critical perspectives and transgressive be-
havior. But this is not the only Ann Scales I find in the work I have re-
read over the past few months. Later in her career, though not exclusive-
ly there, Ann seemed to move from happy warrior to skillful conciliator,
trying to explain to legal actors why they needed feminist thought, or
why it was not as scary, or as alien to their familiar concerns and practic-
es, as they imagined. This was a more carefully controlled presentation,
but it was no less committed and no less empathetic. Ann understood that
it was hard for judges to move out of what she called their places of
"stuckness" and she wanted to share with them resources-in many cas-
es, feminist theoretical resources-that would permit them to do it. In
this mode, she seems more like the early Ruth Bader Ginsburg (to whose
modest, stealth innovations she would sometimes respond with sisterly
frustration) than Catharine MacKinnon (with whom she so strongly iden-
tified in her work). So was Ann Scales a joyful, nonconforming outsider
or a pragmatic insider? The answer, of course, is both-in a challenging,
ultimately complementary, combination. In my comments, I hope to
demonstrate how these parts of Ann's work fit together and what their
juxtaposition reveals.
My effort to fit these pieces together will highlight four aspects of
Ann's work: her affective or emotional range, her pragmatism, her view
of law, and her view of human agency. In developing these ideas I will
focus on specific examples of Ann's work, particularly pieces that strike
me as being in one vein or another. My hope is to "show" as much as I
"tell" because Ann was a wonderfully vivid writer; sometimes just hear-
ing her language makes things clearer than I could ever make them by
paraphrasing.
I. ANN SCALES AS IRREVERENT OUTSIDER
I will begin with a few of the works that capture Ann in her outsider
mode-her sometimes outrageous, persistently nonconforming angle of
vision on the legal world around her. Two of these works focus on legal
education and one looks at another of her favorite substantive topics,
militarism and jurisprudential method. An Absolutely, Positively True
Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing, one of Ann's earliest works, de-
scribes a fabulous course that she co-taught to introduce first-year stu-
dents to law.' The course was full of history, sociology, and philosophy,
and it confronted students with the most emotionally charged examples
possible (from pornography to nuclear holocaust). But much of the arti-
1. Karl Johnson & Ann Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We
Sing, 16 N.M. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986).
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cle focuses on the way Ann and her colleague Karl Johnson began the
course. First they read a quote by Woody Guthrie:
I hate a song that makes you think that you're not any good. I hate a
song that makes you think that you are just born to lose. Bound to
lose. No good to nobody. No good for nothing.... Songs that run
you down or songs that poke fun at you on account of your bad luck
or your hard traveling. I am out to fight those kinds of songs to my
very last breath of air and my last drop of blood. I am out to sing
songs that will prove to you that this is your world and that if it has
hit you pretty hard and knocked you for a dozen loops, no matter how
hard it's run you down and rolled over you,... I am out to sing the
songs that make you take pride in yourself and in your work.
2
Then they led students in a rousing version of Guthrie's This Land
is Your Land. The "seven reasons" of the title explain why it is entirely
fitting to begin students' legal education with a song. These reasons are
riveting because they confront just about everything law schools conven-
tionally communicate to students about their legal education. Consider
number one: "[W]hen you're down, it's hard to sing and even harder to
learn," where she is telling us that legal education works better when it
makes students feel good about themselves rather than confused, inade-
quate, or clueless.3 Or number four: "[Y]ou could think about songs, but
it's much better to sing them."4 Here she celebrates the fact that Woody
Guthrie does not "'think[]' like a traveler," he "roam[s] and ramble[s]"
and follows his footsteps, and "[b]y the end of his journey, he knows
more about the territory than any rational explanation of it could have
told him."5 In case readers have any doubt that Ann was advocating non-
linearity and departures from purely rational forms of cognition in law
school, she adds that logic presses us toward dichotomies and critiquing
logic and its dichotomies gains us only partial release: "[T]o go further,
we must break the rules of logic. We must put ourselves at risk. We must
dare, we must dream, we must act. We must sing.",6 And there are num-
bers five and seven: "[W]hy can't law celebrate our creativity the way
singing can?"' and "[Y]ou don't have to sing someone else's songs; you
can make up your own."8 These reasons convey the unlikely message
that you do not have to empty yourself out to be the blank and neutral
receptacle of the law-your creativity and your perspective have value as
you strive to learn the law and give it meaning.
2. Id. at 434.
3. Id. at 437-39.
4. Id. at 446.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 448.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 453.
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But because all students cannot start their education with Woody
Guthrie, Ann wrote Surviving Legal De-Education, a guide for students
who have to manage law schools as they are conventionally structured.9
A key problem with this kind of education, according to Ann, is that it is
premised on one kind of emotional experience: that of the autonomous
individualist, whose occasional urges toward community or altruism can
be easily satisfied.10 Law schools then call this emotional experience
"objectivity" and make it the focus of assigned readings and classroom
discussions." If this account tracks your experience, you are likely to
feel ratified and no more than typically uncomfortable in law school.
12
As Ann explained:
To that person, the [law school] story says, "You are not alone and
your existential doubts are exactly the ones we are all working on.
We can't actually have communitarian presumptions, of course, but
we can have lots of exceptions to individualistic rules, so long as they
are carefully managed. Just help us consolidate these limits. Good
thing you're here to help!"'
13
If this account of human experience does not align with your life or
inclinations, however, you must "divorce those experiences from the
study of the story, and relegate feelings to a separate realm, perhaps nev-
er to be heard from again."'4 Performing this distancing operation on a
daily basis can make you feel like you have "acid slowly dripping on
[your] soul[]."' 15 This disparate experience is particularly painful, as Ann
observed, because the latter group tends to be composed of women and
people of color. 16
But Ann was not prepared to surrender to this grim reality: her goal
is to create "happy outsiders" in law school. This is no small undertak-
ing, and the article aims to give law students some direction for achiev-
ing it. Framed as a set of lively imperatives, the ideas she proposed tell
us something about how Ann herself approached an imperfect law school
world. They are to be applied, Ann proposed, in a "multilithic" way-
"sort of randomly, when you feel like it. The combined effect, one hopes,
will be like raindrops wearing away a stone."'17 Some of these proposals
involve important elements of jurisprudential critique. "Question authori-
9. Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REv. 139
(1990) [hereinafter Surviving Legal De-Education].
10. Id. at 142-43.
11. Id.
12. Ann notes that members of this group "are miserable, but in a homey way. They are being
exhausted but well-nourished while in training for The Race." Id. at 142.
13. Id. at 143.
14. Id. at 142.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id at 147.
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ty, ' I Ann instructed; in particular, question meta-standards for evaluat-
ing legal rules (such as "predictability") that do not tell you anything
about the ultimate ends of the law.19 For Ann, as for her jurisprudential
hero Lon Fuller, meta-standards and garden variety legal rules must be
informed by the larger goals toward which legal practices are directed.2°
Assertions of authority that neglect or disavow the broader social goals
that animate law should be viewed with skepticism. Other imperatives
focus on language: for example, "Question sports metaphors."2' Sports
metaphors do not simply authorize the experience of men: they may em-
phasize dimensions of rule-based game playing that are alien even to
women who played sports, and may starkly understate the stakes of legal
decision making.22 A better answer, Ann argued, is mothering metaphors,
which capture more accurately the perpetually legitimating, justificatory
task of the judge:
Think about it: when you tell a child to do something, when you is-
sue what you hope to be an authoritative command, the child's re-
sponse very often is to ask why. .. . Successful mothering does not
depend on making references to some higher authority. Rather, it de-
pends upon judgment and justification (We might even call it "rea-
soned elaboration"). It depends on a willingness to explain the rule in
some cases, and a willingness to suspend the rule when the situation
indicates it ... Sports are pre-arranged contests of strength, with very
little flexibility in the rules. Mothering is a constant process of nego-
tiation and judgment. It is a dialectic of persuasion. Like the authority
of law, the mother's authority must be earned every day.
23
Still other suggestions-some of my favorites-are tactical. "Use
the power you have. You are the consumers of legal education today and
the alumnae of tomorrow."24 More colloquially, this means "do every-
body a favor, raise some hell today"25: dog the path of the law school
dean, mount letter-writing campaigns, organize boycotts. And finally,
"Take care of yourselves and each other and have real fun." 26 This soli-
daristic note makes surviving-and potentially transforming-law school
a collaborative, even celebratory, project.27
18. Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 148-49.
20. "We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal
concepts without the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what end is this
activity directed?" Id. at 148 (quoting L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936)).
21. Id. at 149-52.
22. Id. at 150-51.
23. Id. at 152.
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 163.
26. Id.
27. In this article, as in the others discussed in this section, Ann relished her role as an outsid-
er, noting:
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The final article in the outsider category is a different kind of arti-
cle. In Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as
Oxymoron?, Ann was concerned with the commanding, corrosive force
of militarism on U.S. governance and society.28 The article offers a chal-
lenging critique of militarism and law's relation to it, and a novel discus-
sion of how feminists might resist it, from inside and outside legal insti-
tutions. Ann's highly original critique of militarism steps deftly beyond
the most familiar feminist responses to the military: a claim to access that
foregoes systematic institutional critique,29  and a critical pacifism
grounded in women's sometimes essentialized tendency toward nurtur-
ance.30 Ann's focus was not on the military per se, but on the logic of
militarism. She argued that it is driven by the same engines of dehumani-
zation that fuel the oppression of women; in fact, the two operate as mu-
tually reinforcing phenomena.31 Moreover, the law defends militarism by
insisting on a series of dichotomies that similarly serve to undergird
women's oppression: the subjective, personal objections of the protesters
versus the objective security interests of the nation; the lay judgments of
citizens versus the opinions of military experts; the unruly behavior of
the protesters versus the careful deference of the judicial posture.32 Fem-
inists are well situated to teach us how to take responsibility for milita-
rism, and how to make whole the splits or dichotomies that protect it.
The primary exemplars of such responsibility, in Ann's view, are
the fearless civil disobedients of the Greenham Common Women's
Peace Encampment-a group of extraordinary women who camped out
for years to protest Britain's installation of American nuclear missiles.33
These women barricaded the base where the missiles were installed,
danced on the siloes, suffered thousands of efforts at legal eviction and
arrests for various forms of direct action, and served prison time for their
committed work.34 Some of them came to the United States and sued
President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger for violations of
I would not wish to be anything other than An Other at this moment.... Women have
reached a critical mass in law school. Outsiders in coalition are the majority. There is
emotional and intellectual space for us to begin. If you don't believe it, just consider that
you are reading this in a law review.
Id.
28. Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymo-
ron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989) [hereinafter Militarism, Male Dominance and Law].
29. This kind of feminist position would seem to be exemplified in Justice Ginsburg's opinion
for the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550-51 (1996).
30. See, e.g., SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 17
(1989). A particularly sophisticated example of this kind of feminist argument, Ruddick's position
avoided the essentialism that sometimes characterizes efforts to link women, mothering, and paci-
fism, because her argument is that pacifism arises from the habits of mind that are cultivated through
the work of nurturance, particularly of young children, rather than from women's nature. Id.
31. Militarism, Male Dominance and Law, supra note 28, at 40-46.
32. Id. at 46-49.
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. Id. at 28.
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international and constitutional law, in the placement of the missiles.3 5 In
this article Ann celebrated their efforts as a "successful story of contem-
porary feminist history-making," which made "cruise missile madness a
matter of public debate.36 She also interrogated the timid, dichotomous
reasoning through which American courts rejected their claims, invoking
the political question doctrine to justify reliance on military expertise and
delegitimate both public questioning and judicial supervision. She con-
cluded by sketching a more responsible judicial stance, which engages
rather than reflexively defers to militarism. "It is my duty to decide this
case," Ann's hypothetical, responsible judge announces:
I can do so with as much confidence in this process as I have in the
many other cases where fact-finding is very difficult. I'm sworn to
uphold my oath of office; I must expect hat the President will uphold
his. If the executive branch is acting illegally, I must order it to de-
sist. Such a confrontation will not be a constitutional crisis; that crisis
results when the [C]onstitution is routinely ignored and when that ac-
tion is ratified by judicial silence. If the executive ignores my deci-
sion, then that will become a real political question. The political
branches and the people will have to decide.
37
While this article is sober and urgent, rather than transgressive and
energetic, it is equally in the outsider mode. It offers a serious, substan-
tive critique that moves Ann's dominance feminist vision into a new
institutional context.38 It challenges courts for their evasions, and endors-
es a group of innovative, radical activists as the models of legal respon-
sibility. It even ends with a song: "I cast my lot with those women, their
methods and their goals, and send them this love song," Ann wrote, quot-
ing a poem from Adrienne Rich.39 I quickly discovered the dissident
character of Ann's position when, in a fit of enthusiasm about this Essay,
35. Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (dismissing constitutional claims
as political questions).
36. Militarism, Male Dominance and Law, supra note 28, at 27.
37. Id. at 72.
38. The critique of militarism was new for dominance feminism. Catharine MacKinnon has
since taken on the context of armed conflict by looking at rape as an instrument of war or genocide.
See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide, in ARE
WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 160, 161-62 (2006); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, in ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 180, 187-88. But to my knowledge Ann's is the first and most system-
atic critique of militarism as a mindset, frame, or practice, to be undertaken from a dominance femi-
nist perspective.
39. The lines quoted are:
Your small hands, precisely equal to my own- / only the thumb is larger, longer-in
these hands / I could trust the world, or in many hands like these, / handling power-tools
or steering-wheel / or touching a human face.... / such hands might carry out an una-
voidable violence / with such restraint, with such a grasp / of the range and limits of vio-
lence / that violence ever after would be obsolete.
Militarism, Male Dominance and Law, supra note 28, at 73 (quoting ADRIENNE RICH, Twenty-one
Love Poems, No. VI, in THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE: POEMS 1974-77, at 27-28 (1978)).
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I rushed a professional responsibility colleague in the copy room, de-
manding to know his view of lawyers engaging in or endorsing civil dis-
obedience. His chilly perplexity made clear the distance of this potential-
ly transformative piece from the legal mainstream.
There is a lot on display in these articles that demonstrates why Ann
was such an effective instigator of feminist hell-raising. In each of these
pieces, we see a deep critique of our society's subjection of women and
other "outsider" groups, and an equally deep critique of law's complicity,
as reflected in doctrine, objectivist epistemology, dichotomizing, and
deference to existing institutions. There is a vigorous endorsement of
forms of engagement that involve not only thought but also direct action,
not only linearity but also roaming and rambling, not only reasoned ar-
gumentation but also exhortation, poetry, and song.
These articles also demonstrate an emotional range that made Ann
quite unique as a feminist, and even more unique as a dominance femi-
nist. Her work is characterized by joy-in creativity, in solidarity, and in
that moment when we make demands that could make the law and the
world better. It is also characterized by love, a very rare emotion in law
and legal scholarship. She does not simply model it-she specifically
talks about it. "Taking a stand and saying what you really see is a tough
assignment," she said in Surviving Legal De-Education.40 "When anyone
who is committed to liberation does that, love her for it. ' 4' And the
speaker's view of liberation does not have to be the same as Ann's view
for that love to be forthcoming. Ann thought differences of opinion
among allies were the stuff of lively, hard-fought discussions; not the
basis for longstanding divisions. "If we can't agree, or I'm being obsti-
nate, go ahead and call me a bitch," she famously stated, "then give me a
hug and let's make plans to collaborate in the future.' '42 Love for women
whose plight she takes as central, for women and men who try to say
something honest and revealing in face of power, for human possibility
and for what law might be are all present in Ann's work. Ann could also
be fierce, as her work on militarism illustrates best. But her tone in this
work is unusual as well: Ann does not so much seem angry-though
anger would clearly be justified-as she seems serious, aggrieved, and
even disappointed. The law is falling disastrously short, and she knows it
could be doing better. This recognition points to a final affective charac-
teristic which marks Ann's work. There is a kind of courage-a bold
civic commitment-that infuses her scholarship: a quality she sees not as
idiosyncratic but as a stance we should all aspire to. This boldness arises
partly from an understanding that unjust power perpetuates itself when
teachers, students, and citizens fail to confront it. And it arises partly
40. Surviving Legal De-Education, supra note 9, at 16 1.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 162.
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from a belief that each of us has more resources to bring to the confronta-
tion than we may suspect, and we owe it to each other-and to our
shared communities-to use what we have to call institutions to account.
Ann worried about people who let themselves off too easily-be it stu-
dents who sought to avoid the hard work of "legal de-education" or judg-
es who wanted to anesthetize themselves to the forward march of the
military-industrial complex. But Ann worried in a way that was empath-
ic, moral but not moralizing: not "I'm here, what the hell is wrong with
you?" but "you can do this too, let's do it together!" Her sense of em-
powered commitment was solidaristic and, for many of us, contagious.
II. ANN SCALES AS PRAGMATIC INSIDER
I turn now to two works in which Ann functioned more as an insid-
er. The works are linked together in Ann's personal story. In the early
2000s, she was invited to speak about law to a group of Tenth Circuit
judges-the talk became her article Law and Feminism: Together in
Struggle.43 In that talk, she offered an eminently peaceable narrative of
feminist/judicial convergence in a case that recognized that sexual har-
assment could reflect racial as well as gender subordination,44 and she
called for future collaboration between judges and feminist legal schol-
ars. This approach seemed carefully calibrated to win the assent of her
audience, even if it was a little well-behaved by what I tend to think of as
Ann's usual standards. But this was not the way it turned out; she later
noted that with the exception of Judge Henry, who had invited her, her
audience found her talk to be the special pleading of "just another whiny
interest group who wanted its subjective preferences enshrined in law. 45
Instead of being put off by this unexpected chasm, Ann set out to bridge
it. She wanted to help readers understand the legal assumptions that led
judges to classify her as the representative of a whiny, subjectively-
inclined interest group. At the same time, following the suggestion of her
friend Judge Henry, she sought to offer judges "a dejargonized account
of why legal theory, and feminist legal theory in particular, should matter
to them."46
When you venture into Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering, and
Legal Theory, you know you are in a different kind of Ann Scales work.
There is no talk here about raising hell, or acid dripping on souls-
although there is a lively introduction in which she raises such questions
as "Does she have to use the t-word?" (for theory) and the "f-word?" (for
43. Ann Scales, Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291, 291 n.al
(2003).
44. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1408 (10th Cir. 1987); see id. at 294-96.
45. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 3 (2006)
[hereinafter LEGAL FEMINISM].
46. Id. at 4.
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feminism).47 The book is moderate in tone, non-colloquial in style, and
expansively learned. Ann's broad knowledge of philosophy is on offer
here, as is her intimate knowledge of bodies of law, such as tort. Ann
also builds the case for the relevance of feminist legal theory in a distinc-
tive, non-inflammatory way; she does not cut to the chase of women's
disadvantage. Rather, she begins from a broader, jurisprudential perspec-
tive. She focuses in on some of the ongoing gaps or failings of the legal
system-problems that might be experienced by judges or other main-
stream legal actors, as well as by feminists. For example, judges and
lawyers find it hard to arrive at a shared definition of the rule of law be-
cause law lacks an understanding of its ultimate goals-what Lon Fuller
called the end to which "this activity [is] directed.'48 Law also suffers
from examples of what Ann calls "unexamined certainty"49-it frames
dominant or preferred positions as "objective" and everything else as
"subjective,' '5 ° or it confuses "epistemology" with "ontology" when it
comes to assessing the adequacy of evidence.51 In each of these cases,
law has gravitated, to its detriment, toward an unreflective resolution; her
argument is that legal theory could inform a fuller examination and better
answers.
The second half of the book fleshes out feminist legal theory. Legal
feminism begins, Ann declared, "with the principle that objective reality
is a myth."52 This statement was probably a bit jarring for her judicial
readers, but Ann elaborated it with nuance and moderation. Myths are
not necessarily without value, Ann noted; what this means is that we
need "modesty in matters of knowledge .... 'Knowledge' is always open
to revision."53 Introducing feminism in this way meets judges where they
live; starting not with the situation of women, but with the objectivist
assumptions (instilled in lawyers from the first days of law school) that
make responding to women's inequality difficult. Moreover, Ann frames
the critique of objectivism in terms of doubts about what we can know
that judges have surely experienced (and can therefore relate to). In the
chapters that comprise the rest of the book, she offered an account of
feminist legal theory that is indeed dejargonized, in part by boiling it
down to pithy, accessible principles. These principles are similar in sub-
47. Id. at 4-10. This introduction-I might add-is the first thing I give my undergraduate
students when I teach them Feminist Jurisprudence-so it serves as a path into the field for college
students, as well as for judges.
48. Id. at 30 (quoting Fuller & Perdue, supra note 20, at 52).
49. Id. at 34. Ann describes unexamined certainty, in this case among members of the judici-
ary, as "an invaluable attribute of privilege." Id.
50. Id. at 33 (offering the example of Justice Scalia's critique of the majority's position in
Atkins v. Virginia, in which he objected that "[s]eldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obvi-
ously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members," 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
51. Id. at 51-62.
52. Id. at 86.
53. Id. at 87.
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stance to (if more calibrated in presentation than) the cheerful impera-
tives that punctuate her more transgressive works: "Challenge false ne-
cessities"'54 (such as long-standing dichotomies that may be blurrier or
more historically contingent than we think); "Deconstruct the status quo
from the level of knowledge";55 or "Find the best answer for now," rec-,, - - •,,56
ognizing that legal approaches are always "provisional.
When I finished this book I was impressed: Ann had done precisely
what she aspired to do. She distilled feminism down to some plausible,
accessible principles, and explained how it applied to certain problems
that must have nagged at most judges at some point in their careers. But
it also struck me that she had gone to a great deal of trouble to begin by
describing shortcomings of law with which judges might more readily
agree; to define feminism in terms of broad goals and methodological
characteristics so that it overlaps more evidently with judges' concerns;
to keep the tone measured and reassuring-quite different from Ann's
more characteristic, searing, cut-to-the-chase critiques. At some level, I
marveled that Ann found it worth the effort to persuade the kind of judg-
es who had been so cool and dismissive toward her earlier, conciliatory
approach. And while I deeply admired the erudition and thoughtful pro-
gression of the argument, I found myself missing her funny, energetic,
sometimes outrageous incitements. But he more I thought about Ann's
pragmatic bridge-building efforts, the more I thought there was some-
thing worth pondering here. We can learn some valuable things about
who Ann was, and what was distinctive about her feminist legal theory,
by trying to understand why it was important to her to write works of this
kind-perhaps I should say, works of both of these kinds.
III. THE OUTSIDER WITHIN: RECONCILING THE STRANDS OF
SCHOLARSHIP
Ann's capacity to write in two divergent styles and tones, highlight-
ing different aspects of the feminist legal project, says something about
the woman herself. Ann was a Whitman-esque character who contained
multitudes57: it is not everyone, after all, who can be a lawyer and a ro-
58deo rider. But she was also a pragmatist who believed in innovation,
experimentation, and having all hands on deck. Ann wanted women,
men, people of color, whites, students, and faculty to join her in making
law accountable to projects of inclusion and justice. As one of the few
law faculty who actually took time away from academia to work as a
54. Id. at 104-05.
55. Id at 107-09.
56. Id. at 111-12.
57. WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself in LEAVES OF GRASS 49, 152 (2013). ("Do I contradict
myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)").
58. Jean Strout, "I'm Only Gonna Tell You This One More Time: " Lessons from Ann Scales,
HARV. J.L. & GENDER (July 28, 2012), http://harvardjlg.com/2012/07/im-only-gonna-tell-you-this-
one-more-time-lessons-from-ann-scales/.
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lawyer, she also knew how much difference it could make to have judges
on board. So it is no surprise, given these pragmatist commitments, that
she would approach multiple groups in different contexts and appeal to
them differently.
But this tension-or, more accurately, this variety-in her work al-
so speaks to the complexity of her view of the law. Law is not some
foundational, univocal edifice. It reflects the way that a hierarchized but
heterogeneous group of actors have spoken to each other and to the pub-
lic over time. It clearly bears the marks of those who have enjoyed the
most power to shape it; but it is not monolithic. There have been mo-
ments of sanity and perspectives of distinctive legal actors to which we
can also appeal. Some of its practices can-even now-have a feminist
valence: think, for example, of Ann's discussion of the analogy between
law and mothering.59 Though, as a legal culture, we may currently be
"stuck," there is nothing necessary about the current state of the law. The
law, like all of us, as Ann was wont to say, is subject to forces of evolu-
tion.60 And this is an interesting choice of term: not revolution or even
transformation, but evolution. The law can change-perhaps will
change-because it bears within itself some of the seeds of that revision
(strands that overlap, in the Wittgensteinian metaphor Ann favored,6'
with the strands of feminism). This potential invites legal actors to think
about how it might be remade differently. It is not-as, for example, in
MacKinnon's work 62-a vision of before and after brought about by the
systematic introduction of a feminist perspective. In Ann's vision, law is
always already amenable to revision, by large steps and small. Given this
amenability, there is no excuse not to jump in immediately and do what
you can.
Finally, Ann's willingness to write in two registers also speaks to
her view of the human subject. Women may be beset, but they always
retain the possibility of agency. In what is probably the most cheerful
sentence that ever employed these words, Ann wrote "The good news
about hegemony is 'counter-hegemony.'63 Women and other outsiders
are, in Ann's view, "guerilla warriors of life in a system of white male
dominance-taking little victories where they can, operating covertly,
59. See supra text accompanying note 23 (discussing Surviving Legal De-Education).
60. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 77.
61. See, e.g., Surviving Legal De-Education, supra note 9, at 160 (quoting LUDWIG
WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1972))
("And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.").
62. This conception of achieving transformation by using a feminist perspective on the subor-
dinating practice in question to restructure legal doctrine is evident in many facets of MacKinnon's
work, most notably in sexual harassment and pornography. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 217 (1979);
ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY
FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 17 18 (1988).
63. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 135.
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without any apparent organization, on the edges and in a thousand unex-
pected ways. '64 This is a striking, enlivening view of women's agency
and how it can be exercised. Ann was not in the business of lifting the
flag and demanding that people fall in behind it; she was not wary of
women's agency, for fear it might be exercised in ways that did not fit
with her vision. She seemed to be delighted by resistance of all kinds-
who knows, in the end, what strategy might work best? Her role was to
provide a possible endpoint, some markers along the way, and the cheer-
ing, cajoling, inspiring forms of solidarity that made transitions from
stuckness to not-so-stuckness possible.
With the agency of judges, there are some differences in her ap-
proach; they are the beneficiaries and defenders of privilege rather than
those who stand to lose most under current arrangements. But her empa-
thy-and her uncanny ability to see the human at the same time as the
hierarchy-enabled Ann to see that judges may be more similar to out-
siders than we think. They too may feel overwhelmed by the powers
arrayed against them. One of the funniest-and most telling-moments
in Ann's work on militarism was her trip inside the head of a judge de-
ferring to military expertise. When a judge ruling on a challenge to mili-
tarism says, this question "is 'textually committed to another branch" or
"there are no 'judicially . . . manageable standards,"' Ann told us, he
actually meant, "This is freaking me out. There is so much information
flying around and somebody is obviously lying. But World War III can't
really happen, can it? I need to go to chambers and take a Valium. 65
Judges may be defenders of the status quo, but they are prone to elabo-
rate schemes of self-anesthetization, just like the rest of us. However,
relying on judges is not always a "triumph of hope over experience."
66
Judges are also capable, like Ann's judicial hero Harry Blackmun, of
struggling and muddling their way to ethical positions.67 Ann's role in
supporting such agency on the part of judges is subtler and less celebra-
tory than her approach to feminist law students-after all, this is a
somewhat more settled crowd. But she brings to judges who want to do
better the message that they are not alone; they can think about Fuller,
who always wanted to know the end to which the activity was directed,
68
and Holmes, who saw the life of the law in experience. Dipping a toe in
the waters of legal theory-and feminist legal theory in particular-is not
64. Surviving Legal De-Education, supra note 9, at 147.
65. Ann Scales & Laura Spitz, The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial Complex, I
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 541, 552 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
66. Catharine MacKinnon used this phrase to describe her habit of hoping for good decisions
from women judges on cases involving gender inequality. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 215, 220 (1987).
67. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 150.
68. Id. at 192 n.24 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (Little,
Brown, & Co. 1923) (1881)).
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so scary, and it is also important, because maybe legal reasoning is not
working quite as well as we tend to tell ourselves.
I will close by suggesting that Ann was not only capable of sustain-
ing this kind of heterogeneity in her approach; but that she was also ca-
pable of a riveting kind of synthesis, or integration, as in the dazzling
final chapter of Feminist Jurisprudence. In this chapter Ann challenges
readers to consider what she calls a "contemporary solidarity impera-
tive," recognizing that protecting the right to abortion is "the queerist
issue there is"' 69 and that we all need to be at the barricades. Highlighting
this issue is a fascinating choice, not only because of the surprising yet
compelling grounds for collaboration Ann finds here, but also because it
brings together the two strands of her work. In her outsider mode, she is
trying to mediate an ongoing tension between mainstream feminists (who
see "woman" as more fixed in what the term "woman" signifies) and
poststructuralists, recently exemplified by queer theorists (who are criti-
cal both of that fixity and of the increasingly state-identified repertoire of
feminist activists). Refraining and ameliorating disputes among feminists
was one of the things Ann saw as necessary to feminist solidarity.70 In
this chapter, she explains that abortion is both a paradigmatic women's
issue and an issue of bodily discipline, sexual normalization, and imposi-
tion of shame,71 which highlights the convergence of these feminist and
queer theorists and activists, and their respective bodies of work. But at
the same time as she is working on relations between feminist structural-
ists and poststructuralists,72 Ann, in her insider mode, had judges in her
sights. Abortion is an issue on which we cannot afford judicial abdica-
tion. It is also an important example because it permits her to spotlight
the career of Harry Blackmun-the Justice most strongly associated with
69. Id. at 147-49.
70. To take another example, her article, Disappearing Medusa, was a dexterous effort to
bridge a painful rift between Catharine MacKinnon and anti-essentialist feminists of color. Ann
Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 34,
37-41 (1997).
71. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 148-49.
72. Id at 145-47. Here Ann attempts a deliberately brokered entente, suggesting eighteen
"aspects of discussion that we could conditionally agree upon." Id at 145. These include interesting-
ly paired propositions such as:
10. "Gender" is "performative." Gender, in all its manifestations, is also a function of ex-
isting social power. In all the ways that reality bites, but to a degree of gruesomeness that
is impolite to acknowledge, gender hurts. 11. Suffering exists.... 13. It is a legal, politi-
cal, and ethical good thing to do whatever one can to reduce suffering, one's own and that
of all others.
Id. at 146. Or:
14. "Statism" is not the point.... Power exists in many shifting forms. It is not statism to
ask government to intervene on behalf of people who do not possess power on their own
in the world as now constituted.... [A]lthough we should continue debate about the na-
ture and limits of invocations of state power, it is naive to accuse feminists of stat-
ism.... 15. Access to government, however, is not automatically cool. Professor
Ruthann Robson has been right in ... consistently illustrating the "domesticating" effects




women's reproductive rights-who began as a skeptic of feminism and
traveled a bumpy, anguish-ridden path to become an ardent proponent of
women's equality. Blackmun, Ann noted, was
a man who was scared of various things at various times, but who
always eventually rose to the occasion and attempted to do the right
thing.... [H]is papers show a man paying close attention, grappling
with his own biases, and overcoming his own lawyerly reticence and
conservative ideology. By the end, as his opinions show, he under-
stood that abortion was an equality issue, and part of a larger vision
of human dignity.
73
That self-awareness, and refusal to abdicate responsibility for hard
decisions, even when they bring pain or controversy, was the commit-
ment Ann demanded and expected from members of the judiciary. Guid-
ing judges toward responsible decision making, as she subtly negotiated
a collaboration between structuralist and poststructuralist feminists, was
Ann Scales at her best.
IV. CODA: BACK TO THE FUTURE
Ann's insistence on resistant engagement, in a variety of modes and
contexts, and her aspirations to solidarity, whether between feminists and
judges or between women's rights and queer activists, are the hallmarks
of her distinctive, enlivening body of work. They are also reminders to
those of us who aim to continue her efforts, whether through activism or
scholarship. The year since Ann's death has been marked by important
developments in the very fields that elicited her passion, fields that de-
mand challenging, solidaristic response.
Some of these developments concern the military, and as Ann might
have added, the persistence of militarism. The repeal of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" in 2011 was followed by a recommendation by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to re-evaluate the restrictions on women's service in
combat.74 Yet if these changes mean unprecedented access for two
groups of "outsiders" to the military, they have left intact many of the
norms of the institution. Female service members must negotiate a world
where they may enter into combat, but are still subject to massive pres-
sures of sexualization and devaluation. An epidemic of sexual assaults in
the military has rendered women service members twice as likely as ci-
vilians to be sexually victimized, and the system of internal review and
courts martial has utterly failed to respond.75 Military authorities estimate
73. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 150.
74. Julian E. Barnes & Dion Nissenbaum, Combat Ban for Women to End, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
24, 2013, 10:49 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323539804578260123802564276.html.
75. Molly O'Toole, Military Sexual Assault Epidemic Continues to Claim Victims as Defense
Department Fails Females, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2012, 9:36 AM EDT),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/06/military-sexual-assault-defense-
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that only fourteen percent of assaults are reported, and only six percent
76
of those reports yield convictions by courts-martial. Moreover, changes
in the modes and settings of armed conflict that may have made the inte-
gration of outsiders more acceptable to the military mainstream are pos-
ing their own risks. Serving with women or gay men may seem less of a
daunting prospect when war is waged not in a foxhole or even a Humvee,
but by remote-controlled drones, which now threaten to infiltrate civilian
life, and enable soldiers, commanders, and citizens to distance them-
selves from the costs of warfare.77 Both these newer service members
and their heterosexual, male counterparts may also be supplemented, or
even replaced, by private contractors whose omnipresence underscores
the entrenchment of the military-industrial complex.7 8 Though access
may be broader-a serious step forward for those who aim to vindicate
their civic commitments or experience equal citizenship through military
service-the "megamachine," Ann might say, "rolls on."79 The damage
perpetrated by objectifying norms, and the continuing distance between
military decision making and public scrutiny, invites a collaborative ef-
fort by feminist and LGBT activists to interrogate the structure and direc-
tion of the institution into which we are now being accepted.
Other developments concern the domain of reproductive and inti-
mate choice. On the one hand, the parties to Ann's proposed "solidarity
initiative" might seem to be divided by recent developments. Access to
abortion and even birth control have become ever more contentious, as
the 2012 election gave rise to a "Republican war on women."80 At the
same time, gay marriage is approaching a high-water mark of ac-
ceptance,81 with leaders from President Obama to Republican Senator
department n_1834196.html. As a woman service member who suffered multiple sexual assaults in
Afghanistan explained: "Suicide bombers in pieces, [people] pulling dead American soldiers out of
Humvees.... [D]eath was something I had to deal with. I never, ever thought I was gonna have to
deal with my supporters being the ones that did the most damage." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, Addressing the Epidemic of Military Sexual
Assault, DEMOCRACY Now (May 9, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2013/5/9/addressingthe-epidemic of militarysexualassault.
76. O'Toole, supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., David Sirota, How Drones Deceive Us: The Advantage of Technologized War-
fare Is Also Its Most Worrying: The Perception of Decreased Risk to the Aggressor, SALON (May 9,
2013, 12:00 PM MST), http://www.salon.com/2013/05/09/how drones deceive us/ (describing how
drones provide distance from conflict, perceived risk reduction, and how the simplicity of drone
strikes remove critical deterrents to violence).
78. See Lauren Groth, Transforming Accountability: A Proposal for Reconsidering How
Human Rights Obligations Are Applied to Private Military Security Firms, 35 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 29, 38-42 (2012) (discussing the rise of private military contractors and the challenge
of imposing legal accountability).
79. LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note 45, at 97.
80. Frank Rich, Stag Party: The GOP 's Woman Problem Is that It Has a Serious Problem
with Women, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 25, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/frank-rich/gop-women-problem-
2012-4/.
81. See, e.g., Daniel Politi, New Poll Shows Huge Surge in Support for Marriage Equality,
SLATE (Mar. 18, 2013, 3:54 PM),




Robert Portman celebrating the formation of same-sex-led families.82 It
is a period during which, as Kenji Yoshino noted, students are more
comfortable coming out as gay or lesbian than admitting that they once
got an abortion.83 But if we recall that the bridge Ann sought to build in
the final chapter of Legal Feminism was between feminists and queer
activists,84 we may see the ground for more productive collaboration.
The forms of gay and lesbian identity that are most readily accepted, as
queer scholars and activists have observed, are those which most closely
approach the norm of the heterosexual nuclear family: sexuality is do-
mesticated within the confines of quasi-marital relationship and chil-
drearing.8 5 The advent of same-sex marriage may render those who prac-
tice serial monogamy, or live out their sexuality in sex clubs or public
spaces rather than in the confines of the marital bedroom, as vulnerable
as a woman who seeks an abortion or a sexually active college student
who objects to her Jesuit university's failure to subsidize birth control.86
All these expressions of sexual agency stand at great distance from the
norm of the "natural family" a regulative fiction which is making a
surprising comeback in some quarters87 -or its emerging homonormative
counterpart. This resurgent, normalizing sexual politics demands a spirit-
ed coalitional response, which can take Ann's "solidarity initiative" into
new territory.
And so the work continues. Formal equal opportunity-crucial
though it may be-will always come more easily than the more search-
82. Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, Taking Stand on
Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A]; Michael Falcone & Z. Byron Wolf, Repub-
lican Rob Portman Supports Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/republican-rob-portman-supports-gay-
marriage/story?id= 18736731.
83. Kenji Yoshino, "Lawrence as Ur-Text," Conference on Gender, Sexuality and Democratic
Citizenship, Cardozo Law School, Nov. 14, 2010.
84. For an illuminating discussion of the differences between gay/lesbian politics and queer
politics, see Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 89, 100 (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
85. This pattern has led Lisa Duggan and others to coin the term "homonormativity" to de-
scribe the pressure to conform to this newly acceptable version of a homosexual self-presentation.
Duggan notes, "[Homonormativity] is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative
assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a
demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity
and consumption." Lisa Duggan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism,
in MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED CULTURAL POLITICS 175, 179 (Russ
Castronovo & Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002); see also Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008) ("Resisting the normative and epistemic frame that values
nonmarital forms of life in direct proportion to their similarity to marriage," and embracing the goal
of"unseat[ing] marriage as the measure of all things").
86. See, e.g., Rush Limbaugh vs. Sandra Fluke: A Timeline, THE WEEK (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article.php?id=225214 (detailing sequence of events through which conservative
talk-show host Rush Limbaugh called Sandra Fluke, the Georgetown Law student who testified
before Congress about the need for subsidized birth control, a "slut").
87. For a discussion of the resurgence of the "natural family" in the discourse of the contem-
porary Right, see Kathryn Abrams, Disenchanting the Public/Private Distinction, in IMAGINING
NEW LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25, 25-26 (Austin Sarat,
Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds. 2012).
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ing normative and institutional reassessments that would give such op-
portunities more lasting impact. This is why Ann so often focused on
these latter challenges. They are challenges to be undertaken by the out-
siders now within: those who cannot only speak truth to power, but can
communicate it in registers that those in power can at least sometimes
apprehend. The often glacial character of the progress, the sense of tak-
ing two steps forward and one step back, should motivate rather than
disturb us-as they did Ann. "Doing this is a lifetime's work," she mem-
orably reminded us, "not doing it is moral idiocy."
88
88. Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 32 (1992).
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In this Essay, written as part of a symposium honoring the work of
Professor Ann Scales, Professor Katherine Franke explores how Profes-
sor Scales may have approached the cutting edge problem of same-sex
couples divorcing. Professor Scales's work evidenced a deep commit-
ment to the twin projects of recognizing structural gender disadvantage
suffered by women and the tyranny of gender stereotypes. This Essay
speculates that Professor Scales's feminist commitments would be unset-
tled by the application to divorcing same-sex couples of rules and norms
of divorce forged in the heterosexual context where gender inequality set
the parameters of justice. Indeed, Franke speculates that Scales would
share her concern about the potential for divorce law to heterosexualize
same-sex couples by slotting them into familiar social roles of husbands
and wives. The problem of gendering lesbian husbands and gay wives
ought to be a serious subject of feminist critique and is amenable to the
feminist analysis Professor Scales left us in her written work.
t Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Gender and
Sexuality Law, Columbia Law School. © 2013 by Katherine Franke. This Essay derived from the
keynote address I provided at the Symposium at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law in
honor of Professor Ann Scales and her work. I thank Nancy Ehrenreich for this kind invitation to
contribute to such an important tribute to Professor Scales's work. Thanks to Fred Hertz for many
conversations about the complexities of folding same-sex couples into the domain of civil marriage.
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Ann Scales left us too soon. As others have mentioned in this Sym-
posium held in her honor, Ann was one of the founding mothers of femi-
nist jurisprudence-it may be that she even invented the term itself.1 She
left us a rich legacy of work, cut short by her untimely death. In fact, I
am at pains to note that 2012 was a year too full of losses in feminist
legal theory and activism. Besides Professor Scales, we lost Jane Larson
at the University of Wisconsin, Katherine Darmer at Chapman Universi-
ty, and Paula Ettelbrick who had taught at Barnard College, New York
University, and the University of Michigan. Like Professor Scales, Pro-
fessors Larson, Darmer, and Ettelbrick passed away tragically, far too
early, and were among the nation's leaders in generating a body of
scholarship that was nuanced in its explicitly feminist ambitions and the-
oretically sophisticated in its method.2
When Professor Scales returned to the academy in 2003, having
taken a five-year hiatus from a highly successful career as a law profes-
sor, she openly lamented the direction and tone that much feminist legal
scholarship had taken.3 She expressed nostalgia for the early days when
an explicitly feminist analysis of law and social disadvantage was being
forged in the 1980s. This is how she put it:
I... was a ground-floor participant in what came to be known as
"feminist jurisprudence,".... As more voices joined the debate, it
got pretty raucous. Even though there were sharp disagreements and
discomforts, those were heady days. Most of the feminist jurisprudes
knew one another, talked with one another, and kept track of one an-
other's work....
.... Upon my return to the academy, it seemed to me that much of
feminist jurisprudence had gone missing at the same time that I had
gone missing. Before my disappearance, I was already a bit grumpy
about what I regarded as the encroaching domestication of feminist
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (9th ed. 2009) (referencing Professor Ann Scales as
authoring the first publication to use the phrase "feminist jurisprudence").
2. See, e.g., M. Katherine Baird Darmer, "Immutability" and Stigma: Towards a More
Progressive Equal Protection Rights Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 439 (2010);
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK: NAT'L GAY &
LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 9, 14; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay
Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107 (1996); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?: The Need to
Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513 (1993); Jane E. Larson,
"Even a Worm Will Turn at Last ": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1 (1997); Jane E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 997 (1992); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'De-
ceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993).
3. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 2-3
(2006).
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legal theory, the dulling of some of the sharpest edges. Sure enough,
as of my reentry, I discovered that we were in a "postfeminist" age.
4
In fact, it was Janet Halley's invitation that we "take a break from
feminism" that really put Ann over the edge.5 I remember attending a
conference on women and the law at the University of Texas in 2003
when Janet floated the notion of "tak[ing] a break," to the shock, if not
outrage, of many of the participants.6 Ann was among them, and I recall
her reaction-fury, really-that somehow feminism had accomplished
enough politically and institutionally that it was something from which
we could productively take a break. But what I recall even more vividly
were the women of color in the room who, for the most part, taught at
public universities in the South, and who felt that Janet's invitation ig-
nored the unequal distribution of the fruits of feminism across regions,
classes, and races in the United States. When they spoke on the panel
that followed Janet's they were indignant, but more than that, they were
hurt. I sat next to a woman in the audience who was in tears, weeping at
how invisible Janet's talk made her feel-as a woman, as a woman of
color, and as a law professor working at a school where neither she nor
her students enjoyed the privileges and riches of Harvard.
I recall Ann standing in the back of the room, arms crossed and
brow furrowed, more apprehensive about the state of the field than as-
saulted personally by the suggestion that we had entered a time when we
could and should move beyond feminism.
I recount this story to emphasize aspects of Ann's work-including
her writing, her teaching, and her activism-that I think distinguished her
in important ways from many of our peers. The first is how deeply com-
mitted Ann was not only to ideas, but also to ideas that had traction in the
world. She insisted over and over in her work that theory must join hands
with practice and that the two need to inform one another.7 Making ideas
do real work is difficult, but it's what she aimed for in all her work.
Second, she lamented the divisions within feminist legal theory and
the ways in which we fought with one another on the page. She was a
scholar who was at once quite radical in her politics8 and other-regarding
4. Id. at 1, 3 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,
56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence
as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989)).
5. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
(2006).
6. See Janet Halley, Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 197, 224-25 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291,
292-93 (2003); Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 10-11
(1992) [hereinafter Scales, Feminist Legal Method].
8. "[F]eminist legal method can be scary as hell." Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The
Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 36 n. 10 (1997); "[The Senate hearings
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in her ethics.9 Her work took up the ways we could entertain disagree-
ment as feminists on issues in which we have such important and vital
personal stakes. By this, I mean she steered clear of the acrimony that
she felt increasingly characterized feminist legal scholarship after her
return to the academy ten years ago. Strongly influenced by the work of
Catharine MacKinnon, Ann watched how MacKinnon's work was mis-
characterized, parodied, or attacked in ways that personalized the debates
among a community of scholars who no longer saw themselves as some-
how engaged in a joint enterprise.10 In Ann's view, this acrimony dis-
honored the important insights that MacKinnon's work had to offer. So
too she felt it was counterproductive to larger feminist goals such as tak-
ing down patriarchy and women's systematic disadvantage through care-
ful, smart, and grounded analysis of the built-in biases of law and legal
structure.
Rather than take a break from feminism, Ann insisted that we ex-
pand feminism's range. She closed her book Legal Feminism with this:
"Let's explicitly consider and apply the insights of feminist legal theory,
and then get on with all the business at hand."'"
So, taking this demand seriously, I want us to consider how Ann
would have approached a newly emerging domain in American social
and legal life that is ripe for careful feminist analysis but has not, for the
most part, received feminist attention. This domain is that occupied by
newly married same-sex couples.
As more and more same-sex couples legally marry, they find them-
selves governed by a set of rules that allocate rights and responsibilities,
and distribute and redistribute property, in ways that were developed
with heterosexual relationships in mind. Marriage law-and most im-
portantly, feminist reforms to marriage law in the last fifty years-takes
matrimony to be a legal relationship that is fundamentally structured by
gender inequality. The rules of support within marriage and the rules of
distribution upon divorce are designed to take that underlying structural
gender inequality into account. The taken-for-grantedness of this evolu-
tion in the law of marriage and divorce we can chalk up as a victory for
feminist lawyering and advocacy.
As we stand at the precipice of same-sex couples gaining the right
to marry-maybe not in one fell swoop by the Supreme Court this term,
on Clarence Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court] indicated to me that patriarchy is running
scared." Scales, Feminist Legal Method, supra note 7, at I (footnote omitted).
9. When the law must choose among realities, the principle of equality requires that we look
to see whose dignity is most at stake, whose point of view has historically been silenced and is in
danger of being silenced again, and that, in the ordinary case, we choose that point of view as our
interpretation.
Scales, Feminist Legal Method, supra note 7, at 27.
10. This is one of the central, early arguments of her book, SCALES, supra note 3, at 13.
It. Id. at 151.
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but soon-it is worth, if only for a moment, shifting our attention from
gaining the right to marry to the social, legal, and economic consequenc-
es of being married. What will it mean for lesbians and gay men to be
governed by a set of norms that never had them in mind? How might we
anticipate forms of injustice and disadvantage that will ensue when fami-
ly court judges, accustomed to adjudicating the fair dissolution of hetero-
sexual marriages, are faced with applying the law of marriage to couples
whose lives and values may not squeeze easily into the roles of husbands
and wives? Even more so, how might the heterosexual presumptions that
undergird the current law of marriage perversely provide leverage to one
or both parties in divorcing same-sex couples whose position would be
advantaged by exploiting stereotypic and gendered notions of the roles,
vulnerabilities, and powers of husbands and wives?
The project of thinking through marital justice for same-sex couples
should be both queer and feminist in nature and could benefit enormous-
ly from the feminist analysis Ann Scales left us.
Let me offer two examples to illustrate the challenges of applied
feminist theory in this larger context.
First, a few months ago I was invited to give a talk at St. Bartholo-
mew's Episcopal Church on Park Avenue in New York. The church was
founded in 1835 and has a rather affluent membership that is surprisingly
diverse.12 Their lesbian and gay fellowship invited me to talk to them
about the marriage cases that were before the Supreme Court.'3 I don't
get asked to talk at church very often, so I welcomed the opportunity to
reach a new and different audience.
About seventy-five people showed up, including one woman whom
I'll call Beth who lived in New Jersey and came in to mass at St. Bart's
every Sunday. She raised her hand at the end of my talk and shared the
following story:
After divorcing a man fifteen years ago, Beth was set up on a blind
date with a woman-let's call her Ruth-and they dated on and off for
nine years. Beth bought, renovated, and flipped houses and had become
quite successful doing so. Ruth, on the other hand, was a licensed electri-
cian working through the electrician's union. Their relationship was very
volatile, but they wanted to try to figure out how to make it work. There
were some deep issues of conflict-largely having to do with class dif-
ferences and money-that they could not resolve and kept returning to in
their fights. Beth, the more affluent of the two, had two teenage children
from her prior marriage and had primary custody of the kids. Three years
ago Beth and Ruth reunited after having broken up for about nine
12. See St. Bart's, http://www.stbarts.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183
(2010).
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months, and they went to a counselor to set out some ground rules about
their separate and joint financial lives. Together with the counselor they
agreed not to commingle their assets but to live together and jointly con-
tribute to their daily living expenses. Their contributions would not be
the same, as Beth would contribute 80% and Ruth 20%. They both
agreed in front of the counselor to the terms of the financial arrangement,
hoping that this would minimize future conflict in the relationship.
Not surprisingly, it didn't. Beth then told me that they did some-
thing that really surprised me: "We decided to get married in Massachu-
setts." As Beth explained it to me later:
We just thought that getting married would allow us to work things
out without the threat of breaking up. We both thought it would make
us feel safer to work through the hard stuff if we had the legal struc-
ture of marriage around our relationship. I don't know what I was
thinking; it's like people deciding that having a baby will help keep
them together. 14
Fifteen months later they had a terrible fight and Ruth moved out.
Beth then filed for divorce and Ruth's lawyer demanded her equitable
half share of all of Beth's assets, as well as ongoing support. They never
put their premarital financial agreement in writing, but the counselor
with whom they worked out the agreement estified in the trial to its de-
tails.
Here's how the judge ruled: 15
- She ignored the prenuptial agreement because it wasn't in writ-
ing, and under New Jersey law a prenuptial financial agreement must be
in writing.' 
6
* She backdated their marriage to when they started living together
rather than to when they actually legally married, therefore rendering all
of their property accumulated in the six years prior to the marriage mari-
tal property.
- She did not consider the periods in which the two were broken up
and living separately as "breaks in the ongoing relationship" because
Ruth returned to Beth's home a few times a year to visit the kids for
birthdays and holidays, thus evidencing, in the judge's view, an ongoing
relationship.
14. Conversation with Beth, St. Bart's attendee (March 28, 2013).
15. These details are from my conversations with Beth in which she described the judge's
ruling to me.
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-33 (West 2013) ("A premarital or pre-civil union agreement shall
be in writing, with a statement of assets annexed thereto, signed by both parties, and it is enforceable
without consideration.").
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* She found that during a yearlong period when Ruth wasn't able to
get work, Ruth stayed home and took care of the kids and did other un-
remunerated housework, which amounted to her contribution to the fami-
ly's well-being.
* She treated all of Beth's assets as marital property and granted
Ruth a half share in all of it.
Beth and I have talked quite a bit since the meeting at St. Bart's,
and I have gotten a pretty good sense of what she's going through. She
is, as you might imagine, outraged that the laws of equitable distribution
applied to their divorce even though they agreed otherwise. "I want my
experience to be a cautionary tale for others-gay people should be wary
of marriage," she told me. "You have no idea what you're getting your-
self into."
So here are a few things to think about as feminists when consider-
ing this case: Beth's perspective reflects what I've come to call the "les-
bian husband" position. She feels like she earned her own money fair and
square, not due to any gender-based advantage that a male husband mar-
ried to a female wife might have. Ruth should not have any legal entitle-
ment to her money; in fact, Ruth agreed not to make such a claim before
they got married. In so many ways, Beth's position is not unfamiliar in
divorce cases-it's the husband position, seeking to minimize financial
exposure in a divorce from a wife who has lower wage-labor market
power and trying to limit that exposure through a prenuptial agreement.
On the other hand, Ruth looks a lot like a "lesbian wife"-going in
and out of the wage-labor market, earning less money, and contributing
less financially to the family's joint support. The court even understood
her to be a "housewife" for part of their marriage, performing unpaid
domestic labor with which family court judges and divorce law are quite
familiar. On this view, Beth should not be able to just walk away from
Ruth, leaving her destitute while Beth retains all of her substantial assets.
Given that same-sex couples were not able to marry at the point that Beth
and Ruth got together, it is only fair and just that the judge backdate the
marriage to early in their relationship on the notion that they would have
married if they could have. In this sense, the shadow of the law of mar-
riage17 is cast backward as a kind of restitution for a status injury the
couple faced, having been barred from marrying for much of their rela-
tionship.
17. Ariela Dubler has updated Mnookin and Kornhauser's work on the shadow of marriage in
ways that might inform the equities of the illustrative cases I offer in this essay. Compare Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Komhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing how marriage laws affect bargaining powers with respect to di-
vorcing couples), with Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003) (discussing how women out-
side of the institution of marriage have been legally defined by marriage laws).
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On this telling, Beth and Ruth's case looks a lot like a traditional
heterosexual divorce-the husband, the one with more assets, trying to
part with as few of those assets as possible, and the wife, the one with
fewer resources, trying to gain as capacious an interpretation of equitable
distribution as possible.
Let me offer another story-a briefer one, but one that illuminates
another way in which marriage law "unmodified" (to borrow Catharine
MacKinnon's term ) may not be up to delivering justice in the contextof same-sex couples divorcing.
A friend of mine practices family law in the Bay Area and has been
doing so for years-since long before same-sex marriage or civil unions.
He tells me that he's seeing a trend emerging in a number of the gay-
male divorces he has handled. Where the two men in the couple have
different earning power or assets, the less affluent spouse is declining to
demand his half share at the time of divorce because it genders him as a
wife to do so. He would rather leave the marriage with his masculinity
intact than be turned into an ex-wife receiving alimony. For gay men in
this situation, the fear of marriage law gendering them motivates them to
forgo economic advantage. This dynamic contrasts with my first example
where the gendering of the weaker party provides her with an economic
advantage she is more than happy to seize.
With the guys, just as with the women, the law of marriage and di-
vorce imposes-if not imprints-status-based and gendered identities on
the parties in ways that clearly change how they might have seen them-
selves had marriage law not been on the scene. The desirability of these
identities may cut in opposite directions depending upon whether mascu-
linity or femininity is at issue.
The new world we live in, one in which lesbian and gay couples are
increasingly marrying, holds out two different ways of thinking about the
subversive feminist potential of this important change in the law.
We could see the revolutionary project as disassociating gender
from sex. That is to say, we could entertain the notion that women can be
husbands and men can be wives. That's pretty "gender-y" as Eve Sedg-
wick once said.19 I suspect that that project would not satisfy a feminist
like Ann Scales. She would want to do more.
The lesbian-husbands and gay-wives analysis surfaces and illumi-
nates gender differences and advantages that are quite familiar in mar-
riage and in society more generally. Yet this account ratifies marriage as
18. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987).
19. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Gosh, Boy George, You Must be Awfully Secure in Your
Masculinity! ", in CONSTRUCTING MASCULINITY 11, 16 (Maurice Berger et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis
omitted).
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essentially a status-based relationship populated by stock characters
locked into roles that predetermine their relative rights and responsibili-
ties, and powers and vulnerabilities. It risks turning back the modem
reconceptualization of marriage as more contract than status.
Is there any way in which we might, as feminists, be inclined to re-
sist the application of a traditional heterosexual frame of reference for
these cases? Queer theory has certainly been up to this project for some
time.20 But what might a feminist critique contribute? Need we take a
break from feminism to appreciate the risks of returning to good old-
fashioned status when analyzing a marriage like Beth and Ruth's or the
gay-male divorces I described?
It can't be that the only way that power inequalities in marriage can
become legible to family court judges is through the epistemic violence
of casting them in familiar gendered roles that have already been scripted
by traditional notions of marriage. What if we were to see this as an op-
portunity to disorganize marriage and gender altogether? By this I mean,
what if the increasingly common phenomenon of same-sex spouses had
the effect of blowing up the very notion of roles in marriage completely?
Let's turn to Ann's work to see if it can help. Her brand of femi-
nism, as she described it, is "concrete, antiessentialist, . . . instrumental,
eclectic, and open-minded.",21 Concrete insofar as it grows out of real
experiences of subordination caused by gender-based hierarchies. An-
tiessentialist in that it is not tied to any foundational moral principle.
Instrumental to the extent that law should not be understood to be "a
fixed mirror of human rationality, 22 but must always be used to address
human needs and ends. And eclectic to the extent that we have to be
open to revising our "beliefs and strategies when necessary because ex-
perience is too complex to be captured by" adherence to any rigid ap-
proach. 23
Given these precepts, as applied to the challenges of rights and re-
sponsibilities in same-sex marriages, one might be inclined to reject the
return to status through the translation of lesbian and gay relationships
into the vernacular of legal marriage. Instead, let's start with the concrete
contexts and values of lesbian and gay relationships that have evolved
before marriage was ever a reasonable possibility. Outside the structure
of marriage law, same-sex couples were not strangers to the notion of
interdependency, commitment, and care. Rather we forged what many
self-consciously understood to be alternatives to the off-the-shelf, gen-
dered binary of marriage, and we constructed webs of care and commit-
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICSOF QUEER LIFE vii (1999).
21. SCALES, supra note 3, at 8.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 9.
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ment that were not necessarily bound by erotic attachment. So too, we
created erotic attachments that did not necessarily entail care or com-
mitment. Perhaps most importantly we elaborated loving, caring selves
in contexts that were not principally structured by gender inequality.
Unleashed from the preordained roles of husband and wife, gender
turned up in lesbian relationships, if it turned up at all, in often unpre-
dictable, fluid, and interesting ways. It could be used like a lash ("stop
acting like a man") or as a repertoire of erotic exchange, such as in
butch/femme role-play or the familiar description of someone as "butch
in the streets, femme in the sheets." What you saw on the outside wasn't
necessarily what you got on the inside. Of course this is true of men and
women in straight relationships as well, but with lesbians, gender-
however fluid-has been less likely to produce structural inequalities in
the same way that it has with heterosexual couples.
I think Ann would urge us to reject the translation of lesbian spous-
es into essentialized husbands and wives, and instead use the presence of
same-sex couples in marriage as a productive opportunity to further de-
essentialize marriage tout court. Rather than turning to familiar tropes, I
think she'd prefer a more functional approach to the assignment of rights
and responsibilities at the point of lesbian divorce. Rather than asking
whether they functioned like a married couple and then marrying them
retroactively, the court should attempt an inquiry into how their relation-
ship functioned. What kind of commitment had they made to one anoth-
er, and how can the law of marriage reflect and value what lay at the
heart of the relationship when it was working well? These are feminist
values that do not merely come to the rescue of women who occupy sub-
ordinate positions relative to men, but that resist the essentialization of
women as always already the weaker party. In this sense I think that
when it comes to same-sex divorces we need to abandon the structural
approach that most judges bring to heterosexual divorce cases-a struc-
ture many feminists have urged them to take,24 but one that can only un-
derstand inequalities between the parties as necessarily the product of
gender-based power.
Disorganizing gender roles in marriage may help transform the way
that so many wives seem to surrender all manner of self-sovereignty in
marriage, starting with "taking" their husbands' names, to "letting" their
husbands do most if not all of the driving, to the way that marriage as an
economic unit tends to incentivize the making of "choices" that render
one party-typically the wife-more economically vulnerable (such as
not investing in her career, working part-time or not at all, or moving for
his job).
24. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Para-
dox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 79, 171 (1989).
[Vol. 91:1
THE FEMINIST METHOD OF ANN SCALES
This could be the kind of project Ann might have had in mind when
she insisted that we bring "concrete, antiessentialist, instrumental, . . .
eclectic, and open-minded" feminism to bear on the business at handy.
Like you, I'm just heartbroken that she can't be here to help us think it
through, because I, for one, cannot figure it all out on my own.
25. Id. at 8.
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INTRODUCTION
My chosen title for this Symposium Essay is "In Her Own Voice:
Ann Scales as Philosopher, Storyteller, Feminist, and Jurisprude." I'm
not sure I have the order exactly right in the title-it sort of came to me
by cadence rather than by ascending or descending order of importance.
First, I will say a word about why I chose these four words to de-
scribe Ann and her work. Then I will move to a description of my ten
favorite passages from her work. And, of course, these passages will be
"in her own voice"--because no one could say things quite the way Ann
did.
I. THE FOUR ATTRIBUTES
A. Ann Was a Philosopher.1
I use the term "philosopher" to describe Ann for several reasons. I
certainly mean to reference the fact that Ann was a scholar and a thinker;
Der Denker,2 so to speak.3 The Rodin sculpture comes to mind, in part,
because it seems so contrary to the way I picture Ann as "the thinker."
Yet I can also picture her with furrowed brow, biting her knuckles as she
tried to unravel the tricky problems of things like causation. And I
couldn't resist including the reference to Der Denker because it reminds
me of her close friendship with Sheila James Kuehl, who, if you are of
my era, you would have fallen in love with when she played Zelda on the
Dobie Gillis sitcom. Each episode began with Dobie sitting by a replica
of that Rodin statute, Der Denker, as he typically wrangled with a knotty
teenage romance problem. (This is the sort of connection that Ann would
have appreciated.)
1. Ann herself might contradict me. Contra Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time,
42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 99 n.10 (1990) ("Because I am neither philosopher nor anthropologist ... ").
2. "Der Denker" is German for "The Thinker" or for "Le Penseur" as the Rodin sculpture is
generally referred to in French. "Der Denker" seems more appropriate given Ann's frequent refer-
ence to German philosophers (thinkers) such as Kant.
3. I also like the following alternative definition of "philosopher" from the Merriam-Webster
dictionary: A philosopher is "a person whose philosophical perspective makes meeting trouble with
equanimity easier." MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/philosopher (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
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But the Rodin sculpture reminds me of Ann for other reasons and
not just because it is an image of a person thinking big thoughts. When
Rodin was asked about his sculpture and what it meant, he replied in
part: "The Thinker has a story. In the days long gone by I conceived the
idea of the Gates of Hell. Before the door, seated on the rock, Dante
thinking of the plan of the poem behind him ....
And so the image is of a thinker who is a poet. And, as Rodin said
in further explanation of who Der Denker was: "Guided by my first in-
spiration I conceived another thinker, a naked man, seated on a rock, his
fist against his teeth, he dreams. The fertile thought slowly elaborates
itself within his brain. He is no longer a dreamer, he is a creator."
5
Ann, like the Rodin image, was a thinker who was also a poet and a
creator. She painted images for us with her words; images that make us
smile and help us to understand big thoughts in deeper ways.
I describe Ann as philosopher for an additional reason: I mean to
acknowledge that philosophy was important to Ann and that fact is re-
flected in her work. She uses the work of many dead, white philosophers
to make her points from time to time. And when she does, she typically
describes them gleefully in very put-down ways, while according them a
partial stamp of approval for what she thought they got right.
She often invoked Ludwig Wittgenstein in her writing. Once, when
explaining the problems of universalizing experience, she said: "The
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein did a good job of showing how ei-
ther/or categorizations actually disable the usefulness of concepts. I hate
to rely on a dead white man to illustrate this, but I like his weird clarity."
6
Of course, she often added some weird clarity of her own after ex-
plaining what these earlier thinkers had opined.
She described Immanuel Kant as the stodgiest, most sweeping sys-
tematizer of all. She added that, though he was undoubtedly wrong about
many things, he was right about at least one thing:
Whatever else we as human beings may perceive, understand, or
judge, and however we may differ in those pursuits, we could not do
anything without using the underlying notions of time, space, and
causality. They are percepts of reason: these are notions the truth of
which cannot be proven but without which we could not think or be
human. I can imagine space and time as empty, but I cannot compre-
hend a nonspatial object nor a nontemporal event. I can understand
the difficulties in causal analysis, but I cannot help but believe that
4. Joseph Phelan, Who Is Rodin's Thinker?, ARTCLYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 2001),
http://www.artcyclopedia.com/feature-2001-08.html.
5. Id.
6. Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REv. 139,
154 (1990).
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the orange juice got cold because I put it in the fully operational re-
frigerator. All of us rely on contingently reliable measurements of
time, space, and causality in everything we do.
7
Then comes her own twist. Having agreed with stodgy old Professor
Kant that time, space, and causality are ideas without which we cannot
function, she says: "I do not believe that everyone has the same concept
of these percepts. On the contrary, I claim that in legal education, for
example, we inculcate the percepts of reason from a white male legal
point of view, a point of view substantially at odds with other experienc-
e s.
' 8
It is this combination of philosophy and feminist critique that I most
love about her work. And I list "philosopher" first because it is a connec-
tion Ann and I always had. We both came to law from philosophy. She
majored in it at Wellesley and I minored in it at Vassar and then did
postgraduate work in philosophy at the University of Liverpool. And
while we both studied the work of dead white men like Kant and Witt-
genstein (and in my case, Sartre), we have both found some of their work
relevant to the development of our feminist theories of the law.
B. Ann Was a Storyteller.
My next attribute for Ann as teacher and scholar is storyteller. She
used storytelling in her scholarship and in her teaching with tremendous
success. Storytelling is an important part of feminist theory. It is what
makes the abstract concrete. In 1990, Martha Fineman made the point
that what we need is more feminist theory of the middle range-
something between abstract grand theory, unconnected to women's eve-
ryday reality, and a series of individual stories from which it is hard to
generalize.9 Ann didn't generalize from her own stories, but she used
them effectively to make abstract points become more concrete. And she
listened well to the stories of others so that they could be used to similar
effect.' 0
And I know she told stories in class that her students have never
forgotten. She and I shared a student recently; a student who did her first
year at Denver Law and then transferred to Santa Clara Law. When I
learned that this student had been at Denver, I immediately asked her if
she had taken a class from Ann Scales. "Yes," she said, with much en-
thusiasm. It was obviously her favorite course in law school. As fate
would have it, it was this shared student who sought me out when she
7. Scales, supra note 1, at 99-100 (footnotes omitted).
8. Id. at 100.
9. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Femi-
nist Legal Scholarship, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 25, 25 n.1, 28-29 (1990).
10. Consider her effective use of her knowledge and experience with the Greenham Common
Women's Peace Camp in England. See Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist
Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 26-29 (1989).
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first heard of Ann's accident. The student needed to talk about Ann and
so she shared several Ann Scales stories with me; one of which I loved
and ultimately clarified with another one of Ann's Denver Law students.
The story she told me involved a question that Ann posed to her
constitutional law class. The question Ann posed was: Do you know why
each successive Article of the Constitution gets shorter and shorter?
Well, she explained to the class, the Constitution was drafted over the
summer in Philadelphia, and it was very hot in Philadelphia that summer,
and so, you know, by the time they got to the final Article it was 4:00
p.m. on one of the hottest days-and you know what that means-why
it's "Miller time." I think I laughed out loud-it sounded so like Ann.
Yes, Ann was a storyteller, both in her scholarship and in her teaching.
C. Ann Was a Feminist.
Ann was an unrepentant feminist and was forever reshaping what
that meant. When researching my 1989 article called Feminist Jurispru-
dence: Grounding the Theories," I was curious about the phrase "femi-
nist jurisprudence." I wondered where the phrase had come from and
who might have conjured it up. "Women and the Law" conferences,
which had started in the 1970s, were hosting panels on feminist jurispru-
dence by the early 1980s 2-so I had some sense of when use of the
phrase had begun-but I wanted more precise information. Ann's first
article, published in the 1981 issue of the Indiana Law Journal, gave me
my first clue.'3 In that article, Ann told the story of a conference at Har-
vard in 1978, which celebrated the first twenty-five years of women at
Harvard.14 The student organizers, including Ann, decided to do a panel
called "Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence." The panel was to be an in-
quiry into the question of whether or not there should be something
called feminist jurisprudence, and if so, what it should look like. Ann
later told me that the panel was not well received. Why? Because critics
viewed the question as one about establishing special legal rights for
women and that is not jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is the "view from
nowhere" and cannot be established from the special perspective of one
group. "Really?" was Ann's response. And so she titled her first article
Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence. Of course. Unrepentant.
11. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-90).
12. The first conference to sponsor such a panel was the 1983 conference hosted in Washing-
ton, D.C. Patricia A. Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 367, 370
(1997).
13. Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981).
14. Id. at 375 n.2.
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D. Ann Was a Jurisprude.
Finally, I use the word "jurisprude" to describe Ann. I wasn't sure
this actually was a word and so I looked it up. The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines it as "a person who makes [an] ostentatious show of
learning in jurisprudence and the philosophy of law or [someone] who
regards legal doctrine with undue solemnity or veneration."'1 5 "Right," I
said to myself. I am, of course, using the term jurisprude tongue in
cheek.
II. IN HER OWN VOICE
These are the attributes of Ann and her scholarship--the philosoph-
ical slant, the storyteller, the feminist, and the smirky jurisprude-that
drove me to curl up in a comer and start rereading her work when I
learned of her death. I wanted to re-engage with that bouncy person I
first encountered in the spring of 1989 at a conference at the Harvard
Law School entitled "Conference on Sexual Orientation and the Law
School Curriculum." I was there to talk about teaching wills in a way that
would include issues about same-sex couples and their estate plans. I had
no idea who Ann Scales was. All I remember is being in a large room
somewhere in the bowels of the law school when a young woman got up
to give a keynote-style address. I didn't catch her name. I didn't recog-
nize her. I couldn't for the life of me figure out who she was. She was
talking about the military, male dominance, and law. With great clarity
and lots of bright rhetoric, she explained why sexual dominance was
necessary to make the military possible and why the military was neces-
sary for the continuation of sexual dominance. There were lots of men-
tions of objectification and "thingification."
As I began to remember Ann by rereading her writings, I decided
that I wanted to share with you my favorite passages from her work, in
her own words, because no one could say it better than Ann. And I'll do
this in the style of David Letterman, starting with the passage I rank at
number ten and working my way to the top-ranked passage. These are
the ten things that many of us wish we could have said ourselves because
the words capture some inner truth that we already know, but alas, we
are not all philosophical, poetic, feminist storytellers. Thank God, Ann
was.
Number 10: "There is no woman who has not had some practice at try-
ing not to exist too loudly. ,16
Most professional women of my era complain that they can never
be heard.17 Women often speak out at meetings where men predominate
15. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/jurisprude
(last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
16. Scales, supra note 10, at 43.
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and no one acknowledges what they have just said until a man says it.
How ironic that women can't be heard when we want to be heard and yet
we also practice not existing too loudly.
Let me put Ann's single sentence in context by quoting from the
published version of that first speech I ever heard Ann give:
[M]ilitarism normalizes the oppression of women. It supplies the
moral authority for relations of dominance and submission....
... The military produces a class of false moral agents, a class of
persons who have been forced to internalize the commands of an ab-
solute authority. Furthermore, the militaristic individual has been
drilled in the necessity and legitimacy of the use of force .... When
force is legitimated, it is a constant potentiality. Those threatened by
it have no choice but to "imitate nothingness in their own persons."
And that is a definition of woman's otherness. Women have been im-
itating nothingness for a long time .... There is no woman who has
not had some practice at trying not to exist too loudly. The needs of
militarism serve as a legitimating basis for subjecting others to this
process of silencing.
Just as militarism normalizes the oppression of women, the op-
pression of women normalizes militarism. The men at the front need
to be expert at thingification before they can pull that trigger or push
that button. 
18
"Women have been imitating nothingness for a long time.... There
is no woman who has not had some practice at trying not to exist too
loudly." 19 That's it. No more words are needed. Every woman and prob-
ably most men in that Harvard Law School room understood those
words. At the time I heard her speak, the connection she made between
women imitating nothingness and the military's practice of subjecting
troops to a silencing in order to erase their subjectivity sent a chill down
my spine. And it certainly gave me renewed insight regarding the import
of Goldman v. Weinberger,20 the case she was analyzing; the case in
which the Supreme Court upheld the military's right to prohibit a Jewish
solider from wearing a yarmulke.2 1 Subordination of individuality
thingification, in Ann's words-is necessary to the military's success.2 2
17. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full
Class Participation, 38 J. Legal Educ. 147 (1988) (collecting references).
18. Scales, supra note 10, at 42-44 (quoting SIMONE WEIL, THE ILIAD, OR THE POEM OF
FORCE 7 (Pendle Hill Press 1983)).
19. Id. at43.
20. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
21. Id. at 510.
22. Scales, supra note 10, at 43-44.
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Number 9: "Law is second-rate philosophy backed by the force of the
state.,,23
When I first read this sentence I disagreed-not about the force of
the state, but about the proposition that law is second-rate philosophy.
For I think that law is applied philosophy, and that is what made me
choose law over philosophy. From this perspective, law is superior to
philosophy.
My personal view of the relationship between philosophy and law is
influenced by my own past academic connections with philosophy. In
1970, I was in Liverpool working on my master's thesis, which focused
on existentialism and free will, a fairly impossible topic. I was toying
with the idea of law school. I remember at the time reading Simone de
Beauvoir's book, The Ethics of Ambiguity.24 I immediately connected
with a statement she makes in her conclusion to the book. She had been
reading Hegel in the Bibliotheque Nationale and experiencing a great
sense of calm when confronted with the abstractness and theory of his
great system . I suspect the calmness was derived from the ability to rise
to the plane of the universal, the infinite. But then she returned to the
street, and described the following feeling:
[O]nce I got into the street again, into my life, out of the system, be-
neath a real sky, the system was no longer of any use to me: what it
had offered me, under a show of the infinite, was the consolations of
death; and I again wanted to live in the midst of living men.
26
In my own experience, the calmness of the truly abstract has always
been momentary. The comfort of the concrete is more lasting. So, if phi-
losophy is the abstract and law is the concrete, which one is truly second-
rate?
I returned to Ann's article, Midnight Train to Us,27 to see if she had
something more to say on this topic. Here's what she said:
Law is applied philosophy of a sort, but better than "pure" philoso-
phy in two ways. First, it is not as rigorous; it has no requirement of
logical consistency. Indeed, for law to work and move, it can't be
logically consistent. Second, though philosophy in my opinion has
amazing persuasive power (ideas matter), there are no winners or
losers. In law, at least theoretically, if you've got the best argument,
you win, and the world changes.
28
23. Ann C. Scales, Midnight Train to Us, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 710,710(1990).
24. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY (Bernard Frechtman trans., Citadel
Press 5th ed. 1970) (1948).
25. Id. at 158.
26. Id.
27. Scales, supra note 23.
28. Id.
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Law is better than "pure" philosophy, but it is second-rate because it
can't be "pure." That is because law is real and concrete, not abstract and
universal. When I reread Ann's sentence in context, it made me smile,
not in disagreement this time, but in appreciation. She and I share the
value of law as applied philosophy after all, and that value makes it bet-
ter than philosophy. And I have a new understanding of law as second-
rate philosophy.
Number 8: "'Choice' is that essential conjure. It has the same meaning
as if I chose to be Aretha Franklin or the Princess of Wales. ,,29
As you may recall, the United States Supreme Court has held that it
is not sex discrimination to refuse to provide governmental assistance for
poor women who want to have abortions.30 The explanation appears to
be that states can refuse to provide the funding, so long as the poor wom-
an can still choose to have an abortion.31 Ann's rejoinder: "'Choice' is
that essential conjure. It has the same meaning as if I chose to be Aretha
Franklin or the Princess of Wales."
32
Fortunately, the New Mexico Supreme Court listened to Ann's ar-
gument and ruled differently from the United States Supreme Court,
finding that failure to provide funding violated the state's Equal Rights
Amendment.33 This, in my view, is law as applied philosophy. And, in
this instance, "law" appears pretty first-rate.
Number 7: "[S]tuckness. ,34
This is such an Annie word. It is a favorite of mine. It showed up
for the first time in a law review article, as in "[i]t was a time of stuck-
ness for me.",35 It then becomes the organizing principle of her book,
which she divided into two parts: "Places of Stuckness" and "Places
[B]eyond Stuckness.' 36
I love it now that I can explain my lack of total comprehension, or
my inability to explain something, by saying I am in a place of stuckness.
Ann gave the word such a dignified meaning. And she showed us that we
will all, if we think hard enough, get beyond it.
29. Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 12 (1992).
30. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-471,
475-76 (1977).
31. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17 (explaining that a woman's constitutionally protected choice
does not entitle her to the funds that might be necessary to make it possible for her to exercise that
choice in reality).
32. Scales, supra note 29, at 12.
33. See New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (1998).
34. Scales, supra note 29, at 11.
35. Id.
36. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, & LEGAL THEORY (2006).
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Number 6: "The law is organized around a set of bottom lines, presented
as unquestionable. These false necessities are the conversation-
stopping arguments, as in 'when you say Bud, you've said it all. '-3
I now imagine sharing this passage with a class of first year law
students. Too many students arrive at law school believing that the law
provides absolute answers. They need to learn that law is full of contin-
gencies. Facts matter, and sometimes facts matter more than the abstract
principles or rules. Ann Scales continuously taught her students to ques-
tion. Law is not the same as a mathematical proof of the inevitable.
There is no QED. in law. "Bud" is the replacement for QED., and in this
one phrase, she has enlightened us all, with a smile of course, as to law's
contingency.
Number 5: "[T] here is no sex discrimination when pregnant men and
pregnant women are treated the same. ,38
If you haven't used this statement to introduce the Geduldig39 case
to your students, then you have missed the boat. Here's what Ann said in
full: "Dwight Geduldig v. Carolyn Aiello, decided the year I was admit-
ted to law school, and holding essentially that there is no sex discrimina-
tion when pregnant men and pregnant women are treated the same. No-
body at law school could explain that.,
40
Number 4: "Men in need of abortions. "
41
Building on the Geduldig dig, Ann made a similar point when she
discussed Bray v. Alexandria Women 's Health Clinic,42 a case in which
the government relied on Geduldig to argue that blocking access to abor-
tion clinics was not motivated by gender discrimination.4 3 Here is what
she said: "Last fall, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument on whether
blocking access to abortion clinics might discriminate against women, or
whether, one supposes, men in need of abortions might be discriminated
against as well." 44
37. Scales, supra note 29, at 13.
38. Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 39 (1997).
39. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
40. Scales, supra note 38, at 39 (footnote omitted).
41. Scales, supra note 29, at 12.
42. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
43. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12-13, 29-33,
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (No. 90-985), 1991 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 941 (Current Chief Justice John G. Roberts authored this brief for the Solicitor Gen-
eral and relied on Geduldig even though the Petitioners that the brief supported did not, as can be
seen in Brief for Petitioner at 1-64, Bray, 506 U.S. 263 (No. 90-985)).
44. Scales, supra note 29, at 1 1-12.
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Number 3: "You are a strange bedfellow when you sleep alone. ,45
Enough said.
Number 2: "[P]atriarchy is Running Scared. ,A6
Ann wrote this passage in 1992, after the 1991 confirmation hear-
ings of Justice Clarence Thomas. In the midst of the horror and excite-
ment we all felt while living through the Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas
episode,4 7 Ann had an optimistic insight. A flash came to her and she
said: "[P]atriarchy is running scared.
4 8
Surely this is a Roy Orbison reference.49  "Just runnin'
scared ... .,,50 But Ann is using Orbison's words with reversed roles. In
the song, Orbison was the one running scared and the other guy, the big
one, the old flame, is the one he's scared of. Despite "running scared," in
the end Orbison wins against the other guy. Ann's emphasis is in the
opposite direction. She thinks it is a good thing that patriarchy is "run-
ning scared" and I don't think she thought it meant patriarchy would win
out in the end in the way that Orbison did.51 Here's my new interpreta-
tion of the Orbison lyrics using patriarchy as the other guy: "Yeah, patri-
archy might show up... and if he does.., which one will you choose?
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at I (footnote omitted).
47. At these confirmation hearings, then-Professor Anita Hill accused Thomas of sexual
harassment in the workplace. Thomas denied the charges completely calling the affair a "high tech
lynching." PBS NewsHour, Supreme Court Moments in History: Clarence Thomas & Anita Hill,
YoUTUBE (June 29, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-l IEEDD2vxaE (depicting PBS news
account of the event in 1991).
48. Scales, supra note 29, at 1.
49. 1 should note that Aretha Franklin had more of an impact on Ann than Orbison did. Ann
cites Aretha Franklin in footnotes at times. See, e.g., id. at 8-9 n.26. She also names Aretha Franklin
in the first footnote of one article as one of the women whose voices can be heard throughout the
article. Scales, supra note 23, at 710 n.1.
50. The full lyrics to the Orbison hit, Running Scared, are:
Just runnin' scared each place we go
So afraid that he might show
Yeah, runnin' scared, what would I do
If he came back and wanted you
Just runnin' scared, feelin' low
Runnin' scared, you love him so
Just runnin' scared, afraid to lose
If he came back which one would you choose
Then all at once he was standing there
So sure of himself, his head in the air
My heart was breaking, which one would it be
You turned around and walked away with me.
ROY ORBISON, Running Scared, on CRYING (Monument Records 1962), available at
http://www.lyrics.com/running-scared-lyrics-roy-orbison.html.
51. Ann's sense that patriarchy was running scared, and thus women were gaining ground,
was based on events after the Thomas hearings. Thomas was confirmed, but in the process the power
of one woman who stood up to speak truth to power and participate fully in the political process was
alarming to many men. The entire event suggested harder battles might lie ahead to keep women out
of the process and in their proper places. See Scales, supra note 29, at 1-2.
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Yeah, we've been runnin' scared, afraid to lose. But in the end, when
patriarchy is all at once standing there, so sure of himself with his head
in the air, what happens? We all turn around and walk away with Ann."
Patriarchy loses just like the guy in the Orbison song. And if you've nev-
er heard the song that way, go back and listen to it and try it out. It's
quite a trip.
Number 1: "The last Article of the Constitution, Article VII, is so much
shorter than the others because it was drafted at the end of a very hot
summer day in Philadelphia. And when it gets that hot, you know, it's
'Miller time. "52
I still smile every time I imagine her explaining this to her students.
III. CONCLUSION
Ann had her favorite dead white philosophers and she quoted from
them regularly. I'd like to end with a quote from one of my favorite such
philosophers, sometimes known as the father of existentialism, Soren
Kierkegaard. It expresses a sentiment that reminds me of Ann and her
scholarship: "To dare is to lose one's footing momentarily. Not to dare is
to lose oneself.,
53
52. See supra Part I.B.
53. Attributed to Soren Kierkegaard. THINKEXIST.COM (last visited Nov. 28, 2013),
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/to dare is to lose one-s footingmomentarily-not/14796.html.
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Wherever in this city, screens flicker
with pornography...
[W]e also have to walk...
No one has imagined us. We want to live like trees,
sycamores blazing through the sulfuric air,
dappled with scars, still exuberantly budding. .."
-Adrienne Rich'
ABSTRACT
Drawing upon the MacKinnon/Dworkin understanding of pornog-
raphy, Ann Scales introduced a feminist application of "ecological por-
nography" in her 1990 article Feminists in the Field of Time. She cri-
tiques Mount Rushmore as a "scar" on the sacred, a form of ecological
pornography which proselytizes "nature as being enhanced by being mu-
tilated in the image of what white males think nature ought to be and
do." Ecological pornography is enacted in popular culture, where images
of the Earth, animals, and land are cast into the convention of sexually
subordinated, demeaned, used, marginalized, consumed, and violated
women (and those used in the place of women). In a subsequent article,
Ann Scales invokes the ancient Goddess Medusa as signifying "the un-
varnished, undomesticated-and incomplete-counternarrative to patri-
archy." She calls for the reclaiming of "Medusa, in wholeness and in
solidarity." Wholeness is key to solving the crisis of ecological devasta-
tion, founded in the splitting of culture from nature, with elite humans
seen as over and above nature and all oppressed deemed "closer to na-
ture." A related hierarchical splitting is that of life over death. Professor
Scales's Medusan counternarrative understands time not as linear, but as
1 Jane Caputi, Professor, Center for Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies, Communication
& Multimedia Studies, Florida Atlantic University. I thank Ann Scales for twenty-odd wonderful
years of most precious friendship and sisterhood. I thank Nancy Ehrenreich for organizing the me-
morial service for Ann, the subsequent Symposium, and this special issue. I thank Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin for their Medusan mentations, inspiration, and leadership, and
Shannon Gilreath for helpful discussions of the ideas in this article.
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LANGUAGE: POEMS 1974-1977, 25 (1978).
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a continuum. In the former, death is feared as termination, leading patri-
archal men to seek immortality, in part by conquering nature. Professor
Scales opens Feminists in the Field of Time by naming the ecologically
pornographic story conveyed by Mt. Rushmore. She concludes by imag-
ining us as whole, as "mere specks in the plasma of the universe," but
nonetheless "part of something entire," something enduring.
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INTRODUCTION
I am at the point in life where something that just yesterday looked
like an everyday-if uncommonly cherished-object, today looks more
like something infinitely precious, irreplaceable. One of these is a souve-
nir coffee mug from Wimminfest '92, a festival that used to be held an-
nually in Albuquerque. It lists the names of the musicians as well as the
speakers, the latter including "Jane Caputi and Ann Scales." Sometime in
April 2012, I was looking at the mug and realized that I didn't want to
risk anymore its everyday use. I took it out of my cupboard and placed it
on a shelf reserved for sacred things. Now I wonder: Was this a premoni-
tion regarding my impending loss?
Ann Scales died on June 24, 2012, some twenty-two years after we
first met. Both of us were teaching at the University of New Mexico
(UNM) in Albuquerque-she in the Law School, I in American Studies.
When the culture theorist and poet Gloria Anzaldla came to UNM to
give a talk, Ann and I both attended, and that is when we first met, im-
mediately connecting, not only as friends of the very first order, but also
as sisters/collaborators vowing to "stand shoulder to shoulder" ever af-
terward.
One of our first collaborations was the Wimminfest talk, which we




nography of Everyday Life. As a framework for this presentation, we
drew upon the work of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, who
wrote an ordinance that defines pornography as the "sexually explicit
subordination of women, graphically depicted" as well as "men, children,
or transsexuals in the place of women."3 They define this subordination
as being enacted by women "presented dehumanized as sexual objects,
things or commodities" or in "postures of sexual submission."4 Such
subordination also is enacted when "[W]omen's body parts . .. are ex-
hibited, such that women are reduced to those parts, . .." and when
women are presented as whores by nature" and in "scenarios of degrada-
tion, injury, abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding,
bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions exual."5 There
has been enormous controversy over this definition and the ordinance
based upon it. 6 My purpose here is not to go over that ground. Rather, I
want to suggest some of the ways that this framework holds great value
in revealing how a complex of related injustices subordinates women and
those used in the place of women, whom we might think of as women-
kind,7 a group including feminized and marginalized human groups, as
well as all the other-than-human beings we lump under the term nature.
1. ECOLOGICAL PORNOGRAPHY
This complex speaks directly to my theme here,-"ecological por-
nography," which Professor Scales invoked in a 1990 article, as she nar-
rated a particularly heartsickening moment of epiphany:
Last summer, I drove from Boston to Albuquerque. On the way, I
traveled through South Dakota to see the Badlands and the Black
Hills. The trip made me heartsick. The history of South Dakota is the
2. I have continued to elaborate this concept in a film and article. See THE PORNOGRAPHY OF
EVERYDAY LIFE (Berkeley Media 2006); see also Jane Caputi, The Pornography of Everyday Life,
in GENDER, RACE, & CLASS IN MEDIA, 311, 311-18 (Gail Dines & Jean M. Humez eds., 3d ed.
2011).
3. See IN HARM'S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS 428-29 (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997) [hereinafter IN HARM'S WAY].
4. Id. at 428.
5. Id. at 428-29.
6. See, e.g., Lisa Duggan, Nan D. Hunter & Carole S. Vance, False Promises: Feminist
Antipornography Legislation, in THEORIZING FEMINISMS 311, 311-24 (Elizabeth Hackett & Sally
Haslanger eds., 2006).
7. Womenkind* includes female humans, other humans (intersexed or transgender) who
identify (as Ann Scales might see it, "in wholeness and in solidarity") with and as women, and
reaches out to those who are identified and treated as women against their wills. See Ann Scales,
Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 46 (1997).
1 include the asterisk because I intend womenkind* to be a temporary word, one meaningful only for
as long as patriarchal cultures continue to ordain hierarchical and oppositional meanings of sex and
gender, setting up a class-men-formed by deliberate separation from and annihilation (physical
and symbolic) of the class, women. The meaning of womenkind* is informed by background mean-
ings of the word kind, including: "a natural grouping without taxonomic connotations ... a group
united by common traits or interests." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1243
(Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1986). Womenkind* conjures solidarity around both traits and
interests.
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history of many Indian peoples, particularly the Great Sioux Nation,
who have suffered countless inequities, including treaty violations
and massacres such as the one at Wounded Knee. The South Dakota
air reeks of it. At the same time, the South Dakota land cries out with
its fantastic, ever-diminishing prairies and enchanting mountains.
South Dakota is a sacred, and perhaps irretrievably scarred place.
The culmination of my nausea was visiting Mount Rushmore. I
could not stop myself from going there. Mount Rushmore leaps like
the proverbial sore thumb out of a wondrous part of the Black Hills.
The attraction is not the mountain, but its defacement. The image is
familiar: enormous carved faces of dead United States Presidents
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and The-
odore Roosevelt. I was disgusted-and not just because I am pro-
foundly ambivalent about these Presidents' roles in United States his-
tory. Mount Rushmore is ecologically pornographic. Just as pornog-
raphy portrays women as enjoying abuse, Mount Rushmore portrays
nature as being enhanced by being mutilated in the image of what
white males think nature ought to be and do.
8
In her footnotes, Professor Scales mentions that some folks are thinking
of adding the face of Ronald Reagan to Mt. Rushmore.9 Never one to
pull her punch, she opines, well, why not; "[a]s long as we are defacing,"
we might as well add the faces of Edward Teller, the "Father of the H
Bomb";10 Ivan Boesky, the prototype for the "greed is good"'1 Wall
Street criminal;' 2 and Richard Speck, one of the most notorious mass sex
killers, who, in 1966, invaded a dormitory to torture and murder eight
women, six of whom were student nurses and two of whom were regis-
tered nurses'3 from South Chicago Community Hospital.'
4
In this brief story, Professor Scales gives a unique and deliberately
feminist interpretation of the then nascent concept of ecological pornog-
8. Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 95 (1990) (footnotes
omitted).
9. Id at 95 n.2.
10. See Edward Teller, Ph.D., ACAD. ACHIEVEMENT,
http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/telObio-I (last updated Dec. 11, 2013, 21:04 EST) (cred-
iting Edward Teller as the "Father of the Hydrogen Bomb").
I. The line, "[G]reed, for lack of a better word, is good," was uttered in Oliver Stone's 1987
film Wall Street by the character Gordon Gekko. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
1987).
12. See Myles Meserve, Meet Ivan Boesky, the Infamous Wall Streeter Who Inspired Gordon
Gekko, BUS. INSIDER (July 26, 2012, 1:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/meet-ivan-boesky-
the-infamous-wall-streeter-who-inspired-gordon-gecko-2012-7.
13. The names of the women murdered by Speck are: Gloria Jean Davy, Patricia Ann
Matusek, Nina Jo Schmale, Pamela Wilkening, Suzanne Farris, Mary Ann Jordan, Merlita Gargullo,
and Valentina Pasion. One woman, Corazon Amurao, survived by hiding under a bed. See Edward
C. Burks, Speck Is Guilty and Faces Death: But the Judge Can Soften Jury's Recommendation with
Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1967, at I.
14. Scales, supra note 8, at 95 n.2.
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raphy.15 She identifies an underlying identity between white patriarchal
heroes and villains.16 She points to the reversal 7 underlying the claim
that women enjoy abuse.18 I interpret Scales' comments to mean that an
"attraction" like Mount Rushmore is actually a defacement. Hence, we
can draw from her critique to suggest a connection between the deface-
ment of the mountain that resulted in Mt. Rushmore to the defacements
that characterize much of what passes for feminine attractiveness
(achieved through cosmetic surgeries, hair taming potions, foot-binding
fashions, relentless depilations, starvation dieting, skin bleaching, and so
on). Professor Scales, most significantly, I believe, suggests in this piece
that there is a connection among gynocide,'9 genocide, and ecocide (the
destruction of earth and earth beings). In this way, she is expressing an
"ecological feminist" perspective. Karen Warren defined ecological fem-
inism as "the position that there are important connections between how
one treats women, people of color, and the underclass on one hand and
how one treats the nonhuman natural environment on the other.,20 These
oppressive, shared paradigms, of both treatment and perception, structure
an ecological pornography of everyday life, where the Earth and non-
human nature generally are put in "scenarios of degradation, injury, [and]
abasement," positioned as objects, commodities, victims, and defined as
15. The first to use the term probably was Jerry Mander in 1972, who intended the term to be
synonymous with greenwashing (disinformation that promotes as environmentally friendly that
which is actually harmful). For more information, see Bart H. Welling, Ecoporn: On the Limits of
Visualizing the Nonhuman, in ECOSEE: IMAGE, RHETORIC, NATURE 53, 54 (Sidney I. Dobrin & Sean
Morey eds., 2009).
16. 1 am referring here to Professor Scales's commentary suggesting that the notorious crimi-
nal, Richard Speck, also be added to the faces on Mount Rushmore. Scales, supra note 8, at 95 n.2.
17. Reversal is a concept developed by radical feminist theologian and philosopher Mary
Daly. Reversal is the "fundamental mechanism employed in the world-construction and world-
maintenance of patriarchy; basic method employed in the making of patriarchal myths, ideologies,
institutions, policies, and strategies ... Examples a: the absurd story of Eve's birth from Adam... "
See MARY DALY & JANE CAPUTI, WEBSTERS' FIRST NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 93 (1987).
18. Id. at 95.
19. Many theorists and activists use the wordfemicide, defined by Diana E. H. Russell as "the
killing of females by males because they are female" and as "lethal hate crimes." Diana E. H. Rus-
sell, Introduction to FEMICIDE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 3-4 (Diana E. H. Russell & Roberta A.
Harmes eds., 2001). Femicides are motivated by misogyny as well as influenced by masculinist
notions of manhood and resulting distortions taking form around honor, love, pride, pleasure, envy,
religion, culture, and sense of ownership of women. Femicides take many forms, including honor
killings, witch-burnings, selective destruction of female fetuses and infants, boyfriends and husbands
killing their girlfriends and wives, and stranger sex killings. For a full discussion, see FEMICIDE: THE
POLITICS OF WOMAN KILLING (Jill Radford & Diana E. H. Russell eds., 1992). Other theorists and
activists prefer gynocide to convey the full historical weight of these atrocities. Mary Daly first
spoke ofgynocide. MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION 194 (1973). So did Andrea Dworkin. ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 95 (1974).
Mary Daly and I define gynocide as "the fundamental intent of global patriarchy: planned, institu-
tionalized spiritual and bodily destruction of women; the use of deliberate systematic measures ( uch
as killing, bodily or mental injury, unlivable conditions, prevention of births), which are calculated
to bring about the destruction of women as a political and cultural force." MARY DALY & JANE
CAPUTI, WEBSTERS' FIRST NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 77
(1987).
20. Karen J. Warren, Introduction to ECOFEMINISM: WOMEN, CULTURE, NATURE xi, xi (Ka-
ren J. Warren ed., 1997).
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"whores by nature.,21 These practices and definitions are enacted and
reflected in everyday popular culture, readily apparent when images of
the Earth, animals, and land are compared to conventional representa-
tions of women (and those used in the place of women).
II. EVERYDAY ECOLOGICAL PORNOGRAPHY
When internationally famous fashion photographer Juergen Teller
used Victoria Beckham in an ad for Marc Jacobs's designs, he didn't
present her as "a glamorous celebrity," but as "an abstraction, a living
doll;, 22 in other words as a sexualized object. For one photo, she is
dumped into a shopping bag; we see only her bare, high-heeled legs
flopping spread-eagled over its side. A similar image of the planet ap-
pears in an ad for Chaseshop.com. The setting is outer space, where the
Earth, now also just another commodity, is stuffed into a brown shopping
bag. The tag line urges us to "[s]hop the [w]orld.
',23
Everyday pornography regularly shows women as victims of all
kinds of glamorized and sexualized abuse, up to and including murder,
particularly in fashion imagery, and most explicitly in slasher films and
all kinds of serial killer cult offerings.24 Concomitantly, the Earth often is
positioned in ways that suggest victimization by a rapist, sex murderer or
both.25 For example, a serial killer trading card26 pornographically fanta-
sizes a leering Richard Speck holding a knife against the skin of a young,
svelte, pretty blonde nurse (none of his actual victims were blonde).27
She is bound with ropes and dressed only in a fetish-type bra.28 A similar
structure can be found in an ad for InterContinental Hotels: it depicts an
orange, whose peel is carved into the familiar shapes of the continents.
29
A knife rests up against its now Earth-identified skin.30
Years ago, Ann gave me an ad, which she perceived as perfectly il-
lustrating ecological pornography. The ad for a Nissan Patrol GR ap-
peared in British Esquire; it showed a mountain wilderness area and in-
21. IN HARM'S WAY, supra note 3, at 428. For a discussion of everyday pornography involv-
ing animals, see CAROL J. ADAMS, THE PORNOGRAPHY OF MEAT (2003).
22. Cathy Horyn, When Is a Fashion Ad Not a Fashion Ad?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at
GI.
23. This ad appeared as a full page in the New York Times, sometime around 2002.
24. JANE CAPUTI, THE AGE OF SEX CRIME iii (1987).
25. This was also the underlying gallows humor in the classic Stanley Kubrick film, Dr.
Strangelove, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, where the aptly-named Air
Force General, Jack D. Ripper, sets into motion world nuclear destruction. DR. STRANGELOVE, OR:
How I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1964).
26. BARI KUMAR & SAMANTHA HARRISON, Richard Speck, in 52 FAMOUS MURDERERS
(Mother Prods. 1991).
27. Pictures of all of the victims can be found at the Murderpedia website. Juan Ignacio
Blanco, Richard Franklin Speck, MURDERPEDIA, http://www.murderpedia.org/male.S/s/speck-
richard-photos.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
28. See KUMAR & HARRISON, supra note 26.
29. This ad is from the early 1990s.
30. Id.
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corporated a stick-on replica of the SUV, removable by the viewer.31 The
copy read: "Stick it where the hell you like."32 This underlying cultural
project of masculine sexual subordination of a feminine or feminized
landscape, so evident here, is even more explicitly stated in a caustic
cartoon by David Levine, depicting Henry Kissinger on top of and fuck-
ing a prone woman whose head is planet Earth.33 It was Kissinger who
gave us the aphorism: "[Power] is the great aphrodisiac."34 The porno-
graphic paradigm (with both personal and planetary implications) of such
sexualized and gendered-masculine power is perfectly expressed in that
most telling word, fuck. The first two meanings offuck as a verb are (1)
"to engage in heterosexual intercourse involving the penetration of the
penis into the vagina with (a person)," and (2) "to harm irreparably; fin-
ish; damage; spoil; botch; (chiefly in passive) to put into a difficult or
hopeless situation; doom.3 5
Perhaps nature is understood through feminine metaphors like
Mother Earth only because culture has been defined as separate and mas-
culine. Or, perhaps, the Earth and what we generally call Nature in some
non-heterosexist and non-dualistic way we can barely imagine, does rep-
resent a maternal principle; one that contains female and male and every-
thing else in between or beyond.36 Certainly, oral traditions around the
world have long associated nature with a sacred feminine principle (one
that includes the masculine), the maternal and sexual source of life, nur-
turance, death, transformation, and renewal.37 Some contemporary envi-
ronmental justice organizations deliberately invoke this association. For
example, the group "Hands off Mother Earth," (H.O.M.E.) describes
itself as a "global campaign to defend our one precious home, Planet
Earth, against the threat of geoengineering experiments.
3 8
Eco-pornographic representations continue this association, but now
are linked in ways that frame anyone defined as "closer to (feminine)
31. See Jane Caputi, Everyday Pornography, in GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN MEDIA 434,
437 (Gail Dines & Jean M. Humez eds., 2d ed. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing
the advertisement).
32. Id.
33. David Levine, Cartoon, Screwing the World, NATION, Feb. 25, 1984, at 215.
34. See Hedrick Smith, Foreign Policy: Kissinger at Hub, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1971, at 1.
35. THE F-WORD 83, 88 (Jesse Sheidlower ed., 3d ed. 2009).
36. See, e.g., PAULA GUNN ALLEN, GRANDMOTHERS OF THE LIGHT: A MEDICINE WOMAN'S
SOURCEBOOK 180-83 (1991); VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENT 40 (Zed Books Ltd. 1988). We also might ponder all the variations of "Mother" and
"mothering" that do not follow a completely female and/or biological relationship (for example, the
"Mothers," such as Angie Xtravaganza, of the intentional families and their affiliated "Houses"
created by gay and transgender Latino and Black New Yorkers, who are the subject of the 1990 film
Paris Is Burning). PARIS Is BURNING (Miramax Films 1990).
37. For an analysis of this in Pueblo Indian literature, see Patricia Clark Smith & Paula Gunn
Allen, Earthy Relations, Carnal Knowledge: Southwestern American Indian Women Writers and
Landscape, in THE DESERT IS NO LADY 174, 174-96 (Vera Norwood & Janice Monk eds., 1987).
38. ETC Grp., About, HANDS OFF MOTHER EARTH,
http://www.handsoffmotherearth.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
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nature" as inferior.39 For example, in numerous popular representations,
young, desirable white women are cast on the floor, signifying their ab-
jection by associating them with the "lower," earthy sphere. Sometimes
women are represented literally as the ground (as in an ad for car audio
speakers that shows one such figure prone, her skin covered with road
maps).40 Desirable, young, white women appear most often because, in
the United States, they still pass as the "universal" woman, as well as the
trophy-object elite men, at least publicly, most want to possess. When a
dark-skinned woman is subjected to the same identification with nonhu-
man nature, land, or with animals, there are different inflections.
Alice Walker once made the intersectional41 observation that alt-
hough white women are represented as "objects" in pornography, black
women are represented as "shit. ',42 This is also true in everyday pornog-
raphy including everyday ecological pornography. Each year, the men's
magazine Esquire names a "sexiest woman alive" and features her in a
photo spread. In 2010 and 2012, white women were named and they
were shown posed in conventional ways stressing their availability-in
lingerie or laid out on a bed.43 But the Jamaican Rihanna, who was
named in 2011, received different treatment. For her photo spread, Ri-
hanna is naked, and, in most of the pictures, she is outside and on the
ground.44 Dirt particles are shown clinging to her skin, and she is covered
with sticks and other sorts of debris, even what looks like washed-up
seaweed.45
III. MARGINALIZED AND FEMINIZED MEN IN ECOLOGICAL
PORNOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS
Occasionally a marginalized and often feminized man plays the role
of the land. For example, a series of 2010 Old Spice ads that claim that
their product will allow you to "become one of the freshest smelling
places on Earth" feature a dark-skinned man, Isaiah Mustafa, who is
shown as literally a place on Earth, his skin embedded with features most
U.S. consumers would associate with "exotic-vacation" type lands.46 I
39. Susan Griffin, Split Culture, in HEALING THE WOUNDS: THE PROMISE OF ECOFEMINISM 7,
7-8, 11-12 (Judith Plant ed., 1989).
40. JENSEN AUDIO, Advertisement, FEEL THE RAW NAKED POWER OF THE ROAD (c. 1999).
41. Intersectionality involves dealing with the intersections and interactions of multiple op-
pressions, resulting in, for example, sexism being experienced differently by women of different,
and differently privileged, ethnicities. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991).
42. Alice Walker, Coming Apart, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 95,
103 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Ryan D'Agostino, Minka Kelly: Is the Sexiest Woman Alive, ESQUIRE, Nov. 2010, at 120;
Ross McCammon, The Sexiest Woman Alive 2012, ESQUIRE, Nov. 2012, at 118.
44. Ross McCammon, The Sexiest Woman Alive Is Rihanna, ESQUIRE, Nov. 2011, at 110.
45. See id.
46. Old Spice, Fiji, ADS OF THE WORLD, http://adsoftheworld.com/media/print/old-spice-fiji
(last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
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cannot recall any such instances of seeing a white man positioned with
the earth or land until very recently in an illustration for an article in
Rolling Stone on "Gangster Bankers, Too Big to Jail.,'47 This article de-
tailed the impotency of U.S. and British justice agencies in stopping the
abuses of HBSC, "the storied British colonial banking power" that
helped to launder money for Mexican drug mobs, various terrorist organ-
izations, and "countless common tax cheats.,48 The illustration depicts a
miserable, diminutive white man, whose head is planet Earth.49 He is
dressed in a buttoned-up shirt and bow tie (adopted in 2013 as a symbol
of the marriage equality movement),50 bound with ropes, held down, and
threatened by a huge, conventionally masculine, big-nosed and phallic,
white man who pushes a large gun into his eye.51 This image still em-
ploys the conventional "feminization" of the Earth, but now with homo-
phobic bullying as the metaphor for the gendered and implicitly sexual
domination.
IV. WHORES BY NATURE/NATURE AS WHORE
One part of the MacKinnon/Dworkin definition of pornography that
some find particularly problematic is the one that identifies pornography
as presenting women (and those used in place of women) as whores by
nature. For example, Duggan, Hunter, and Vance find that this term
(along with sex object) negates the reality of women as autonomous sex-
ual agents.52 I find this criticism perplexing, for isn't it, rather, being
defined as a whore by nature that does precisely that? The designation
whore by nature means that women are the very embodiment of sex in a
context where sex is stigmatized, put squarely on the "wrong" side of
that invidious-and foundational-culture/nature divide.53 That cul-
ture/nature divide is one of several related hierarchal dualisms:
male/female; top/bottom; mind/body; pure/dirty; light/dark; and spir-
it/flesh. In this framework, "the man" (with variations based on intersect-
ing factors like race or sexuality) is identified with all the favored sides,
paradigmatically culture/mind, whereas "the woman" (again with inter-
secting factors intervening) is nature/body/sex, understood to be inher-
ently antithetical to mind. Historically, this definition of women as utter
carnality, veritably as whores by nature, has supported the religious per-
47. Matt Taibbi, Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 28, 2013, at 51.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Ashley Lee, Jesse Tyler Ferguson Promotes Marriage Equality in New York with New
Bow Tie Collection, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/jesse-tyler-ferguson-promotes-marriage-425068.
51. Taibbi, supra note 47.
52. Duggan et al., supra note 6, at 317.
53. For ecofeminist critiques of the culture/nature divide, see Griffin, supra note 39, at 7-17;
VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF NATURE 41-68 (1993).
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secution of women as witches.54 It has criminalized sexually autonomous
women, while also absolving rapists who contend that their victim, all
along, was asking for it. It allows pimps (of any ilk) to contend that it is
women who commodify ourselves, that women are veritably made to be
used55 and used up (rather like the long-suffering female tree in that per-
ennially popular children's story, The Giving Tree, by Shel Silverstein).56
I bring up that sorry story deliberately; for nature, though often un-
derstood through a sexist lens as an all-loving and forgiving "Mother," is
simultaneously understood and treated as a "whore." Sometimes, nature
is the "Pretty Woman"57 type whore, the one a wealthy, white man might
even marry. We see this, for example, in the touristic promotion of exotic
"island therapy,"58 or some conservationist exhortations to preserve those
"[l]ast [g]reat [p]laces. 59 Other times, nature is the bitch type of whore,
the one who will trick and ruin you with tsunamis, hurricanes, and so on.
But, mostly, nature is treated in consumerist and militaristic cultures as
the quintessentially cheap and dirty whore (dirt, of course, is a synonym
for earth)-the one who is always available; the one whom you don't
really even have to pay; the one with no power to set limits on what you
can do to her; the one who gets so used up she ends up wasted, dumped,
and unmourned.60 Meanwhile, Nature, that paradigmatic whore by na-
54. The Dominican priests who wrote the quintessential, officially papal-approved, witch-
hunting and torturing manual, The Malleus Maleficarum (1484), avowed that "all [witchcraft] comes
from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable." HANS PETER BROEDEL, THE MALLEUS
MALEFICARUM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF WITCHCRAFT 26 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
Andrd Schnyder, MALLEUS MALEFCARUM, KOMENTAR ZUR WIEDERGABE DES ERSTDRUCKS VON 1487,
at 40 (1993)).
To conclude. All witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable. See
Proverbs xxx: There are three things that are never satisfied, yea, a fourth thing which
says not, It is enough; that is, the mouth of the womb. Wherefore for the sake of fulfilling
their lusts they consort even with devils.
THE MALLEUS MALEFICARUM OF HEINRICH KRAMER AND JAMES SPRENGER 47 (Montague Summers
trans., Dover Publ'ns 1971) (1928).
55. Andrea Dworkin originally theorizes the meaning of women being defined as whores by
nature. She writes: "The metaphysics of male sexual domination is that women are whores.... One
does not violate something by using it for what it is: neither rape nor prostitution is an abuse of the
female because in both the female is fulfilling her natural function . ANDREA DwORKIN,
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 203 (1989).
56. See SHEL SILVERSTEIN, THE GIVING TREE (1964).
57. I am referring to the 1990 film, Pretty Woman. In this film, Julia Roberts plays the "pretty
woman," who is ultimately able to leave prostitution and marry a rich capitalist. PRETTY WOMAN
(Touchstone Pictures 1990). The beginning of the movie refers to a decidedly less lucky, and per-
haps less "pretty," prostitute, whose murdered body has been found, tossed in a dumpster. Id.
58. This is the title of a tourism promoting piece, aimed at American travelers. Adam Pitluk,
Island Therapy, GOHUB, http://hub.aa.com/en/aw/therapist-pim-blue-steel-door-dirk-jan-recourt (last
visited Dec. 21, 2013).
59. The rhetoric of saving the "[lI]ast [g]reat [p]laces" is employed, for example, by The
Nature Conservancy. See, e.g., Jay Harrod, Arkansas: Saving the Last Great Places Under Earth,
NATURE CONSERVANCY (Apr. 2006),
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northameica/unitedstates/arkansas/explore/saving-the-
last-great-places-under-earth.xml.
60. 1 am thinking here of one of the opening scenes, referring to a murdered prostitute, whose
body is found in a dumpster in the 1991 "comedy" Pretty Woman, the fate that the "pretty" prostitute
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ture, is expected to demonstrate that proverbial "heart of gold;" willing,
despite all maltreatment, to keep accepting and recycling wastes (even
the most toxic) and to continue to provide such essential "services" as
nourishment (spiritual and physical), shelter, clean air, and water.
In her last, unfortunately unfinished, article, The Burden of Uncer-
tainty: "Chemical Body Burden" as Sex Discrimination, Professor
Scales takes up the theme of environmental pollution in relation to can-
cer, but still within a framework critical of pornography, writing at the
outset of this piece that "pornography is the glue that holds the world-
wide oppression of women together.",61 Upon first reading this, I coun-
tered, saying that I believed it to be religion that performs that function.
But, on reflection, there really is no debate when we grasp the underlying
identity of patriarchal religion and pornography. I consider this in detail
elsewhere,6 2 but briefly, we can note the ways that both collaborate to
support the culture/nature divide. For patriarchal religion, "God the Fa-
ther" is male, though asexual, disembodied, and heavenly-pure spirit.
There is no female divine and women are dogmatically inferior to men
due to their alleged tendency to sin and innate carnality (whorishness).
For patriarchal pornography, the same structure adheres: Women are
"body" and "sex" in a cultural context that understands these as degrad-
ed, as matter divorced from and even antagonistic to spirit. Pornography,
thought of in this way, is not deviant. Rather, it is the secret twin of pa-
triarchal religion.
V. ECOLOGICAL PORNOGRAPHY AND RAPE OF LAND AND PEOPLE
Since Professor Scales first wrote about ecological pornography,
other scholars and activists also have elaborated this concept. In a 2009
article, Bart Welling defines "ecopornography" as those practices of vis-
ual culture (particularly voyeuristic nature photography) that appear
beautiful, but actually obscure abuse.63 Like Professor Scales, Welling
links ecopornography to the "genocidal oppression of native peoples and
the colonization of their lands by European settlers .... "64 Andrea
Smith, in her book Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian
Genocide, analyzes the ways that "colonial relationships are themselves
seems to escape by marrying a much older and very rich man. PRETTY WOMAN (Touchstone Pic-
tures 1990).
61. Ann C. Scales, The Burden of Uncertainty: "Chemical Body Burden" as Sex Discrimina-
tion 7-9, 32 (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Denver University Law
Review).
62. See Jane Caputi, Re-Creating Patriarchy: Connecting Religion and Pornography, I
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 293 (2011).
63. Welling, supra note 15, at 53-55, 57. For example, many photos of creatures, like the
near-extinct Florida panther, suggest that this is a beautiful, free animal in the wild but actually the
scene is a posed one with a captive animal. The panther's habitat has been largely destroyed, build-
ing highways through it and cars and trucks regularly kill the remaining panthers. Their visage, then,
is put on a license plate with a plea to "save" them. See id. at 54, 63.
64. Id. at 57.
2013]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
gendered and sexualized,' '65 including ways that are sexually violent,
encompassing rape, murder, and mutilation. These actions, Smith argues,
established the "ideology that Native bodies are inherently violable-and
by extension, that Native lands are also inherently violable."66 This
founding atrocity is then mined for humor in the work of a Playboy car-
toonist,67 showing two Pilgrim men at the first Thanksgiving, off to the
side of the feast and raping Native women, with one remarking, "You
know, this might be the start of a great American tradition."
68
Smith further analyzes the ways that colonizers represent them-
selves as masculine and hence "naturally" dominant, while representing
those they conquer as naturally inferior-feminine, animalistic, savage,
more nature than culture, and marked by filth, "sexual perversity," and
"unbridled sexuality;" in short, as innately "whorish. 69 Smith writes that
"Native peoples are constantly equated with nature, which is in turn
equated with unbridled sexuality.,70 She compares the abuse of prosti-
tutes with colonizers' abuse of Native Americans, noting that "prostitutes
are almost never believed when they say they have been raped because
the dominant society considers the bodies of sex workers undeserving of
integrity and violable at all times.",71 Scholar and activist Haunani-Kay
Trask also shows such connections, taking the institution of prostitution
as paradigmatic of oppression, in that it defines the female "as an object
of degraded and victimized sexual value for use and exchange.72 Trask
finds this analogous to "the utter degradation of our culture (Hawaii) and
our people under corporate tourism.' '73 In that system, the tourist is told:
"Everything in Hawaii can be yours, that is, you the tourist, the non-
native, the visitor. The place, the people, the culture, even our identity as
a 'Native' people is for sale. Thus, Hawaii, like a lovely woman, is there
for the taking."74
In 2010, Professor Scales gave a speech honoring the work of Cath-
arine MacKinnon, whom she unwaveringly and profoundly esteemed.
Professor Scales defines the essence of MacKinnon's work as requiring
"solidarity with all people everywhere, particularly those who are femi-
65. ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 1
(2005).
66. Id. at 12.
67. PLAYBOY, Nov. 2007, at 130. The name of the cartoonist is written on the cartoon but is
illegible.
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. SMITH, supra note 65, at 10, 129.
70. Id. at 129.
71. Id at 10.
72. HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN
HAWAI'I 185 (1993).
73. Id. at 185, quoted in SMITH, supra note 65, at 125.
74. For a classic ad promoting this ideology, see one photographed by Edward Steichen for
Matson Cruise Line, which appeared in the November 1, 1941, issue of Vogue magazine on the
inside back cover. See ONLY SKIN DEEP: CHANGING VISIONS OF THE AMERICAN SELF 373 (Coco
Fusco & Brian Wallis eds., 2003).
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nized, those who are systematically tortured, traded, abused, diminished,
and otherwise treated as the raw materials for eventual consumption as
highly-processed things."75 And, as the logic of an ecological feminist
critique demands, "raw materials" themselves should never be treated as
"raw materials;" that is, as objects for instrumental use. The association
between "those who are feminized" (beginning with women) and raw
materials dates back to the historical origin of patriarchy.
VI. ECOLOGICAL PORNOGRAPHY AND THE PATRIARCHAL PARADIGM
Historian Gerda Lerner provides an analysis of the development of
patriarchy as a historical system, by analyzing how it developed in one
form in the ancient Near East from the third to the first millennia
B.C.E.76 The key element was men's appropriation and control over
women's sexual and reproductive capacities, which effectively turned
women into a form of raw material, into a resource to generate wealth for
men.77 This equation of women with property, Lerner argues, led not
only to the institutions of marriage and prostitution, but also to the inven-
tion of slavery as well as private ownership of land.78 Land/Nature, like
women, was redefined, turned from creative source into (exploitable)
resource, "raw material.79
These foundational constructs inform an Annie Leibovitz cover for
the November 2012 issue of Vanity Fair.80 It features Daniel Craig as the
latest James Bond, but invokes the 1964 Bond film Goldfinger and the
Ian Fleming novel on which it was based.81 In the novel, the villain, the
obscenely wealthy Goldfinger, is basically a hoarder. A popular reality-
TV show features mostly poor and cluttered women as those abject be-
ings, but in truth, it is the wealthiest men who manifest that obsession.
Goldfinger, like Christopher Columbus, is marked by an "obsession with
gold' 82 and Goldfinger expresses this mania through both hoarding and
sexual domination. He pays women to submit to being painted gold and
then to have intercourse with him. 3 This allows Goldfinger to feel that
he is "possessing gold ... marrying it." 84 Usually, he leaves the women's
backbone skin exposed so that they don't epidermally suffocate-but not
always.85 Goldfinger retaliates against Bond for having sex with his mis-
tress by having her painted gold all over, killing her.86 Presumably, he
75. Ann Scales, The World as She Found It, 46 TULSA L. REV. 7, 7 (2010).




80. VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2012, at cover.
81. IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER (Penguin Books 2002) (1959).
82. LAURENCE BERGREEN, COLUMBUS: THE FOUR VOYAGES 179 (2011).
83. FLEMING, supra note 81, at 162.
84. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 162-63.
86. Id.
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also rapes her first. The image of this "attractive," raped and murdered
golden woman went on to become the most recognizable icon associated
with Bond.87 The Leibowitz photo shows Craig's smirking face set
against the backdrop of a svelte, curvy, and sectioned golden female
body, his head placed literally over her sex.88 Women, defined as whores
by nature, have long been told that we are "sitting on a gold mine."
89
Men, variously, seek to stake their claim. The message transmitted here
is that male sexual gratification-as well as status, wealth, and power-
all derive from possession of women/slaves/stuff/land. This gratification
is a kind of necrophilic one, as it requires, one way or another, that a
being is killed into a thing; something also evident in Mount Rushmore,
where the living, "sacred, and perhaps irretrievably scarred"9 mountain
has been defaced and replaced by a monument intended to immortalize
not only those particular presidents, but the white, masculinist ego and its
conquests.
VII. THE MEDUSAN COUNTERNARRATIVE
To continue our collaboration, and at her suggestion, Ann and I de-
veloped and co-taught two interdisciplinary courses at the University of
New Mexico in 1994-95.91 Ann was a consummate teacher-
knowledgeable and always prepared, but equally dazzling when some-
thing unexpected came up. She put forth an ideal of teaching in "a matrix
of unconditional love, 92 and in my experience, she realized that goal.
During the 2013 Symposium on her work held at the University of Den-
ver, Professor Nancy Ehrenreich told the audience that she once had
asked Professor Scales for the secret of her successful teaching. In reply,
Professor Scales quipped: "I give a lot of handouts."93 How apt, I
87. To deliberately pay "homage" to this icon, the Bond film, QUANTUM OF SOLACE (Eon
Productions 2008), included a scene showing another of Bond's sexual partners drowned in oil, with
her dead, oil-covered body laid out on a bed in a manner identical to the Goldfinger scene.
88. VANITY FAIR, supra note 80, at cover.
89. "Sitting on a gold mine" is an idiomatic phrase meaning to be "in control of something
very valuable." Farlex, Sitting on a Gold Mine, THE FREE DICTIONARY,
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/sitting+on+a+gold+mine (last visited Dec. 21, 2013). Many
women are told that we are literally "sitting on a gold mine," which is understood to mean that
female sexual and reproductive powers have commodity value, whether in virginal status ensuring
proper marriage or as something to be prostituted. For example, one blogger states:
Ever since I can remember my grandmother has told me that I am sitting on a gold mine.
Even at a young age I knew what she was talking about because she had no problem
whatsoever elaborating. I grew up knowing that my "gold mine" was precious and that no
matter what, I should take the best care of it at all costs! She told me to wait until I was
married to a man who loved me with all of his heart. To save it as a gift.
Raylina Robinson, Sitting on a Gold Mine, PARDON MY AUDACITY (June 3, 2013),
http://uniqueluxury.wordpress.com/2013/06/03/sitting-on-a-gold-mine/.
90. Scales, supra note 8, at 95.
91. The first, in the UNM Law School, was "Pornography, Sexual Representation, Culture";
the other, taught through American Studies, was "Sex, Gender and the Law."
92. Scales, supra note 8 at 95, 112.
93. Nancy Ehrenreich, Professor, Sturm Coll. of Law, Opening Remarks at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law Symposium Honoring the Work of Ann Scales: On "Having Fun and
Raising Hell" (Mar. 30, 2013).
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thought; for Ann so generously doled out the only real currency-love
and attention-to her students. She was, moreover, witty, charismatic,
and impassioned in the classroom, inspiring many students with a life-
long commitment to social justice.
. Ann always made it real, feeling herself obliged "to name what is
happening."94 To show just how sacred that task is, she wrote a piece
called Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, warn-
ing against the ways that legal theory can work to silence and quash the
transformative powers of feminism.95 Medusa, an ancient Serpent God-
dess who signifies wisdom and the sacredness and powers of nature,96
including the death power, is defamed in patriarchal myth as an ugly and
terrifying monster, needing to be slain by a hero. The hero's "death defy-
ing" act is then rendered in numerous, often vividly sexualized, depic-
tions. One of the most egregious is Perseus and Medusa,97 a sculpture by
Benvenuto Cellini that shows the hero holding the decapitated head and
trampling on her fallen body.98 The popular arts regularly rehash this
ritual scarring of the sacred. Medusa is stalked and killed, for example,
once again in the popular film, Clash of the Titans, in both the 198199
and 20101°° versions. Meanwhile, popular representations, from slasher
films through fashion displays and corporate advertising, regularly dis-
play similar scenes of decapitation and dismemberment of women as
well as the Earth.01
Obviously, because this ritual re-enactment (literal and symbolic) of
her death and debasement continues to be performed, Medusa is not so
easily disposed of. Rather, she still is present, relevant, potent, and
threatening. Professor Scales explains exactly what it is about Medusa
that makes her so dangerous:
94. Scales, supra note 7, at 46.
95. Id. at 37-38.
96. The serpents associated with Medusa appear throughout world sacred narratives as mani-
festations of "the holiness of nature" and "the principle of life itself," which necessarily includes
death. JEAN CHEVALIER & ALAIN GHEERBRANT, A DICTIONARY OF SYMBOLS 845 (John Buchanan-
Brown trans., Penguin Books 1996) (1969); see also JOSEPH CAMPBELL & BILL MOYERS, THE
POWER OF MYTH 45 (Betty Sue Flowers ed., 1988).
97. This piece was sculpted from 1545-54. Michael Cole, Cellini's Blood, 81 ART BULL. 215,
215, 232 n.10 (1999).
98. The statue stands in the Piazza Signoria in Florence. MARY D. GARRARD,
BRUNELLESCHI'S EGG: NATURE, ART, AND GENDER IN RENAISSANCE ITALY 286 (2010). Cellini's
commission did not include sculpting Medusa's body, but he took that on, gloating that he had based
the figure upon that of his mistress. Id. The sculpture itself, art historian Mary Garrard writes, is a
work of "unparalleled gender violence ... a gory decapitation [in which] . . . Perseus triumphantly
displays Medusa's head and its dripping ligaments, his feet planted on her twisted body. From her
neck a gruesome mess of blood and gut erupts .... Cellini's debasement of the feminine is com-
plete." Id.
99. CLASH OF THE TITANS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1981).
100. CLASH OF THE TITANS (Warner Bros. 2010).
101. 1 elaborate in Jane Caputi, The Pornography of Everyday Life, supra note 2, at 311-18,
and in my forthcoming film, tentatively titled, Our Planet/Ourselves: Connecting the War on
Womenkind* to the War on the Earth.
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By turning men to stone, she prevented "the male gaze," thus deny-
ing the possibility that women could be defined by men. . . . Her
snakes represent unintimidatable self-possession. She had to be killed
because, by her very existence, she could expose the contingency of
the Law of the Fathers .... Her destruction required female complici-
ty, which was amply rewarded .... Medusa symbolizes female poten-
tial ....
In short, Medusa is the unvarnished, undomesticated-and incom-
plete-countemarrative to patriarchy.
0 2
Professor Scales closes this piece by urging us "to reclaim Medusa, in
wholeness and in solidarity."'0 3 This language directs us to the need to
heal the broken and fragmented consciousness that produces the cul-
ture/nature divide and related hierarchical dualisms. Finally, a key fea-
ture of the assault on Medusa is her disarticulation (dismemberment),
including her decapitation, which philosopher Hl6ne Cixous recognizes
as a silencing.1°4 Reclaiming Medusa, Professor Scales loudly took on
patriarchy's "sacred" institutions-not only pornography, but also foot-
ball, which, she recognized as a sport that "normalize[s] and encour-
age[s] harms to women, including educational and sexual harms."
10 5
A. Scars and the Sacred
Ann was not only an ideal person to hash out ideas with, but also a
true friend whom I trusted implicitly. She was a most valued advisor in
any number of realms-intellectual, political, legal, emotional, and spir-
itual. She had exceptional wisdom, humor, compassion, strength, and
resilience. She also grappled with serious depression and had scars left
by sexual harms inflicted on her when she was young, by familial and
social homophobia, and by cancer. She lost her only sister as a teenager
to that disease and then received her own diagnosis of breast cancer a
few years before her death.
In The Burden of Uncertainty: "Chemical Body Burden " as Sex
Discrimination, Professor Scales sought to establish a legal framework
for victims of environmental sexism, resulting in cancer:
My interest here is the burden on the element of causation-in-fact,
especially in the context of toxic torts, and with special attention to
breast cancer.
102. Scales, supra note 7, at 35 (footnotes omitted).
103. Id. at 46.
104. H161ne Cixous, Castration or Decapitation?, 7 SIGNS 41, 49 (Annette Kuhn trans., 1981).
For elaboration see Susan Griffin, Split Culture, in HEALING THE WOUNDS: THE PROMISE OF
ECOFEMINISM 7, 7-17 (Judith Plant ed., 1989); VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF
NATURE 59-60 (1993).
105. Ann Scales, Student Gladiators and Sexual Assault: A New Analysis of Liability for Inju-
ries Inflicted by College Athletes, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 205, 208 (2009).
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Here, I propose a judicial burden-shifting doctrine on the element
of causation in cases of injuries sufficiently correlated with exposure
to approximately 80,000 "ordinary chemicals," those chemicals that
pervade our daily lives in multiple ways, from food to plastics to fab-
rics to cosmetics to household cleaners. Focusing particularly on or-
dinary "endocrine disrupting chemicals," I will refer to this problem
henceforth as "Ordinary Chemical Exposure," or "OCE." Moreover,
I will argue that such a burden-shifting doctrine in OCE cases [is]
justified by our social commitment to eliminate sex discrimination. 106
Cancer of the reproductive and sexual organs is specifically a matter of
environmental injustice, Professor Scales and others argue.'°7
The title, The Burden of Uncertainty: "Chemical Body Burden" as
Sex Discrimination, could not help but reflect Ann's own pain of living
with a cancer diagnosis as well as the toll of the various treatments-
radiation, pharmaceutical, and surgical-that she bore. It also reflected
her awareness, which she discussed in the 1990 article, that her mother
had been dosed with what probably was the drug DES during her two
pregnancies. °8 Both daughters then ended up with cancer. As I reflect on
Ann, her life and her work, I realize newly the profundity of the insight
that she received that day from the Black Hills; the awareness that patri-
archy, "perhaps irretrievably," scars the sacred.1°9 But Ann, like those
"sycamores blazing . . . dappled with scars, still exuberantly bud-
ding," invoked by Adrienne Rich,110 also continued to bud, to dazzle, to
open out and flower, despite her pain. One of her favorite compliments
was to tell someone that "the Goddess shines through you." And, of
course, that was eminently true of her.
106. Scales, supra note 61, at 3-4. Scales notes that her proposal owes much to the "Environ-
mental Racism" or "Environmental Justice" movements. Id. at 4 n.7 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
107. For example, certain ethnic groups (for example, Mexicans, because so many work in
pesticide-laden fields) as well as adult women (with variations resulting from their ethnicity and
region) have far higher blood levels of what is known as "Ordinary Chemical Exposure." This is due
to a variety of reasons including women's greater store of body fat, as well the feminine gender ole
requiring daily interactions with chemical-laden beauty and household cleaning products. For more
information on this issue and the concerns of environmental justice, see STACY ALAIMO, BODILY
NATURES: SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MATERIAL SELF 116-18 (2010).
108. DES is the common designation for Diethylstilbestrol, which is a synthetic form of estro-
gen. Doctors prescribed it to pregnant women between 1940 and 1971 to prevent miscarriage, prem-
ature labor, and other complications associated with pregnancy. Numerous health problems are
known to be associated with the daughters and sons of these women, including greater risk for a
variety of cancers, including breast cancer. For more information see the fact sheet on this drug and
its relation to cancer on the website for the American Cancer Institute. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) and
Cancer, NAT'L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/DES (last updated
Oct. 5, 2011).
109. Scales, supra note 8, at 95.
110. RICH, supra note 1, at 25.
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B. Wholeness, Endurance, and Eternity
Now on to another of her enduring pieces, one that makes me laugh
more than cry, an article on how to survive what Ann calls "Legal De-
Education."'1 11 The article is brimming with choice advice applicable to
most any school (or situation) we find ourselves in. Once again, telling
that Medusan counternarrative is requisite: "Taking a stand and saying
what you really see is a tough assignment. When anyone who is commit-
ted to liberation does that, love her for it."' 112 Professor Scales continues,
reminding her readers that it is okay to disagree, even with her, even with
the ideas in that very article. And, she says, "[i]f we can't agree, or I'm
being obstinate, go ahead and call me a bitch, then give me a hug and
let's make plans to collaborate in the future."
'" 13
Reading this, at first I want to say, "damn," more than anything I
wish that I could. But even without her actual, living presence in my life,
Ann is and always will be an essential part of me; someone I can't com-
pletely lose, for she indelibly changed me for the better, changed me for
good.114 She continues to inhabit, inform, and transform my conscious-
ness and my spirit and she always will. Re-reading Feminists in the Field
of Time, Ann's reflections on this very phenomenon newly caught my
attention.
In this piece, Professor Scales explores the legal and spiritual impli-
cations of the patriarchal linear, progressive sense of time, enshrined in
the Mount Rushmore monument that "portrays puny, genocidal United
States history as more important than the timelessness of the Black
Hills."1" 5 She draws on the philosopher Julia Kristeva, who finds that
women's sense of time is "measured by cycles, gestation, biological
rhythms, and cosmic events," and is one where time is viewed as "an
illusion, as not really passing."'1 6 Professor Scales continues:
I recognize these approaches in the wise women I know. They
acknowledge that they are "in the field of time," in the sense of living
a life bounded by birth and death. However, they see birth and death
as mere markers in a much larger cycle. They pursue their daily tasks
and make plans in accordance with linear time measurement. But
these are practical accommodations, not expressions of allegiance.
Ill. Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REV. 139
(1990).
112. Id. at 161.
113. Id. at 162.
114. At the memorial for Professor Scales at the University of Denver on September 21, 2012,
her former student, Julie Nichols, eulogized her magnificently by invoking the song "For Good"
from the musical Wicked. Elphaba and Glinda sing to each other in love and enduring commitment
about the effect they have had on each other: "I do believe I have been changed for the better / And
because I knew you ... I have been changed for good." KRISTIN CHENOWETH & IDINA MENZEL, For
Good, on WICKED (Decca Broadway Records 2003).
115. Scales, supra note 8, at 96.
116. Id. at 109.
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These women could not endure life except in their conviction that
they-that all of us-are part of an expression of eternity. 1
17
Although Professor Scales writes of "life," she is referring not only
to the general phenomenon, but to the experience of life for women in a
pornographic culture; that "city" where, as Adrienne Rich puts it,
"screens flicker with pornography," but where "we also have to
walk."1 8 Professor Scales finds that it is an awareness of ourselves as
part of eternity that makes this endurable.1 9 Significantly, she speaks of
eternity, not immortality.1 20 The drive for immortality is a distinctively
patriarchal and egocentric one. It manifests in that obsessive need to
make a mark-a scar-on the sacred, mountains, and otherwise.22 It is
expressed mythically in horrific heroism like Gilgamesh's razing of a
primal forest,123 as well Perseus' assault on Medusa. It motivates blood
sacrifice, resulting in genocide, gynocide, and ecocide.124 It takes reli-
gious form in what ecological feminist philosopher Val Plumwood calls
patriarchal "heavensm,125 and philosophical and scientific forms in the
"live-forever" aspirations of contemporary post-humanists and synthetic
biologists. 26 Professor Scales recognizes that this lust for immortality is
based in the egotistic denial that all of us are "mere specks in the plasma
of the universe."27 In the linear, patriarchal sense of time, death is feared• . 28
as the end of the line; as termination. But, an ecological understanding
instead knows death as a continuum of being, what Professor Scales in-
vokes as eternity, which is always "here and now."1 29 A Medusan sense
of time realizes the impossibility of isolating either a beginning or an
ending; it recognizes the cycle of existence as a timeless process of birth,
117. Id. at I10.
118. RICH, supra note 1, at 25.
119. Scales, supra note 8, at 110.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 96; NANCY JAY, THROUGHOUT YOUR GENERATIONS FOREVER: SACRIFICE,
RELIGION, AND PATERNITY 144-45 (1992).
122. Scales, supra note 8, at 96.
123. ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, FORESTS: THE SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION 13 18 (1992).
124. I elaborate on gynocide and the quest for immortality in Jane Caputi, The Gods We Wor-
ship: Sexual Murder as Religious Sacrifice, in GODDESSES AND MONSTERS: WOMEN, MYTH,
POWER, AND POPULAR CULTURE 182, 182-206 (2004).
125. For an ecofeminist philosophical analysis of patriarchal fear of death, as well as the articu-
lation of a countemarrative, see Val Plumwood, Visiting Fellow, Fenner Sch. of Env't & Soc'y,
Austl. Nat'l Univ., Canberra, Remarks at Harvard Forum on Religion and Ecology: Tasteless: To-
wards a Food-based Approach to Death 3 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://valplumwood.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/tasteless.doc.
126. This is particularly obvious in contemporary post-human discourse, exemplified by such
thinkers as Max More and Raymond Kurzweil. I offer an extended discussion of this in Jane Caputi,
Feeding Green Fire, 5 J. FOR STUDY RELIGION NATURE & CULTURE 410, 430 (2011). For its repre-
sentation in advocacy for synthetic biology, see GEORGE CHURCH & ED REGIS, REGENESIS: HOW
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY WILL REINVENT NATURE AND OURSELVES 219-220 (2012).
127. Scales, supra note 8, at 112.
128. See Plumwood, supra note 125.
129. CAMPBELL & MOYERS, supra note 96, at 67. Much of Ann Scales's orientation in Ferni-
nists in the Field of Time seems influenced by the thought of Joseph Campbell on such concepts as
eternity and "the field of time."
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growth, decline, death, transformation, and renewal. There is loss, and
we greatly mourn those we love, but there is no actual "passing away" in
the same ecological sense that there is no "away" for us to safely dispose
of toxins like nuclear waste. Everything really is everything.1 30 Every-
thing is one ecosystem; everything is inescapably interconnected.
While fear motivates the drive for immortality, a sense of happiness
and wholeness accompanies immersion into eternity, as beautifully ex-
pressed by Willa Cather, describing a young boy's epiphany in an actual,
earthy field-a pumpkin patch:
I kept as still as I could. Nothing happened. I did not expect anything
to happen. I was something that lay under the sun and felt it, like the
pumpkins, and I did not want to be anything more. I was entirely
happy. Perhaps we feel like that when we die and become a part of
something entire, whether it is sun and air, or goodness and
knowledge. At any rate, that is happiness; to be dissolved into some-
thing complete and great. When it comes to one, it comes as naturally
as sleep.
131
Ann Scales opens her profound piece Feminists in the Field of Time
by naming the heart-sickening, egotistical, and ecologically pornographic
story conveyed by Mount Rushmore. She concludes by taking up
Adrienne Rich's challenge to begin the work of "imagin[ing] us,"'
132
which I take as those of us, Lesbian and otherwise, who seek a world
other than patriarchy. Professor Scales thus imagines us in solidarity and
in wholeness, as "mere specks"'33 to be sure, but "part of something en-
tire . . . something complete and great,"' 34 something enduring, some-
thing scarred, but still, irretrievably, sacred.
135
130. LAURYN HILL, Everything Is Everything, on THE MISEDUCATION OF LAURYN HILL (Ruff-
house Records 1998).
131. WILLA CATHER, MY ANTONIA 11-23 (Barnes & Noble Books 1994) (1918).
132. RICH, supra note 1, at 25.
133. Scales, supra note 8, at 112.
134. CATHER, supra note 131, at 12.
135. 1 am grateful to Kathryn Boundy for sharing her insights with me on how "scars must be
made part of the sacred past/present." E-mail from Kathryn Boundy to author (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:59
PM) (on file with author).
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Ann Scales was a critic of militarism. She challenged her readers to
engage in "a radical critique of all of the excuses for and covers for the
use of force-that is, a radical critique of militarism-in whatever con-
text it appears." She also cautioned that this critique is perhaps most im-
portant in contexts where the influence of militarism is less obvious. This
Essay takes up Scales's challenge to call out and critique militarism, and
to do so in a context where the influence of militarism may be less obvi-
ous, by focusing on immigration law and policy. Part I of this Essay
summarizes Scales's critique of militarism. Part II uses Scales's analysis
of Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which involved a
failed sex-based equal protection challenge to a citizenship law, as a
starting point for tracing out the broad influence of militarism on immi-
gration law doctrines. Part III explores the obvious ways in which milita-
rized immigration policies legitimate state-sanctioned violence, using the
Sixth Circuit's 2013 decision in the case of Villegas v. Metro Govern-
ment of Nashville as an illustrative example. Part IV argues the less ob-
vious point that this violent enforcement is used in the service of an im-
migration regime that is structured to reinforce gender hierarchies.
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INTRODUCTION
I think you can tell a lot about a person from the way she is memo-
rialized: the people who gather, the things they talk about, the memories
they share. I didn't know Ann Scales in life, but I was given the wonder-
ful opportunity to honor her life at the Symposium held in her honor on
March 31, 2013, at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I
learned a great deal about her that day.
The gathering was diverse. It held students and teachers. It held cli-
nicians and doctrinal faculty and faculty who seek to break down the
borders between those groups. It held lawyers and nonlawyers, scholars
from across the academy, and many who work outside of the academy. It
held men and women of many races, ethnicities, and nationalities. The
room was full of people who are gay, lesbian, straight, bisexual, or still
questioning their sexual orientation. The room contained feminist schol-
ars and queer scholars who profoundly disagree with one another about
many fundamental questions but who all agreed about the importance of
Scales's contributions to scholarship and to society. Indeed, keynote
speaker Katherine Franke observed that two individuals whose methodo-
logical approaches were often in tension or at odds with Scales's own
gave the keynote speeches at the Symposium.1 Even in her passing, Ann
Scales gave us an important space in which to "[t]ake a [b]reak from
[a]crimony.' 2 All of this says something very important about Professor
Scales's capaciousness as an intellectual and a human being.
I. Scales's writing exhibits a unique capacity both to articulate her own strongly-held views
and to make space for views that others might read as hopelessly oppositional to hers. My favorite
example of this, but certainly not the only one, is her rereading of Angela P. Harris's Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). Some feminist legal scholars
had excoriated Harris's piece. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Keeping It Real: On Anti-
"Essentialism," in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 71, 73-74
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). Professor Scales's views on poststructuralist attacks on feminist
theory certainly aligned with those of Harris's critics. See Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE
CONVERSATIONS 395, 405 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009). Yet, ultimately, Scales read
Harris's work more generously and attentively than many of Scales's allies. Most notably to me,
Scales noted that Harris's opening epigraphs et forth both the Constitution's "[w]e, the people" and
a quote from Jorge Luis Borges's Funes the Memorious, in which the character "could recount
experience only by taking more time than it took to live it." Id. (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (discussing Harris, supra, at 581-82); see U.S. CONST. pmbl.; JORGE LUIS
BORGES, FUNES THE MEMORIOUS (1942). The import was that it was certainly important o avoid the
essentialism that effectively disappears ome experiences systematically, but that it was also im-
portant to avoid "a kind of under-generalization that leads to communicative failure." Scales, supra,
at 405. Scales understood Harris to be "talking about the need for conversation always to proceed in
the territory between saying everything and saying nothing." Id. Notwithstanding the admittedly
"confrontational" title of her chapter, id. at 395, Scales reminded the reader that conversations and
progress were possible even among those with distinct theoretical commitments.
2. Katherine Franke, Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law & Dir., Ctr. for Gend. &
Sexuality Law, Columbia Law Sch., Keynote Address at the University of Denver Sturm College of
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There was a lot of laughter in the room, and there were tears, too.
Those who were dearest to Professor Scales were able to say to those
who only really knew her through her writing that they recognized
"Ann" in our comments. This means that Scales not only wrote what she
really thought but also put herself into her writing. Her scholarship not
only reflected her thoughts and beliefs but also reflected some essence of
her.
I did not know Ann Scales, but at her memorial Symposium, I
learned that I would have liked to have known her. With this Essay, I
attempt to explore, apply, and perhaps expand one aspect of her feminist
jurisprudence: her critique of militarism. Part I of this Essay summarizes
Scales's critique of militarism. Part II uses Scales's analysis of Nguyen v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,3 which involved a failed sex-
based equal protection challenge to a citizenship law, as a starting point
for tracing out the broad influence of militarism on immigration law doc-
trines. Part III explores the ways in which militarized immigration poli-
cies legitimate state-sanctioned violence, using the Sixth Circuit's April
2013 decision in the case of Villegas v. Metro Government of Nashville4
as an illustrative example. Part IV argues the frequently overlooked point
that this violent enforcement is used in the service of an immigration
regime that is structured to reinforce gender hierarchies.
I. ANN SCALES'S CRITIQUE OF MILITARISM
Ann Scales was a critic of militarism. She theorized that "law and
militarism are intimately related,... militarism and male dominance are
intimately related, and ... feminism is inconsistent with all of them.,
5
Scales defined militarism in slightly different ways over time. In a 1989
article, she defined it as "the pervasive cluster of forces that keeps histo-
ry insane: hierarchy, conformity, waste, false glory, force as the resolu-
tion of all issues, death as the meaning of life, and a claim to the necessi-
ty of all of that.",6 Later, she defined militarism as
the manifestation at every level of policy-military and otherwise-
of the logic of war.... Every policy, including every domestic poli-
cy, must be measured by its effect on military capability and readi-
Law Symposium Honoring the Work of Ann Scales: Taking a Break from Acrimony: The Feminist
Method of Ann Scales (Mar. 30, 2013).
3. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
4. 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
5. Ann C. Scales, Midnight Train to Us, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 710, 710 (1990) [hereinafter
Scales, Midnight Train] (describing her article Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist
Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989) [hereinafter Scales, Militarism]).
6. Scales, Militarism, supra note 5, at 26. Other feminist scholars have offered similar defi-
nitions to similar concepts. Cynthia Enloe, for example, writes that "[tjo become militarized is to
adopt militaristic values (e.g., a belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force) and priorities as
one's own, to see military solutions as particularly effective, to see the world as a dangerous place
best approached with militaristic attitudes." CYNTHIA ENLOE, GLOBALIZATION AND MILITARISM:
FEMINISTS MAKE THE LINK 4 (2007).
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ness, lest some rival gain any small advantage. Cost is no object.
Disproportionality is part of the expectedly exorbitant price.
7
In Scales's view, the forces of militarism and gender "account... for the
oppression of women in whatever patriarchal institution-religion, state,
family, academy-and by whatever method-rape, battering, economic
exploitation, rendering invisible."8 She believed that "[w]e can't over-
come gender oppression without demilitarizing ourselves and our
world."9
Scales noted that the gendered nature of militarism poses a problem
for the law because law is "a system of social order backed by the force
of the state."0 The state's ability to fine, arrest, detain, shame, exclude,
deport, and even kill lawbreakers is what often gives the law its power.
Militarism thus undergirds law; unsurprisingly, judges often in turn use
the tools of law to avoid confronting militarism. Specifically, Scales
claimed that courts frequently use legal doctrines such as the political
question doctrine to dodge their obligations to resolve challenges to mili-
tarism.1 But for Scales, the fact that legal doctrine can be wielded in
ways that avoid confronting militarism does not completely undermine
the possibility that law can be a tool by which militarism can be con-
fronted. 12
Scales also recognized that law is not exclusively legitimated by
force or the threat of force. Law also functions because it is, at least theo-
retically, a system of mutual obligation-one that is the product of "mu-
tual promises to abide by agreements."'3 Scales observed, however, that
not all of those individuals subject to the law have the same agency with
respect to the law, which gives the lie to the purported mutuality of the
obligation. '
4
Scales's work illuminates the fact that whether law is a system of
rule backed by militaristic force or a set of mutual obligations premised
on imperfect mutuality, or some combination of these two things, the law
draws its sources of legitimacy from social ordering principles that struc-
turally and historically have excluded women. For Scales, the challenge
for feminist jurisprudence is to "change the way law views women and to
make possible the autonomy presumed by traditional theory."'5 In her
7. Ann Scales, Soft on Defense: The Failure to Confront Militarism, 20 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 369, 371 (2005).
8. Scales, Militarism, supra note 5, at 26.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 30.
11. See id. at 65-68.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 32 (relying on theories of H.L.A. Hart and Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedi-
ence, in Crises of the Republic 49, 79 (1972)).
14. Id. at 34.
15. Id. at 36.
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view, we must move away from a system of law that is legitimated pri-
marily through militaristic force or that is imposed (forcibly) on those as
to whom there is no mutual obligation.'6 Law itself can be a tool toward
that end, but Scales also argued in favor of challenging unjust laws
through civil disobedience-or "nonviolent direct action."' 17 Such chal-
lenges allow individuals who are structurally disempowered to partici-
pate in legal decision-making, while also "invit[ing] the courts to be di-
rectly participatory" in the legal decision-making structure, including
"the military decision-making structure."
'18
While attentive to the transformative possibilities of law, Scales re-
alistically acknowledged that the law most often serves the goals of mili-
tarism and the exclusionary projects of the liberal state. This is true not
only insofar as legal doctrine is manipulated to keep courts from con-
fronting militaristic structures,'9 but also to the extent that the invulnera-
bility of militarism "shapes the debate" over constitutional questions on
issues as diverse as abortion, citizenship, self-defense, and doctrines of
sovereign immunity in tort law.20 Recognizing the ubiquity of militarism
in legal doctrines and legal logic, and convinced that militarism is "busy
reinforcing gender, in its worst non-fluid forms," Scales challenged her
readers to engage in "a radical critique of all of the excuses for and co-
vers for the use of force-that is, a radical critique of militarism-in
whatever context it appears."2' She also cautioned that this critique is
perhaps most important in contexts where the influence of militarism is
less obvious.
22
This Essay takes up Scales's challenge to call out and critique mili-
tarism, and to do so in contexts where the influence of militarism may be
less obvious. I focus on immigration law and policy. Scales posited a link
between militarism and the construction of oppressive gender norms, but
it is often difficult to visualize this link in the abstract. Focusing on one
concrete example helps to illustrate both the legitimacy of Scales's asser-
tion, as well as its limits.
II. MILITARISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY
In Soft on Defense, Scales used the case of Nguyen v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service as a vehicle for exploring "how militarism
shapes constitutional jurisprudence in unspoken ways.,23 The case in-
volved an equal protection challenge to U.S. citizenship laws, which
16. See id. at 29-30, 33-34.
17. Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 59.
19. Id. at 65-70; see also Scales, supra note 7, at 374-75.
20. Scales, supra note 7, at 377-85.
21. Id. at 390, 392.
22. Id at 392.
23. Scales, supra note 7, at 377 (discussing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)).
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allowed the children of unmarried U.S. citizen mothers to become U.S.
citizens automatically but required unmarried U.S. citizen fathers to sat-
isfy certain additional statutory requirements before their children could
24become citizens. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, upholding
the differential standards on intermediate scrutiny by a 5-4 vote.25 The
majority concluded that Congress could take account of biological dif-
ference to achieve its desire to ensure a genuine biological connection
26between the citizen parent and the child. The majority reasoned that,
unlike a mother, who will always be present at a child's birth, an unwed
father may not even know about the child.27 Justice Kennedy wrote for
the majority:
Given the [nine]-month interval between conception and birth, it is
not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived,
nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's
identity. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a
child born overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context
has always been with young people, men for the most part, who are
on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries.
28
The Court was noticeably concerned that the children of male U.S.
citizen soldiers might claim U.S. citizenship. Scales noted that "[t]o grant
automatic citizenship to their children, thereby subjecting each and every
soldier-father to the possibility of paternity suits, child support payments,
and the like, might deprive combat of some of its appeal."29 In the Ngu-
yen decision, Scales saw the Court's investment in the ideas that soldiers
need to be able to have sex with women abroad without concern that the
consequences may follow them home, and that the nation needs to be
24. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57-60.
25. Id. at 56.
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 65.
28. Id. at 56, 65.
29. Scales, supra note 7, at 379. It is not just wartime service, but also "peacekeeping" that
raises this possibility. This is evident in Dina Francesca Haynes's description of Arizona Market, a
marketplace that developed in the Br~ko District after it was flooded with American troops and
made into an American protectorate in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accords. Dina Francesca
Haynes, Lessons from Bosnia's Arizona Market: Harm to Women in a Neoliberalized Postconflict
Reconstruction Process, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1779, 1792-93 (2010). In time, it became a hotspot of
human trafficking, where naked women were sold for sex. Id. at 1794-95. Haynes writes:
By 1999, it was well-known that peacekeepers and other internationals were spending
time in Arizona Market-purchasing sex, buying women, and sometimes even selling
them. Nevertheless, when High Representative Wolfgang Petrisch belatedly tried to shut
down Arizona Market, calling it a "lawless wasteland," an American colonel argued to
keep it open, pointing out by way of comparison that Times Square in New York City
was far from perfect with its own host of pimps and prostitutes. Such statements suggest
that a "boys will be boys" mentality was accepted by some as a justification for the im-
proper behavior of military and international personnel participating in postconflict re-
construction work. The reasoning was that military personnel who were involved in risky
and demanding work so far from home ought at least to be allowed the comfort of sex.
Id. at 1796-97 (footnotes omitted).
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sure that the spoils of war do not come home in human form to claim the
benefits of U.S. citizenship.
Concerns about the military clearly affected the Court's reasoning
in Nguyen, even though Nguyen was not a case about a soldier's child-
or even a case about a child abandoned abroad. Scales viewed this as an
example of militarism warping constitutional doctrine.
There are, unfortunately, many other examples of constitutional rea-
soning in citizenship and immigration cases where the military is not
necessarily invoked, but where militarism is in evidence. The law around
immigration and citizenship is permeated with "the logic of war." In-
deed, the constitutional cases undergirding immigration law, which cede
largely unreviewable power to Congress to decide the terms of admission
and removal of noncitizens, rely quite explicitly on a rationale of national
security to justify the abdication of review.
30
Since national security provides the legal justification for immigra-
tion restrictions, militarized interventions in defense of those restrictions
are also easily justified as a matter of law and policy. It is therefore un-
surprising that our borders have become increasingly militarized. This is
true in the case of the physical land border as well as in the interior of the
country, where a great deal of extended border enforcement takes
place.3'
One could conceive of many possible models for immigration con-
trol, ranging from a fairly laissez-faire, open-borders policy in which the
30. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) ("'[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.'... [T]his Court has firmly
and repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976))); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) ("The right of a nation to expel or deport for-
eigners who have not been naturalized, or taken any steps toward becoming citizens of the country,
rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entrance into the country."); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of
the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the [C]onstitution, the right to its
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it,
cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one .... Nor can their exercise be hampered,
when needed for the public good, by any considerations of private interest.").
31. See, e.g., DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 11-13 (2013),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf (detailing both border and
interior enforcement measures and concluding that immigration enforcement "now represents the
federal government's most extensive and costly law enforcement endeavor"); Jennifer M. Chacrn,
Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 633-34 (2012) (discussing
the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border); Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immi-
gration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifih Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563,
1572-73 (2010) [hereinafter Diversion] (describing the rise of interior enforcement); Nina Bernstein,
Border Sweeps in North Reach Miles into U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at Al (noting that
border sweeps actually extend deep into the interior of the country); Kirk Semple, Report Faults
Border Patrol on Tactic Miles from Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at A27 (describing a recent
report that shows the extensive use of border transportation checks).
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state plays little role32 to a fully militarized, closed-border model like that
existing in the inaptly named Korean "Demilitarized Zone."33 The U.S.
model of enforcement is inching ever closer to the latter.
34
This is not a mere product of right-wing politics. At the grand bar-
gaining tables over comprehensive immigration reform that are currently
assembled, almost all parties at the table insist on the objective of border
security as a precursor to any further meaningful immigration reform
bill. The immigration reform bill that passed in the Senate in June 2013
includes border security goals that must be met before the provisions
legalizing the immigration status of qualify'ing noncitizens will take ef-
fect.35 The border security plan includes a multi-billion dollar expendi-
ture on drones and border fence construction, border patrol agents, sta-
tions and bases, additional border crossing technologies, and increased
prosecutions of illegal entry and felony reentry crimes.
36
President Obama has resisted the idea that the border is too insecure
to allow for immigration reform.37 Obama Administration officials urge
that the border has never been more secure.38 But the decision to embrace
32. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 18-19 (2007) (advocating for such an open bor-
ders model).
33. See Joe Havely, Korea's DMZ: 'Scariest Place on Earth,' CNN INT'L (Aug. 28, 2003,
03:21 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/22/koreas.dmz/ ("The Demilita-
rized Zone (DMZ) that divides the two Koreas is the most heavily fortified border in the world,
bristling with watchtowers, razor wire, landmines, tank-traps and heavy weaponry.").
34. For arguments that our border security measures are trending in that direction, see, for
example, Mark Koba, Immigration Bill 'Could Create DMZ' Like Korea, CNBC (May 24, 2013,
07:19 EST), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100761353 (quoting law professor Mark Noferi's statement
that the immigration bill creates "a DMZ like North and South Korea, except [it's] between the U.S.
and Mexico-our third largest trading partner" (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
35. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
36. The exact price tag is still being negotiated. The initial bill carried a price tag of approxi-
mately $6.5 billion in border security measures such as these, and that number increased in subse-
quent hearings. See, e.g., C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernndez, Crimmigration Provisions ofimmi-
gration Bill, CRIMMIGRATION (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:00 AM),
http://crimmigration.com/2013/04/18/crimmigration-provisions-of-immigration-bill.aspx (discuss-
ing, among other things, the price tag of various border policing proposals). Those numbers were not
high enough to gamer bipartisan support. In June, the Senate passed a bill that provides for $46
billion in border security expenditures. See generally Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate). See also Ashley
Parker & Jonathan Martin, Senate, 68 to 32, Passes Overhaul for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2013, at Al (discussing the passage of the bill and describing its contents). The House of Represent-
atives has not yet enacted companion legislation.
37. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive
Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas (May 10, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/05/I0/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform-el-paso-texas ("We have
gone above and beyond what was requested by the very Republicans who said they supported broad-
er reform as long as we got serious about enforcement. All the stuff they asked for, we've done.").
Recent independent policy analysis of border security has also reached the conclusion that the bor-
ders are quite secure and border enforcement mechanisms are sophisticated and extensive. See
MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 31, at 46-47, 143.
38. See, e.g., Jim Avila & Serena Marshall, Napolitano on Immigration: Border Is Secure So
'Fix the Entire System,' ABC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2013),
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the militaristic and nationalistic metrics of security long espoused by
restrictionists shows that, in some senses, the terms of the debate have
shifted. Immigration policy is now measured in the metrics of militarism.
Of course, when one looks to life in Mexican cities like Ciudad Jud-
rez or Tijuana, or contemplates the fate of many migrant border crossers,
it is clear that our purported border security actually countenances a great
deal of human insecurity in the form of lost lives on both sides of the
border.39 Our conception of border security is narrow. Within the nar-
rowed parameters of the border security discussion, it is not entirely clear
how much border security is enough. Border apprehensions have fallen
drastically4° and net migration from Mexico is currently zero,41 but when
four U.S. Senators recently visited Nogales, Arizona, on the Mexican
border, they were convinced that the border is still not secure enough.42
The term border security as it is currently used in the national dis-
course is a post-9/1 1 phenomenon. In fact, the term that we have come to
view as synonymous with immigration issues has only been a part of this
discourse for the last seven years or so. A search of the New York Times'
online database reveals that the term was never used by that newspaper
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/napolitano-immigration-border-secure-fix-entire-
system/story?id= 18630676 ("The amount of manpower, technology, everything else that we have
put on that border is simply amazing .... This is not the same border that was." (quoting Depart-
ment of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Press
Release, Press Secretary Jay Carney, Press Briefing (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/01/28/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-1282013 ("[O]ur borders now are
more secure than they have ever been in history.").
39. See, e.g., Andrew Rice, Life on Line, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at MM20 (contrasting
the rising violence in Judrez against the high levels of security on the U.S. side and noting that
"[m]any analysts believe that the absence of violence here is due to a rational choice by the cartels,
which calculate that creating chaos in the United States would disrupt this fairly free flow of goods.
'The nature and the cause of violence in Mexico is driven in part by the border itself,' says David
Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego."). For examples of
discussions concerning the increase in migrant deaths as a result of increased border militarization,
see STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE AMERICAN
IMAGINATION 121-28, 135 (2003) (presenting analysis of Latino stereotypes and culture including
the perilous conditions of immigrant border crossings); LUIS ALBERTO URREA, THE DEVIL'S
HIGHWAY: A TRUE STORY 24 (2004) (documenting the true story of a border crossing in southern
Arizona in 2001); Femanda Santos & Rebekah Zemansky, Death Rate Climbs as Migrants Take
Bigger Risks to Cross Tighter Borders, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2013, at A14 ("The number of migrant
apprehensions declined precipitously in recent years, one of the strongest indicators that fewer
people have tried to cross the border illegally. But the number of migrant deaths has remained high.
'Less people are coming across,' said Bruce Anderson, the chief forensic anthropologist at the medi-
cal examiner's office, 'but a greater fraction of them are dying."').
40. U.S. BORDER PATROL, NATIONWIDE ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS FISCAL YEARS
1925-2012, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border security/border patrol/usbp statistics/usbp-fyl I_stats/
25_10 appstats.ctt/25_ I appstats.pdf.
41. JEFFREY PASSEL ET AL., PEW HISPANIC CTR., NET MIGRATION FROM MEXICO FALLS TO
ZERO-AND PERHAPS LESS 6 (Apr. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report final.pdf.
42. Fernanda Santos, Immigration in Spotlight as Senators Tour Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2013, at A14 ("Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, whose office organized the tour,
said that while there has been progress, the border 'is still not as secure as we want it to be or expect
it to be."').
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in general discussions of U.S. immigration during the period from 1996
to 2001-and this included the period in the mid-1990s when Congress
was enacting bills that were explicitly intended to address issues relating
to both immigration and national security.43 The term "border security"
was nowhere to be found in the debates or media coverage. When used at
all, the term was used in reference to foreign countries in war zones or
with border regions characterized by serious armed conflict.
44
In the month of March 2006, however, the term burst into the popu-
lar discourse. Seventeen New York Times stories referenced border secu-
rity in March 2006. 45 A similar pattern unfolds in other major media out-
lets. "In the Los Angeles Times, the term 'border security['] appears in
twenty articles or editorials in March 2006. But between January 1996
and August 2001, the Los Angeles Times search engine turns up no story
that contains both the terms 'immigration['] and 'border security.['],
46
Of course, the United States can date its preoccupation with secur-
ing the southern border back much further than 2006. The process of
converting the U.S.-Mexico border into a meaningful barrier to entry
began in earnest in the mid-1920s, and proceeded in starts and stops from
that time.47 Periodic waves of interior enforcement accompanied this
project, as evidenced by the so-called repatriations of Mexicans in the
1930s48 and Operation Wetback in the 1950s.
49
In the mid-1990s, sealing the border became a national craze. Dur-
ing the Clinton Administration, U.S. citizens witnessed a spike in the use
of military-style operations in which our national government attempted
to "secure" fragments of the southern border through the aggressive use
of armed force.50 And in 2003, when the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) was formed and immigration agencies were placed under its
auspices, the transformation of immigration policy from a labor issue
43. For a brief summary of the relevant provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-
646 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012)), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, title IV, § 439, 110 Stat. 1276 (1996) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1252c (2012)), both of which contained immigration security provisions, see, for example,
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1827, 1842-46, 1851-53 (2007).
44. See Chac6n, supra note 43, at 1853 n. 146.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See KELLY LYTLE HERNANDEZ, MIGRA!: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 12-14
(2010) (explaining the growth of the U.S. Border Patrol and fortification of the U.S.-Mexico border
throughout the 1900s); see also Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 273, 292-96 (2010) (discussing the historical and contemporary militarization of the
southern border).
48. FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRiGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL:
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930s (1995).
49. JUAN RAMON GARCiA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at xiii-xiv (1980).
50. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 121, 127-30 (2001) (describing and criticizing these border militarization operations).
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(managed by the Department of Labor) to a crime issue (managed by the
Department of Justice) to a national security matter (managed by DHS)
seemed complete.
But it was not until 2006 that we, as a national community, latched
on to the term "border security." Why did we suddenly become so inter-
ested, as a nation, in border security in 2006?
In 2006, comprehensive immigration reform proposals were wend-
ing their way through Congress. There was a bipartisan spirit to the
whole project.51 Citizens and denizens were advocating for change.
Spanish-language media were calling for reform, and activist DJ Piolin
began calling for marches.52 By May 1, the supporters of reform were
sufficiently organized to stage nationwide marches in support of immi-
gration reform.53 Wearing white, marching peacefully, and waving
American flags, these people-citizens and denizens, students and elder-
care providers, gardeners and journalists, domestic workers and construc-
tion workers, farm workers and academics, restaurant workers and law-
yers-took to the streets nationwide to demonstrate in favor of the right
of long-term residents to some sort of stable and legal status in exchange
54for their long-term contributions to U.S. culture and the economy.
Restrictionists offered two main responses to these calls for reform.
One was a law-and-order narrative: Respect for the rule of law demands
that we punish, not reward, the lawbreakers. The second was the milita-
ristic response: The very presence of these masses of unauthorized mi-
grants is a testament to our insecure borders. We can't even talk about
legalizing migrants until the border is secured.
Both of these responses are appeals to militarism. The second one
quite obviously appealed to classic fears of invasions and infiltration.
Less obviously, the rule-of-law claims are also rooted in militarism. The
legal violations that are actually at stake here-civil infractions such as
51. One of these bills ultimately passed in the Senate in May 2006. Rachel L. Swarns, Senate,
in Bipartisan Act, Passes Immigration Bill; Tough Fight Is Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at
A 19. The process repeated itself again the following year. Robert Pear & Jim Rutenberg, Senators in
Bipartisan Deal on Broad Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2007, at Al. Both times, the deal
ultimately foundered and no legislation came to pass.
52. Editorial, Piolin 's Progress; He Rallied Latino Listeners to March for Immigration Re-
form; Now He's Behind a Push for Citizenship, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A14 (noting that he
"rallied thousands of May Day marchers in 2006 and ... worked all [of 2007] for immigration
reform").
53. Rachel L. Swams, Immigrants Rally in Scores of Cities for Legal Status, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 2006, at Al.
54. For discussion of the marches and the use of the legacy of the civil rights movement see,
for example, Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the
Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-102 (2007) (argu-
ing that the marches offered only an incomplete and nascent attempt at a new, multi-racial civil
rights movement and noting obstacles to future collaborations); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration
and the Civil Rights Agenda, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 125, 125, 145-46 (2010) (arguing that a civil
rights paradigm offers an incomplete framework for immigration reform).
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visa overstays, misdemeanors such as entry without inspection, felony
reentry offenses, and visa fraud offenses-are not malum in se offenses.
They are only crimes because our legislators have made them so, invok-
ing the prerogative of sovereignty as a justification. The individuals who
have broken these particular civil and criminal laws have run afoul of
laws designed to protect state sovereignty. Here, the law is operating not
to defend citizens from particular wrongs, but to protect the body politic
from violations of the nation's borders and to repel individuals who are
characterized, oddly, as simultaneously so dependent as to be undesirable
and so superhumanly criminal as to require violent containment. Taken
together, these responses were sufficient to drown out the call for reform,
and comprehensive immigration reform initiatives were scuttled in 2007,
leaving millions of immigrant families and workers in limbo.
How did the fever-pitched determination to secure the border in that
time period manage to trump all other purported value goals in immigra-
tion, including family reunification, labor and workforce needs, and hu-
manitarianism? Scales cautioned about that: "If militarism is working its
magic, [the disproportionality of the response it engenders] is largely
invisible; it is treasonous to notice it, much less question it."'55 She is
right. It is bad form to call attention to our border excess. Nevertheless, it
is important to scrutinize these practices.
III. MILITARISM IN ENFORCEMENT
The consequences of our militarized immigration regime are harsh.
Our sovereign prerogative to be free of the sometimes-wanted, some-
times-unwanted migrant becomes a logic that justifies a host of violent
state practices, including protracted and indefinite civil immigration de-
tention, sometimes under highly punitive conditions;56 the fragmentation
of mixed-status families;57 and the pervasive fear of over-reaching law
55. Scales, supra note 7, at 371-72.
56. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 10 n.32 (2013), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/pillars-reportinbrief.pdf (noting that the current system of
"immcarceration" now takes in over 400,000 noncitizens each year); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immi-
gration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43-45, 50-51 (2010) (describing and propos-
ing reforms from the growing system of "immcarceration"); Note, Improving the Carceral Condi-
tions of Federal Immigrant Detainees, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1476, 1476 (2012) (describing some of
the violent and demeaning conditions in immigration detention); Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz,
Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at Al; DORA
SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 2-3 (Oct. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (documenting widespread,
systemic problems in immigration detention and recommending solutions and improvements).
57. Jacqueline Bhabha notes that citizen children whose parents are being deported cannot
assert the rights of their parents to stay in the United States. The standard results in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship," and she notes that "[r]ather than acknowledging and mitigating the
trauma of family separation, particularly for young children, the rule requires decision makers to
revoke deportation only when the applicant demonstrates that the hardship incurred is 'substantially
different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien
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enforcement in communities like Maricopa County, Arizona, with largeimmigrant and Latino populations.58 And these are just the domestic
costs.
There are also a host of externalities that we ought to take more
time to internalize: the violence in Mexico that occurs as a result of our
drug demands, our guns, and our militarized border policies-with the
deaths of hundreds of women in Judrez59 being only one poignant exam-
ple of how this violence touches the lives of vulnerable populations.
The Sixth Circuit's March 2013 decision in Villegas v. Metro Gov-
ernment of Nashville provides a microcosmic window on the pain and
suffering inflicted by our border militarization schemes.60 According to
Judge Clay, who wrote for the panel majority:
Plaintiff Juana Villegas's saga began on July 3, 2008[,] when her
car was stopped by Berry Hill, Tennessee police officer Tim Cole-
with close family members here."' Jacqueline Bhabha, The "Mere Fortuity of Birth"? Children,
Mothers, Borders, and the Meaning of Citizenship, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP,
BORDERS, AND GENDER 187, 209 (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009) (quoting In re Mon-
real-Aguinaga, 23 I.&N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001)); see also David B. Thronson, Of Borders and
Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, I I
TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 45, 52-53 (2005) (recording the difficulties-including separations-
encountered by mixed-status families in U.S. family courts); Frontline: Lost in Detention (PBS
television broadcast Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/lost-in-
detention/ (recording Cecilia Mufioz, an Obama White House official and long-time immigrants
rights activist, justifying the Administration's policy of enforcing laws that separate families).
58. In December 2011, Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez of the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice wrote a letter to Bill Montgomery, the County Attorney for
Maricopa County, summarizing the results of a prolonged investigation of the Maricopa County
Sheriffs Office (MCSO). The Department found "that MCSO, through the actions of its deputies,
supervisory staff, and command staff, engages in racial profiling of Latinos; unlawfully stops, de-
tains, and arrests Latinos; and unlawfully retaliates against individuals who complain about or criti-
cize MCSO's policies or practices .... Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney, Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. (Dec.
15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso findletter 12-15-
1 I.pdf. That same month, the Civil Rights Division issued findings of similar misconduct by the East
Haven, Connecticut police. Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez stated that the Department
had found that
[East Haven Police Department] engages in discriminatory policing against Latinos, in-
cluding but not limited to targeting Latinos for discriminatory traffic enforcement, treat-
ing Latino drivers more harshly than non-Latino drivers after a traffic stop, and intention-
ally and woefully failing to design and implement internal systems of control that would
identify, track, and prevent such misconduct. The pattern or practice of discriminatory
policing that we observed is deeply rooted in the Department's culture and substantially
interferes with the ability of EHPD to deliver services to the entire East Haven communi-
ty.
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to
Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town of E. Haven, Conn. (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ct/Press201l /East%20Haven%20Findings%20Letter'/o2012-19-1 .pdf.
And on May 24, 2013, Judge Snow of the federal district court in Arizona ruled that the Maricopa
County Sheriffs Office had unlawfully instituted a pattern and practice of targeting Latino drivers
and passengers in Maricopa County during traffic stops under the guise of immigration enforcement.
Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, No. PHX-CV-07-02513-GMS, 2013 WL 2297173, at *1-3 (D. Ariz.
May 24, 2013).
59. Rice, supra note 39.
60. 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
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man. At the time of the stop, Plaintiff was nine months pregnant.
When Plaintiff failed to produce a valid driver's license, Coleman ar-
rested Plaintiff and transported her to the jail operated by the Da-
vidson County Sheriffs Office ("the jail"). Once there, a jail em-
ployee, working as an agent of the United States through Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement's 287(g) program, see 8 U.S.C. §
1357(g), inquired into Plaintiffs immigration status and determined
that Plaintiff was not lawfully in the United States. Due to her illegal
status, a detainer was placed on Plaintiff, which meant that federal
immigration officials would delay taking any action until after reso-
lution of Plaintiffs then-pending state charges. After being unable to
post bond, Plaintiff was, as a result of the immigration detainer, clas-
sified as a medium-security inmate.
Plaintiff was held in the jail from Thursday, July 3, 2008[,] until
late on Saturday, July 5, 2008. At 10:00 p.m. on July 5, 2008, Plain-
tiff informed a jail guard that her amniotic fluid (or "water") had
"broke" and that she was about to have her baby. Plaintiff was trans-
ported to the jail infirmary where a nurse confirmed that Plaintiffs
water had broken and summoned an ambulance to take Plaintiff to
Nashville General Hospital (the "Hospital"). For transportation in the
ambulance, Plaintiff was placed on a stretcher with her wrists hand-
cuffed together in front of her body and her legs restrained togeth-
er ....
.... According to hospital records, when the shackles were re-
moved, Plaintiff had only dilated to 3 centimeters ("cm").... Plain-
tiff gave birth without any complications at approximately 1:00 a.m.
on July 6, 2008-roughly two hours after Peralta removed her shack-
les. Plaintiff remained unshackled until shortly before Peralta's shift
ended at 7:00 a.m., when he re-restrained Plaintiff to the bed at one
of her ankles. Plaintiff was never handcuffed postpartum.
At the time of Plaintiffs discharge from the Hospital, Defendant
did not allow Plaintiff to take the breast pump that the Hospital staff
had provided her. Defendant justified this based on safety concerns,
and that under its policy, it did not consider a breast pump to be a
"critical medical device," which would have allowed Plaintiff to take
it back to the jail.
61
The district court was concerned by these facts and granted Plain-
tiffs partial summary judgment motion, allowing a jury to deliberate on
damages, which the jury awarded.6 2 The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Although it concurred that
shackling during labor and delivery is generally considered a rights vio-
lation, the Sixth Circuit noted that there are exceptions where the shack-
61. Id. at 566-67 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 567.
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led individual poses a "security or flight risk," and Ms. Villegas was
classified as a medium-security inmate.63
Why was Villegas a flight risk? She was a flight risk because, after
her arrest by Nashville authorities, Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) issued a detainer for her. Her arrest prompted ICE to issue a
detainer because she was in the country in violation of the law-a civil
immigration violation. With the logic of militarism driving immigration
policy, the commission of a civil immigration violation was enough to
establish that Villegas was frighteningly risky from a security perspec-
tive-risky enough to require shackling throughout early labor and short-
ly after childbirth; risky enough to deprive her of a breast pump on "safe-
ty" grounds.
These risk characterizations are raced of course. The fact that she is
Latina probably helps to account for the stop of her vehicle in the first
place.64 But Villegas's threat was evident to her jailer not just because of
her race but also because of her sex. The potent act of birth itself-her
giving birth to an American citizen-was a frightful border breach.65 We
have seen the trope of the threateningly fertile Latina in the context of
the discussion around birthright citizenship and anchor babies.
66
The Sixth Circuit was therefore unconvinced that the local agents
who shackled Ms. Villegas were aware that they were violating her
rights. The facts of her case did not establish their deliberate indifference
as a matter of law. The circuit court determined that it was not clear as a
matter of law that Ms. Villegas's captors understood that shackling posed
a risk to her childbirth process. "On remand," the court wrote,
a jury will need to determine whether Plaintiff was a flight risk in her
condition and whether Defendant had knowledge of the substantial
63. Id. at 573-74 (internal quotation mark omitted).
64. The ACLU of Tennessee concluded that the 287(g) program in Davidson County, Tennes-
see, had increased the racial profiling of Latinos in the County, which includes Nashville. LINDSAY
KEE, ACLU-TN, CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE'S JAIL MODEL 287(G) PROGRAM 11 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.aclu-
tn.org/pdfs/287g%28F%29.pdf. Similar reports had emerged elsewhere. MEISSNER ET AL., supra
note 31, at 1592-93 (noting these reports and explaining the incentives for profiling inherent in the
governing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
65. See LEO R. CHAVEZ, COVERING IMMIGRATION: POPULAR IMAGES AND THE POLITICS OF
THE NATION 215 (2001). Chavez's analysis reveals "magazine covers that reference Mexican immi-
gration . . . ha[ve] been overwhelmingly alarmist." Id. Of particular note, some magazine covers
deploy images of women in ways that "suggest a more insidious invasion, one that includes the
capacity of the invaders to reproduce themselves." Id. at 233.
66. See generally Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing the Borders of Birthright Citizenship:
Some Thoughts on the New (and Old) Restrictionism, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 311,324 (2012) (critiquing
the misleading deployment of "anchor baby" rhetoric in debates around birthright citizenship (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). For an example of such an argument made in a more scholarly tone,
but still tellingly invoking the visual image of the "border crosser," see Peter H. Schuck, Op-Ed.,
Birthright of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A19 (arguing that "anchor babies"--the chil-
dren of a mother who "briefly crosses the border to give birth"-are not entitled to and should not be
granted birthright citizenship (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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risk, recognized the serious harm that such a risk could cause, and,
nonetheless, disregarded it, recognizing that such knowledge may be
established through the obviousness of the risk.
67
Regarding the deprivation of the breast pump, the court wrote that
"[a]bsent proof that the breast pump was prescribed, as is necessary un-
der a diagnosed medical-needs theory, Plaintiff must show that it was so
obvious that even a layperson would recognize the need to provide Plain-
tiff with a breast pump.
68
The dissenting judge, Judge Helene White, critically engaged the
majority's characterization of Villegas as a flight risk in terms that apply
quite well to almost all of the categorical risk determinations that are
currently acceptable in immigration law and yet unacceptable in almost
any other context. She wrote:
Here, Defendant maintained that Villegas's restraints were "con-
sistent with" her medium-security designation and that illegal immi-
grants in general pose a danger of flight. But Villegas's medium-
security designation did not take into account her late-term pregnan-
cy or that she had gone into labor, nor was it based on any assess-
ment of flight risk or risk of harm-it was automatic because of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer. Villegas was
not being held for a crime of violence and had not been convicted of
any crime. She was not individually assessed for flight risk or risk of
harm to herself or others, and she had not engaged in any conduct ev-
idencing such.. . . Neither the ICE detainer's automatic designation
of Villegas as "medium-security" nor generalized evidence that ille-
gal immigrants may pose a flight danger constitute "clear evidence"
that Villegas was a security or flight risk.
69
Judge White also noted that the laboring Villegas was at all times
accompanied by an armed guard.7 °
To me, what is extraordinary about Villegas's case is the ordinari-
ness of so many of its features in the universe of immigration enforce-
ment: the inhumane conditions of detention-even detention itself-
without individualized assessments of risk, and the invocation of national
security as a justification to detain individuals for long periods of time
and separated from families and from counsel.71
67. Villegas, 709 F.3d at 578 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 579.
69. Id. at 582. (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. The 1996 amendments to the immigration detention provisions have obviated the need for
individualized determinations regarding detention in a wide range of immigration cases. See Marga-
ret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES
343, 344 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005); see also Kalhan, supra note 56, at 43. For
a discussion of the problematic conditions of immigration detention, see, for example, RUTHIE
EPSTEIN & ELEANOR ACER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
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The Villegas case, and the many cases and stories that it stands in
for, also illustrate just how right Scales was when she asserted that mili-
tarism is "gendered to the ground.72 This is true not simply because the
"logic of war" is used to justify the use of shackles and the threat of arms
against a woman in labor who poses no actual threat to anyone, but also
because militarism in immigration enforcement exacerbates the sex and
gender inequalities that permeate our immigration policies.
IV. MILITARISM AND THE REIFICATION OF GENDER INEQUALITY IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
We like to think of our post-1965 immigration admissions policies
as facially neutral-a product of the civil rights revolutions of the time.
Certainly, the code is now free of any express reference to race and free
of the national origin quotas of old. That said, the laws are not neutral in
their application. Some of this is probably by design on the part of at
least some of the laws' drafters; some of this is the result of unconscious
bias and policy blinders that infect most of the work that all of us do in a
society so long characterized by its social hierarchies of race, class, gen-
der, disability, and sexual orientation.
Elsewhere, I have written, as have many others, about the persistent
racial bias in our immigration policies.73 In similar ways, the immigra-
tion categories also contain sex and gender bias. The admissions criteria
tend to reproduce patriarchal, heteronormative family structures. Ann
Scales was keenly aware that "laws that privilege traditionally gendered
families reinforce the social marginalization of sexual and gender mi-
norities, and not just (not even primarily) by excluding the minorities
from those institutions.74 Unfortunately, immigration law is unquestion-
ably a site of such privileging.
One obvious example is immigration law's refusal to acknowledge
same-sex unions as recently as the summer of 2013. Until 1990, gays and
lesbians were explicitly barred from admission on medical grounds.75
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM-A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 25 (2011), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf (not-
ing a host of problems with conditions of detention); Urbina & Rentz, supra note 56.
72. Scales, Militarism, supra note 5, at 52 n.102 (quoting Catharine A. MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 655 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted). There are plenty of other examples we might use to illustrate
Scales's perspicacity in this regard, including the ongoing sex abuse scandal in the military and the
stereotypical gender norms enacted to achieve the sexual humiliation and torture of the prisoners
held by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER,
May 10, 2004, at 42, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa ct.
73. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of
Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 347-48 (2007); Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncover-
ing the Federal Government's Racial Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV 1361 (2011).
74. Scales, supra note 1, at 398.
75. INA § 212(a) formerly contained a provision that excluded individuals of "psychopathic
personality" and this was interpreted to include homosexuals. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA
M. RODRiGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 271-72 (5th ed. 2009) (internal
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Although that bar was revoked, there were still barriers to entry. Most
significantly, notwithstanding the Obama Administration's declaration
that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional, prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor,
76 U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) continued to deny the spous-
al visa applications of legally married same-sex couples.77 In immigra-
tion law, marriage was still bureaucratically defined as between a man
and a woman.78 This affected not just those seeking a green card, but
could also affect long-term nonimmigrant visa holders9 who had to rely
upon discretionary work-arounds to bring their spouses to the United
States.
Hope for a legislative fix as part of a comprehensive immigration
reform package in 2013 seemed to die with Senator Leahy's proposed
amendment to achieve marriage equality in immigration; he withdrew
that amendment in the Senate Judiciary Committee when it became clear
that he lacked the support to get the amendment passed.80 But when the
United States Supreme Court declared DOMA unconstitutional in Wind-
sor,8 1 the Administration finally ended the long history of discrimination
in immigration law-United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
announced that it would accord married same sex-couples the designa-
quotation marks omitted). This provision was later revised to include "sexual deviation," which
Congress intended to encompass homosexuality. Id at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted). For
references to the ban, see Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982) (using the ban as
evidence that Congress could not have intended "spouse" to include a same-sex spouse (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 451,462-63 (1963) (avowing
application of the ban through an interpretation of the statute that treated Fleuti as if he had not left
the country).
76. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
77. The USCIS Adjudicators Field Manual included a reference to DOMA's admonition that
"[f]or a relationship to qualify as a marriage for purposes of Federal Law, one partner must be a
man, and the other a woman." USCIS, ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL § 21.3(a)(2)(1), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFMIHTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-15.html. Shortly prior to
Windsor, the Administration granted deferred action status to avoid breaking up same-sex couples,
but this was discretionary. Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at Al 6.
For descriptions and criticisms of the failure of immigration law to recognize same-sex
couples, see generally Chac6n, supra note 73, at 361-62; Matthew Lister, A Rawlsian Argument for
Extending Family-Based Immigration Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 745, 746
(2007); Victor C. Romero, The Selective Deportation of Same-Gender Partners: In Search of the
"Rara Avis," 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 537, 537-38 (2002).
78. See, e.g., Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042 (finding that Congress intended to "confer spouse
status under section 201(b) [of the INA] only upon the parties to heterosexual marriages" and that
this policy "has a rational basis and therefore comports with the due process clause and its equal
protection requirements").
79. The INA generally uses the term "nonimmigrants" to refer to individuals who are entering
the country but who have no intent to remain permanently. Examples include student visa holders
and tourist visa holders, as well as certain categories of short- and medium-term work-related visas.
80. David Welna, Fears of Killing Immigration Bill Doomed Same-Sex Amendment, NPR
(May 22, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://www.npr.orgblogs/itsallpolitics/2013/05/22/186075168/fears-of-
killing-immigration-bill-doomed-same-sex-amendment.
81. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
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tion of a "spouse" under immigration law. 82 Moreover, the Board of Im-
migration Appeals recently granted immigration benefits to a same-sex
spouse, citing Windsor.
83
This monumental change to immigration policy is an important
breakthrough. Nevertheless, immigration laws continue to promote and
replicate traditional family structures. Only those individuals who are
eligible under the immigration code's highly technical definitions of
"spouses" and "children" are eligible for family-based immigration at
all.84 Individuals in civil unions, for example, do not qualify as "married"
for immigration purposes. Those who wish to acquire family unification
privileges must marry in jurisdictions where their marriages are lawful.
Immigration law and policy have also reified traditional gender
roles in other ways. Economic migration and humanitarian migration,
which, along with family-based migration form the three major legal
paths to admission in western countries such as Australia, Canada, and
the United States, "have created patterns [of] reinforcing notions of
women's dependence and men's independence."85 In the category of
economic migrants, many of the admissions categories tend to favor
highly educated workers who, in many sending countries, are predomi-
nantly male. At a March 2013 hearing held by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Mee Moua of the Asian-American Justice Center testified
82. Press Release, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, Napolitano Statement on
the Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act (July 1, 2013),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/07/01/statement-secretary-homeland-security-janet-napolitano-
implementation-supreme-court.
83. Zeleniak, 26 1. & N. Dec. 158, 2013 WL 3781298, at *159 (B.I.A. July 17, 2013). The
Board concluded:
The Supreme Court's ruling in Windsor has . . . removed section 3 of the DOMA as an
impediment to the recognition of lawful same-sex marriages and spouses if the marriage
is valid under the laws of the State where it was celebrated. This ruling is applicable to
various provisions of the Act, including, but not limited to, sections 101 (a)(15)(K) (fianc6
and fiancee visas), 203 and 204 (immigrant visa petitions), 207 and 208 (refugee and
asylee derivative status), 212 (inadmissibility and waivers of inadmissibility), 237 (re-
movability and waivers of removability), 240A (cancellation of removal), and 245 (ad-
justment of status), 8 U.S.C. §§ I101(a)(15)(K), 1153, 1154, 1157, 1158, 1182, 1227,
1229b, and 1255 (2012).
Id.
84. The terms "child" and "parent" are defined for immigration purposes at 8 U.S.C § 1101(b)
(2012). Additional requirements are imposed in certain cases for citizenship purposes. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2012).
85. Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik, Introduction to MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES:
CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 57, at 9; Catherine Dauvergne, Globalizing Frag-
mentation: New Pressures on Women Caught in the Immigration Law-Citizenship Law Dichotomy,
in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 57, at 333, 337-
39. For analyses of the ways in which immigration law has operated historically to create and define
gender categories, see generally NANCY F. COTr, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 132-55 (2000); MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION,
AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2005); see also Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 648 (2005) (arguing that "the regula-
tion of sexuality, morality, and marriage was a pervasive regulatory force in the development of
immigration law").
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that women are significantly underrepresented in employment-based
visas and rely on family-based migration as a means to immigrate.
86
Consequently, under the current system, it is most often wives and
children who enter with immigration statuses that depend upon their rela-
tionship with the primary employment visa holder. For many of the
spouses of workers who enter on nonimmigrant visas, the right of entry
does not even carry with it a right to work,87 which only deepens their
dependency and fuels the replication of traditional gender roles that
could just as easily be subverted through other conscious choices in im-
migration policy.
There are several significant implications that flow from the policy
choice to deny work eligibility to the dependents of primary visa holders.
The first is that, to the extent current immigration reform proposals favor
a reduction in immigration visas based on family ties in favor of granting
more visas to individuals with certain professional skills, these proposals
run the risk of further aggravating the gender gap that already exists in
terms of access to channels for legal immigration. An express commit-
ment to gender equality in immigration reform might significantly alter
the terrain of reform proposals, but existing reform proposals purport o
promote security without regard to the effects of the resulting policy
choices on equality.
Second, the current system-where women are often dependent on
men for their status-has resulted in exploitation in some immigrant
families. The structure of U.S. immigration law actually provides power
to potential abusers by rendering other family members dependent on the
primary visa holder for both financial support and immigration status.
88
Recognizing this, Congress has devised legislative mechanisms aimed at
insulating dependent immigrants from abuse and exploitation by the pri-
mary immigration visa beneficiary, but these legislative solutions are not
always adequate and raise problems of their own.
One legislative solution has been to allow victims of domestic abuse
to self-petition for lawful permanent resident status so that they are not
86. Senate Judiciary Has Hearing on Women and Family Issues Under Immigration Laws, 90
NO. 12 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 747, 747-48 (2013) ("Ms. Mee Moua, President and CEO of the
Asian American Justice Center ... not[ed] that women are significantly underrepresented in em-
ployment-based visas and thus must rely on family-based immigration to immigrate to the U[nited]
S[tates] on their own or rely on their spouses to immigrate through employment channels.").
87. USCIS cautions that
[o]nly a few nonimmigrant classifications allow you to obtain permission work in this
country without an employer having first filed a petition on your behalf. Such classifica-
tions include the nonimmigrant E-1, E-2, E-3[,] and TN classifications, as well as, in cer-
tain instances, the F-I and M-I student and J-I exchange visitor classifications.
Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. n.],
http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers
(last updated Sept. 7, 2011). This list does not include the spouse of H-lB visa holders, for example.
88. H.R. REP. No. 103-395 (1993).
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dependent on an abusive spouse to provide long-term, lawful permanent
resident status.89 This is sometimes known as VAWA self-petitioning,
because the right was created as part of the Violence Against Women
Act.90 Another has been to provide special U visas that offer legal immi-
gration status to individuals who are the survivors of domestic abuse and
who are willing to testify against their abusers.
91
VAWA self-petitioning and U visa eligibility are helpful to individ-
ual immigrants, but they are band-aids on structural problems, and they
in turn reinforce the gender assumptions and norms that lead to the un-
derlying problems of partner dependency and exploitation in the first
place. They leave dependent spouses and children in a supplicant posi-
tion not faced by the primary visa holder-needing to establish abuse in
order to be allowed to regularize their immigration status. In the case of
U visas, this requires cooperation with law enforcement,92 which can be
daunting to individuals with little knowledge of the U.S. legal system.
And it requires law enforcement to certify the helpfulness of applicants,
which can be a dicey proposition when law enforcement is undereducat-
ed or simply hostile to such claims.93
Immigrant women are critical contributors to the U.S. economy.
Some of these women are themselves the recipients of visas as highly
skilled immigrant workers. Sometimes, women are able to accompany
partners with visas that also allow them to work in the formal economy,
and they do so. Some of them are entrepreneurs and small business own-
ers who have found creative and economy-boosting work-arounds to
prohibitions on employment.94 Many women work under the table as
home elder-care providers, nannies, and maids.95 Almost all of them do
work within their households.
89. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), (B)(ii)-(iii) (West 2013).
90. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(1)(K) (West 2013).
91. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (West 2013).
92. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(ll); 81U.S.C.A. § 1184(p)(1) (West 2013) (requiring cooperation).
93. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(p)(1) (West 2013) (requiring law enforcement certification). For a
discussion of the variability of law enforcement attitudes to U visa certification, see Tracie L. Klinke
& Alpa Amin, U Non-Immigrant Status: Encouraging Cooperation Between Immigrant Communi-
ties and Law Enforcement Agencies, 5 J. MARSHALL L.J. 433, 461-63 (2012). For a discussion of
the benefits and limitations of U visas, see Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus
Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 323-25 (2010).
94. SUSAN C. PEARCE ET AL., IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., OUR AMERICAN IMMIGRANT
ENTREPRENEURS: THE WOMEN 15 n.14 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Women Immigrant Entrepreneurs 12081
I.pdf ("575,740 foreign-bom women who immigrated as adults reported that they were
self-employed in their own incorporated or unincorporated businesses .... ").
95. Richard Dunham, Top Jobs for Undocumented Workers: For Men, Construction; for
Women, Housekeeping, TEX. ON POTOMAC (May 10, 2013),
http:/iblog.cbron.com/txpotomac/2013/05/top-jobs-for-undocumented-workers-for-men-
construction-for-women-housekeeping/) ("Nearly half of the women working in the U.S. without
proper legal documents are in housekeeping or child-care jobs.").
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With the exception of the primary visa holders, however, the law
reduces the complexity and contribution of these immigrant women into
three categories: (1) the dependent beneficiary of a spouse's employ-
ment-based immigrant or nonimmigrant visa who has no independent
labor significance; (2) the supplicant of the state who seeks to terminate
the dependency on the primary visa holder by providing law enforcement
assistance to the state; and (3) the "illegal alien" worker who is outside
the law. In none of these categories is the woman migrant a prototypical-
ly "desirable" neoliberal actor.
Nor are the legal limits on economic and family migration the only
ways that immigration policy facilitates gender stereotypes. Scales's
analysis of the Nguyen case highlights how citizenship requirements that
impose higher barriers to the children of unmarried U.S. citizen men as
compared to the children of unmarried U.S. citizen women both reflect
and institutionalize sex and gender stereotyping around parenthood.96
Scholars have also written about how the public-private distinction has
resulted in the favoring of male asylum applicants over female applicants
who suffer violence at the hands of nonstate actors.97 There are other
examples, but the above discussion suffices to sketch out the ways that
neutral laws result in a situation where, generally speaking, women and
men often enter the United States as immigrants on very different legal
terms. Reform proposals have tended to ignore the significance of this
fact and have not made sex and gender equality an objective of immigra-
tion reform legislation.
Ann Scales's work helps to illuminate how these policy choices-
and the constitutional doctrines that make them possible-are rooted in
militarism. Catherine Dauvergne has pointed out that there is a "widely
shared assumption ... that sovereign nations 'are morally justified in
closing their borders, subject to exceptions of their choosing."'98 In the
United States, this justification has translated into the Court's acknowl-
edgement of Congress's plenary power to define who can come to and
who can stay in the United States.99 This power supersedes constitutional
protections on the rights of noncitizens and citizens, including their First
Amendment rights, their right to equal treatment under the law, and their
right to due process. The courts do little to scrutinize these congressional
choices because immigration powers are viewed as rooted in national
security. This is true whether or not national security is actually implicat-
96. See discussion supra Part II.
97. See, e.g., Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the "Domestic"
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 392-94, 400-01 (2001); Jennifer
Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by
Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 81, 111-13 (1999); see also Talia Inlender, Status
Quo or Sixth Ground? Adjudicating Gender Asylum Claims, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES:
CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND GENDER, supra note 57, at 356, 356-79.
98. Benhabib & Resnik, supra note 85, at 11 (quoting Dauvergne, supra note 85, at 336).
99. See cases cited supra note 30 (discussing the plenary powers doctrine).
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ed by the discriminatory laws. Militarism trumps equality and justifies
replicating prevailing hierarchies in immigration law.
Once the inequalities that undergird the current immigration admis-
sion system are exposed, it becomes easier to see the damage that these
inequalities wreak on immigration policy more broadly. When the wom-
an migrant is frequently placed by law into the categories of a dependent,
a supplicant, or a lawbreaker, it is not surprising that lawmakers are not
actively seeking to improve avenues of legal admission to women work-
ers. The structural inequalities embedded in immigration law ultimately
work to reinforce the recurring trope of migrant women as state depend-
ents who seek to anchor themselves to the country through pregnancy
and childbirth. This in turn, provides fodder for arguments in favor of
limiting channels of immigration and also of eliminating birthright citi-
zenship.
1° °
These distorted understandings of women migrants that emerge
from policy choices also result in policy choices purportedly undertaken
to assist victimized migrant women that actually worsen the plight of
these women. I have written elsewhere about how domestic strategies
designed to combat human trafficking have perversely increased the vul-
nerability of migrants because anti-trafficking is used to justify a host of
militarized immigration enforcement strategies that make migrant cross-
ings more dangerous and costly, drive unauthorized migrant workers
further underground, and fuel a myth of migrant criminality that further
justifies militarization of border enforcement in a tragic feedback loop. 10'
These policies frequently exacerbate the sexual exploitation of and vio-
lence against men, women, and children both as they migrate and in the
workplace. I see our approach to human trafficking as a further reflection
of our nation's outsized fear of dependent, non-contributory, and crimi-
nal immigrants. This world view has resulted not just in self-defeating
anti-trafficking approaches, but in a sweeping militarization of immigra-
tion enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Ann Scales ends Militarism, Male Dominance andLaw with a poem
by Adrienne Rich that hopes for the obsolescence of violence.10 2 I do not
think it is surprising that Ann Scales made the mission of peace so cen-
tral to her equality agenda. In so doing, she was echoing the calls made
100. See Rosenbloom, supra note 66, at 314-16; Schuck, supra note 66 (discussing the dis-
course around "anchor babies" and birthright citizenship).
101. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to
Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3009-12, 3032-39 (2006).
102. Scales, Militarism, supra note 5, at 73 (quoting Adrienne Rich, Twenty-One Love Poems,
No. VI, in THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE: POEMS, 1974-1977, at 21, 27-28 (1978)).
Scales's work places women at the center of these efforts toward an end to violence. Id
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by great equality activists like Dr. Martin Luther King.103 Dr. King rec-
ognized the power of militarism to replicate existing social hierarchies
and stamp out quests for equality. Scales's work draws upon the hard-
fought lessons of Dr. King, as well has his belief that change requires not
only activism that relies upon the law but also activism that is not afraid
to act peacefully outside the law.10 4
Ann Scales's work on militarism is important because it asks us to
bring to the surface and question the logic of war wherever it taints our
quest for gender equality. I can see militarism's influence in immigration
policy and have focused on those issues here, but I also recognize its
influence in many other spheres as well.'0 5 Much more work needs to be
done to understand the role that militarism plays in engendering social
inequality, but Ann Scales has given us a magnificent running start. May
she rest in peace.
103. For a discussion of King's peace activism, see, for example, Russell Baker, Bravest and
Best, 45 N.Y. Rev. Books 6 (Apr. 9, 1998) (book review) (describing how in the later days of his
activism, King "saw race, war, and poverty as evils inextricably bound and decided that all three
must be tackled as one.").
104. Compare Scales, Militarism, supra note 5, at 56 (calling for "nonviolent direct action"
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City
Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 293-
94 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) ("One may well ask, 'How can you advocate breaking
some laws and obeying others?' The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws:
there are just and there are unjust laws. I would agree with Saint Augustine that '[a]n unjust law is
no law at all.' ... An unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a minority that is not binding on
itself. This is difference made legal. On the other hand a just law is a code that a majority compels a
minority to follow that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal.... There are some
instances when a law is just on its face and unjust in its application.").
105. President Obama recently offered his view that the "war on terrorism" also needs to be
defined and limited. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at he Na-
tional Defense University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. That is a welcome acknowledge-
ment, but it is unlikely to demilitarize national policy. Mary Dudziak has pointed out that war is an
"enduring condition" that is strategically invoked to justify deviations from peacetime legal norms.
MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 5, 11-32 (2012).




The thesis of this Essay is that any successful movement for equali-
ty-indeed, any movement for freedom-for gay people needs the in-
sights and theories of feminism for sustenance and for flourishing. Draw-
ing heavily on the work of radical feminist scholar Ann Scales, and with
special emphasis on the importance of feminism to the lives and political
aspirations of gay men, the Essay compares the theoretical matrices of
feminist legal theory and queer legal theory. By exploring the relevance
of issues generally thought of as "feminist issues," such as pornography
and abortion, to gay men's lives, the Essay shows that, rather than aban-
don feminism as much of queer theory suggests, gay men-and all
LGBT people-should embrace feminism as a fundamental component
of an ethical movement toward substantive, social, and legal equality.
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Solidarity is possible .... Solidarity is also the only viable option for
progressive people. The liberal ideal of absolute individualism makes
no sense in a world of inevitably interdependent language users....
Solidarity requires constant reevaluation of issues and constant reju-
venation of commitments and coalitions.
-Ann Scales
1
Outsider jurisprudence asserts ... that oppression on the bases of
race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and class is unjust if any-
thing is unjust.
-Ann Scales2




I have to say that I have been and remain ambivalent about being a
part of this Symposium. It is, without question, the most difficult writing
I have undertaken in my professional life. This kind of occasion, in
which a friend is memorialized, is a splendid thing. It invites us to re-
member that Ann is present, all of her, in her written work, and that she
lives on in it, continues to speak to us through it. For those of us close to
her, that offers some comfort. Nevertheless, an event like this also re-
quires one to practice an ethics of interpretation on one's friend. It asks
that a whole human life, and the body of work from which that life was
in ways large and small inseparable, be cut to pieces. The fact that one
must be dismembered in order to be remembered is, in my opinion, the
saddest of ironies. So I struggled.
Because of the breadth and depth of Ann's insight, I could have
gone in many directions with this piece. At first, I thought I would write
something about legal education. That would have been easy; there's
plenty wrong with it, as Ann knew well. Had I read her incredible article,
Surviving Legal De-Education, before going to law school, I would have
been a better law student. At the least, I would have understood what law
1. Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY:
INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 395, 407 (Martha Albertson Fineman
et al. eds., 2009).
2. Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 28-29
(1992).




school was doing to me, why my energy was drained-why I was a little
crazy. In Surviving Legal De-Education, Ann riffed on Scott Turow's
One L, in which he described law students in a way that assumed a lot
about who law school, and by extension the law, was really for.4 Of
course, Turow was writing about that law school "Shining on a Hill," as
it were, the prestigious5 Harvard, where students and faculty are thought
of as Olympians.6 Ann and Turow were classmates, and she makes an
appearance, albeit a background one, in One L.7 Of course, the problems
in legal education that Ann identified don't just exist at Harvard. They
are systemic. In short, the late, great Derrick Bell would have to have
blown up more than just Harvard Law School in order to save us.8 In the
end, I felt I couldn't improve on what Ann saw and addressed, returning
as she did to the theme in Midnight Train to Us9 and Feminists in the
Field of Time,'° and in other work. I abandoned the theme.
Then I pondered the question with which Ann began her beautiful
book, Legal Feminism: "Does [legal feminism] have a future?"" If it
does, what does it look like? I remembered Adrienne Rich's observation,
a lifetime ago now, that so very little work had imagined a feminist uto-
pia. I noted that little has changed since Rich originally penned this
observation in 1974. So, I set about the work of imagining such a thing.
A friend had encouraged me to write a narrative piece. Now, I thought,
was the time to do it. After all, Ann had been emphatic about storytell-
ing's importance to liberation.13 So, I imagined that Ann, now abiding in
the Feminist Future, came to visit me. I imagined our conversations
about what this future would be like and what those of us here, now,
could do to realize its possibility. Hearing Ann's voice in my head, revel-
ing, again, in her sharp wit and keen sense of humor, and of course her
4. Turow had written of his first year classmates: "We are men and women drawn to the
study of rules, people with a native taste for order." SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 300 (1977). Ann im-
proved substantially upon this perspective, writing: "The day is coming soon when some right-
minded successor to Scott Turow can write about her first-year classmates: We are women and men
drawn to the living of life, people with a native taste for survival, for diversity, and for freedom."
Scales, supra note 3, at 164.
5. 1 am always mindful that the original meaning of the word prestige is a "trick." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 983 (1 1th ed. 2003) (defining the word prestige).
6. See TUROW, supra note 4, at 10, 12.
7. See Scales, supra note 3, at 164.
8. See Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2382, 2382 (1989).
9. Ann C. Scales, Midnight Train to Us, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 710, 710-11(1990).
10. Ann C. Scales, Feminists in the Field of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 97-98 (1990).
11. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, & LEGAL THEORY 1 (2006).
12. ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978, at 153
(1979) ("I have been trying to think of a celebrated literary utopia written by a woman.... Even
minds practiced in criticism of the status quo resist a vision so apparently unnerving as that which
foresees an end to male privilege and a changed relationship between the sexes.").
13. See, e.g., Ann Scales, supra note 3, at 148 ("Included in these alternative realities are
transformative versions of authority, power, and order.... [l]n Robin West's words, . . . we [must]
'flood the market with our own stories,' until they are heard, until there is room for us simply to be
who we are." (quoting Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Ctll. L. REV. 1, 65 (1988))).
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masterly feminist philosophy, was a beautiful experience. I wrote all of
these conversations down. But something wasn't quite right. How would
these "conversations" translate in a forum requiring a live address to a
room full of people? In short, how could this project translate as anything
other than schizophrenic? I may yet take this quantum leap with my
friend, but now isn't the time. So I put it all away and started over again.
I think the reason for all of this grasping, the fits of starting and
stopping, was that I resisted saying what needed to be said. I didn't want
to talk about what this Essay ended up discussing. I didn't want to talk
about the relationship of radical feminism to gay men's lives-at least
not now. Mostly, I think, I didn't want to do it because it risks contrib-
uting to the well-worn criticism that feminism should be avoided because
it is too contentious.'4 And certainly I didn't want to take this moment
about Ann, rightly perceived as a moment about women, and turn it into
something about men (thus reinforcing the suspicion that many women
have about male feminists). And most assuredly I didn't want to be per-
ceived as taking a moment that is supposed to be all about Ann and mak-
ing it all about me. Basically, my fear was that in saying what I wanted
to say for this occasion Ann might be, somehow, lost. What I finally real-
ized, what made this Essay finally possible, was that far from being lost
in it, Ann's work is essential to any discussion uncovering why and how
gay liberation goes "off the rails," as one of my readers put it, 15 when it
attempts to separate from radical feminism. It was Ann's great love for
gay people-for gay women and men-that led her to insist that femi-
nism matters in our lives, even in the lives of gay men, and led her to
take unpopular positions on gay pornography.'6 And it was Ann's friend-
ship-her love for me and mine for her-that made so much of my work
possible.
Ann was always interested in what she called feminism's sharpest
edges, by which we continually shape its possibilities. And so I joined
14. See Diane Richardson, "Misguided, Dangerous and Wrong" on the Maligning of Radical
Feminism, in RADICALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM RECLAIMED 143, 143-54 (Diane Bell & Renate
Klein eds., 1996), for a discussion.
15. E-mail from Jeffrey Vanek to author (Aug. 28, 2012, 12:48 PM).
16. Ann supported an equality-based regulation of pornography in Canada, in the landmark
decision R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.), and opposed excepting gay marketed materials
from that definition. See Ann Scales, Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad Attitudes and the
Fate of Butler, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 349, 349 (1994). In fact, Ann was called as an expert witness
for the Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium, a distributor of gay porn at issue in the Canadian case
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Can.),
in which several gay groups lobbied for gay porn to remain unregulable under the Butler standard
because it, according to them, isn't harmful. See Scales, supra, at 352 n.4. Ann very nearly was not
called when these groups found out that her position was that gay pornography did produce equality-
based harms to gays as a group and should be subjected to the Butler analysis. See Audrey Fannin,
'Conversation with... 'Speaker Advises Students to Not Do Work They Hate, WAKE FOREST U. SCH.
L. (Oct. 7, 2010), http:l/news.law.wfu.edu/2010/l0/a-'conversation-with- ... '-ann-scales/. She was
careful to underscore that gay pornography should not be marked for any especially burdensome
legal targeting simply because it was gay-oriented. Scales, supra, at 356.
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this Symposium to talk about the role that feminist jurisprudence has to
play in the lives of gay men, not because I enjoy doing it, but because I
think it is what Ann would have wanted me to say in relation to her
work. I think the most striking possibility feminism brings to gay men's
lives is the possibility of love unmodified. As Ann emphasized, quoting
Robin West, "I can't imagine any project more crucial, right now, to the
survival of this species than the clear articulation of the importance of
love to a well-led public life."' 17 I haven't had the opportunity to hear or
read Katherine Franke's keynote address before drafting these thoughts,
but if this is what she is reflecting when she describes Ann's feminist
method as "[t]aking a [b]reak from [a]crimony," then she will have done
Ann's life and work some justice.18
Ann believed in solidarity. Although it may not be apparent on the
surface, the practice of solidarity flows directly from the feminist prac-
tice of relating political ideas and actions to personal experiences through
seeking in one's own oppression a basis for solidarity with others. In this
very real sense, emotional support becomes political support, laying
aside forever the false dichotomy posed by the patriarchalists that tells us
that choosing the values of connectedness necessarily means walking
away from moral agency.19
INTRODUCTION
Ann Scales dedicated her life to "[f]eminism [u]nmodified,
' 20
which is to say Radical Feminism, which is to say exactly what Ann
17. Scales, supra note 9, at 718 (quoting West, supra note 13, at 65 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Ann's focus on a "public life" makes her revelation here no less relevant to queer theory,
despite queer theory's preference for an explanation of the world centered on individual choices, as
opposed to recognition of group-based realities. As I have noted:
The political and civic institutions that create, shape, and enforce laws and define com-
munities-and our active and conscientious involvement in them-are necessary because
without them many of the intensely private and personal aspects of our lives would not be
possible .... [O]ur neglect of our public responsibilities will not only perpetuate our pub-
lic inequality but also will ultimately threaten the privacy we often prize above all else.
SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS: THE GAY PERSON IN AMERICA TODAY 86-87 (2006).
18. Katherine Franke, Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law & Dir., Ctr. for Gend. &
Sexuality Law, Columbia Law Sch., Keynote Address at the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law Symposium Honoring the Work of Ann Scales: Taking a Break from Acrimony: The Feminist
Method of Ann Scales (Mar. 30, 2013).
19. See Scales, supra note 9, at 718 n.25 ("I am not suggesting that we have to choose the
values of connectedness and caring and survival over our individual freedom or well-being or moral
agency. To posit that either set of values must be relinquished in favor of the other is simply to buy
right back into the same destructive dichotomy between self and world.").
See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 306-07 (1995), for a discussion on the role of the concept of "agency" in
feminist theory, particularly for its centrality to strains of feminism critical of radical feminism.
20. This is, of course, a direct reference to the work of Catharine MacKinnon. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 262 (1987)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. Ann was proud to be associated with MacKin-
non. Time and again in her written work and public speeches on feminism, Ann invoked MacKin-
non. For Ann, feminism was synonymous with the "antisubordination theory" or dominance femi-
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said-and meant-when she said "feminist jurisprudence"-a field, it is
useful to remember, that she named.21 So I would feel somehow dishon-
est contributing to a symposium remembering her and celebrating her
work without taking a close look at what feminist jurisprudence is, what
it looks like, and what it does in the real world, which Ann's work taken
in its totality emphatically tells us is the only place it matters. In sketch-
ing out what feminism means for gay men, I can do little better than
build on the definition Ann provided:
Positively, the feminism I know is concrete, antiessentialist, con-
textual, instrumental, eclectic, and open-minded. It is concrete be-
cause it grew from and answers to the real experiences of subordina-
tion caused both to women and men by gender hierarchy. It does not
depend on any transcendental moral principle, unless a commitment
to equality is that. Indeed, the feminism of which I speak is antifoun-
dationalist ... because it recognizes that foundationalist explanations
usually are excuses for social inequalities. The feminism of which I
write is antiessentialist because not only is point-of-view the primary
referent for social action but point-of-view is itself an elastic and
contextual phenomenon. All of the ways that each of us participates
nism MacKinnon has done so much to shape. See SCALES, supra note 11, at 9, 13 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In her book, Legal Feminism, Ann described the importance of MacKinnon's theory to
her own feminist theory and activism.
Before critics dismiss the book solely on [the ground of its reliance on MacKinnon's
work], I would ask them to consider why they would do so. Even those who vehemently
disagree with MacKinnon must acknowledge that much contemporary legal theory is in-
spired by her work or transpires in (sometimes saliva-sputtering) response to her work.
As a purely academic matter, it is distressing to me how MacKinnon has been carica-
tured. I have observed, again and again, how often MacKinnon's critics have not read her
writings, or not read them with care, or have failed to reread those works as circumstanc-
es required .... [Olne needs to understand ... that much of contemporary United States
jurisprudence is connected to MacKinnon. No serious treatment of feminist legal theory
can fail to engage her work.
Id. at 13.
Ann also describes her own feminism being in a place of "stuckness," until she encoun-
tered MacKinnon's "inequality approach," presented in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979) (emphasis omit-
ted). See Scales, supra note 2, at 11. In 1997, Ann wrote:
I read Professor MacKinnon's first book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, and I
began to feel that an explanation (maybe even a better world) was possible .... I spent
many hours mapping her dominance approach against everything I knew about law, and
testing it against my entire experience of politics and human misery. It rang not only true,
but transformative.
Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
34, 39-40 (1997) [hereinafter Scales, Disappearing Medusa] (footnote omitted).
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (9th ed. 2009) (crediting Ann Scales with the first
published use of the term "feminist jurisprudence" (quoting GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 129-30 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Compare Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 193 (1989-1990) (identifying a panel moderated by Ann Scales as
the inaugural forum for "feminist jurisprudence" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Sheila
James Kuehl, For the Women's Reach Should Exceed Their Grasp, or How's a Law Journal to Be
Born?, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 9 (1997) (crediting Ann Scales with coining the term "feminist
jurisprudence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
TOGETHER IN STRUGGLE
in our various identities are constituted by historical, cultural, and in-
dividual practices. The sources of essentialism are beyond feminist
control. Existing modes of power attempt to essentialize our identi-
ties, the better to capture each and every new incarnation as a market
niche. My feminism is built from resistance to that.
22
In order to expand on this kind of definitional project, it is necessary
to include some things and exclude others. This is bound to make some
in my audience nervous, if not bitterly resentful. This is a risk I feel is
worth bearing in this moment, in the name and memory of the woman
whose life and friendship meant so much to me, who taught me just ex-
actly what the well-worn feminist quote "[t]he personal is political"
means.23 Our friendship was simultaneously personal and political, the
two inseparable, fiercely both at all times, and in hindsight left me doubt-
ful of my own admonition that "lov[ing] [someone] for political reasons"
might be an impossible thing.24 Ann's place in my life as a strong lesbian
mother-sister-friend, thus her feminism and magnificent gayness, and
my experience of it, has taught me that.
In honor of that presence, I want to use the space allotted me here to
draw, as directly as I know how, the links between radical feminism and
gay male liberation. In so doing, I will engage the poststructuralist heo-
retical project generally named "queer theory," in order to show just ex-
actly what its engagement with reality on a contingency basis only (mak-
ing it an antithesis of feminism) costs.25 My many conversations with
Ann infused my last book, The End of Straight Supremacy.26 Although
most of the reviews of that book have been praiseful, I was struck by one
review, by Dennis Altman, that chastised me for "[t]he application of an
22. SCALES, supra note I1, at 8. To Ann's final point, I would add these illuminating observa-
tions about queer life, generally of the trend in consumerism experienced as politics and
a more mainstream cultural trend that both invites and disavows queer... identity ....
To cite a few prominent examples: the rise of a new gay and lesbian niche market in the
1990s; the new "cultural visibility" of queers in public life; the cultural fascination with
the figure of the "metrosexual"; the recycling and mainstreaming of lesbian sartorial
styles, ranging from the campiness of drag king culture to the refined and sexy androgyny
of the L.A. lesbian look (popularized by the The L Word); and the neutralization of
"queer" through shows such as Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, which cemented the as-
sociation of homosexual aestheticism with a particularly vapid and rationalized notion of
lifestyle.
ELISA GLICK, MATERIALIZING QUEER DESIRE: OSCAR WILDE TO ANDY WARHOL 162 (2009).
23. See Robin Morgan, The Personal Is Still Political, 16 NEW PERSP. Q. 53, 53 (1999) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
24. SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY: REALIZING GAY LIBERATION
43 n.46 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Queer theory and queer legal theory are not monoliths. And not all work identifying with
queer theory or as queer aligns itself with straight supremacy in the ways I critique in this Essay.
Professor Francisco Valdes's work is a notable example. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Outsider
Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and "OutCrit" Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurispru-
dential Method, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 399, 399
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). However, much of, if not most of, queer theory and queer legal
theory shares the characteristics I critique below.
26. GILREATH, supra note 24, at xiii.
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anti-porn feminism to mainstream gay pornography .... As grateful
as I am for Ann's mentorship that so shaped the theory that emerged in
The End of Straight Supremacy, I find myself grateful to her, again, for
the context to address this important criticism of our work.28
I. FEMINISM AND GAY MEN
To query what feminism has to offer gay men-why it is essential
to our lives-requires me to define feminism. Notwithstanding the gen-
eral history of feminist infighting for theoretical primacy, one reason that
my defining feminist jurisprudence will be a source of unease is, frankly,
that I am a gay man. I think a lot of people become uncomfortable when
a gay man starts talking about feminism.29 When straight men do it there
is, naturally enough, suspicion. Yet, somehow the straight man can be
accepted because perhaps he is one of those darling men who has gotten
in touch with his "feminine side" and has made the absolutely Herculean
effort to learn to cry. My own experience, in some cases, is that when a
gay man speaks of feminism there is outright contempt from some wom-
en. Does he think he is a woman? Is he co-opting women's experiences
and women's oppression for his own ends? Surely it is not news to any
of us that a historical tension has existed between some radical feminists
and some gay men.30 There have been some good reasons for this, name-
ly that gay male culture is infused with a most recalcitrant form of mi-
sogyny.31 There is no denying that. It is also the case that in its rush to an
ethic of sexual limitlessness, much of so-called queer theory has inad-
vertently or intentionally exalted the very sexual sadism and ritualized
violence radical feminism opposes.
32
27. Dennis Altman, Can the Revolution Be Recovered?, GAY & LESBIAN REV., Mar.-Apr.
2012, at 30, 30-31 (reviewing SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY:
REALIZING GAY LIBERATION (2011)).
28. 1 say our work because Ann too believed a sex equality theory of pornography was essen-
tial to gay liberation. In many ways, her work prefigured my own. See Scales, supra note 16, at 350,
358.
29. There is absolutely no question that most feminist work, not to mention feminist writing,
has been done by women-men have rarely and exceptionally participated in the project. See, e.g.,
Brian Klocke, Roles of Men with Feminism and Feminist Theory, NAT'L ORG. FOR MEN AGAINST
SEXISM, http://www.nomas.org/node/122 (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).
30. DAVID FERNBACH, THE SPIRAL PATH: A GAY CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN SURVIVAL 18
(1981) ("Gay men start out from a very different relationship to the gender system than do women,
and the same applies to lesbians in so far as they struggle on the specific basis of their gayness.
While women are oppressed by being what the gender system requires them to be, offering them a
certain reward of legitimacy for being a 'proper' woman and accepting oppression, gay people are
oppressed by our inability-or refusal-to be 'proper' women or men .... The minimum starting-
point of the gay struggle, accordingly, is the demand for our right to exist, for a basic social toler-
ance. These two very different starting-points explain how it is that the women's and gay movements
have by no means immediately recognized each other as allies.").
31. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 173-76, for discussion of male-over-female dominance
in gay pornography.
32. See, e.g., id. at 169-203 (discussing the dehumanization of gay pornography and women
in pornography); see also Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom 's Shadows, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
179, 191-200 (2011) (reviewing TIM DEAN, UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING (2009)) (discussing the idea of sexual freedom).
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I think there has been, too, a self-imposed "gotcha" of sorts by some
radical feminists, whereby, in the attempt to shore up the distances sepa-
rating individual women, and thus create some solidarity in sisterhood,
seclusion from men was deemed necessary. This move alienated women
from a group-gay men-that should be a natural ally to feminist causes.
The late Mary Daly comes to mind with some prominence here. She
once wrote that women who identify as "gay" cannot be "Female-
identified.,33 In contrast, I have argued that solidarity between women
and gay men is essential to both groups.34 This is in the tradition of radi-
cal feminists, like the late Andrea Dworkin, who understood the connec-
tions we share in a gender system that operates to constrain and subdue
35
us.
Some of my male colleagues in the academy seem to think that my
work is accepted or better regarded by women in the academy because I
am a gay man, that the fact of my gayness somehow gives us, the women
and me, a common denominator of sorts. Naturally, I am, on account of
this, immediately suspect to these same male colleagues. I think, at
times, the phenomenological reality I always bring with me as a gay man
helps. For example, I think the fact that I can begin to explain a point in a
faculty meeting without relying on some asshole sports analogy is proba-
bly appreciated by most of my women colleagues (and, for that matter, in
class by my women students).36 And I think this is where the link that my
straight male colleagues believe they have identified between me, as a
gay man, and women stops in their minds. There is something more, of
course: there is the special bond between people who struggle together
for liberation from patriarchy-be they male or female. I have always
liked the way Andrea Dworkin put it when she said, "Women and male
homosexuals are united in their queerness . . . .37 Ann could be counted
with Andrea and with me in this understanding.38 Her feminism was un-
33. MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINIsM 376 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See, e.g., GILREATH, supra note 24, at 25-27.
35. See ANDREA DWORKIN, Biological Superiority: The World's Most Dangerous and Dead-
ly Idea, in LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE 110, 110-15 (1993), for a discussion of the downfalls of
superiority based on immutable traits, such as gender.
36. Ann had something to say about sports metaphors. She wrote with characteristic lucidity
that "the function of sports metaphors is not only to illustrate, but to legitim[ize] [male supremacy]."
Scales, supra note 3, at 149-50.
37. ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 90 (1974) ("Women and male homosexuals are
united in their queerness, a union which is real and verifiable ... which contributes to the cultural
oppression of both.").
38. Of course, other feminists have also understood the need to include men in the struggle
against male supremacy. Bell Hooks, for example, wrote in 1984 that
[s]eparatist feminist rhetoric suggested that all men share equally in male privilege, that
all men reap positive benefits from sexism. Yet the poor or working-class man who has
been socialized via sexist ideology to believe that there are privileges and powers he
should possess solely because he is male often finds that few, if any, of these benefits are
automatically bestowed on him in life. More than any other male group in the United
States, he is constantly concerned about the contradiction between the notion of mascu-
linity he was taught and his inability to live up to that notion.
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modified but it was inclusive. As she put it, "[F]eminism" is not "a way
of thinking available only to persons born female. Rather, . . . femi-
nism.... [is] the critique of objectivity in epistemological, psychological,
and social-as well as legal-terms."39 Ann understood as well as any-
one I have yet encountered the importance of feminist writing that speaks
to everyone who might resist sexist oppression. She understood that real
feminist revolution happens when patriarchy is actually recognized and
resisted by women and men galvanized to challenge male supremacy.
Claiming radical feminism as my ground means that I challenge the
queer theoretical project, which has been antagonistic to the insistence of
feminist jurisprudence that real sexual injuries to real people, even when
those people are gay men, be acknowledged by the law and responded to
in concrete ways. This is a point of critical importance: feminist jurispru-
dence-in the way that Ann conceptualized and practiced it-means to
use the law to respond to and undermine social hierarchy in whatever
form, and not merely peripherally, but as the heart of feminist practice.
This feminism is, simply put, a theory of inequality based on the realities
of male-over-female domination, which has been the model for all forms
of systemic and systematic oppression. It is concrete and specific in this
regard, with the realities of women's lives lived under male dominance
forming the crucible from which a new way of knowing (not merely of
thinking)-an epistemology-emerged and continues to develop. The
work of legal feminism has been to connect this knowledge to the law, to
the coercive power of the state, and thus to speak truth to power.
The method of this feminism has been exposing the lies of male su-
premacy, which are mostly backed by the authority of the state through
the force of law-a law that takes the male point of view as the objec-
tive, neutral universal. As Ann put it, it is a system of law that "made
maleness the norm of what is human, and did so sub rosa, all in the name
of neutrality." 40 Significantly for the application and importance of radi-
cal feminism to gay liberation-and to gay men specifically-this femi-
nism was never, and never aspired to be, a claim to female subjectivity. It
was never a quest to supplant patriarchy for matriarchy. As Ann put it,
"Feminism does not claim to be objective, because objectivity is the ba-
sis for inequality."41 The feminism Ann embraced, worked for, sacrificed
BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 75 (2d ed. 2000).
I agree with the sentiment Hooks expressed here. Classism-and virtually every other
ism"-is a functionality of male supremacy. I do think, however, it's a shame that Hooks doesn't
engage gay male reality here, especially since she stresses that lower-class men "[m]ore than any
other male group" suffer from male supremacist norms. Id. I should think that of all men who suffer
from the "contradiction" between socialized masculinity and the "inability to live up to that notion,"
gay men deserve, at least, a mention. Id.
39. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1373 n.2 (1986).
40. Id. at 1377.
41. Id. at 1385.
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for, and practiced was not about access to a subject position or its corol-
42lary power of objectification. Rather, this feminism was about naming
the reality of patriarchal oppression, establishing its contours, and chang-
ing them for the good of women and men. And surely no men suffer this
oppression more acutely than gay men. To accomplish this goal, it is
necessary, as Ann put it, to "resist[] abstraction.' 43 In that sense, femi-
nism cannot be "a practice that makes claim to objective, universal truth
in the way that, for example, some of the wilder versions of 'law and
economics' theory do." 44 Nor is radical feminism interested in the "op-
pression sweepstakes,45 in that it does not insist that women's experi-
ences as women are superior or constitutive of a metanarrative or meta-
theory that must exclude all men. It acknowledges that women and men
are defined and controlled by gender.
This brings me to my first point of engagement with feminist juris-
prudence and its relationship to queer theory. Whereas feminism has
been in many important ways a practice before it was a theory, with the
theory emerging from the practice of establishing an account of reality
under patriarchy based on lived experiences, queer theory has been an
academic enterprise, the result of postmodern theory, which has as its
basis a suspicion, even rejection, of claims to reality. Like everything
postmodern or poststructural, queer theory is an idolatry of the unreal; it
disputes that there are such creatures as "homosexuals" or "gays" or such
a thing as "gay identity."46 Again, this is simply an extension of the old
42. As I have said, "In a subject-object culture, one must be a subject in order to be objective
about much. To be objective about being objectified is to be dead." GILREATH, supra note 24, at 21.
43. Scales, supra note 39, at 1374.
44. Ann Scales, Law and Feminisim. Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291, 291
(2003).
45. Scales, supra note 3, at 160 (defining "oppression sweepstakes" as "a heated discussion
about whose treatment has been worse" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. One recent example is Katherine Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning
Gay Rights, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012). Franke's is an extremely nuanced piece that
resists simplification, but despite its many qualifications, the article reveals the risk that poststructur-
alism poses for gays (I suppose I should write "same-sexers" or something here, because "gay" as an
identity is anathema to queer theory poststructuralism) who do not have even the meager protections
liberal legal concepts afford. Franke writes:
Once we recognize that the normative homosexuality that undergirds human rights dis-
course is not merely a "fact" in the world, but more of a complex value, it becomes easier
to see how the state's embrace of the sexual citizenship of these new human rights hold-
ers risks rendering more vulnerable a range of identities and policies that have refused to
conform to state-endorsed normative homo- or heterosexuality. This is true both for
queers whose desires refuse to orient themselves ineluctably toward marriage, as well as
for Muslims with sexual norms and practices ofpolyamory, homosociality, and modesty.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added). Professor Franke seems to make a (very nuanced) apology for Iran's
President Ahmadinejad's insistence that there "is no such thing" as a homosexual in Iran. Id. at 34.
For Franke, Ahmadinejad is possibly a victim of Western, imperialist misinterpretation. Quoting an
Iranian colleague translating Ahmadinejad, Franke explains:
[N]ow the other issue is that when the second time he says "In Iran there is no such
thing" the phrase that he uses is literally "such a thing has no external presence/vojud e
khareji nadareh"-now this phrase. "[V]ojud e khareji nadareh" idiomatically means
"does not exist" but literally means "has no external existence"-yet another polyvalent
phrasing that has embedded in it the suggestion that homosexuality is not a socially ac-
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antifeminist bugaboo that feminist jurisprudence is flawed for asserting
such a human being as "woman," or for claiming that women could have
a point of view or constitute a community or share a common experi-
ceptable behavior in Iran, namely we do not see it in public space-adding credence to
... a sympathetic reading of Ahmadinejad that in Iran these are private matters.
Id. at 34-35 (first alteration in original) (quoting an E-mail from Hamid Dabashi, Hagop Kevorkian
Professor of Iranian Studies & Comparative Literature, Columbia Univ., to Katherine Franke (Feb.
12, 2011, 12:29 PM EST) (on file with Katherine Franke) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Actu-
ally, the price of a public queer identification in Iran is state-sanctioned (often state-mediated) death,
a fact to which the string of citations Franke collects attests. See id. at 35-37; cf, e.g., Iranian Queer
Org., Human Rights Violations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Homosexu-
ality in the Islamic Republic of Iran, INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, 1-3, 6-7 (Oct.
5, 2011), http://iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/537-1. (identifying Iranian statutes that punish homosex-
ual acts by death); BE LIKE OTHERS (Tanaz Eshaghian 2008) (documenting experiences of men and
women seeking gender reassignment in Iran). But Franke seems to take Iran's position that docu-
mented executions of gays in Iran are perhaps not really obvious examples of the murder of gay men
at all, but actually only documented executions of pedophiles (again, a misinterpretation by Western
imperialists with a human rights agenda?). Franke, supra, at 36-37 ("it turns out, however, that the
young men in this picture were very likely prosecuted for sexually assaulting a thirteen-year old boy,
not for consensual homosexual conduct."). And, interestingly, here, unlike for Ahmadinejad, there is
no laborious examination of alternative interpretations. See id. I'm not sure on what grounds, or with
what evidence, Franke is convinced that those executed in the particular episode to which she refers,
youths who were, in fact, adolescents themselves, were pedophiles.
In any event, there is sympathy in Franke's piece with Joseph Massad's idea that there is
no such thing as a gay identity in the Muslim Middle East. Id. at 33-34; see Joseph Massad, Re-
Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 14 PUB. CULTURE 361, 363 (2002). 1
suppose it's all in whom you ask: Maybe it's reasonable to consider Ahmadinejad a reliable source.
What is most distressing for me about this particular aspect of Franke's article is that it moves to
erase the state's complicity in producing gay identity as always and only a private identity because
the penalty for public identification is death. Franke diminishes the price of public queerness exacted
from gays in Iran and all around the world. Feminists and gay liberationists have the pesky habit of
asking gay people for an account of their experiences and then believing what they tell us. So here
are some questions I'd like to put to queer theorists: If there is no such thing as gay people in the
Middle East or in Africa, as is widely claimed by multiculturalist theorists, then why was Hassan El
Menyawi tortured and exiled? Why is David Kato dead? Why did Abdellah Thia flee Morocco?
Why do roving death squads in Iraq target certain kinds of men for brutalization and death? Why do
countless men in Iran mutilate their bodies in order to conform their homosexuality to the mandated
gender dichotomy in an act of transsexualism sanctioned by the Iranian government-often under-
taken at state expense-and glorified by queer theory? This latter query alone should stand as an
unassailable indictment of the public price of queerness in Iran. What norm of modesty explains all
of this? And where, exactly, is the murder of gay people not an expression of religious or cultural
(often the same thing) values? See Shannon Gilreath, Why Gays Should Not Serve in the United
States Armed Forces: A Gay Liberationist Statement of Principle, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
7, 17-23, 27-30 (2011) (documenting assault, murder, and terrorization of gay people in the Middle
East and the United States by citing various reports).
I believe Franke and I are in agreement on the rudiments of the larger argument she makes
about resisting cooptation. I'm all for resisting essentialism, and cooptation and universalization, but
to take the real life experiences of gays in "foreign" places and to make of them merely a figment of
the Western mind seems a lot like cooptation to me. To say to gay women and men who have
claimed a gay identity, affirmatively and courageously, in the Middle East and Africa, and who have
suffered appallingly real experiences on account of it, that their identity is always a non-identity,
seems awfully essentializing to me. And a culturally relative defense of the murder of gays anywhere
is a defense (to borrow from Martin Luther King, Jr.) of the murder of gays everywhere. See
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 290 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986)
("Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."). That seems pretty universal.
I thank Hassan El Menyawi for pointing out Professor Franke's article to me and for his
always-clarifying conversation.
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ence.47 When Will Roscoe said of gays, quite profoundly, in my opinion,
that he could "think of no other contemporary minority whose intellectu-
als are so deeply invested in erasing their [identity], ' 48 he could have
added to these anti-identitarian censors the "anti-essentialism" critics of
feminism, who have engaged, whatever their motivation, in the same
kind of cover-up enterprise.
49
You know Ann, despite her dazzle as a classroom teacher and her
genuine love for and appreciation of her students and her groundbreaking
writing, never really identified as an academic. She saw herself as a fem-
inist activist. I think the academic obscurantism just summarized ex-
plains why. Ann agreed with Catharine MacKinnon that to be a good
theory, a theory has to be good in practice.50 In other words, for her, fem-
inist theory was not the playground of the especially enfranchised-a
group at whose apex lawyers must surely be placed. Ann was the child of
academics (her father was a university president); she was educated in
the privileged cocoons of Wellesley and Harvard; she got "the job" with
a fancy Wall Street law firm-the kind of job that tells law graduates
they've "made it."51 But Ann was not the sort of person to luxuriate in
the comfort of academic degrees or family privilege. She did what aca-
demics do not have to do: she faced reality. She cared about women-
and men-for whom sexual subordination is reality.
For Ann, feminist jurisprudence meant seeing sexual injury as a
form of discrimination. It also meant realizing that women's subordina-
tion to men is not natural or inevitable, but political, thus structural.
From the perspective of radical feminism, sexuality itself is structural.
This is the central tenet of feminism, and it is the central importance of
feminism to gay male liberation-the realization, as Andrea Dworkin put
it, that "[e]very social form of hierarchy and abuse is modeled on male-
over-female domination."52 To understand this is to see, in the light of
feminism, that the gay sexuality gay men experience is, in fact, produced
47. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 158-59 (1988).
48. Will Roscoe, Aflerword to HARRY HAY, RADICALLY GAY: GAY LIBERATION IN THE
WORDS OF ITS FOUNDER 331, 347 (Will Roscoe ed., 1996). But see Steven Seidman, Identity and
Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A
QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 105, 133-35 (Michael Warner ed., 1993)
(noting "a turn in poststructural gay theory beyond a critique of identity politics to a politics against
identity").
49. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 585-601 (1990) (criticizing Catharine MacKinnon's dominance theory as "flawed by its
essentialism").
50. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman
Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) ("It is common to say that something is good in
theory but not in practice. I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it?").
51. See Audrey Fannin, 'Conversation with...' Speaker Advises Students to Not Do Work
They Hate, WAKE FOREST U. SCH. L. (Oct. 7, 2010), http://news.law.wfu.edu/2010/10/a-
'conversation-with-... '-ann-scales/.
52. ANDREA DWORKIN, OUR BLOOD: PROPHESIES AND DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL POLITICS 68
(1976).
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in the subject-object context of straight male supremacy. In other words,
the reality of sexuality for gay men, no less than women, is forged on the
anvil of straight male power. As MacKinnon put it, the "situation offers
no outside to stand on or gaze at, no inside to escape to ... no place else
to go. '53 If you doubt this is true, take a moment to really look at gay
male pornography. Here you see in technicolor the hermetic precision of
sexual hierarchy at work. In gay male pornography the structural domi-
nance of heteronormative sexuality-that sexuality in which sex is "gen-
dered to the ground' 54 and wielded as a weapon-is twisted open for all
but the willfully blind to see.55 The fact that so many gay men do not see
it is testament to the ontological and epistemological perfection of
straight male supremacy. This is precisely why consciousness-raising
became synonymous with feminist method as a form of political prac-
tice.
56
II. QUEER LEGAL THEORY AND GAY LIBERATION (QUEER THEORY AS
ANTITHESIS)
The best point of entry to engage queer theory jurisprudentially is
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.57 and the queer theoretical
debate that emerged from the case.58 Ann certainly thought Oncale was
profoundly important.59 The case established that same-sex sexual har-
assment was actionable;60 thus, men could no longer sexually dominate
other men in the workplace and be untouchable. As Marc Spindelman
put it, because Oncale disrupted the conventional social understandings
of men subordinating other men as simply "boys [being] boys" and of the
53. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 639 (1983).
54. Id. at 655.
55. GILREATH, supra note 24, at 169-70. See also infra Parts Ill, IV.
56. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 543 (1982) ("The pursuit of consciousness becomes a form of political prac-
tice."); Scales, supra note 39, at 1401 ("Feminist method proceeds through consciousness raising.");
Scales, supra note 2, at 29 ("The historical and personal experience of the oppressed, revealed
through consciousness-raising, is amply persuasive. In the meantime, lawyers must give up on
monolithic reality and believe that there is something to be learned and a better society to be
achieved by listening to formerly silenced people.").
57. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
58. In reality, Joseph Oncale's life was one of pornographic torture. While working on an oil
rig in the Gulf of Mexico, he was subjected to sexual torture by several male co-workers and super-
visors. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523
U.S. 75 (1998). He was sexually assaulted on several occasions, during which he was held down
while a co-worker placed his penis on Oncale's body. Id. at 118. He was threatened with rape and
only narrowly escaped one rape attempt perpetrated in a communal shower. Id. at 118-19. Eventual-
ly, fearing for his safety, Oncale quit his job. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. His claims of sex discrimi-
nation through same-sex sexual harassment were held actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 76-79.
59. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
60. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
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victims committing the normative infraction of failing to "take it like a
man," Oncale was a blow to male-supremacist thinking.
6'
Professor Janet Halley, however, assails the result as an invitation
for the Supreme Court to license homophobia in legal decision making,
particularly criticizing the brief filed by Professor Catharine MacKinnon
in support of Oncale's sex discrimination claim.62 Setting aside Halley's
various interpretive distortions of MacKinnon's brief and, by extension,
radical feminism,63 what I find most disturbing is Halley's reimagining
of Joseph Oncale's complaint. In truth, Oncale was the victim of at-
tempted gang rape and various other sexual assaults while employed on
an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. His assailants were all men.
Proclaiming that she is going to "put [Oncale's] allegation of un-
wantedness aside, as a mere allegation"64 (as if that's somehow new,
instead of the standard male-supremacist response to any unwanted sex-
ual attention by men), Halley proceeds to turn Oncale's life into pornog-
raphy by making of his attempted rape the "fantasy" of gay male sexuali-
ty that male supremacy dictates as truth: Oncale wanted this rape as a
65gay man. He, as gay men do, wanted to be sexually dominated by (os-
tensibly) straight men. Halley writes:
We can imagine that a plaintiff with these facts willingly engaged in
erotic conduct of precisely the kinds described in Oncale's complaint,
or engaged in some of that conduct and fantasized the rest, or, in-
deed, fantasized all of it-and then was struck with a profound desire
to refuse the homosexual potential those experiences revealed in
him.6
6
Halley's pornographic fantasy of Oncale's real life is an extension
of the ethic of derealizing the real that flavors queer theory as, itself, an
extension of postmodernism. It also clearly demonstrates how "[q]ueer
theory... has in significant ways aligned itself with male supremacy and
its regulation of the general erotic economy that gives meaning to wom-
en's and men's sexual lives. 67 You see, queer theory as an epistemolog-
ical project-as an explanation of how we know who we are as gay men
and women-effectively turns "the Closet" inside out. The Closet ordi-
61. Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 201, 201 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra
note 61, at 182, 189-93.
63. Marc Spindelman lucidly illumines Halley's misperceptions in his piece in the book. See
Spindelman, supra note 61, at 204-16. Professor Spindelman subsequently revised and expanded his
argument while maintaining his disagreement with Halley. See Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality
Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10-47 (2004).
64. Halley, supra note 62, at 192.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Spindelman, supra note 61, at 202.
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narily functions as a shroud. It is the place to which gay men and women
retreat in order to escape persecution and stigma. The price for this es-
cape is invisibility. Thus, in order to be "free" from stigma (and conse-
quently to have or retain any value whatsoever) in this basest conceptual-
ization of what that means, queers must accept their place in the hetero-
sexual hierarchy. Just as gays had forced the door of this existential
deathtrap open, queer theory came along and said that in order to live
meaningful, fulfilled lives-indeed, in order to be-queers should open
themselves to the erotic possibilities of the very sexual hierarchy that is
the engine of male supremacy, which means for gay men (as Halley re-
veals in her Oncale critique) that to be fucked by a straight man is the
apogee of sexual liberation.
Thus, in the insistence on the absence of limits as the meaning of
sexual liberation, Halley and queer theory suggest something much more
alarming than that lesbians and gay men cannot be legally liable for the
sexual injuries they cause, but rather that (at least in most cases) such
sexual injuries are not possible or, more precisely, are a function of the
victim's own internal homophobia-his refusal to live outside of the
Closet. If this is what Halley means when she says that queer theory
deemphasizes the differences between heterosexual and homosexual,
then we should all-gay and straight alike-be terrified.68 Whatever oth-
er conclusions may be drawn from it, it certainly illumines what she
means when she says that queer theory "thinks it is fine to be 'queer in
the streets, straight in the sheets.' 69 For the materialization of this reve-
lation in the daily reality of gay men's lives, gay male pornography
serves as the perfect propaganda.70 Now, how you can realize this and
fail to see that straight male supremacy is metaphysically nearly perfect
is beyond me. I'm still waiting for gay men to resent it.
Extending her critique, Halley insists that queer theory's objection
(and antagonism) to radical feminism stems from radical feminism's
perceived failure to understand that surrendering to such "pleasures"
"rearranges conventional associations of the feminine with subordination
and the masculine with power.,71 Halley provides as her example the fact
that lesbians and (according to her) increasing numbers of straight wom-
en fuck their partners with strap-on dildos.72 Here, Halley's argument
68. See Halley, supra note 62, at 194.
69. Id.
70. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 169-203. Indeed, Halley could be simply describing gay
male porn when she explains that queer theory "tends to minimize ... the differences between same-
sex eroticism and cross-sex eroticism." Halley, supra note 62, at 196. Sadly, as I argue in The End of
Straight Supremacy, much of the mainstream gay rights movement serves this same function, as in,
for example, the push for assimilation into the marriage paradigm. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at
207-32; see also Nelson Tebbe et al., Debate, The Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 159 U. PA. L.
REv. PENNuMBRA 21, 28-35 (2010) (including Shannon Gilreath's rebuttal argument about gay
marriage at the debate).




reveals queer theory as little more than a manifestation of an aggressive,
reductive, and assimilationist transsexualism. At its most successful,
queer theory aspires to little more than gender role reversal. It might fair-
ly be called transintellectualism, for like the false claim of transsexual-
ism to any real gender disruption,73 queer theory merely tinkers with the
system of sexual hierarchy from which straight supremacy is ontological-
ly and epistemologically inseparable. As a normative project, queer theo-
ry remains committed to that same system. After all, if a central tenet of
male power is that the penis is a weapon,7 4 how does a lesbian using it in
the way it normally functions-to effectuate subordination through sex-
disrupt anything? And if gay men, in the porn they produce for them-
selves, merely follow the script set for them by male supremacy, how is
the sex held aloft as "fantasy" not simply heterosexuality in drag? But
queer theory cannot see this, refuses to see it, since its preferred concep-
tual framework makes power an individual plaything-something to be
"perform[ed]"75 -and thus renders structural critique impossible. By
contrast, feminist jurisprudence as a normative project works to under-
mine male supremacy. In this, it is queer theory's anathema, and it is for
gay women and men (and for all women and men), unlike queer theory, a
possible path to liberation.
To understand the connection between gay pornography, sexual vio-
lation, and queer theory in this way is to understand the truth in Ann's
definition of feminism with which I began: "Existing modes of power
attempt to essentialize our identities, the better to capture each and every
new incarnation as a market niche. My feminism is built from resistance
to that.,76 It is also to underline the life force of feminist jurisprudence,
the belief that in order for any of us to exercise any legal right-certainly
the right to free speech or the right to equality or the right to privacy-
we must first have an integrity of the body that is absolute. This is a
plausible reading of what Ann meant when she said, "Gender literacy is
among the most serious pro-life work that anyone can undertake.77 It is
also what led her to understand same-sex rape as a sex equality issue and
78abortion as a queer issue.
73. GILREATH, supra note 24, at 271.
74. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 23-24 (1981) ("The
seventh tenet of male supremacy is that sexual power authentically originates in the penis. Masculin-
ity in action, narrowly in the act of sex as men define it or more widely in any act of taking, is sexual
power fulfilling itself, being true to its own nature.").
75. The notion of "performativity" is most closely associated with e work of Judith Butler.
See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 139-46
(1990).
76. SCALES, supra note 11, at 8.
77. Id.
78. See generally Scales, supra note 1, at 407-10.
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Ann saw Oncale as "the most positive queer case ever decided in
the U[nited ]S[tates] ... more important than Romer v. Evans... or
Lawrence v. Texas."79 More specifically,
Oncale opened the wider range of gender issues, including abuse by
sexualization in circumstances that no one can mistake for flirting. In
that case, the court came as close to understanding as it has yet that
sex discrimination is centrally about the production and manipulation
of gender norms: the issue was not that Joseph Oncale was harassed
because he was a man-he was harassed because of the kind of man
he was perceived to be. It had to be a sex discrimination case under
federal law, but it was also a victory for the principle, dear to the
hearts of feminists and queer theorists and all combinations thereof,
that no one should be forced "to occupy a gender norm that is under-
gone, experientially, as an unlivable violation."
80
Understanding this "force," however, remains problematic for queer the-
ory, because queer theory, not unlike liberalism, is obsessed with
"choice," and its legal equivalent, "agency." Indeed, in a rhetorical frame
in which nearly everything is up for grabs, in which hardly any facts can
be established and where every experience is merely contingent,
"choice" seems to be the only thing that is absolute; hence Halley's bot-
tom line that Joseph Oncale should simply have surrendered to the eroti-
cism offered him by his assailants in her (only just) imagined version of
what happened to him, and her proffer of the "lesbian phallus" as a revo-
lutionary culture shift.81
In queer theory's version of liberation, sexual liberation hinges on
seizing the dominant role by turns-on having the "option" to assume
the dominant position in sexual hierarchy, thus on sexualizing inequality.
Here we see queer theory most closely aligned with the trans-politics that
has emerged from it (and, I think, eclipsed it). Essentially, gay men no
less than gay women are told that we should become "male impersona-
tors," claiming the gender-specific power of which the masculinized
dominance of male supremacy robs us by gendering us feminine based
on our refusal to sexually dominate women-in other words, for siding
with the girls. This is supposedly revolutionary because, even though
some of us must necessarily assume the "submissive" role some of the
time, we have the option of trading it off for the dominant role. For gay
men especially, this means we have the option to be men again, in a sys-
tem in which to be a man is defined as being socially permitted to sexual-
ly dominate a feminized "other." ("Man fucks woman; subject verb ob-
ject.,82) This is the revolutionary potential queer theorists see in the "bot-
79. Id. at 403-04.
80. Id. at 404 (quoting JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 213 (2004)).
81. Halley, supra note 62, at 194 (citing Judith Butler's discussion of the "lesbian phallus" in
BODIES THAT MATYER: ON THE DIsCURsIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 57-91 (1993)).
82. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989).
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tom" having the option of becoming the "top," to use gay male cultural
lingo.
83
Missing entirely from this analysis is the fact that in this vision of
liberation gay men are liberated to do nothing not already scripted for us
by heterosexuality. Lesbians in strap-ons, too, are left in the same bind,
"liberated" to do little more than mimic sexually how male supremacy
says women are to be touched and fucked. What is jettisoned in all of
this pornographic "performing" is the ability to claim a space in which
some substantively equal alternative to this catatonia-inducing repetition
might be formulated.84 Queer theory, then, mistakes a sexuality embod-
ied by gender as an escape hatch from sexual inequality when, in fact,
this very sexuality is "the linchpin of gender inequality.85 It is also, it
should be said, a theory that does absolutely nothing for women, includ-
ing for lesbians qua women. As Andrea Dworkin explained, "devalued
males can often change status, escape; women and girls cannot."86 Cer-
tainly, the female usurpation of the dominant role socially, especially
sexually, is usually delimited by what women can work out with men on
male terms. In every conceivable incarnation, the sexuality aspired to by
queer theory reflects the hierarchical absolutes of male supremacy. It is
straight "in the streets" and "in the sheets."
III. PORNOGRAPHY
I want to probe further the ways in which queer theory reifies male
sexual power as the substance of culture, as well as expose this cultural
root in "gay male" pornography, through a reading of Janet Halley's
reading of Duncan Kennedy's Sexy Dressing.87 In her claiming of Ken-
nedy's avowedly heterosexual perspective as "queer,"88 Halley quite
clearly summarizes what Kennedy intended to say when he wrote Sexy
83. See, e.g., Carl F. Stychin, Exploring the Limits: Feminism and the Legal Regulation of
Gay Male Pornography, 16 VT. L. REV. 857, 886, 892 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The "top" is the insertive partner; the "bottom" is receptive.
84. Radical feminism, by contrast, has always supposed that such an alternative is possible,
indeed, that it already exists in certain counterfactual instances. So much for the old canard that
radical feminism theorizes all sex as "bad."
85. MacKinnon, supra note 56, at 533.
86. DwoRKIN, supra note 74, at 61.
87. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. (1993). By concentrating on Halley's work
as I have in this Essay, I hope I am not interpreted as making some normative evaluation of Halley's
work as the best representative of queer theory, although it certainly is representative. I focus on
Halley here only because her work fetishizing sexual injury in the name of queer theory handily
translates queer theoretical concepts to the realm of jurisprudence (by which I mean, as Ann did,
"legal theory generated by lawyers, as opposed to theories about law emerging from other disci-
plines." See SCALES, supra note 11, at 153 n. 1); because Halley, openly lesbian, claimed to articulate
queer theory in a male voice; and because Ann used Halley's work specifically as an example of the
limitations of poststructuralism. See, e.g., id. at 3, 139-40.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding, Ann Scales thought Janet Halley's prescription
to "'take a break from feminism['] ... is a bad idea." Id. at 3.
88. Janet Halley sub nom. Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS, supra note 1, at 9, 17-18.
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Dressing, which in fact espoused nothing particularly new. What is so
interesting about her gloss on Kennedy is how neatly it exposes the het-
eronormativity of what masquerades in theory circles as "queer." It is
precisely the unabashed heterosexual-ness of Kennedy's theory that
makes Halley, notably writing here sub nomine Ian Halley (I suppose
thus as a "queer man"), claim it as "queer" and, thus, antifeminist. Halley
writes:
Sexy Dressing takes women's sexy dress as a semiotic system that
registers, in subtle and dynamic ways, the degree to which women
are able to enter as strong, self-interested bargainers into sex and
sexually fun symbolic play with other women and with men. He ar-
gues from a position of highly identified "erotic interests"--his
own-which he bluntly characterizes as those of a heterosexual white
middle-class male who wants there to be women (on the street, in the
media, at work) who can afford to be erotically thrilling to
him.... The project is unequivocally pro-sex.
To me, moreover, it is distinctly "queer" in its analysis of sexuali-
ty, power, and knowledge. It fragments and "flips" the male/female
model-and because its reasons for doing so emerge not from Freud
but from social theory-the resulting pattern of sexual complexities
is explicitly political .... It's not feminist. It "Takes a Break from
Feminism." Moreover, seeing it as "queer" instead-because of its
embrace of male heterosexual erotic interests-provides deep satis-
faction to my own ambition that queer work would be able to "Take a
Break" not only from these feminist strictures, but also the homo-and
bi-supremacy that more or less go with the term so far.
89
First, Halley's synopsis of Kennedy's argument that he takes wom-
en dressed in sexually-objectifying ways as a/the way in which women
can "enter as strong, self-interested bargainers into sex ... with men," as
if it is somehow radical, strikes me as extraordinarily dim.9° If Kennedy
is articulating the point of view of heterosexual male-ness, then, of
course, this is his theme. This is little more than a restatement of the role
male supremacy has always allotted women. Women should be sexually
desirable and accessible everywhere for men. Women are told by the
same men who want to keep them this way that this is what makes wom-
en strong. (How convenient.) Historically, even when viewed as some-
how ruinous (think Eve), a woman's carnality has been propagandized as
her source of power. Even when the truth is closer to a woman's sexuali-
ty being defined as the reason she is to be subdued, harassed, raped, sub-
jected, married, and bred, the fiction is that men do everything in life to
win her sexual attentions. The male orgasm at the hands of a woman is
so powerful a motivator that he is powerless before her sinister, manipu-
89. Id.
90. Id. It is also consonant, I think, with the postmodern trend of taking a very simple concept
and smothering it with language in the hope that it will become unrecognizable and thus "novel."
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lative charms. Via this fiction, "[t]he male, through each and every one
of his institutions [the public street, the media, any place of employ-
ment], forces the female to conform to his supremely ridiculous defini-
tion of her as sexual object."91 And if any lawyer or law professor needs
"proof," I should think the overwhelming content of any law library
would suffice.9 2 Halley's spin on this as being somehow sharp seems to
me to implicate exactly what I think Ann Scales meant when she criti-
cized "poststructuralism" for continually covering ground that has al-
ready been covered. 93 In any event, Halley names Kennedy's stance of
(hetero)male subjectivity and female-feminine objectivity unequivocally
as "pro-sex."94 This is no surprise for anyone familiar with Halley's take
on the sexual assault endured by Joseph Oncale. To be pro-sex in the
queer theoretical model is to be pro-objectification.
Next, and most interestingly, Halley moves to call Kennedy's
straight-male "algorithm" for maintaining straight male supremacy
"queer."95 In so doing, she lays queer theory's cards on the table. In her
reimagining of Oncale's ordeal, the acme of homosexual male sexual
experience is taken to be rape. In her reading of Kennedy, she broadens
this to include sexual objectification generally.96 As in the general thrust
of the transintellectual project, and following on her critique of Oncale,
Halley claims this "'flips the male/female model," thus undermining
structuralism of the feminist sort that Professor Kennedy claims is "para-
noid., 97 But, of course, nothing is flipped here. Assigning to women the
power of sex, when men in fact have it, has been an important way male
supremacy has perpetuated itself. (And in what universe is this not politi-
cal?) The fact hat some women no doubt do feel powerful in this frame
proves little more than its metaphysical perfection. As Andrea Dworkin
once put it: "When those who dominate you get you to take the initiative
in your own human destruction, you have lost more than any oppressed
people yet has ever gotten back."98 Finally, and in this light, Halley's
"ambition" that queer politics become more hetero-affirming aspires to
precious little.99 The thoroughly heterosexual, assimilationist value regis-
ter of most of mainstream gay and queer politics is already nearly total,
as I have documented at great length.'0°
91. DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 22.
92. A large and growing body of feminist work critiques the male supremacist bias of the
law's "objectivity" in nearly every facet of law. Ann contributed to this criticism. See, e.g., Scales,
supra note 9, at 718-23.
93. Scales, supra note 1, at 404.
94. Halley, supra note 88, at 17.
95. Id. at 17 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See id.
97. KENNEDY, supra note 87, at 143, 145.
98. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 143 (1987).
99. Halley, supra note 88, at 18.
100. See generally GILREATH, supra note 24, at 77-79, 223.
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Halley's recurring insistence that what is "queer". "flips" the
male/female structure is delusional. One needs to look no further than
gay male pornography for evidence.'°1 A popular genre of this pornogra-
phy is "gay for pay" porn, in which an ostensibly straight man is induced
into sex with a gay-identified man by one of two manipulations: either
the straight man is persuaded to have sex with the gay man by the medi-
ating influence of a woman, either for promise of sex with the woman
(whom he really wants), or because she tells him it turns her on sexually
to see him with another man. Or, he is induced into pornography through
an exploitation of sheer economic desperation, i.e., by the promise of
money, hence the "gay for pay" styling of much of this material.102 In the
first scenario, wherein a straight man is induced to have sex with a gay
man because he wants a woman, the intractability of the male/female
model, as Halley styles it, should be obvious enough.
The second scenario, in which money serves as a form of force,
may need more unpacking. In the system of male supremacy, money is
acutely sexual and is, indeed, indistinct from heterosexuality in opera-
tion, such that heterosexuality as we know it would cease to exist if the
money were extracted from it. As Andrea Dworkin observed,
Money is primary in the acquisition of sex and sex is primary in the
making of money: it is tied into every industry through advertis-
ing.., or items are eroticized in and of themselves because of what
they cost. In the realm of money, sex and women are the same com-
modity. Wealth of any kind, to any degree, is an expression of male
sexual power.103
"Gay for pay" pornography is in keeping with this general script of male
supremacy because what makes sex with straight men sexy is that in each
of these cases gay men work out the "objectification" of the straight men
in explicitly straight male terms. In other words, this pornography reveals
that masculinity follows from the use of money as force, primary in the
acquisition of sex, and internalized in gay men as a function of the mas-
culine process taken as the route to value. "A commitment to money as
such follows as an obvious and public commitment to the display of
In 1986, Ann described the hegemonic method of patriarchy as: "[I]ts aims are united
within a social fabric by assimilating the subordinated classes into the dominant one, and by allying
those classes with it." Scales, supra note 39, at 1379. If there is a more lucid description of what is
going on in the liberal support of same-sex marriage, I wish someone would clue me in to it.
101. Halley argues that queer theory emerged, at least in part, as an opposition force to the
MacKinnon/Dworkin anti-pornography civil rights ordinance. Compare infra note 110 and accom-
panying text, with Halley, supra note 88, at 26 ("[Wle probably wouldn't have queer theory if there
had not been the need for articulate pro-sex opposition ... to male/female model regulatory ambi-
tions (for example, anti-pomography ordinances).").
102. See generally GILREATH, supra note 24, at 174-75 (explaining the two manipulations:
promises of money or sex with women).
103. DWORKiN, supra note 74, at 20-21.
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masculinity as an aggressive and an aggrandizing drive."' 4 Thus, in both
form and function, this "gay" pornography is compulsorily heterosexual,
and so is the queer theory that endorses the primacy of its message. No
"break" from "homo-supremacy" need be taken.10 5 Straight men remain
in control ontologically, because their existence as straight men drives
the fantasy and shapes its parameters.10 6 They are still firmly on top hier-
archically because this gay experience is little more than their desires,
and the process for achieving them, functionally translated, however
briefly, into "queer" form.107 Gay men have negotiated this "liberation"
only on the terms allowed them by the oppressor. A theory aggrandizing
this as subversive is a case of The Emperor Having New Clothes.10 8 As I
have noted elsewhere, "[i]n gay pornography we see what heterosexuali-
ty is"; 19 in Halley's explication of queer theory, we see it too.
IV. FEMINISM AND GAY LIBERATION: TOGETHER IN STRUGGLE
Ann Scales was a fervent supporter of the anti-pornography civil
rights ordinance proposed by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin. The ordinance, to date the only serious legal proposal to deal
with pornography's harms, defined pornography as "the graphic[,] sex-
ually explicit subordination" of women, men, children, or transsexuals.'I0
Of the effort, Ann wrote:
It is possible that pornography regulation would cut into the vicious
cycle of gender hierarchy. The social construction of gender could
change, and that would be to everyone's benefit. Both women and
men are significantly eaten up by genderization. The gender hierar-
chy deprives men of their humanity; it deprives women of their
lives.
1 1
Radical feminists, like Ann, who have opposed pornography because of
the recognition that it is the nerve center112 of male supremacy, have at-
104. Id. at 22.
105. Halley, supra note 88, at 18.
106. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 173-76 (discussing the masculine archetype).
107. Id.
108. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (Naomi Lewis trans.,
Candlewick Press 1997). Or, if the reader prefers an analogy better made to high literature, perhaps
"a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing" fits. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
109. GILREATH, supra note 24, at 169-70.
110. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 262, for a discussion of the
ordinance. Although MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed their ordinance in slightly different versions
at different times, the structure reflected here was unaltered. See id.
Ill. Scales, supra note 2, at 32 (footnote omitted). I think Ann would permit me a correction
here. Pornography does deprive gay men of our lives in myriad ways. See GILREATH, supra note 24,
at 190-201 (detailing the correlation between an upsurge in "bareback" pornography and spiking
HIV infection rates, the risk to performers in gay pornography in terms of sexually transmitted
infections as well as substance addiction, and the connection between pornography and pervasive
rates of sexual abuse within male-male homosexual relationships).
112. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 24-25. ("The harmony and coherence of hateful
values, perceived by men as normal and neutral values when applied to women, distinguish pornog-
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tacked its role in the subordination of women and men. Gay men, mostly
blind to pornography's harms, have not been as quick to see the relation-
ship of "women's issues" to their lives or their politics. But as I noted
before, in her analysis of queer theory, Ann gave us this gem:
"[A]bortion is the queerest issue there is.""l1 3 Abortion is a sex equality
issue, to be sure, but Ann illumines it as a gay liberation issue as well.
She wrote:
One is ineluctably reminded of the ongoing kerfuffle about what
"causes" homosexuality .... It is convenient to the powers-that-be to
portray homosexuality as an unconstrained "choice" that could simp-
ly be . . . remedied by the advances of science. Abortion is another
context where "choice" is portrayed by opponents as a matter of de-
structive petulance on the part of women with unwanted pregnancies.
In real life, reasons for abortion vary hugely, and simply must not be
constrained by some legislature's schedule of acceptable considera-
tions. 114
Abortion, like pornography, constructs women and men as such.
Restrictions on abortion for women (necessarily, since only women need
abortions), who have virtually always less say over the when, how, and
why of pregnancy in the first instance, is a function of sexual hierarchy.
Gender is not irrelevant to the abortion question, and gender's meaning
produces men and women in its image. 15 Anti-abortion restrictions oper-
ate as sexual politics forming an integral part of the male-supremacist
process that makes gender hierarchy-inequality-into social reality. For
many, if not most, women seeking an abortion, as Ann pointed out,
choice is not how they got there. I am reminded of a line from a Maya
Angelou poem that reads: "She stands / before the abortion clinic, / con-
founded by the lack of choices."' 16 The focus on choice or agency, or
whatever other convenient legal synonym can be thought of, merely
serves to invisibilize the overwhelming force that is ineluctably a part of
the environment that produces the need for abortions and the restrictions
that limit access to them. This conceit, this fiction of autonomy masking
a reality of force, is what keeps male supremacy running like a well-oiled
machine. As Adrienne Rich asked, "[W]hose interest is served, and
whose fantasies expressed, by representing abortion as the selfish, will-
raphy as message, thing, and experience. The strains of male power are embodied in pornography's
form and content, in economic control of and distribution of wealth within the industry, in the pic-
ture or story as thing, in the photographer or writer as aggressor, in the critic or intellectual who
through naming assigns value, in the actual use of models, in the application of the material in what
is called real life ....").
113. Scales, supra note 1, at 407.
114. Id.
115. This is crucial to understand: Gender hierarchy is never not relevant. Males learn, prac-
tice, and affirm heterosexual values because mastery of these values is the only way to win the
acceptance of fathers and male peers.
116. MAYA ANGELOU, Our Grandmothers, in I SHALL NOT BE MOVED 33, 36 (1990).
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ful, morally contagious expressin of woman 's predilection for vio-
lence?"'1 7 Following Rich, Ann provided much needed clarification:
The abortion decision is too much like history-making: it is morally
complex, it is often morally compromised, it is a matter of taking re-
sponsibility for difficult and sometimes unanticipated results. It is
important for the right-wing to describe the abortion decision as ca-
pricious. In the context of the oppression of women, arguments
against abortion often involve perverse attempts to portray the violat-
ed as the violent. .. . But "violent" is precisely what women cannot
be, according to the law, and the legal power to do "violence," how-
ever narrowly defined, is a credential for the autonomy that the law
presumes men and women to possess equally. 118
Ann illuminated how the seemingly contradictory faces of the "pro-life"
movement in fact pose no contradiction at all. While it is true that many
members of the "pro-life" movement condemn abortion but "support the
death penalty and the moral righteousness of war," there is no actual
tension in these positions because "those are decisions traditionally made
by men in legislatures and situation rooms; a woman qua woman just
doesn't have the capacity to decide any matters of life and death."'19
I began this Essay with an explanation of just how far queer theory
is willing to go. Taken at face value, it stands for the principle that sexual
injuries to gay people are a virtual impossibility. How one can express a
devotion to gay/queer people and yet embrace that position is hard to
understand. And yet I think Ann, through her careful attention to the
abortion question and her linkage of the abortion issue to gay liberation,
has given us the building blocks for the best explanation of queer theo-
ry's embrace of gender and death. 1
20
Gay people have been denied by compulsory heterosexuality the
capacity to decide matters of life and death. Queer theory purports to
claim that capacity, in the process eschewing anything that smacks of
victimization, including, generally, any admission that gay men raped by
straight men didn't want what they got. It is a theoretical posture purport-
ing to give gays what male supremacy and its Closet have stolen from us:
117. RICH, supra note 12, at 17.
118. Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymo-
ron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 37 (1989).
119. Id.
120. Ann wrote that, "[u]ltimately, force and gender are parts of the same death-seeking pro-
cess." Id at 26. When you couple this with Simone Weil's observation of the kind of "force that
does not kill, i.e., that does not kill just yet... [but rather has] the ability to turn a human being into
a thing while he is still alive," you see why those threatened with this force feel they have little
alternative but to "imitate nothingness in their own persons." SIMONE WELL, THE ILIAD, OR THE
POEM OF FORCE 4, 7 (Mary McCarthy & Dwight Macdonald trans., Pendle Hill 1983). We also see
exactly what queer theory (and liberal theory) risks by invisibilizing force through a rhetoric of
"choice" or "performativity." See generally Marc Spindelman, supra note 32, at 179-222, for an
especially lucid look at how gender and death are equally generative principles for queer theory.
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the capacity to choose sexual autonomy. What the queer theorists seem
to miss is that they have provided no choice that the dichotomization of
the Closet did not already offer: the choice between existential destruc-
tion and physical destruction. 12 To miss this is to miss much.
What "academented122 theory obscures, pornography makes plain.
Gay porn mogul Chuck Holmes said that his legendary porn production
company, Falcon Studios, presented characters "who looked like they
wouldn't ever do anything but be the best little fellows-the little busi-
nessmen, the good members of their community-and all of a sudden
they'd just kiss each other, and all hell would break loose, and they'd just
try to fuck one another to death."123 If in pornography straight men are
actualized by the fuck, both in the films and in the application of porno-
graphic values in the real world (which civil libertarian defenders of por-
nography encourage us to think of as two separate spheres), gay men are
actualized too, each according to his purpose. What Chuck Holmes elu-
cidates is the stark difference in what this actualization means-the dif-
ference in what the fuck means-for gay men submerged in pornography
and pornographic culture, fucking is annihilation. And it is more than
just self-annihilation; it is mutual annihilation, not merely suicidal, but
homicidal.124 So much for contingency; so much for choice.
121. MacKinnon, supra note 53, at 654-55 ("Whose subjectivity becomes the objectivity of
'what happened' is a matter of social meaning, that is, it has been a matter of sexual politics. One-
sidedly erasing . . . violation or dissolving the presumptions into the subjectivity of either side are
alternatives dictated by the terms of the object/subject split, respectively. These are alternatives that
will only retrace that split until its terms are confronted as gendered to the ground.").
122. See MARY DALY & JANE CAPUTI, WEBSTERS' FIRST NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 184 (1987) (defining "academentia" as "n : normal state of persons in
academia, marked by varying and progressive degrees; irreversible deterioration of faculties of
intellectuals" (attributing Diana Beguine with the invention of "academentia")).
123. JEFFREY ESCOFFIER, BIGGER THAN LIFE: THE HISTORY OF GAY PORN CINEMA FROM
BEEFCAKE TO HARDCORE 134-35 (2009) (quoting Falcon: The Bird's-Eye View, How Founder
Chuck Holmes Built a Sex-Video Giant, UNZIPPED, Apr. 13, 1999, at 16, 21 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Ann Scales understood that death and mass murder were supreme pornographic values
enacted by male supremacy on a worldwide scale. "Mount Rushmore is ecologically pornographic..
. . Mount Rushmore portrays nature as being enhanced by being mutilated in the image of what
white males think nature ought to be and do." Scales, supra note 10, at 95. And then, with regard to
the images carved into Mount Rushmore, she added, "Mount Rushmore might as well be sublimely
ridiculous. As long as we are defacing, let's add Edward Teller, Ivan Boesky, and Richard Speck."
Id. at 95 n.2.
124. In most heterosexual pornography, the assumption is that the used female bodies will
survive. Thus, as Dworkin notes, "[r]uthless blame-'you provoked me'-is used to encourage the
individual and social silence which is the most hospitable environment for the continuation of con-
quest." DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 24. In gay male pornography, by contrast, there is apparently no
presumption of survival. As Marc Spindelman explains of gay sexuality, expanding on Catharine
MacKinnon's rendering of male supremacy into grammar ("Man fucks woman; subject verb ob-
ject."): "Man fucks man, man kills man." See Marc Spindelman, Sexuality's Law, 24 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 198) (on file with Ohio State University, Moritz
College of Law).
One wonders, given Janet Halley's pornographic reframing of Joseph Oncale's experienc-
es, what she would have said to Konerak Sinthasomphone, a fourteen-year-old victim of Jeffrey
Dahmer, who briefly escaped but was returned to Dahmer by Milwaukee police, despite his head
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Gay men have our situation, generally on the bottom of male-
supremacist hierarchy, propagandized as a choice, in the way that Ann
notes-that our sexuality is a function of choice-but in other important
ways too. When, as boys, we are tormented and abused by other males,
we are told that "boys will be boys" and that if we are going to be so
openly gay we should simply expect abusive treatment.125 When we are
sexually assaulted and sexually harassed out of our jobs as adults, we are
told by bourgeois law professors that we wanted it and that we should
choose to enjoy it. And the pornography in which and through which we
are objectified is defended as a choice, too. In fact, we are told it is our
choice, and when we refuse to accept that, we are told that it is somebody
else's choice to objectify us, which also happens to be these same some-
bodies' free speech or art or fantasy. We are told that their choice to ob-
jectify us is more important than our desire not to be an object-not to be
their speech or art or fantasy. When we are told that pornography and our
objectification in and through it is an idea, or an expression, or a fantasy,
we are not told that it is a process. We are encouraged not o see that
pornography is a process of objectification. The objectification I am talk-
ing about cannot be admitted by most liberals or by queer theory or by
other poststructuralist strains that claim to be "pro-sex" because some-
thing real is going on here in which choice-at least for those being ob-
jectified-is merely an illusion. In order to be objectified, one must first
be a subject-a status in which choice is said to reside. But through the
process of objectification the subject becomes an object, a thing defined
always only by the potential use to which it can be put. Choice is alien to
this frame. A chair does not choose to be sat upon. A car does not choose
to be driven. They are objects existing merely as an extension of their
use. They are made for this use. To be objectified for the purpose of sex,
which is to be made for sex, which is to be made into a "sex object," is to
be in exactly the same place as the chair or the car. 1
26
Thus it is not enough to say simply that pornography depicts gay
men-those in pornography and by extension the majority of gay men
who are overwhelmingly the consumers of pornography'27 -as wanting
bleeding from the obvious wounds where Dahmer had attempted to drill holes in his skull with a
power drill, because the officers believed they were witnessing typical gay sex gone slightly awry.
Milwaukee Panel Finds Discrimination by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at 138; GILREATH,
supra note 24, at 200. Let's imagine (as queer theorists like to do) that Sinthasomphone, a Laotian
immigrant who spoke nearly no English, made it to Harvard and encountered queer legal theory in
all its macabre grandeur. Should he have taken Halley's advice to embrace this torture-experienced
as sexually arousing by Dahmer, thus as sex-to the point of death? This is not a rhetorical question.
125. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
126. Accord MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 173 ("A sex object is
defined on the basis of its looks, in terms of its usability for sexual pleasure, such that both the
looking-the quality of the gaze, including its point of view-and the definition according to use
become eroticized as part of the sex itself.").
127. See GILREATH, supra note 24, at 170 n.3. Of the "multibillion dollar per year business"
that is pornography, "revenues from sales of gay male pornography constitute approximately half of
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to be humiliated, subjected, battered, possessed, ultimately sexualized-
to be sex-because here, again, the conceit of choice is preserved. But an
object exists only as a function of its use. Pornography is a process of
objectification that, by definition, obliterates the choices of those por-
nographed to make it and those who internalize its meaning through con-
sumption of its message. We are made things. Things do not choose.
Things are acted upon according to their purpose. To see choice here is
an option available only to a very few-usually, it seems to me, an arti-
fice contrived by the patriarchalists and those most useful to them for
perpetuating the system, mostly academics and the criminally insane.
One thinks here of the various theories of how the Jews, systematically
slaughtered by the Nazis, went willingly to the ovens.
129
Once objectification has been accomplished, the dominant succeed
ontologically on their own terms: the force necessary to sustain the sys-
tem is invisibilized. Pornography is a process by which heterosexuality
remains compulsory, no less for gay men than for anyone else, since in
gay pornography the images we see of gay sex are merely reflections of
the heterosexual norm. The only fantasy involved is the fantasy that we
choose any of it. You see, for all the queer theoretical posturing about
role choice, "topping" and "bottoming," fucker or fuck-ee, a sexuality
locked in genderized hierarchy through eroticized dominance and sub-
mission permits no real choice. In pornography-on film and in every-
day life-we do not choose a role; we are assigned a role. And as
MacKinnon noted, "Gender is an assignment made visually."
130
Building on Simone Weil's observation that force "is that x that
turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing,"'131 Ann Scales ob-
served that "[t]he patriarchal combination of force and gender accounts
for our frustrating experience of patriarchy as a house of mirrors as well
as an imposing monolith.... It requires that men thingify women in or-
der to be worthy to be thingified themselves."132 And anyhow, if being a
"sex object," or if being pimped on film or otherwise is such a great
"choice," one has to wonder why more straight men aren't doing it. Or,
for that matter, why more tenured law professors aren't "choosing" it. As
[the profit]." Id. Since estimates putting us at around ten percent of the total population are consid-
ered generous, this fact is really quite astonishing. Id.
128. See id. at 130 ("The oppressed person begins to wonder if he, indeed, may be that thing
that his oppressors say he is. Dehumanization is a very effective means of changing someone into
nothing because it ensures that the messages one hears from others about oneself eventually become
the messages one hears from oneself about oneself, and that is all the more damaging.").
129. See Samuel P. Oliner, Jewish Heroes and the Wilhelm Bachner Story, HIDDEN CHILD
(Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, New York), 2012, at 7, 19-20 (discussing the myth of
Jewish passivity during the Holocaust and noting that "[t]he distortion by anti-Semites, and even by
some Jews, that Jews didn't care about hemselves or their family and that they walked passively to
their death, is far from the truth. It is a falsehood that needs to be corrected.").
130. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 20, at 173.
131. WElL, supra note 120, at 3 (emphasis added).
132. Scales, supra note 118, at 26.
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Ann Scales explained: "Being on the bottom of a hierarchy is not a pose,
it is not a choice, there is nothing safe about it, and it only looks brave
and defiant to those for whom its choicelessness and violation and dead-
ended chances look romantic and elevated because they are not real."'
133
Queer theory, with its celebration of sexual violence and death and
its pointed rejection of law as a means to change, is anchored in this kind
of unreality because it is detached from gay people's experiences. This is
not to say, of course, that those people postulating queer theory are not
entitled to a claim to experiences that matter or are real, but only to say
that queer theory proceeds from a posture that is swallowed by its partic-
ularities. Until very recently, gay people have not had much of a claim to
choice or to the law. Instead, choice and agency and, indeed, law itself,
have been only alien concepts. If it weren't for the fact that queer theory
comes primarily from those who have had a choice, or at least are now at
the apex of choice, being mostly in the academy, the surrender posited by
queer theory might be an understandable response to a lethally anti-gay
culture. Instead it is a willful abandonment of law and the state by people
who should know better. When law is thus abandoned, left to the devices
and prerogatives of the already powerful, that power is consolidated and
strengthened. How can it escape notice that in this environment the phys-
ical force to which Joseph Oncale was subjected, and to which countless
women and gay men are subjected daily, is the law and, thus, is reali-
ty?' 34 Queer theory is, in this respect, either remarkably cruel or its pro-
genitors are really quite far removed from the realities most women and
gay people face. Force and sexual abuse seem a lot less like a lovely aca-
demic game of charades when you are the one with the fist in your
face. 35 As an opposite of queer theory, "A feminist theory and practice
attempts to account for the fracturing of reality, and then to make reality
whole again."'
' 36
Ann once told me that what drew her to the law was the law's abil-
ity "to make itself stick." I have always found that explanation incredibly
appealing. It is this power of the law to change circumstances and power
realities that make it a necessary tool for gay liberation, not something to
run away from or satirize. Several years ago, Jamie Nabozny, the gay
plaintiff in Nabozny v. Podlesny,37 the case establishing that same-sex
sexual harassment of one student by another in school, when the school
administration discriminates in its response on the basis of sexual orien-
133. Scales, supra note 39, at 1392.
134. Compare GILREATH, supra note 24, at 137-39 (discussing violence against gays general-
ly), with id. at 199 (discussing the high degree of physical and sexual violence within same-sex
relationships).
135. ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE & DEATH: UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR
AGAINST WOMEN 118 (1997) ("There's nothing abstract about it. This is a war in which his fist is in
your face.").
136. Scales, supra note 118, at 52.
137. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
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tation, could be the basis for a sustainable constitutional suit,138 told me
how much his victory in that case meant to him. What the law did for
Nabozny was to give him back the hope his abusers had taken from him.
It allowed him to go from a sullen, suicidal, defeated youth to the re-
markably well-spoken, confident, witty grown man I met. It also gave
him the drive to devote his life to other victimized gay youths. It gave
him back his humanity. And what Nabozny's case did for gay children
was to give them a tool to reclaim this same hope, without which there is
no humanity. Any theory that purports to have as its focus the lives and
hopes of the sexually marginalized can do nothing if it cannot do that.
Right now I can hear Ann saying, "I'm [o]nly [g]onna [t]ell [y]ou [t]his
[o]ne [m]ore [t]ime" 139: A theory not good in practice is not a good theo-
140ry.
CONCLUSION
In April 2005, only a little before Ann delivered her critique of
queer theory at Emory Law School, Andrea Dworkin died. In the last
couple of paragraphs of that paper, Ann remembered her friend. It is hard
not to see the parallels between these two women, both of whom were
brilliant, tough, warm, empathic, and humble. Ann wrote:
Andrea Dworkin died the same week as Pope John Paul II. Millions
of people mourned publicly for the Pope. I wished that there were a
women's St. Peter's Square where those of us who loved and re-
spected and owed so much to Andrea could gather to grieve. This
will have to do.
141
I am grateful that Ann is getting this Symposium, which she deserves.
It's something that Andrea, to date, hasn't gotten, at least not in the Unit-
ed States.
Ann continued, with Andrea's memory as context:
There is nothing to be gained by portraying any particular experi-
ence of oppression as inevitable or primary. At the same time, there
is much to be lost from refusal to recognize the regularity of some
kinds of injuries. There is no reductionism or essentialism, nor any-
thing intellectually passd about recognizing the suffering that women
undergo as women, simply because they are women. Ditto for the in-
juries suffered by transgendered people because of that status, and by
gay people because of that status, and by anyone else who isn't
measuring up to the dictates of sacred and narrow institutions. We
should always engage in debates about the difficulty of grounding
138. Id. at 457-58.
139. Scales, Disappearing Medusa, supra note 20, at 36 n. 10.
140. See MacKinnon, supra note 50, at 13 ("It is common to say that something is good in
theory but not in practice. I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it?").
141. Scales, supra note 1, at 409.
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normative claims, and the dangers of normativity being transformed
into normalization. Those disputes will never be over. In the mean-
time, however, we should put more energy into opposing demonstra-
ble instances of injustice.
42
I can't really think of a better way to close this Essay, except to re-
member a facet of Ann's life that she definitely would have wanted re-
membered: Ann never let anyone forget that she was a Westerner-an
Okie-a real cowgirl. As a young woman, in fact, she was a successful
rodeo rider, earning her among her close friends the honorific title "Ro-
deo Gal." These experiences gave her an authentic pioneer spirit-a real
freedom of mind and spirit that made all of us who came close to her a
little freer. Certainly, experiencing her freed me to say all of this. Per-
haps now Ann is freer still, for as Ann's dear friend and mine, Jane Ca-
puti, recently reminded me, energy does not "pass away," as we like to
say, but is simply transformed.43 So, in the words of Ann's beloved Kit-
ty MacKinnon, "precious rodeo gal, ride on."'144 As for me, I'll keep on
doing my best to live what Ann taught me, which is to say: I'll see you
on the barricades, which is exactly where Ann wanted us to be. 
45
142. Id. at 409-10.
143. See Jane Caputi, Professor, Fla. Atl. Univ., Remarks at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law Symposium Honoring the Work of Ann Scales: Ann Scales on the Patriar-
chal/Pornographic Paradigm, with Meditations on the Ongoing Medusean Makeover (Mar. 30,
2013).
144. E-mail from Catharine MacKinnon to Ann Scales (Jan. 12, 2009, 6:58 AM) (used with
permission).
145. These are the words with which Ann closed her remembrance of Andrea Dworkin. Scales,
supra note 1, at 410 ("See you on the barricades, where Andrea would want us all to be.").
2013]

FLEXIBLE FEMINISM AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN
ESSAY IN HONOR OF ANN SCALES
LYNNE HENDERSONt
ABSTRACT
Professor Ann Scales began her distinguished career by taking fem-
inism and reproductive justice seriously. She became a leading feminist
voice and influence on a number of topics. In later years, she returned to
concerns about reproductive justice by presciently emphasizing the need
to preserve women's access to abortions.
This Essay discusses Professor Scales's concerns and feminist
method and then turns to reproductive justice. The Essay notes that, with
Scales, a right to abortion is foundational for reproductive justice. The
Essay then examines the increasing narrowing of access to abortion
through law. The Essay next examines a current crisis over access to
contraception, including arguments that some contraceptives are aborti-
facients and therefore should not be available and the debate over insur-
ance coverage for contraception under the Affordable Care Act.
The Essay concludes with an examination of what reproductive jus-
tice advocates can do to stop what appears to be a steady undermining of
rights to abortion and contraception, drawing in part on Professor
Scales's concern with always examining women's voices and using po-
litical as well as litigation strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
The loss of Professor Ann Scales is incalculable. Her contributions
to Feminist Legal Theory, practice, and education cannot be overstated,
as participants in this Symposium can all attest.' With a humanity and
honesty that will be sorely missed, she bravely worked on many subjects
throughout her all-too-short life, negotiating dangerous territories among
feminists, LGBT activists, and legal scholars. She never deserted femi-
nism as a worthwhile and, forgive me, essential lens through which to
view the law and the world as a necessary ground for study for scholars
and lawyers.
This Essay examines one of the primary issues of concern to Profes-
sor Scales (hereinafter Ann, if it is not too disrespectful) throughout her
career: the fact that most females, and no males, have the ability to be-
come pregnant and bear children. This fact, that females after a certain
age have the ability to reproduce human life, poses enormous existential
questions, but that is not my concern here. My concern is more con-
crete-I think Ann would like that term-it is that after a brief moment
in time that gave females in the United States more power over their re-
productive capacities than they had ever had, those who oppose women's
power to reproduce have deployed the law again and again to deny them
choice and their capacity to decide when and how to bear children.
The current crisis over abortion in many states, and the fights over
provisions for contraception under the Patient Protection and Affordable
2Care Act (ACA), are not only historically familiar, but also encompass
1. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The Outsider Within: The Radical, Not-So-Scary Feminist
Jurisprudence ofAnn Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 23 (2013); Patricia A. Cain, In Her Own Voice:
Ann Scales as Philosopher, Storyteller, Feminist, and Jurisprude, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 53 (2013);
Jane Caputi, Ann Scales "Imagines Us ": From the Eco-Pornographic Story to the Medusan Coun-
ternarrative, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 65 (2013); Jennifer Chac6n, Feminists at the Border, 91 DENV. U.
L. REV. 85 (2013); Nancy Ehrenreich, On "Having Fun and Raising Hell": Symposium Honoring
the Work of Professor Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Katherine Franke, Taking a Break
from Acrimony: The Feminist Method of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 41 (2013); Shannon
Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 109 (2013);
Tamara L. Kuennen, "Stuck" on Love, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 171 (2013); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Raising Hell, Making Miracles: The Everlovin' Legal Imagination of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L.
REV. 13 (2013); Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, How Masculinities Distribute Power: The
Influence of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 187 (2013); Robin Walker Sterling, On Surviving
Legal De-Education: An Allegory for a Renaissance in Legal Education, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 211
(2013).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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one of Ann's major concerns. I deeply regret hat Ann is not here for me
to thank her personally for bringing reproductive issues back to my atten-
tion in a powerful way and to guide all of us on the difficult road ahead.
The term reproductive justice seems to encompass all that Ann
cared about: it captures all the legal, social, cultural, and economic con-
cerns raised by women's ability to give life. The term evades the dichot-
omy of "pro-life" (whose?) and "pro-choice" (under what circumstanc-
es?). It stands for the proposition that women should not be forced into
stereotyped roles or treated unequally because they bear children. It es-
capes the frame of either/or that Ann opposed. And, from my point of
view, that dichotomy was always a loser: Who can be "anti-life" at a
general level, even if "pro-choice" fed into the increasingly atomistic
discourse of the late twentieth century? Those frames created a false di-
chotomy of benefits and burdens that consistently overlooked females.
Ann was always against false dichotomies.
Part I of this Essay connects Ann's work and advocacy to reproduc-
tive issues. Part II discusses the current crisis status of legal, safe, and
rare abortion under U.S. law, long a concern of Ann's. Part III discusses
renewed resistance to access to birth control, an issue too easily shrugged
off after many victories in courts over forty years ago. Part IV asks what
we, as feminists, can do to restore reproductive justice for females.
However one defines feminism, I simply do not believe that anyone
can deny that the disadvantages females encounter by virtue of their ca-
pacity to give life are feminist issues. Men created the religious beliefs
and secular laws about women, sexuality, and human reproduction
throughout our history. While we cannot ignore the role(s) of men in
ensuring reproductive justice and freedom, we must focus on the unique
experiences of females and the effects that regulating or prohibiting abor-
tion and contraception have on women, their lives, and their relationships
to others. If we conscript men of goodwill in this fight, all to the good.
3
This is especially crucial now, as I hope to make clear in the following
Essay.
I. SCALES AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE
From the beginning of her career as a Harvard Law student, Ann
was concerned with reproductive justice for women. She just knew that
the Supreme Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello4 was wrong and
made no sense.5 I remember seething at the notion that there was no vio-
3. 1 know some feminists who believe men support abortion so they can maintain sexual
access to women. That may be a "masculinities" problem. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 1.
There are men who pressure women to have abortions, but others who do not and who support their
partners in their choices.
4. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
5. Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 376-77 (1981).
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lation of the Equal Protection Clause because, as the opinion infamously
noted, a state law that discriminated against pregnant women in disability
coverage was not "discrimination on the basis of sex" because there were
"pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.,,6 I seethed, but Ann did
something about it: Geduldig led her to found the Harvard Women's Law
Journal in order to give women a voice in the law and to commit herself
to feminism and gender justice.7
Ann's first article, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, specifically
criticizes Geduldig for denying women equal status as human beings.
8
Her next article, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,
noted that legal feminists "have, for example, squandered over a decade
discussing what legal standard could have prevented the outrage of
Geduldig ... ,9 She argued that the problem was "not that the Supreme
Court used the wrong legal standard. The problem was much more seri-
ous: It was that our highest court cavalierly allowed California to disad-
vantage women with respect to their reproductive capabilities."'0 In her
clear statement about reproductive justice, she noted that the Court "en-
dorsed a modern version of a centuries-old method of domination" that
legal feminists failed to address adequately." Unless feminists confront-
ed the built-in gender bias of the law and the habit of the law to exclude
women's experiences and voices, the law would not change. At that time,
many believed "liberal feminism" could not get the job done because it
was part of a pre-existing legal vision of the human that had excluded
women. For many of us, including Ann, "dominance feminism," as
grounded in Catharine MacKinnon's work, held the promise of "freedom
from systematic subordination because of sex.' 2 The antisubordination
path does not depend on a theory solely grounded on male dominance,
however. An antisubordination approach also creates opportunities to
examine other forms of oppression and advantage based on race, LGBT
identity, and class, which fits much of Ann's work.
A. Scales 's Flexible Feminism
Ann may have started with an outrage over inequalities in law based
on women's reproductive abilities, but she moved on to use feminism to
critique vast swaths of law, from causation in torts to the growth of mili-
tarism in the United States, from pornography and sexual violence to
6. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20, 501.
7. Ann C. Scales (1952-2012), U. DENV. STURM C. L.,
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/ann-scales (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
8. Scales, supra note 5, at 377.
9. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1398 (1986).
10. Id. at 1399.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1395 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 117 (1979)).
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Queer Theory and beyond.13 Because she was committed to what I term a
"flexible feminism," she deployed her intellect and respect for others in a
way that I believe set an example for anyone who refused to abandon the
"f-word" and who pursued gender justice. 14
For Ann, feminism was broadly defined as those who believe wom-
en (or females of any age) are full human beings who should have full
rights and responsibilities and whose experience and suffering should
matter in the law. The law had ignored women for centuries, because it
was a male field, and it was feminist jurisprudence's duty to introduce
women's voices and experiences. Although Ann was strongly influenced
by Catharine MacKinnon's work, she never asserted that there was any
one path or "right way" to "do feminism."
For Ann, feminism became a "method" based on women's experi-
ences as a gender/sex category, rather than an "essentialist enterprise."'5
While it is true that the original feminist legal scholars and litigators did
not attend to the other dimensions of subordination of women based on
race and class-because they were drawing on what they "knew"
through consciousness raising-at least they were in positions privileged
enough to start giving women a voice in the law. Thus, Ann did not label
them as hopeless or take an aggressive stance toward them in her work.
She saw that we tangled ourselves in knots over issues,'6 only to let the
male-dominated system remain in power. Despite hurtful disputes and
fragmentations about what feminism was or was not, and whether we
should just forget feminism altogether, Ann saw through our respective
myopias and reconciled what she could. In her articles, she was respect-
ful and thoughtful about divisions as they developed.
I agree with Ann that the category "female" should not be aban-
doned. For example, in the introduction to her book published in 2007,
she stated that "the feminism I know is concrete, antiessentialist, contex-
13. See, e.g., Ann Scales, "Nobody Broke It, It Just Broke": Causation as an Instrument of
Obfuscation and Oppression, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 269, 269-86
(David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) [hereinafter Scales, "Nobody Broke It, It Just
Broke "I (discussing causation and gender bias in torts); Ann Scales, Soft on Defense: The Failure to
Confront Militarism, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 369, 369-93 (2005) (criticizing the gen-
dered nature of militarism and condemning war); Ann Scales, Poststructuralism on Trial, in
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE
CONVERSATIONS 395, 398-99 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Scales,
Poststructuralism] (describing her work with Equality New Mexico in amending the state Human
Rights Act to include "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See also other essays for this Symposium cited supra note 1.
14. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 9 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In her book, Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering, and Legal
Theory, Ann explained why "feminism" is the most useful term for female-focused study and analy-
sis. Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Ann Scales, Disappearing Medusa: The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory?, 20 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 34, 38-39 (1997); SCALES, supra note 14, at 8.
16. SCALES, supra note 14, at 8.
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tual, instrumental, eclectic, and open-minded."' 17 She eschewed ortho-
doxy in favor of what she termed "pragmatism" in many of her works.
My interpretation is that she was less a formal philosophical pragmatist
in her works-although as a person trained in philosophy, she certainly
knew the pragmatic philosophical literature-and more a "pragmatist" in
the sense of political flexibility and practicality: If something does not
work, abandon it; do not cling to a theory or principle if it does not fit
facts or reality; learn from experience. In other words, she was a practical
and flexible scholar, teacher, and lawyer.
Ann learned and grew; she saw things from different points of view;
she changed or modified her positions when she thought she had been
mistaken or had not prevailed. She recognized that human knowledge is
never absolute and that facts and circumstances change. Despite her
Humean skepticism, or a skeptical attitude towards empiricism, she was
willing to venture into that field in her later writings.1 8 Throughout her
life, she never stopped growing in understanding, while remaining in-
sistent that the category female matters.
Ann did adhere to one basic principle or moral position: Human suf-
fering is deeply wrong. Law should not cause human suffering. And
throughout her life, she continued to insist suffering was wrong. She
stressed that "[s]olutions once embraced can cease to be useful or can be
coopted by others for bad ends."'19 Thus, there are no ultimate "right" or
"wrong" answers. Her perspective reflects her pragmatism or practicali-
ty: When what worked once for violence against women or rape reform
as a step forward at a latter time might have been co-opted or abused by
existing legal habits.20 For Ann, paying constant attention to develop-
ments and gendered hierarchies was crucial.
It is no wonder her feminist "sensors" were out as anti-abortion and
anticontraception forces started to pick up political influence in the Unit-
ed States, just as other issues she cared about were also exploding. Thus,
in some of her later work, she returned to the issues of pregnancy and
gender, especially as the somewhat unclear right to an abortion became
increasingly threatened.
17. Id.
18. See Scales, "Nobody Broke It, It Just Broke, " supra note 13, at 274-75 (noting empirical
evidence is "never ... enough" for feminists or anyone challenging power).
19. SCALES, supra note 14, at I 11.
20. See ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF
SUCCESS (2013) (critiquing and examining unanticipated consequences of rape reform; noting new
areas that developed and arguing for addressing these issues); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 9-17, 28 (2012) (critiquing domestic
violence reform and unintended consequences; making suggestions for new approaches in response).
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B. Scales 's Concern for Reproductive Justice
In her book on feminist jurisprudence, and her chapter, Poststruc-
turalism on Trial, Ann returned to the theme of reproductive justice.
21
She emphasized the need for legal feminists and queer theorists to turn
their attention back to abortion rights.22 In her book, she used the issue of
abortion to illustrate how feminist legal methods could apply to a major
legal area involving gender. While writing, "abortion [is not] an end in
itself," she said "[it] is a necessary option for now, and feminists should
portray it as such. 23 Access to abortion is so intertwined with women's
lives and opportunities, including efforts to combat gender stereotypes
and stereotypical role assignments, it simply cannot be ignored as an
integral part of women's lives.24 And, as I shall discuss in more detail
later, she was correct in observing that, "winning abortion cases is not
nearly enough .... If the federal right goes away, the matter will move
back to the states and the streets.25 Ann presciently concluded that
"[t]his is one of those situations where I suspect I'll tire political muscles
that I didn't know I had.",
26
In Poststructuralism, she urged that "the right to abortion
... is the most critical solidarity imperative at the moment.27 She envi-
sioned a link between feminists and queer theorists that had not existed
before. Because abortion is so linked to disciplining the body, recogniz-
ing full sexual equality, and the valuing of certain lives over others be-
cause of gender, she argued, feminists and queer theorists have many
interests in common and should work together in solidarity to preserve
the rights of women to obtain safe, legal abortions.28 Solidarity among
those oppressed because of gender and sexuality was not only possible, it
was "the only viable option for progressive people.,
29
I agree with Ann that reproductive justice is a core issue for femi-
nist work, broadly defined as working to resist and overcome subordina-
tion and oppression of females. First, abortion and access to contracep-
tion have been the way for women in the United States and throughout
the world to be safe sexual beings without being forced into a role or
status. 30 Forcing women to bear children at whatever cost o them places
21. SCALES, supra note 14, at 147-51; Scales, Posistructuralism, supra note 13, at 407-10.
22. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 36-37.
23. SCALES, supra note 14, at 112.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 114.
26. Id.
27. Scales, Poststructuralism, supra note 13, at 407.
28. See SCALES, supra note 14, at 148-49.
29. Id. at 147.
30. See NANCY L. COHEN, DELIRIUM: HOW THE SEXUAL COUNTERREVOLUTION IS
POLARIZING AMERICA 9-16 (2012) (describing reactions to the "sexual revolution" started by the
birth control pill as being based in "traditional family" values); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 92-94 (1984); Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 439-46 (2013) (discussing stereotypes and roles as well as Luker's work);
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them back into stereotyped roles and imposes duties on them no men
have ever had to bear. Perhaps the core issue is whether females should
be required to be "mothers" or bear children by the laws still shaped
mostly by men. Even with adoption as a possible choice once the baby is
born, forcing women to become pregnant and to carry a pregnancy to
term against their own decisions is a denial of a woman's full human
status, because someone else has determined she must give her life and
body to another being-presumably because they doubt her full human
capacities as a moral and competent decision maker.3 1 Abortion oppo-
nents also argue that the regret of women who have had abortions justi-
fies prohibition.32 Opponents omit the grief women may experience in
giving up their babies for adoption and the harms to adoptees themselves.
Moreover, many infants-especially mixed-race, minority status, and
disabled infants-may never be adopted.
By focusing on Roe, Ann was perhaps not quite as explicit as she
could have been about just how much the right to obtain an abortion had
already eroded when she wrote. Perhaps she believed, as she mentioned,
that Maher v. Roe33 and Harris v. McRae,34 in which the Court held that
there was no right to government-funded abortions for poor women reli-
ant on government healthcare, had already substantially eroded abortion
rights. She probably was also more than aware that in those early post-
Roe years, the Court permitted states to prohibit access to abortions in
publically funded hospitals, even when the affected woman could pay
full costs and the state would not have to pay for the procedure.35 Unfor-
tunately, she did not really develop any arguments about the continuing
erosion of abortion rights after the decisions in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey36 and Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 11).
37
Jack M. Balkin, Balkin, C.., Judgment of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID:
THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 31,41,
45 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (presenting a "revised" opinion for Roe v. Wade); Reva B. Siegel,
Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE v. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 63, 76.
31. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1628-30 (1987)
(discussing that women are "somehow blameworthy" and have "'odious' motives" (quoting Robert
F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 175 n.49 (1985))); Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV 1569, 1569, 1621 (1979) (arguing Good Samaritan laws
should not require such personal sacrifices and articulating non-subordination principle); Robin
West, West, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 30, at 121, 130
(discussing Good Samaritan laws); see also Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape,
Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457, 492 (2013) (noting Carhart Irs doubt about women's
ability to recognize the goodness of pregnancy until after the abortion occurs).
32. See infra p. 164 and note 147.
33. 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977) (upholding state's refusal to fund abortions for poor women).
34. 448 U.S. 297, 302, 326 (1980) (upholding the so-called Hyde Amendment prohibiting
Medicaid funding for abortions for poor women unless their lives were at stake or, in this iteration,
the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest).
35. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (upholding ban on abortions in public
hospitals in St. Louis); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1989)
(upholding ban on use of public hospitals and facilities for abortions in Missouri).
36. 505 U.S. 833, 874-76 (1992) (upholding all but one restriction on abortions under Penn-
sylvania law and adopting an "undue burden" test for state regulation).
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II. THE EROSION OF ABORTION AS PART OF REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE
Those who support abortion as part of reproductive justice have lost
so much ground in the past few years that Time Magazine recently pub-
lished a cover story on the erosion of abortion rights.38 Indeed, countless
news stories have appeared in the past year noting numerous new state
restrictions and virtual, if not total, attempts to abolish abortion after the
2012 elections. When Time Magazine declares that we are worse off than
we were forty years ago, when the Court held 7-2 that women had a lib-
erty right or interest in access to abortion in Roe, we should be alarmed.
This Part discusses the steady erosion of protections for women that has
occurred.
Casey undermined the strength of a woman's liberty interests in
abortion, subordinating those interests to the "[s]tate's profound interest
in potential life" from conception-whatever that means.39 "[A] State is
permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abor-
tion, even if those measures do not further a health interest."'40 There-
fore, states could go far in promoting "life" over women's health and
physical, psychological, and social well-being.
Abortion opponents have used Casey's weakening of a woman's
"interests" in obtaining abortions and its increased focus on fetal and
states' interests and rights to justify increasing restrictions on abortion. In
Casey, three Justices set the standard of review for abortion regulations:
Regulations that do not impose an "undue burden' 41 or that were not
enacted for the "purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle" to
a woman's access to abortion42 are constitutional. The three Justices un-
dertook a cursory review of a number of Pennsylvania's regulations, and
ignored the district court's factual findings with one exception: The opin-
ion drew heavily on the district court's fact-finding and other information
about domestic violence to hold that obtaining the consent of a husband
was an undue burden because of dangers married women might face.43
37. 550 U.S. 124, 132, 166 (2007) (upholding the federal "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003" as prohibiting a certain late-second trimester procedure as, I guess, within the Commerce
power. I say "I guess" because Justice Kennedy's opinion for a 5-4 Court only adverted to congres-
sional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause). The Court had struck down a state's ban on
all partial-birth abortions in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Id. at 922.
38. Kate Pickert, What Choice?: Abortion-Rights Activists Won an Epic Victory in Roe v.
Wade. They've Been Losing Ever Since, TIME, Jan. 14, 2013, at 38.
39. See 505 U.S. at 878. From conception could mean once an egg is fertilized or when there
is implantation in the uterus. As untold-and unknown-numbers of fertilized eggs never reach
implantation for reasons beyond birth control, such as a regular menstrual cycle or other factors, it
seems surreal to say conception begins at fertilization.
40. Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 874.
42. Id. at 878.
43. See id. at 887-98. The Justices also mentioned the history of legal subordination of mar-
ried women as a factor in striking this provision, providing a hint of equality concerns. Id. at 897.
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The three Justices looked at each individual regulation separately,
rather than noting the cumulative effects that so many regulations would
have in creating obstacles to abortion. Thus they myopically overlooked
the coercive effect that the regulations as a whole could exert on women.
Waiting times, travel requirements, requirements that doctors tell women
the risks of abortion and childbirth along with the "probable ... age of
the unborn child[,]" 44 parental notification requirements (as long as there
was some form of "judicial bypass" for minors),45 the requirement that
women hear readings on the "father's duty" to support the child even if
the pregnancy was caused by rape,46 and everything else-although
clearly intended to create obstacles to abortion-passed constitutional
muster. Moreover, the state could prohibit abortions altogether once the
fetus became "viab[le]" unless the woman's life or health were at stake.47
Exactly what "the life or health" of the woman meant-or means-
remains unclear.48 Perhaps worse, the three Justices implied that women
could not comprehend the "full consequences" of having an abortion and
suggested that women would be psychologically devastated unless the
state mandated that doctors inform them of the nature of the procedure,
the age of the fetus, and the loss of life involved.49 The arguments of
anti-reproductive rights advocates about the harm of abortion to women,
and judicial doubt about women's moral decision-making capacities be-
came part of the Court's reasoning, if not the specific "law," as Carhart
H illustrates.
In Carhart II, the Court upheld the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003, which prohibited the performance of one type of pro-
cedure used in late-second trimester abortions.50 Not only did Congress
have the power to regulate abortion, presumably under the Commerce
Clause, but also Justice Kennedy's opinion made it clear that he doubted
women's capacity to engage in moral decision making. Congress could
step in because women were not moral agents who could make decisions
about the procedure used.51 So much for "informed consent"! The major-
ity seemed to take note of abortion opponents' co-optation of the argu-
ment feminists had used that women are harmed by unwanted pregnancy
by observing women might be harmed by having had an abortion, espe-
44. Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted). I dispute that in utero human development
can be reduced to this image. A fertilized egg is not an unborn child.
45. Id. at 946.
46. Id. at 903.
47. Id. at 861,879.
48. See id. at 866, 878-80 (concluding that the interpretation of the circuit court was "suffi-
cient[]").
49. Id. at 882.
50. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 11), 550 U.S. 124, 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)).
51. See id. at 159.
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cially of this rare type, instead of carrying the pregnancy to term and
giving birth.52
Since the Court decided Casey and Carhart II, opportunistic state
legislatures and governors have enacted a proliferation of restrictions on
abortions and abortion providers. .53 The recent trends to require ultra-
sounds, to require doctors to "show the pictures" from the ultrasounds to
women in the interests of "informed consent,,54 and so on, are trou-
bling. Trends in many states require doctors to tell women that the
fetus is a full human being from the time of conception-in some laws,
from the time of fertilization, not implantation 55-and increasingly regu-
late abortion clinics on such matters as hall space and medical technolo-
gies in order to force them to close.56 In several states now, doctors who
perform abortions must be admitted to practice at a local hospital, but
there are no hospitals that give these doctors admitting privileges.57 Most
recently, several state legislatures have passed laws prohibiting doctors
from performing abortions once a fetal heartbeat can be detected-at six
or twelve weeks, depending on how intrusive the procedure used to hear
it is-effectively criminalizing even first trimester abortions. North Da-
kota's legislature passed a ban on abortion "if a fetal heartbeat can be
detected, or as early as six weeks into a pregnancy.58 Wisconsin recently
joined this group of Republican-controlled states.59 "Supporters say their
goal is to challenge the Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling...
,60 Arkansas passed a ban on "most abortions" after twelve weeks
"when a fetal heartbeat can be detected using an abdominal ultra-
sound.",61 Texas has enacted restrictions perhaps making many abortions
52. See id. at 159-60; see also Bridges, supra note 3 I, at 479-80 (discussing the effectiveness
of the argument in Carhart I that abortion harms women); Cahill, supra note 30, at 439- 46.
53. John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, at A].
54. See Michael P. Vargo, The Right to Informed Choice: A Defense of the Texas Sonogram
Law, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 457, 458 (2012), for an article that argues this is good for wom-
en, does not harm them, and helps in making a moral choice.
55. See H.B. 2253, 85 Leg., 119 Sess. (Kan. 2013).
56. Associated Press, Abortion Clinics Face Strict Rules Under New Bill, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
4, 2013, at A7.
57. Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421-24 (S.D. Miss. 2013)
(enjoining enforcement of law requiring admitting privileges as an undue burden because women
would have to leave the state); Michael Martinez & Greg Botelho, Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley
Signs Law Raising Requirements for Abortion Clinics, CNN,
http:/www.cnn.com/2013/04/09/politics/alabama-abortion-law (last updated Apr. 9, 2013, 19:05
EDT) (describing Alabama law requiring doctors to have admitting privileges and clinics to meet
stringent requirements).
58. Associated Press, Most Restrictive Bans on Abortion in Nation Advance, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 16, 2013, at A6.
59. Associated Press, Court Challenge Filed to Restrictive Abortion Rules, S.F. CHRON., July
6,2013, at A10.
60. Associated Press, Most Restrictive Bans on Abortion in Nation Advance, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 16, 2013, at A6.
61. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
impossible in that state, despite efforts to oppose the legislation.62 Maybe
these states will agree that abortion is only permissible if a woman's life
is endangered, resulting in judicial and medical fear of even determining
whether the woman will die.63
At the federal level, the House passed a bill to prohibit abortions af-
ter twenty weeks.64 Other bills introduced in Congress have come close
to defunding Planned Parenthood entirely because it provides some small
number of abortions.65 Congress also excluded abortion from required
coverage under the Affordable Care Act.
66
As it stands now, the laws of most states forbid any insurance fund-
ing for abortions.67 Since Harris v. McRae, Congress has forbidden fed-
eral funding for most abortions under Medicare and has allowed states to
refuse funding under Medicaid.68 Therefore, I have to disagree respect-
fully with advocates and scholars I admire deeply who have argued the
abortion issue should be "left to Congress." We will need to work with
courts and states right now; if times change, then we can change our ap-
proach-a pragmatic approach Ann might approve. Yet many states are
not promising either.
Many of the new state laws seem to violate even Casey. The laws
appear to be designed to reach a conservative Supreme Court that abor-
tion opponents believe may now overturn Roe and Casey. After all, if
corporations are persons under the First Amendment, how can unborn
humans not be. 69 Thus, the Court could hold that a fetus or unborn child
62. See Manny Fernandez, Filibuster in Texas Senate Tries to Halt Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2013, at A14 (noting that the bill sought to ban abortions after twenty weeks, require clinics
to meet the standards of other surgical centers, and require doctors to have admitting privileges);
Manny Fernandez, Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will Press Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, at A12 ("The measure, House Bill 2, bans abortions after [twenty] weeks
of pregnancy, requires abortion clinics to meet the same standards as hospital-style surgical centers
and mandates that a doctor have admitting privileges at a hospital within [thirty] miles of the facility
where he or she performs abortions."); Christy Hoppe, Federal Judges Question Whether Texas
Abortion Law Has Forced Clinics to Close, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2014. The case is cur-
rently in the Fifth Circuit. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012). Attempts to stay the implementation of the law failed; Justice Scalia denied a
stay on September 29, 2011. See Supreme Court of the U.S., No. 11A335,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/lla335.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2014).
63. Associated Press, Bill Allowing Life-Saving Abortions Passers 1st Round, S.F. CHRON.,
July 3, 2013, at A3.
64. Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2013).
65. See, e.g., H.R. 217, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 61, 113th Cong. (2013).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 18023 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 156.280 (2012); Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-
Care for All: The Expansion ofAbortion-Funding Restrictions Under Health Care Reform, 15
CUNY L. REV. 391, 392-93, 416-17 (2012).
67. The State of Washington may go the opposite way and approve a requirement that health
care insurers in that state cover abortion. Associated Press, Legislation Seeks to Make Insurers Cover
Abortion, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 2013, at A12.
68. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; Soohoo, supra note 66, at 392.
69. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342, 372 (2010) (holding that corporations are
persons under the First Amendment for purposes of the Free Speech Clause).
[Vol. 91: 1
2013] FLEXIBLE FEMINISMAND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 153
is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. That would effectively
nullify any right to abortion, as "life" trumps "liberty" and presumably
women's equality.
At minimum, the "right to life" could create procedural hurdles to
abortion under the Due Process Clause similar to those the Court rejected
in Doe v. Bolton in 1973.70 Or, more likely, the Court could simply hold
that abortion regulation should be left entirely up to the states on the ba-
sis that Roe was wrong from the beginning and should be entirely re-
versed. To preserve women's access to safe, legal, and rare abortions,
feminists will have to use every tool and all the energy we have. No
woman or girl should have to endure an unwanted pregnancy because the
state coerces her into that "decision"-no matter what the circumstanc-
es.
7 1
Not only do we face difficulties in providing reproductive justice
for women in the abortion context, but we are also facing a crisis in birth
control. Not only is abortion at issue, so is contraception. First, there is a
spillover effect-opponents to contraception, abortion, or both have be-
come adept at characterizing certain methods of contraception as aborti-
facients. An abortifacient can range from anything that interferes with
fertilization under some religious doctrines to anything that interrupts
implantation in the uterus. Second, the Affordable Care Act overlooked
the subterranean controversy over payment for birth control that had
been brewing. Whether employers-or pharmacists or whoever-should
have to obey laws requiring payment for insurance coverage against their
religious or moral beliefs has become a battleground under the ACA. The
one leading case on requiring employer insurance payments for birth
control was the California Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Chari-
ties of Sacramento v. Superior Court,72 but California has been quite
protective of abortion rights for many years. In the meantime, "con-
science clauses" enacted in many states had already exempted employ-
ers, insurers, and pharmacists from providing contraception to employees
or customers on religious grounds.73 Now the fight is obvious and na-
tional. The next Part discusses the obstacles for women needing contra-
ception.
70. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198 (1973).
71. As Donald Regan noted in 1979, "Anyone who attempts simply to deny that there is an
intrinsic horror to unwanted pregnancy lacks either imagination or compassion." Regan, supra note
31, at 1617
72. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 80 (Cal. 2004)
(setting out four-point test for insurance coverage for those employed by religious businesses).
73. See Jed Miller, Note, The Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists' Con-
sciences and Women's Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237, 241-45 (2006); Protect-
ing the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers and a Parent's Right to Know: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 29 31
(2002) (statement of Lynn Wardle, Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107 househearings&docid=f:80684.pdf.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
III. EROSION OF THE "RIGHT" TO ABORTION AND SPILLOVERS INTO
CONTRACEPTION
In Griswold v. Connecticut,74 the Supreme Court held that the
choice whether "to bear or beget a child
' 75 was a "fundamental right ' 76
for heterosexual married people under the Constitution.77 A few years
later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,78 the Court held that the right to access to
birth control was an "individual right" that did not depend on marital
status.79 That right, of course, did not require government subsidies under
the Constitution, but it did reinforce the importance of every individual's
"decision whether to bear or beget a child." 80 Over the past forty years,
the growth of Republican "social conservatism" and power has endan-
gered even the fundamental right to contraception.
As the Managing Editor of the Thirteenth Annual Review of Gender
and Sexuality Law in the Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law
noted in the Foreword, "Who would ever have guessed that birth control
would be the issue at the dawn of the 2012 election?",81 Yet it was a ma-
jor issue.82 Religious organizations and socially conservative Republican
and Democratic members of Congress opposed coverage for birth con-
trol. For example, House Republicans refused on procedural grounds to
allow then-law student Sandra Fluke to testify before the House Over-
sight and Government Reform Committee on rules regarding "Con-
science Clause Exceptions" to contraception.83 Subsequent attacks on her
when she spoke to the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee
on the need for insurance coverage for contraception made it quite clear
that there are those who would deny access to insurance coverage for
contraception for women under the ACA--or under any insurance poli-
cies.
84
As we know, opposition to birth control is a part of our country's
history. Obtaining access to birth control became a major, and long-
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
76. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 485 (majority opinion).
78. 405 U.S. 438.
79. Id. at 453.
80. Id.
81. Dustin F. Robinson, Foreword, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 107, 108 (2012).
82. The Democratic Party tried to portray these issues as part of a "War on Women" by the
Republicans in the 2012 presidential election campaign. See COHEN, supra note 30 (discussing the
evolution of arguments over sexuality, contraception, and reproductive choice that dominated both
parties from the 1960s up to the 2012 election).
83. See Jenna Johnson, Sandra Fluke Says She Expected Criticism, Not Personal Attacks,
over Contraception Issue, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/sandra-fluke-says-she-expected-criticism-not-
personal-attacks-over-contraception-issue/20 I /03/03/glQAJql UpR story.html.
84. Id.; Robinson, supra note 81, at 107 ("[W]e believe in civilized discourse .... We stand
by our fellow Journal member to the fullest, and we condemn those who would use vile and vitriolic
rhetoric to disparage and shame anyone who calmly and rationally expresses an opinion.").
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fought, feminist issue.8 5 Since the decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt,
states may not prohibit the sale, use, or access to birth control. Federal
laws governing Medicaid insurance provide for birth control coverage.
But financing for over-the-counter, non-prescription sales of contracep-
tive drugs is doubtful.86 Religious organizations and others frequently
frame arguments against access, sales, and even approval, of particular
forms of birth control as abortifacients, and therefore a violation of a
right to life. Many opponents would deny access to artificial methods of
birth control entirely on religious grounds, others on less specific
grounds. In either case, women in many states could lose access to many
forms of contraception, which undoubtedly leads to unwanted pregnan-
cies, which of course leads back into the abortion loop.
A. Rape and Emergency Contraception
Current federal funding for the poor that prohibits the use of public
funds to pay for abortions does have an exception for "rape or incest" or
the "life of the mother.,87 But to qualify, a woman must meet the onerous
requirements for coverage-the victim must cooperate with law en-
forcement, for example, in order to be eligible.88 Moreover, because
much of law enforcement still disbelieves women who say they were
raped, it is a slim thread upon which to rely.89 Despite decades of reform
in rape law, police and prosecutors, as well as medical providers, are still
wedded to biases about what "real rape" is.90 Worse yet, funding for
Emergency Contraception (EC)-most commonly referred to as "Plan
B" contraception, although a generic exists-for rape victims who are
brave enough to go to Emergency Rooms (ERs) has become ensnared in
the battle over abortion. Therefore, even in the case where the law does
provide an exception to the prohibition on abortion funding, finding cov-
erage is still difficult.
For rape victims, access to EC that prevents conception can be dif-
ficult if not impossible. Even if a majority of Americans believe that a
rape victim should get contraception, there is a horrible disconnect be-
85. See generally C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL (1972) (discuss-
ing history from Comstock laws through Griswold); LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S
RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976).
86. Probably someone could argue that over-the-counter sales of so-called barrier methods
also should not be allowed in this topsy-turvey universe. For example, spermicides, condoms, and so
on are endangered; diaphragms and cervical caps require prescriptions still, so I haven't a clue where
that leads us.
87. H.R.J. Res. 440, 96th Cong. § 109 (1979). At one point, the so-called Hyde Amendment
did not even have a "rape or incest" exception. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1980)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat.
1418 (1976)).
88. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 457.475 (2012).
89. CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 82-95.
90. Id. at 69-74, 82-103.
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tween "real rape"91 and who is really a rape victim. An example: The
claim that "legitimate rape victims"-an oxymoron if ever there was
one-cannot become pregnant was a factor in the 2012 elections and
continues to be.92 As easy as it is to dismiss extremist statements that
victims of "legitimate rape" cannot become pregnant,93 abortion oppo-
nents continue to make that argument. Moreover, Roman Catholic Bish-
ops and others oppose contraception even when the pregnancy is a result
of rape. So for a rape victim who seeks contraception, there may be no
option-even if she acted "fast enough" and was a "good girl" and went
to an ER. Many rape victims/survivors do not go to ERs in time, but for
those who do, being denied EC worsens the trauma and horror of rape.
Rose Corrigan's empirical study of rape crisis centers and counse-
lors in six states, and her book Up Against a Wall, make it clear that hos-
pitals may refuse to give rape victims EC either because of religious af-
filiation or conscience clauses that exempt them from dispensing such
medications. Only thirteen states require hospital ERs to dispense EC to
rape victims "upon request"; six other states only require hospitals to
"inform" victims that such contraception exists.94 Stranger still is that,
although in 2009 the FDA approved nonprescription sales of EC for
women eighteen years and over and subsequently modified the rule to
allow seventeen-year-olds to purchase EC over the counter,95 doctors in
ERs still believe they have to write prescriptions and refuse to do so.
9 6
Thus the trauma is compounded.
Because Roman Catholic hospitals may fall within religious excep-
tions, and some hospitals or individual doctors in ERs refuse to inform or
administer EC even in states with such laws,97 rape victims are left to
flounder. In areas where hospitals refuse to give victims EC, victims over
91. Id. at 83 (describing law enforcement and prosecutorial skepticism in her study); SUSAN
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998); Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring
Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41,41 (1993).
92. Associated Press, Republican: Akin 'Partly Right' on Rape Comment, USA TODAY (Jan.
11, 2013, 15:16 EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/20I3/0l/11/gingrey-akin-
rape/1827489/ (quoting Rep. Phil Gingrey, R-Georgia, an OB-GYN, asserting that adrenaline can
sometimes prevent ovulation); Jonathan Weisman, Obama Camp Seizes on Republican's Abortion
Comments, CAUCUS: N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, Oct. 24, 2012 (mentioning both Akin's "legitimate rape"
comment in Missouri, and Mourdock's "God's will" comment in Indiana).
93. CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 158.
94. Id. at 166.
95. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (summarizing
FDA changes). The FDA recently announced that Plan B One Step could be sold to fifteen-year-olds
and that the medication should be placed on pharmacy shelves instead of behind the pharmacist's
counter. Pam Belluck, Drug Agency Lowers Age for Next-Day Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2013, at A10.
96. See CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 162 (discussing that some, often Catholic, hospitals do
not have EC on the premises and suggesting that doctors will write prescriptions for it, but will force
women to go elsewhere to fill the prescription. Ultimately, then, these hospitals are not providing
any assistance to women seeking EC).
97. CORRIGAN, supra note 20, at 178-89.
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a certain age may have to travel long distances to obtain what is now an
over-the-counter medication to prevent pregnancy, and they must do it in
a short period of time.98 Given "conscience clauses" that allow pharma-
cies to refuse to sell EC (or any contraception), it may not be possible for
a victim who promptly went to the hospital or care facility to obtain EC,
even over the counter.
The failure to provide EC for the victim within a few days of the
rape-24 hours is optimal, 72 hours may be too late-may mean that a
rape survivor will have to find a doctor willing to prescribe RU-486, a
medication that causes miscarriage and can be more dangerous to a
woman's health,99 and a pharmacist willing to sell it to her, or she will
have to seek an abortion, a perverse result. Of course another perverse
result is that failing to give women the power to decide whether to have
an abortion or get EC may increase inaccurate or false claims of rape by
women simply to obtain the care they need. Indeed, the original plaintiff
in Roe initially told the Texas hospital she was pregnant because of a
rape, because she did not know the Texas law prohibiting abortion had
no exception for rape.l°° These factors argue for requiring EC for rape
victims.
B. Contraception More Generally
Although "[o]ver half of all states have passed legislation that pro-
tects women's right[s] to insurance coverage of contraceptives,"''1 1 not all
states require that health insurance cover contraceptive costs. Even in
states that require payment for prescription contraceptives, health insur-
ance may not be required to cover payments for over-the-counter medi-
cations, such as Plan B/EC. This issue became more public and apparent
with the passage of the ACA, upheld 5-4 by the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.10 2 Under Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations, the ACA has
required that health insurance provide coverage for contraception for all
women as part of preventive medical care.103 These regulations have in
turn led to numerous challenges from religious groups and individuals,
98. Id. at 161-65, 180-82, 195-96.
99. RU-486 is known generically as mifepristone, and now a battle is going on in the United
States Supreme Court over whether Oklahoma doctors can prescribe mifepristone and misoprostol
for their off-label prescription effects that minimize health damage under the FDA off-label allow-
ances. See Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 133 S. Ct. 2887, 2887 (2013) (granting certiorari
and remanding to Oklahoma Supreme Court); Erik Eckholm, In Mexican Pill, a Texas Option for an
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at Al; Lyle Denniston, New Test on Abortion Rights,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013, 3:50 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/new-test-on-
abortion-rights/.
100. Texas at the time had no rape exemption. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
101. Kelly Lyall & Nicholas Schneider, Access to Contraception, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 145,
149 (2012).
102. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012).
103. See id. at 2577.
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once again making contraception a major political issue.1°4 No matter
how hard the Obama Administration has tried to accommodate the Free
Exercise Clause concerns, the battle has continued.
Troublingly, the authors of Access to Contraception in the
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law declared, "Reconciling the
controversy over access to contraception necessarily involves a balancing
of the conflicting rights of those who are pro-life and those who are pro-
choice, of health care providers and their patients, and of employers and
their employees."
10 5
Exactly where did the rights and interests of women fall out of con-
sideration in this summary? Exactly why do the authors see a dichotomy
between "pro-life" and "pro-choice" when it comes to the right to con-
traception? Perhaps the authors were so accustomed to typical court
frameworks for analyzing abortion that gender disappeared from the con-
sideration of, at a minimum, the fact that "the patient" is always female.
The utter silence-or silencing-of organized women's groups and voic-
es about the importance of reproductive control in their lives because of
the dichotomies and doctrinal frameworks that define what is "permissi-
ble discourse" or what the mass media thinks deserves attention may
have led to exclusion of an Equal Protection analysis. Or, the answer
may lie in how successfully anti-choice groups, including Feminists for
Life, have managed to characterize many, if not all, methods of birth
control into abortifacients.
In fact, the Georgetown authors examined EC and concluded that
because "EC can prevent the implantation of a fertilized embryo" it is
probably an abortifacient, e.g., a method that kills a fetus.106 That as-
sumption is not true.10 7 But even if it were true that EC may prevent im-
plantation of a fertilized egg, it does not stop a pregnancy after implanta-
tion. To be effective, EC must be taken within 24 hours, and at most 72
hours, after sexual activity that can produce pregnancy.10 8 The "implanta-
tion" argument does render RU-486 an abortifacient, as well as DES
(Diethylstilbestrol, the emergency medicine available at the time I was
raped), because it leads to the expulsion of an implanted embryo. Many
think intrauterine devices (UDs) are abortifacients, because they prevent
104. See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2013, at Al.
105. Lyall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 150.
106. Id. at 152.
107. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the
medical knowledge about Plan-B and dismissing claim it prevents implantation).
108. "Sexual activity" can mean so many things, and many sexual activities can have nothing
to do with heterosexual intercourse. It is a euphemism for anything that could produce a pregnancy.
Rape, sexual assault, being drunk when intercourse occurs, or even ejaculation outside the vagina
can lead to pregnancy. I guess "sexual activity" here is a stand-in for desired, wanted heterosexual
intercourse, which of course does not fit women's circumstances in all instances. See Henderson,
supra note 91, at 57-6 1(discussing women's experiences of heterosexual intercourse).
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implantation of fertilized eggs. Other forms of birth control prevent im-
plantation too, by interfering with the build-up of the uterine wall-are
they too, then abortifacients? How far out will the arguments go that any
birth control is indeed an abortifacient or analogous to one? Some of
these questions may have to be decided by the courts, but we cannot pos-
sibly depend on the courts alone to restore the ability of females to obtain
legal, safe contraceptives wherever they live.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment also provides the
basis for current major opposition to the interpretation of the ACA that
requires employers of fifty or more employees in secular business enter-
prises, including education and hospitals, to provide health care coverage
for contraceptives for women, the subject to which this Essay now turns.
C. Religion and Contraception
Religious organizations that run businesses and individual employ-
ers of more than fifty employees have sued to be exempt from the re-
quirement that they provide insurance coverage for women's reproduc-
tive health, including contraception, based on the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion Clause.109 Despite a series of modifications to regulations proposed
by HHS allowing religious organizations under many circumstances to
refuse to pay for coverage for contraception, the suits are continuing as
of this writing. Although HHS has recently promulgated a "final" rule
that could moot the following discussion, the matter is by no means set-
tled.110
The Roman Catholic Church, a major employer in schools and hos-
pitals that are subsidized by insurance, taxpayers, and non-Catholics,
opposes the use of any "artificial" contraception."' A serious battle on
abortion has been going on over contraception for some time: Some
Bishops have gone so far as to call for refusing communion to pro-choice
political candidates who are members of the Church.12 This battle has
extended to contraception with the enactment of the ACA. The U.S. Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops, unhappy with any compromises thus far
proposed, filed suit opposing any requirement that Catholic employers
provide insurance coverage for contraception under any circumstances. 113
109. Rachel Zoll & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Final Gov't Birth Control Rule for Faith Groups,
ASSOCIATED PRESS: BIG STORY (June 28, 2013, 18:05 EDT), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/final-
govt-birth-control-rule-faith-groups.
110. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Waves White Flag in Contraceptive Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2013, at A19; Revised rules, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (exempting religious non-profits).
111. Robert H. Brom, Bishop of San Diego, Birth Control, CATHOLIC ANSWERS (Aug. 10,
2004), http://www.catholic.com/tracts/birth-control; see The Catholic Church in America: Earthly
Concerns, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2012, at 32.
112. John Thavis, Cardinal Ratzinger Lays out Principles on Denying Communion, Voting,
CATH. NEWS SERV. (July 6, 2004), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0403722.htm.
113. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion at 1-3, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebe-
lius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (Civ. No. 1:12-cv-00815-ABJ); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Are
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Other employers that are not religious organizations have filed suit
claiming that the law would violate their personal religious beliefs, and
therefore, the First Amendment bars requiring them to pay for insurance
coverage for at least some forms of contraception.' 14 Thus far, the lower
courts have split on whether private employers have a strong Free Exer-
cise claim.1 5 As this Essay was going to print, the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari on this issue.
16
It is beyond the scope of this Essay, and beyond the scope of my
knowledge, to analyze fully the religious issues. But it is not a promising
picture. While the ACA requirements might have passed muster under
Employment Division v. Smith,1 7 because they are laws of general ap-
plicability and not intended to discriminate against any particular reli-
gion, they may not hold." 8 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA)119 in an effort to overturn Smith.20
In City of Boerne v. Flores,121 the Court held that Congress could
not overrule Smith to require applying a compelling interest test to state
laws.' 22 The majority did not say whether Congress could bind itself to a
higher standard. In 2006, however, the Court held 8-0 that the federal
government was bound by the "compelling interest" and "substantial
governmental interest" tests of RFRA in a case quite similar to Smith.
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal2 3 held that
the sacramental use of a controlled substance was protected by RFRA's
required tests for Free Exercise cases, but left open whether RFRA ap-
Catholic Bishops Seeking a Religious Preference or Religious Freedom? 3-4 (Valparaiso Univ.
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 13-1, Feb. 2013), available at
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2209772.
114. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 738 (2013).
115. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296-97 (W.D.
Okla. 2012), rev'd and remanded, 723 F.3d 1114 (1Oth Cir. 2013) (denying preliminary declaratory
and injunctive relief from HHS regulations to privately-held corporate employers); Korte v. Sebe-
lius, 528 F. App'x 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (issuing injunction against regulations on grounds of substan-
tial burden on Free Exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Order, O'Brien v. Dep't
of Health and Human Services, No.12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012) (summarily granting injunction
pending appeal).
116. Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the denial of unemployment benefits to Native American
Church members who were fired for their use of peyote, a sacramental drug for some Native Ameri-
can religions).
118. See id. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)), invalidated by City of Boere v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
120. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (holding that the Constitution does not require a religious
practice exception to federal laws).
121. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
122. Id. at 511.
123. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
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plied across the board.124 The Court has also held 9-0 that a teacher at a
religious school could not sue for discriminatory firing under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, using a broad interpretation of her job duties
as "ministerial.' ' 125 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. EEOC26 suggested that the "ministerial" role of employees of
religious organizations meant they could lose their rights under federal
antidiscrimination laws.127 Title VII's prohibition on discrimination
against an employee "because of sex" would not apply if the employee is
"ministerial.' 28 The Free Exercise Clause could override federal statutes
under either the compelling interest standard or under the definition of
employment, because sex discrimination has never had the highest level
of protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a religious em-
ployer may not have to contribute to insurance costs for contraception.
If the federal government is bound by RFRA, Free Exercise claims
could trump women's claims of discrimination for denial of contracep-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause. At no time has the Court held
that discrimination against women is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.'29 Insurance coverage might be a closer case, as
contraception is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. But the
government has no duty to pay for the exercise of even fundamental
rights such as birth control; thus, employers could argue they also have
no duty under the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, when faced with a balanc-
ing between religious freedom and women's equality, the eventual out-
come in the courts is far from clear. 130
IV. SO WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
As Ann wrote, the abortion and contraceptive laws and cases re-
quire the exercise of political muscles we may not have used or did not
124. Id. at 423 (finding that the compelling interest test applies to a Controlled Substances Act
case under federal law).
125. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 698
(2012).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 706-07 (holding RFRA and First Amendment preclude anti-discrimination suits by
"ministerial"-in the religious sense-employees in a case involving possible retaliatory discharge
of teacher in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
128. If the employee's religion is a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) under Title
VII, she would not have statutory or probable constitutional protection against discrimination on the
basis of her use of contraception or pregnancy; if she were a ministerial employee, she would proba-
bly have no protection under federal civil rights statutes. Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-
Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1016-18 (2013); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2012) (defining BFOQ as including membership in a religion).
129. The Court first established gender discrimination's governing standard to be intermediate
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (rejecting strict scrutiny and requiring a sub-
stantial relationship to "important governmental objectives" in sex-based classification cases); see
also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (explicitly shifting the burden to the state
and requiring an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for sex-based classifications (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. Bodensteiner, supra note 113, at 16-20 (discussing weakness of Establishment Clause
arguments under current cases); Griffin, supra note 128, at 997-99.
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know we had. As Carol Sanger wrote in 2012, all of U.S. politics, from
school board elections up to the Presidency, has been in part "infected"
by the issue of abortion. 31 As others have urged, abortion always should
have been left to the political process-and perhaps unfortunately, the
time is now. As reproductive justice is now on the defensive, and as po-
litical organizing takes time, I first discuss the need to continue litigating.
Then, I discuss the silencing of voices for reproductive freedom in the
public sphere and politics. Finally, in thinking about how to engage the
political process, I pay homage to Kate Michelman's "Who Decides?"
campaign132 because it brings home just how personal and contextual all
the things Ann cared about are to the abortion decision and contraception
for women.
A. Litigation
Justice Ginsburg is often cited for the proposition that the "political
process" would have been better than the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe.133 But, to quote another controversial decision, Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1),134 "we cannot turn the clock back."'135 Although
recent historical scholarship has challenged the accepted belief that Roe
set off the current potent opposition to abortion (and birth control?),
36
there is no question that widespread academic and political criticism of
the opinion in Roe has existed since the case was decided.
Because of increasingly repressive laws in some states and chal-
lenges to the ACA, we cannot abandon litigation as a strategy, even
though it is reactive and perhaps confined to current doctrinal approach-
es, at least in the lower courts. Indeed, several lower federal courts have
struck down extremely restrictive legislation in many states,'37 although
what happens on appeal remains unclear. Even in litigation, there is room
for some creativity. As a recent article suggests, although abortion may
still be framed as a liberty interest and litigators are too overwhelmed to
131. Carol Sanger, About Abortion: The Complications of the Category, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 849,
857-58 (2012).
132. NARAL: REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM & CHOICE, Kate Michelman: Biography,
http://web.archive.org/web/20000815055758/http://www.naral.org/about/kate-bio.html (last visited
Jan. 4, 2013).
133. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385 (1985). With all due respect to Justice Ginsburg, whom I admire
greatly, Equal Protection themes haunted these cases, but Equal Protection doctrine for women was
still quite underdeveloped.
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. Id. at 492.
136. See BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT'S RULING (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2d ed. 2012); Linda Green-
house & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120
YALE L.J. 2028, 2073 (2011).
137. See, e.g., Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11 -CV-804, 2014 WL 186310, at * 16 (M.D.N.C. Jan.
17, 2014) (holding Right to Know Act violated women's First Amendment rights); Planned
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900-01 (W.D.
Tex. 2013) (holding admitting-privileges provision lacked rational basis).
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develop equality arguments,38 there is no reason that litigators have to
abandon equality themes that have been developing.'39 Nor need litiga-
tors give ground to law review articles and groups claiming women are
harmed by abortion. In fact, as Professor Carol Sanger has noted, "[t]here
is reliable data on [whether abortion harms women], and studies indicate
that the primary emotion women experience after an abortion is relief
and a feeling of well-being.' 40 Moreover, although Feminists for Life
has promulgated the historical argument that the first major feminists
opposed abortion, a recent article persuasively disputes that claim.'4' A
number of articles and empirical studies also dispute the use of "judicial
bypass" procedures as an adequate protection for minors seeking abor-
tions without parental consent. 
42
At least legal scholars can do the research to help correct the record.
We can also work to see that those people litigating cases actually get
that scholarship and information in time-something the anti-abortion
and anti-contraception forces have managed to do. Certainly in the age of
the Internet and online research sources, it should be easier to link prac-
ticing lawyers and advocacy groups with current data and information.
B. The Silencing of Women
One mistake abortion supporters made was to let opponents capture
the term "pro-life" as if there were only one life involved in abortions.
Rhetorically, "pro-choice," though it drew on a strand of liberty and
freedom arguments deep in U.S. history, was and is weak. "Pro-choice"
also missed the point that abortion supporters were also pro-life-the life
of the woman, the lives of her existing children, the lives of so many
others affected. "Pro-choice" may have resonated in the early 1970s and
1980s under the increasingly individualistic rhetoric of the times, but by
then, when pictures of fetuses had already appeared in the Texas brief in
Roe43 and "social conservatives" had gained an upper hand in politics,
that "libertarian" approach was doomed. Complicating matters further
were feminist critiques of choice and consent, as those critiques could
138. Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality Arguments
to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 377, 403-06 (201 I).
139. Id. at 383-84, 407-12 (noting Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases and Equal Protection
themes in some Court opinions).
140. Sanger, supra note 131, at 876. Sanger also observes that relief doesn't mean the decision
was not difficult or made without regret; however, it was the best decision under the context and
circumstances at the time. Id.
141. Tracy A. Thomas, Misappropriating Women's History in the Law and Politics of Abor-
tion, 36 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 1, 8-10, 19, 28-31 (2012) (critiquing Feminist for Life' representations
of the historical record, with particular emphasis on statements by Elizabeth Cady Stanton).
142. Thayer Hardwick & Hillary Hodsdon, Abortion, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 109, 116-18
(2012) (discussing judicial bypass and whether it is effective in terms of treating adolescents with
respect).
143. Henderson, supra note 31, at 1621.
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easily, although mistakenly, undermine women's power to choose.
144
Thus the term "reproductive justice" may be the better one to use now.
145
The 2013 Time Magazine cover story and others overlook the fact
that for many years feminists tried to work with anti-abortion groups to
find common ground, using support for women's equality and opportuni-
ty, along with access to contraception and healthy families to bridge the
gaps.146 We may be able to work with Catholics for Choice and others on
obtaining access to contraception and promoting healthy families and
adoptions, but only with the realization that they may not help when we
advocate the right to abortion. Still, avoiding abortion is optimal for all
concerned, and we should not decline alliances on some issues unless the
risks of co-optation are high.
Women's voices in favor of abortion and contraception have been
lost-in the legislatures, in the courts, and in the media-especially since
Casey. Speaking out is crucial if we are to recover the stories of women
who support abortion and who have had abortions and are relieved.
While abortion opponents have emphasized studies that women regret
abortion and posit a non-scientific "post-abortion syndrome" as a harm to
women, most, if not all studies demonstrate that women have been
helped by abortion and are better off than they would have been had they
been forced to bear a child.147 The framing matters, and so do the stories
of the millions of women who have had abortions (and millions more
who use contraception!).
C. Politics: Who Decides?
Carol Sanger has rightly pointed out that "abortion politics" have
infected every election from school boards on up. 48 Women may whis-
per amongst themselves, but few women of prominence, not to mention
the rest, speak up publically about having had abortions.149 Kate
144. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 326-27 (1995) (examining tensions in feminist theory over women's capac-
ity to choose under constrained conditions).
145. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1408, 1425-27 (2009) (emphasizing issues of pregnancy and child care
as connected to all parts of reproductive justice, as well as using Critical Legal Studies' rights cri-
tique and criticisms of consent and choice in sexuality and pregnancy categories).
146. Pickert, supra note 38.
147. See Sanger, supra note 131, at 875-76. Sanger also notes that the "relief' doesn't mean
that the decision was not difficult or that there is no regret, id. at 876; but life is full of hard choices,
and we make the best ones we can. There are no algorithms for moral and life choices unless one
obeys rules no matter how stupid they are. Id.
148. Id. at 857.
149. Id. at 868. "Coming out" can be dangerous, but maybe our LGBT friends can assist us in
finding ways to do this. I have often imagined distributing an anonymous questionnaire to female
law professors, lawyers, and students on this issue. Women in power would be next-especially
politicians. But I lack the empirical expertise to design a "good instrument" and get past a Human
Subjects Committee. This seems so lame now. Maybe I should learn how to do the survey and de-
velop a plan.
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Michelman, former director of the National Abortion Rights Action
League (NARAL), is one of the few I can recall.150 Sarah Weddington,
the lawyer who argued Roe as a young lawyer, is another.'5' Ms. maga-
zine submitted to Congress a petition signed by thousands of women
who had had abortions that only yielded a few thousand signatories-but
maybe Ms. as print media could not mobilize the Internet capacities we
have now. 52 Prominent women avoid the topic in terms of their stories
and personal history for many reasons, including, most important, their
personal safety. Indeed, a current Internet effort to gather women's sto-
ries of their abortion decisions, in order to counteract claims that women
do not know what they are doing, has succeeded in gathering numerous
posts, but many contributors have posted as "anonymous."'' 53 I personally
am not surprised, because who wants to be harassed by zealots, much
less threatened and trashed by other anonymous commenters?
I believe that violence and threats against clinics, doctors who per-
form abortions, and local women who are abortion activists and speak in
favor of abortion, have silenced many who support the right to decide
whether to bear a child. Retaliation has its psychic costs for a sex-class
vulnerable to violence to begin with. Protestors near abortion clinics
force women seeking abortions to run a gantlet, although the Court has
held that some restrictions on proximity to clinics and confrontation with
patients do not violate the First Amendment.1 54 The protests intimidate
legal abortion providers and counselors as well. The Court has held that
150. Linton Weeks, Kate Michelman, the Public Face of a Woman's Right o Privacy, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 2006, at C1.
151. 1 thank Pat Cain for pointing this out at the conference. See also SARAH WEDDINGTON, A
QUESTION OF CHOICE 13-17 (Feminist Press 2d ed. 2013) (discussing the abortion she had as a
graduate student in the late 1960s).
152. See We Had Abortions, MS. MAG. (Fall 2006),
http://www.msmagazine.com/fa1l2006/abortionmag.asp. I thank Khiara Bridges for telling me a Ms.
petition naming names existed and Stanford Law Library for finding the reference.
153. See Sharing Our Stories: I Was 16 Years Old..., MY ABORTION. MY LIFE.,
http://myabortionmylife.org/pages/sharing-our-stories.php#lwas 16 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
154. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000) (upholding regulation prohibiting abortion
protestors from approaching persons, distributing literature, and displaying signs within eight feet of
a health care facility that provides abortions); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377-
81 (1997) (upholding "fixed" fifteen-foot buffer zone and striking down the "floating buffer zones"
on free speech grounds); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769-76 (1994) (up-
holding injunction barring picketing within thirty-six feet of a clinic on public property but exempt-
ing private property, and upholding noise injunction but striking down a 300 feet restriction). It is
possible, however, Hill will be overruled by the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted
certiorari in McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
The case is part of a long-running challenge to a Massachusetts law making it a crime for speakers
not involved with a "reproductive health care facility" to come within thirty-five feet of entries. Id. at
3 (internal quotation mark omitted). Question two of the grant specifically asks if Hill "should be
limited or overruled." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McCullen, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (No. 12-1168), 2013
WL 1247969, at *i.
One of the most outrageous stories about anti-abortion protestors I've heard was from a
friend whose very-wanted baby died in utero, through no one's fault. Apparently, the safest place for
her to have the fetus removed was an abortion clinic; imagine how she felt being yelled at and called
a "baby-killer."
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picketing private residences may be regulated or prohibited.'55 But still,
the threat of violence remains: As the director of the only clinic in North
Dakota, Tammi Kromenaker, a social worker, said, she "takes different
routes to work every day to avoid falling into a routine that might make
her a target .. . 'Even if I'm at Target looking at clothes, I never let my
guard down. -156
Even being associated with reproductive justice has cost individual
women in other ways: Professor Dawn Johnsen, an extremely well-
qualified nominee to head the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the
Obama Administration's Justice Department, was pilloried by Republi-
cans for her decades-old association with abortion rights at the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and as Legal Director of what is now
NARAL-Pro Choice America.157 Eventually, she withdrew from consid-
eration, 158 and there still is no permanent Assistant Attorney General
running the OLC. 159 I personally recall Senator Harry Reid, now Senate
Majority Leader, trying to negotiate difficult political terrain by "smug-
gling" Kate Michelman into Nevada to speak to selected Democrats
about insurance coverage for contraception under federal law. There was
no general public announcement and no local coverage of the meeting.
Further, Texas Governor Rick Perry recently attacked Texas State Sena-
tor Wendy Davis's filibuster against an extremely restrictive law, and
said that if abortion had been available to Ms. Davis's mother, Davis
would not have "managed to eventually graduate from Harvard Law
School .... It is just unfortunate that she hasn't learned from her own
example that every life must be given a chance to realize its full potential
and that every life matters."'16
155. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1988) (upholding ban on focused picketing of
abortion doctor's residence under First Amendment).
156. Pickert, supra note 38.
157. Professor Johnsen's curriculum vitae reveals that she was Acting Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the OLC during the Clinton Administration. She has also been the Legal Direc-
tor of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights League (now NARAL-Pro Choice) from 1988
to 1993, and a lawyer for the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project. Dawn Johnsen, Curriculum
Vitae, available at http://newsinfo.iu.edu/pub/libs/images/usr/6107_h.pdf. The Republicans never let
her nomination to head OLC go forward, and she eventually withdrew from consideration. Charlie
Savage, Long After Nomination, an Obama Choice Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A16.
Of course, she also had the temerity to be a Democrat in Indiana. I proudly admit, I am a former
colleague of hers.
158. Savage, supra note 157.
159. Caroline Diane Krass became the Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Office of Legal Counsel on December 21, 2013; however, as of this writing, she has not been con-
firmed by the Senate. See Meet the Leadership: Acting Assistant Attorney General Official Biog-
raphy, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/olc/meet-olc.html (last updated Jan. 2014).
160. Igor Volsky, Rick Perry Attacks Wendy Davis: 'She Was a Teenage Mother Herself,'
THINKPROGRESS (June 27, 2013, 11:57 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/06/27/22271 01/rick-perry-attacks-wendy-davis-she-was-a-
teenage-mother-herself/. Exactly how does Governor Perry know that? Who appointed him the
ultimate arbiter over women's decisions?
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No wonder people run scared, especially in an age of tweets, Inter-
net defamations from anonymous sources, push-polls implying pro-
choice female candidates for elected office had an abortion, and a dis-
course of trashing, all protected by the First Amendment's Free Speech
or Free Press Clauses.
The Time Magazine article also speaks of a split between the origi-
nal activists and younger women who do not identify with the old guard
of the feminist movement. 6 1 The younger women reject the term pro-
choice and wish to focus more broadly on "reproductive justice."'162 They
have energy and skills to mobilize in new and promising ways; I just
hope that intergenerational conflicts can be bridged. Ann built bridges,
and there is no reason not to build bridges across generations here be-
cause so much is at stake.
One idea I had for mobilization was Kate Michelman's "Who De-
cides?" campaign. It may not work now, but it is worth exploring. Who,
indeed, has the power to decide what "reasons" are "good enough" to
have an abortion or have access to contraception? A state legislature that
decides a rape victim cannot get an abortion because a born child would
be "evidence" of the rape? Or one that declares that once a doctor can
detect a fetal heartbeat-maybe just as the woman is realizing she is
pregnant, having missed a period-there can be no abortion no matter
what? Or the legislature that decides abortion is permissible only if the
woman's life is in danger? Who decides? What "counts"? For the medi-
cal review committee in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, it
was not enough that Mary Doe had already lost custody of three children.
As Robin West has pointed out, this "mentally unwell, emotionally un-
stable, economically impoverished, noncustodial mother[,] and aban-
doned wife" could not obtain permission from a medical panel to have an
abortion.'63 While this might smack of eugenics, it also indicates that
decisions by supposedly neutral parties may result in anguish and pain.
As for feminist method, women's voices matter. Women I know
and love may have wildly varying stereotypes or stories about when and
why a woman's reasons for abortion are "good enough." Moral intuitions
can vary deeply, and unless one takes an absolutist position against all
abortion, moral intuitions provide little guidance for general laws.'64 I
keep hearing secondhand stories about women who use abortion as their
primary method of birth control and that seems careless. I might think it
"enough" reason in a case of a bullied sixteen-year-old who was raped
because she became intoxicated at a party, or that it is "enough" reason
161. Pickert, supra note 38.
162. Id.; See also West, supra note 145, at 1426-32 (summarizing arguments for changing
from "choice" to "reproductive justice").
163. West, supra note 31, at 123.
164. See generally ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND
INTRINSIC VALUE 197-202 (2004) (detailing the concept of intuitionism as moral philosophy).
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for a terrified nineteen-year-old in college who had a scholarship and
would have had to lose it if she had to carry the fetus to term. Then there
is my own story of a "real" rape when I was in the ER demanding DES,
and that makes me think any form of unwanted sex is "enough." For an-
other person, a good enough reason is taking antidepressants or other
medications that carry risks to a fetus. For another, it is a boyfriend or
husband who has abused her. For another, a woman learns of severe birth
defects that her family cannot afford to support. For another, all the
woman's precautions failed, and maybe the man is telling her to "get an
abortion." Or maybe it is only "enough" if the unborn child suffers from
a fatal defect and will not survive or the mother's life is in extreme dan-
ger. 165
What reasons are "good enough?" Should the burden be placed on
women to perform according to someone else's opinions and expecta-
tions? Surely the woman or teenager or child who has to bear the preg-
nancy is in the best position to decide-under the facts and circumstanc-
es of her life-whether to carry the fetus to term, not to mention the trag-
edies when the fetus cannot survive or would have a short life. A woman
is certainly in a better position to decide than a legislature or anyone else
when she can have a child.
Ultimately as scholars, we may think we lack political skills. But
Ann worked diligently with LGBT groups in New Mexico to get modifi-
cations to the state antidiscrimination statute for LGBT persons.1" We
have a voice. The result was a substantively important change in the
law. 167 Working with local politicians and the legislative process is im-
portant. The Democratic Party in Texas may have "failed," but Wendy
Davis and abortion-rights advocates put up an important fight without
much time to organize.
We may be naYve about our particular legislature or local govem-
ment, and the current Congress may be dysfunctional, but there is infor-
mation out there on how to be effective politically, even without billion-
aire funding. Understanding how legislators and legislatures work may
be difficult, but lawyers are an important category of legislators and
staff, so finding common ground and working on proposals is possible.
President Obama recently came out in support of Planned
Parenthood, even though anti-abortion attacks quickly followed.1 68 But
165. See Associated Press, Bill Allowing Life-Saving Abortions Passes 1st Round, S.F.
CHRON., July 3, 2013, at A3 (noting that Ireland's complete ban was revisited after death of woman
because doctors refused to perform surgery).
166. Scales, Poststructuralism, supra note 13, at 398.
167. Id. at 398-99.
168. Peter Baker, In Speech to Planned Parenthood, Obama Criticizes New Abortion Laws,
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we have an ally for a while. Many of us may not be good lobbyists, but
may know of good lobbyists and have connections through our local bar
associations and other groups. Nonprofits may be barred from direct
funding or campaigning, but they contribute to dialogue. I am sure there
are many other ways to work towards reproductive justice, and I hope
that we will find them. Ann did, and we could do worse than follow her
courageous example.
CONCLUSION
Ann Scales was a brilliant and loving scholar. I have tried to carry
through one of her messages as best I can. We can all honor her by trying
to carry her love and passion for her work forward.
May the Goddess, Spirits, God, whatever, be with you, dear Ann.
You will always be alive in our hearts, and the work you started will





Professor Ann Scales wrote about places where legal feminism has
become stuck, and how it might become unstuck. This Essay focuses on
a particular point of "stuckness" in legal feminism: how to treat women
who love intimate partners who are abusive. This Essay argues that alt-
hough feminist legal scholars have discussed in great depth the many
reasons a woman in an abusive relationship might need to preserve her
relationship, they have inadequately exposed, or even acknowledged, the
reasons she might want to preserve her elationship. In particular, this
Essay argues, feminist legal scholars avoid or ignore the fact that a pri-
mary reason many women stay in abusive relationships is for love. Ac-
cording to many feminist legal scholars, love is a product of false con-
sciousness. With more and better information, abused women would
come to understand that they don't "really" love their partners, and that
leaving, rather than staying, is the solution. Scales argued that false con-
sciousness is a weak analytical tool for a variety of reasons, discussed in
this Essay in subpart II.B. More importantly, she argued that within legal
feminism, false consciousness is a "conversation stopper" and a "thought
stopper." In short, Scales attempted to get feminist legal scholars out of
the muck of false consciousness. This Essay documents how feminist
legal scholars are stuck on love in the context of intimate partner abuse,
and applies Scales's lessons for getting unstuck.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ann Scales wrote about places where legal feminism has become
stuck, and how it might become unstuck.1 One place of stuckness is theS ,,2
concept of "false consciousness. This is the notion that an oppressed
group (such as women in a patriarchal society) might falsely buy into the
ideology of an oppressive social system, and that these internalized be-
liefs both conceal and act against the oppressed group's (women's) real
interests.3 One example, observed by Scales, is the view that women who
have been physically abused by their male partners, but who do not wish
to end their relationships with those partners (such as by refusing to co-
operate with the criminal prosecution of them), are deemed to be suffer-
ing from false consciousness.4 By internalizing any number of dominant
ideologies-for example, that a "little bit" of domestic violence is ac-
ceptable in intimate relationships5-women perpetuate their own physi-
cal oppression by men.
In my own work in the field of intimate partner violence, I have ob-
served that, while feminist legal scholars have discussed in great depth
the many reasons a woman might need to preserve her relationship,6 we
have done a poor job exposing, or even acknowledging, the reasons she
might want to preserve her elationship.7 In particular, we ignore the fact
that a primary reason many women stay in abusive relationships is for
love.8 From a feminist perspective, love is a product of false conscious-
ness.9 With more and better information, abused women would come to
1. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY passim
(2006). Scales divides her only book, a culmination in many respects of her corpus of scholarship,
into two parts: "Places of Stuckness: Roles, Rules, Facts, and the Liberal View of Human Nature,"
and "Places Beyond Stuckness: Feminist Notions, Controversies, and Promises."
2. Id. at 44, 120 (describing "false consciousness" as a term that signifies "a continuing
source of feminist infighting and paralysis").
3. Id. at 124 ("Most political theorists define false consciousness as a belief that is 'false,'
that is both produced by and reinforcing of an oppressive social system, and that conceals and acts
against the believer's real interests.").
4. Ann Scales, handout from presentation of her book LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note I, at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law (Apr. 2007) (on file with author). For a review and
critique of this argument, see Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The
Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 519, 561-73 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 628 (2000) ("Though not as prevalent as it once was, the view that
occasional violence is a normal part of family life persists. Many decisionmakers either hold this
view or empathize with individuals who do. Predictably, these decisionmakers refuse aggressively to
enforce condemnatory domestic violence laws." (footnote omitted)). Kahan argues generally that
when the law is much more condemnatory of a social norm than the average decision maker tasked
to enforce it, the decision maker resists enforcing it. Id. at 607. This, in turn, reinforces the very
norm that lawmakers seek to change. Kahan calls this a problem of "sticky norms," and describes
intimate partner violence as falling squarely within it. Id. at 628.
6. See infra note 15.
7. Id.
8. See infra note 17 and accompanying discussion.
9. As observed recently by Leigh Goodmark:
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understand that hey don't really love their partners, and that leaving,
rather than staying, is the "real" solution.0
Scales argued that false consciousness is a weak analytical tool for a
variety of reasons, discussed in subpart II.B. of this Essay." More im-
portantly, she argued that within legal feminism false consciousness is a
"conversation stopper and a thought stopper."'' 2 Scales attempted to get
us unstuck. In this Essay, I document how feminist legal scholars are
stuck on love in the context of intimate partner abuse, and I apply
Scales's lessons for getting us unstuck.
II. THE LACK OF LOVE IN THE LITERATURE
A. How Legal Feminists Avoid and Apologize for Love'
3
Within the literature on intimate partner violence, many scholars
have observed that the law provides a one-size-fits-all solution: separa-
tion of the parties.14 To illustrate why separation cannot be the only solu-
Rather than listening to women who want to stay in their relationships, though, those
women are said to have traumatically bonded or are told that they are rationalizing away
the abuse in order to protect their emotional commitments....
... Hesitation or unwillingness to end a relationship means that the woman is being co-
erced, threatened, or controlled; from the feminist perspective, such women might be ac-
cused of "false consciousness."
LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 100
(2012).
10. Id. ("We must focus on love, the literature argues, in order to show women that they don't
really love their partners, but rather are bonded with them in an unhealthy manner, and that separa-
tion, not saving their relationships, should be their goal.").
It. See discussion infra II.B.
12. SCALES, supra note 1, at 120.
13. For the purposes of this Essay, I include the work of legal scholars who have written
extensively about how the law might more effectively address intimate partner violence, and who
have grappled with the tension between protecting women and respecting their autonomy of decision
making (or agency). The list quite certainly is non-exhaustive but includes a number of the most
prolific scholars on the subject, including Kathy Abrams, Donna Coker, Clare Dalton, Deborah
Epstein, Sally Goldfarb, Leigh Goodmark, Cheryl Hanna, Margaret Johnson, Laurie Kohn, Tamara
Kuennen, Christine Littleton, Martha Mahoney, Holly MacGuigan, Kris Miccio, Linda Mills, Emily
Sack, and Elizabeth Schneider, to name several but not all.
14. See, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 80-105 ("[Dlomestic violence law and policy
continues to rely almost exclusively on separation-based remedies. The focus on separation springs
from a core belief that women in violent relationships should not remain in those relationships.");
Cheryl Hanna, Because Breaking up Is Hard to Do, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 92, 94 (2006)
("We should always rethink our strategies and avoid one-size-fits-all approaches. The criminaliza-
tion of domestic violence is still in its infancy, and we have much to learn about what works best and
for whom."); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 307 (2005) ("Both law
and popular culture equate existence of violence with separation from the relationship."); id. at 305
(describing the predominant, or "[p]rotagonist[]," ideology underlying the current criminal justice
system approach as emphasizing the need for victims to leave their relationships as a deeply prob-
lematic one-size-fits-all approach); Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread
Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 454, 456 (2008) ("In many
jurisdictions domestic violence cases, identified principally by evidence of physical violence, are
handled on a one-size-fits-all basis."); see also DONILEEN R. LOSEKE, THE BATFERED WOMAN AND
SHELTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WIFE ABUSE 20 (1992) ("The collective representation
of wife abuse leads to the common sense conclusion that a woman should leave such a relationship,
and this prescription is part of the collective representation: A woman experiencing wife abuse must
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tion, several scholars have brilliantly unearthed the many rational reasons
that victims of intimate partner violence need, or want, to preserve their
intimate relationships. Amongst these are safety (the well-documented
fact that separation is the most dangerous time for victims), finances,
cultural norms, religion, and immigration status, to name but a few.'
5
Feminist legal scholarship, addressing intimate partner violence, richly
and deeply covers this particular topic.
Rarely in this body of work, however, do scholars explore in any
depth the idea that love for a partner may be the primary reason a woman
wants to preserve her relationship.'6 This dearth of discussion is remark-
able, considering that empirical data clearly show that women explicitly
state that love is a key reason explaining why they stay.
17
Even more remarkably, those few scholars who acknowledge love
rarely use the word love in their writing. Rather, we opt for more clinical,
sanitized terms. Instead of love, scholars use terms such as "connection"
leave her relationship." (emphasis added)); Sally Engle Merry, Wife Battering and the Ambiguities of
Rights, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 271, 304 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1995) (arguing that the price women pay for going to court is separation, and that the law expects
women to sever connections with violent men); Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection
Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2008) ("The cumulative effect of these [mandatory] reforms was a
transformation of legal policy from the assumption that battered wom[e]n should stay to the assump-
tion that they should leave."); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
7, 8 (2004) ("[A]lmost all of these legal interventions are premised on the notion that battered wom-
en want to end their relationships, invoke the power of the legal system to keep their batterers away,
and ultimately sever all legal ties with their abusers."); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2, 59 (2006) ("A decision to effectively end a relationship is initiated by the prosecu-
tor on behalf of the state, adjudicated as a criminal matter, and criminally enforced. It becomes an
extension of the imperative to treat DV as a crime.").
15. See Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying Principles
of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 515, 530-36 (2010) (re-
viewing the literature discussing the multiple reasons that explain why a woman might want or need
to preserve the intimate relationship).
16. There are just a handful of exceptions where love is explored as a reason for staying in a
violent relationship. See Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459,
1474-75 (2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000)) ("[Women] do not necessarily want o be in a position where they can just
leave. They want to be in relationships in which they forgive. They may even want to be in relation-
ships that involve some relinquishment of self, autonomy, and power. And what is more, they are not
alone. Women who are not in battering relationships and men who do not batter want these kinds of
relationships too." (footnotes omitted)); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1991) (observing that women's
response to violence in a relationship relies on numerous goals: their experience of the violence,
economic security, love of partner, and view of life outside of the relationship, among others). See
generally LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE
25-31 (2003); Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a Big Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. Ill
passim (2010) (discussed in detail infra Part Ill).
17. See Catherine Donovan & Marianne Hester, 'I Hate the Word "Victim"': An Exploration
of Recognition of Domestic Violence in Same Sex Relationships, 9 SOc. POL'Y & SOC'Y 279, 282
(2010) (reviewing a body of empirical studies that have concluded that "[1]ove for a partner and hope
for the future of the relationship are amongst key reasons given by people in heterosexual and same
sex relationships for staying in or returning to domestically violent relationships").
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and "emotional attachment."8 To fully appreciate the degree of discom-
fort such sanitized words display, one need only imagine saying, "I feel
emotionally attached to you," or "I am deeply connected to you," rather
than, "I love you," to one's spouse or partner before hanging up the
phone or turning in for the evening. Or imagine explaining to someone
outside of the relationship how you feel about your partner by saying: "I
feel very emotionally connected to her."
Worse, on the rare occasions when scholars explicitly acknowledge
that women may love their partners, we frequently are apologetic,'9 sug-
gesting that we (feminist legal scholars) resign ourselves to "accept" the
reality that the women we are advocating for do, indeed, love their part-
20ners.
If listening to women subjected to abuse is important to feminist le-
gal scholars, as they claim, and if women are "experts on their own lives,
attuned to the likelihood of future abuse," why do we not defer to a
woman's expression of love, and her desire to continue an intimate rela-
tionship, even when it is abusive?2' Our treatment-whether it be avoid-
ance or apology-illustrates our stuckness with regard to how to treat
women who love their abusive partners.
18. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritiz-
ing Victims'Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, II AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 465, 476-79, 493 (2003) (describing in detail the multiple "[r]elational [f]actors"
that go into a woman's decision making regarding whether to preserve the relationship, using "emo-
tional connection" and "emotional attachment," though mentioning the word love one time, on page
493 ("A woman may love her partner but also be afraid of him.")); Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 1500
(describing "mutual emotional commitment, companionship, intimacy, and sharing," but never using
the word love (emphasis added)); Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies,
and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1113-14 (2009) ("The cur-
rent [civil protection order] laws are particularly well situated to permit petitioners to construct a
remedy that redefines a relationship that is tainted by abuse but nonetheless is meaningful-
connected by children, economics, emotional, and psychological ties." (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)); Kuennen, supra note 15, at 537 ("A victim may choose to stay in a relationship that she
knows is dangerous because the intimate connection is worth the risk." (emphasis added)).
19. See GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 98 ("The domestic violence literature tiptoes carefully
around the concept of love. The literature accepts the idea that some women subjected to abuse do,
in fact, continue to say that they love their partners despite the abuse. But the literature explains this
love away, almost apologizing for the desire of women to continue their relationships.").
20. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 90 (2008) ("We
need to ensure that every battered woman has the opportunity and ability to leave her relationship,
receives sufficient counseling to make the most independent choice possible, and is fully informed
about available alternatives. But we also need to understand and accept that some women will decide
to continue a connection with an abusive partner .. " (emphasis added)); Goldfarb, supra note 14,
at 1500-01 (describing the multidimensional emotions that abusive relationships produce, such as
"mutual emotional commitment, companionship, intimacy, and sharing," and thus concluding that
the aspiration of many women to remain with their partners "should not be dismissed as naive or
misguided" (emphasis added)).
21. This is a central question posed by Leigh Goodmark. See GOODMARK, supra note 9, at
100.
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B. Love As a Product of False Consciousness
Scales traced the concept of false consciousness to political theorist
Friedrich Engels and discussed its heritage prior to becoming associated,
22
in this country, with dominance feminism in the 1970s. Pertinent to the
present discussion is Scales's working definition of false consciousness
as "a false belief that is produced by and reinforces existing power ar-
rangements in society, and that is held in spite of being contrary to the
holder's own interests."
23
This concept of false consciousness comes up in two ways for
scholars who write about intimate partner violence. The first is that
women in abusive relationships do not really understand the danger they
are in.2 4 More specifically, women who say that they love their abusive
partners, and thus choose not to support criminal prosecution, or choose
not to seek restraining orders, or who otherwise generally do not avail
themselves of legal remedies designed to separate them from their part-
ners, are unable to fully or realistically or rationally appraise their risk of
danger.
Empirical data, however, make indisputably clear that women in
abusive relationships appraise their danger more accurately than any
assessment tool out there.25 To date, there is no tool social science has to
offer that women who have experienced abusive relationships cannot
more accurately outscore.
26
The second, much more complex argument is that a woman in an
abusive relationship doesn't really love her partner; rather, what she ex-
periences as "love" is actually an unconscious, conditioned reflex to liv-
ing in a sexist, oppressive culture that tells her she must be with a man at
all costs. This is what Scales called the "cult of true womanhood.2 7 The
argument proceeds that if the woman was conscious of her own oppres-
sion, she would be able to make an authentic choice. In this instance, the
choice would be either: (1) not to love a partner who is abusive, or (2)
desire to leave a partner who is abusive.
Scales argued, persuasively, that false consciousness is a weak ana-
lytical tool for several reasons. First and foremost, an accusation of false
consciousness implies that "there is a 'true' consciousness accessible to
the critic against which the consciousness of the criticized can be con-
22. SCALES, supra note 1, at 123-29.
23. Id. at 129.
24. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 559-61 (describing an important part of danger assessment
as whether "women suffer from a false consciousness of their risk of future violence or a diminished
capacity" in decision making).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. SCALES, supra note 1, at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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trasted.' '28 Scales flatly rejected this notion. One cannot claim to objec-
tively know another's interests.29
Even if an outsider could gain access to another's "true" conscious-
ness or genuine interests, another of "the obvious analytical problems"
30
with false consciousness is figuring out how to measure whether the per-
son is choosing beliefs that are consistent or inconsistent with their genu-
ine interests. As Scales stated, "Even if we could presume to interfere in
another's interests, what interests would we need to be talking about?
Short- or long-term interests? Individual or group-based interests? What
interests can we isolate and which should we include? Economic, psy-
chological, communicative, technological, sexual, intellectual, politi-
cal?'
31
Finally, Scales asked: "Could it never be said that I have a genuine
interest in undermining my own interests... ?,32
For all of these reasons, Scales rejected the term false conscious-
ness, which she characterized as "debilitating for feminist efforts. '33 Ra-
ther, she argued, what is important is recognizing what the concept has
meant or could mean. "For all the postmodem critique and other sources
of destabilization of political action, we have got to have some concepts
(and names for) the traps and, yes, falsehoods, that invite people without
power to participate in their powerlessness."
34
Scales did not coin a new term, but she thoughtfully described two
levels of responsible inquiry into oppressive falsehoods: personal and
political.35 Regarding the personal, she observed:
When I have thought of people (especially those I like and otherwise
trust) as being wrong or deluded, my conclusions tend to follow from
having observed similar mistakes or delusions among my own inter-
nalized oppressions. I have no doubt that it is my responsibility to
continue to take that self-inventory, nor any doubt that I will uncover
more sources of self oppression.
36
Consequently, the political:
The responsibility of being a political actor, a lawyer, an author, a
teacher, a parent-a human-is to find evidence and good arguments
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id. ("The now widespread belief in the social character of knowledge renders suspect any
suggestion of objective knowledge about other people's interest or even one's own interests.").
30. This is Scales's characterization. Id. at 129-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 130.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 133.
34. Id. at 134.
35. This allusion to the personal and political, or personal is political, is not lost on Scales's
audience.
36. SCALES, supra note 1, at 134.
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and alternatives in every situation where it appears that a person or
group could profitably reinterpret her or their own experience. And it
is never that "you are completely wrong and worthless." These inter-
actions are always partial; it is this [partial] aspect of experience that
could be reinterpreted .... 37
Rather than ignoring, denying, or patronizing women who experi-
ence and express love for their intimate partners, even in the context of
abuse, we must ask women to examine their own feelings and beliefs.
We might probe whether the love they feel is only loosely, or rather is
quite closely, tied to the cult of true womanhood. We might ask if the
love they feel causes them to surrender to the identities of their part-
ners.38 We might not like their answers. We might also ask if the love
that women feel is a source of strength.39 Or a source of safety. Or even a
source of survival.n0 Perhaps it is any and all of these; perhaps it is none.
Examining, rather than denying, love in the context of intimate partner
violence should be the business of feminist lawyers. And examining,
rather than denying, our discomfort with love in the context of intimate
partner violence should be the business of feminist legal scholars.
C. Other Reasons Explaining Why We Don 't Talk About Love
There certainly are reasons, other than false consciousness, explain-
ing why feminist legal scholars do not explore, let alone address, the love
a woman may feel for an abusive partner. First, it could be a political
disaster for the battered women's movement, for it could jeopardize the
hard-fought battle to get the state to take domestic violence seriously,
and to treat domestic violence as a serious crime rather than a private
"relationship problem" to be dealt with in the home.41 "How could we
possibly take seriously women's accounts of love and hope without un-
dermining the little protection from male violence women have been able
to wrest from the legal system, without indeed increasing our already
37. Id.
38. See Baker, supra note 16, at 1474 (arguing that some women may desire to relinquish
their selves to that of another).
39. E-mail from Evan Stark, Assoc. Professor of Pub. Admin. & Dir. of Master's in Pub.
Health Program, Rutgers University, Dir. of Div. of Urban Health Admin., UMDNJ School of Pub.
Health to author (Mar. 20, 2013, 3:47 PM) (on file with author).
40. See id.
41. Scholars in the field do indeed make these arguments. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton,
Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 51 (1989) ("Often it appears as if feminist questioning of the [law's]
impulse toward separation should at least wait until women can count on the law allowing them to
separate."); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1688-90 (2004) (warning that the divide amongst femi-
nists with regard to aggressive state interventions threatens the ground gained: "Isn't this where we
were over twenty-five years ago?").
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overwhelming vulnerability? '42 This is indeed a dilemma for battered
women's advocates and activists.
One piece of this political problem is, as Leigh Goodmark de-
scribes, "the need to prevent a return to [outdated and] discredited theo-
ries about why women subjected to abuse stayed with their abusers.,
43
She cites as examples masochism and learned helplessness."a If feminist
legal scholars were to fully bring to light the fact that many women love
their abusive partners, they risk that women will once again be seen as
pathological.
This is indeed a problem, but is not insurmountable. We have new
theoretical constructs to temper, if not alleviate, this concern.45 In the
past two decades, researchers have done extraordinary work to differen-
tiate among types of physical aggression that occur in intimate partner-
46ships.6 These theories call for critical examination of the context of ag-
gressive acts and words, and specifically of the intent of the perpetrator
and the effect on the victim. Aggression, according to lead theorists, ex-
ists on a continuum: at one end, there is situational "fighting" that is not
uncommon or outside of community norms; at the other end, there is the
use of coercively controlling tactics-including, but not limited to, vio-
lence-that are deliberately intended to restrict the victim's liberty and to
control every aspect of her life. 4
Perhaps some degree of aggression in intimate relationships is ac-
ceptable. Renowned sociologist Evan Stark argued that if scholars writ-
ing in the area of intimate partner violence accepted the possibility that
not all violence in relationships is abusive (and the flip side of this coin,
that many forms of coercive, but nonviolent, conduct are abusive), we
might better understand, explain, and address the most dangerous, and
always-gendered, type of intimate partner violence: "coercive control.
48
Currently, what the law labels "domestic violence" is a misnomer. A
woman who slaps her husband once is as much a perpetrator of the crime
of domestic violence under the current legal regime as a man who is both
42. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 98 (quoting Littleton, supra note 41, at 47) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. ("Researchers once theorized that masochism kept women from leaving .... [S]ome
have claimed that learned helplessness is simply masochism devoid of its erotic component.").
45. This is not to say that Goodmark's concerns are exaggerated or misplaced; I too worry,
despite these new constructs.
46. Goodmark provides an overview of these theories. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 38-40.
47. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE
104-06 (2007).
48. Evan Stark's work is highly respected by legal scholars who argue for law reform in
domestic violence cases. Stark's differentiation amongst types of "domestic violence" has been
widely discussed. He argued that there is a difference between "fights," "assaults," and "coercive
control," the latter being the most serious and debilitating, perpetrated by men against women for the
purpose of restricting the woman's freedom and dignity and, consequently, where feminists should
focus their attention. See id.
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violent and dominates every aspect of his partner's life, such as what she
wears, whether she may have friendships outside of the relationship, and
how much money she has. The current legal definition is problematic not
only because it focuses too narrowly on discrete incidents of physical
violence, without capturing the many coercive tactics shy of using vio-
lence that a perpetrator may use to control every aspect of a victim's life,
but also because it is too broad; within its net is caught fighting-what
couples in intact relationships do, sometimes, that simply does not fall
outside of a community norm.4 9
If feminist legal scholars were more discerning in targeting legal
sanctions on the intent and consequences of coercive control, portraying
it as the domination of a life, rather than continuing to use less politically
charged words such as abuse or control, they could broaden
the demand for justice beyond the relatively narrow emphasis on vio-
lence-free relationships, put[] the attainment of substantive equality
back on the table, and suggest[] an agenda of rights and redistribution
that would attract constituencies from civil rights and labor that have
kept their distance because of our emphasis on policing.
50
Still, Stark recognizes the political risk:
[R]eintroducing domination as the focus of concern will cost us allies
with no particular sympathy for feminist issues, including those op-
ponents of "violence against women" who accept traditional gender
hierarchies and view women paternalistically .... In the current cli-
mate of reaction, the media may counter talk of domination by put-
ting our battered sisters and their supporters back into jumpsuits; pic-
turing them as crocks, cranks, harpies, or worse .... 51
But, he argues, "ledgers have two sides. Reassigning attention to
domination could constitute a new audience, attract a cohort of activists
energized by a desire to be free rather than merely safe, and lay the foun-
dation for new alliances to replace those we lose. 52
In addition to attracting new allies, the systematic differentiation of
intimate partner violence into types and degrees could generate a produc-
tive conversation between scholars who do not write in the field of inti-
mate partner violence and those who do. Many legal scholars who write
about the law and intimate relationships (such as family law scholars and
"law and emotion" scholars) write as if marriage and "normal" intimate
49. Goodmark attempts to resolve these problems when she redefines the crime of domestic
violence in Chapter 2. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 29-53.
50. STARK, supra note 47, at 371.
51. Id. at370.
52. Id. Stark here refers to activists in civil rights and labor who have been repelled by the
law-and-order and policing emphases of the battered women's movement, and to thousands of men
and women who have been turned off by the current victimization narrative. Id. at 370-71.
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relationships do not involve fights, physical aggression, or coercion.5 3
Kathy Abrams observed that because the law does not engage with in-
tact-intimate and familial relationships, but rather with relationships that
are breaking up, scholars have under-investigated the fear, pain, despair,
and abuse that occur in "normal" relationships.
54
It has long been interesting to me to read family law articles sug-
gesting comprehensive, forward-looking reforms, and then to see a care-
fully worded exception qualifying the reforms as inapplicable to relation-
ships marked by intimate partner violence.55 Given the prevalence of
intimate partner violence, these scholars' reforms likely do not apply to
nearly half of all the relationships they describe.56 On the flip side of this
coin, scholars writing in the area of intimate partner violence have under-
investigated, if not dismissed, many of the emotions that occur in intact
relationships.57 Namely, love.
I1. GETTING "UNSTUCK"
That feminist legal scholars writing in the field of intimate partner
violence are stuck on love would be of less concern to Scales than if we
53. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, The Elkins Legislation: Will California Change Family
Law Again?, 15 Chap. L. Rev. 443, 489 (2012) ("There is virtually universal agreement that except
in rare cases involving domestic violence[,] . . . negotiated agreements in family law cases benefit
both the parties to the dispute, the court system as a whole, and the children who are the subject of
the dispute."); Deborah Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 63, 63
(2012) (reviewing the legal scholarship in family law over the last twenty years, and proposing that
"courts and court-annexed programs build out practices of equipoise," defined as a "mode of pro-
cessing information and emotions that disrupts habituated and unhelpful interactions between per-
sons and instead encourages thoughtful engagement with emotions, resulting in reduced adversarial-
ness and constructive problem solving," but never mentioning or addressing cases involving domes-
tic violence); Andrew Schepard, Kramer vs. Kramer Revisited: A Comment on The Miller Commis-
sion Report and the Obligation of Divorce Lawyers for Parents to Discuss Alternative Dispute
Resolution with Their Clients, 27 PACE L. REV. 677, 679 (2007) (arguing that lawyers should have
the obligation to advise clients regarding mediation and altematives to litigation in family law cases,
but stating, "[M]ediation may not be appropriate in cases involving serious allegations... of domes-
tic violence."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for De-
pendency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 246 (2004) ("It is well established that secure relationships
with parents contribute in critical ways to healthy child development and that family dissolution
imposes financial and psychological costs on children. Other than in situations of domestic vio-
lence,.., children's development usually is enhanced if their parents' relationship endures.")
54. Kathryn Abrams, Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family,
16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 301, 307-08 (2009) (explaining the barriers to acknowledging emotion in
family law, one of which being that the legal system does not engage with intact families and thus
we have scant understanding of the feelings of despair, jealousy, and pain that are normal parts of
relationships).
55. A wonderful exception to this norm, and one I hope to see replicated, is Clare Hunting-
ton's discussion of the typologies of violence and how her proposed "reparative model" of family
law could apply to some types of abusive relationships in which there has been a history of violence.
See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1312-16 (2008).
56. Martha Mahoney beautifully made this point more than two decades ago. Despite the
statistics showing domestic violence to be "extremely widespread in American society," and the fact
that the statistics themselves are "widely reproduced, there is little social or legal recognition that
domestic violence has touched the lives of many people in this society .... This radical discrepancy
between the 'mysterious' character of domestic violence and repeatedly gathered statistics reflects
massive denial throughout society and the legal system." Mahoney, supra note 16, at 10-11.
57. For a detailed discussion on this theory of "Getting Unstuck," see infra Part Ill.
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stayed stuck. Any place of stuckness is a place, and an opportunity, to be
recognized; and Scales argued, to be constantly reinterpreted.
58
A. An Illustration of Getting Unstuck
In a recent article, Cheryl Hanna discussed love in the context of in-
timate partner violence.59 Her article is exceptional not only for this rea-
son, but also because it is a departure from her previous work; she rein-
terprets her prior, closely held and widely cited position regarding the
value of women's personal autonomy in intimate partner violence.
In the article, Hanna observed: "What to do about the role of love in
relation to those choices that we make creates a particular dilemma for
feminist legal theory."60 A key strand of her argument is that while wom-
en may not choose to be involved in intimate relationships that are abu-
sive, they may accept the relationships nonetheless. After all, she ob-
serves, the "nearly universal desire [for love and] to be in a relationship.
often leads us to accept situations we never anticipated or wanted.61
"Yet, the law, neither in theory nor in practice, does a very good job at
understanding the role love plays when we consent to things that may
cause us heartache and harm.62
The article explores the question, left open after Lawrence v. Tex-
as,63 of under what circumstances individuals should be allowed to con-
sent to activity that occurs in the context of their private, intimate rela-
tionships. Hanna examines, among others, a case involving intimate
partner violence.64 When the police responded to the home, the victim
told them that her husband had threatened to "kill her by snapping her
neck and that he told her he had a gun in the house."65 The victim did not
support the prosecution, and she recanted during trial. As of the writing
of Hanna's article-ten years after the trial-the couple was still married
and living together.
66
In that case, Hanna argues, the victim did not necessarily consent to
the discrete threat, but Hanna asks us to think more expansively about
consent and what it means.67 While a victim may not "choose" her part-
58. SCALES, supra note 1, at 38 (describing how points of stuckness can be chalked up to
"essentially contested concept[s]"-ones that have "permanent potential critical value" to be exam-
ined and reinterpreted (quoting W. B. Gallie, IX Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 169, 193 (1956)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Hanna, supra note 16.
60. Id. at 128.
61. Id. at 113.
62. Id. at 127.
63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
64. Hanna, supra note 16, at 145-48 (examining People v. Brown, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 743
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2001), in which football star Jim Brown was accused of threatening his
wife, Monique).
65. Id. at 145.
66. Id. at 148.
67. Id. at 146-47.
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ner's anger or aggression, she may "put up with it." 68 She understands
the risks to herself. She values the relationship. Perhaps the consent,
then, is to the relationship as a whole.69 Why should the state intervene,
Hanna asks, particularly after Lawrence, in which the Supreme Court
recognized that love can be an expression of autonomy and thus protect-
ed as a liberty interest?
70
The problem is where to draw the line. Hanna asks a number of
questions: Are there "instances in which the law ought not respect an
individual's expression of love?",71 Such as when she is at risk of lethal
violence?72 In that circumstance, should not a prosecutor prosecute, de-
spite the victim's desire to preserve the relationship because she loves
her partner?73 And if individual women, rather than state prosecutors,
decide whether to prosecute men for crimes of physical and sexual vio-
lence, is this not the practical equivalent to allowing a defense of con-
sent?74 The state is allowing the woman to consent both to the discrete
act of violence that is the subject of the prosecution, and it is allowing
her to consent to remain in a risky relationship.75
Hanna grapples with each of these questions, and she concludes that
76there is no right answer. In each case, there is the potential for men to
exploit women, and in each case, the women "derive some benefits,...
pleasure, ... joy, or ... love[,]" and "also suffer some harm . . . from
both male... aggression[] and... state intervention.77
Hanna concludes that feminist legal scholars must continue to
struggle with these tensions.78 To remain relevant, feminist legal theory
should "persuade us to accept ambivalence, and to be open to changing
our minds because of the complicated nature" of women's (and men's)
lives.79 Indeed, Hanna herself, as evidenced by the article, changed her
mind; she acknowledges that in past scholarship, she did not give ade-
quate weight to the privacy and liberty interests of victims, and to the
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. To be clear, Hanna does not equate consent with choice; women who love their abusive
partners do not choose to be abused. Rather, Hanna argues that women who remain in abusive rela-
tionships may be willing to risk being abused because of their love. Id. at 136, 146-47.
70. Id. at 128 (discussing Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
71. Id. at 129.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 138-39.
74. See id. at 139-42.
75. If the law allows women in violent, intimate relationships to decide when the state should
intervene (i.e., allows women to consent to remain in risky relationships), "the consequence would
be less legal restraints on men in the fulfillment of their sexual and aggressive desires." Id. at 135.
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 156.
79. Id.
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damage to women's overall autonomy when the state intervenes against
their wishes.8 °
B. Moving Forward
A fundamental tenet of feminism is listening to women's voices.81
Catharine MacKinnon (who Scales was devoted to) described listening to
and believing what women say as the "methodological secret" of femi-
nism.82 As stated previously, feminists working in and writing about the
battered women's movement have described women subjected to abuse
as "the experts on their own lives, attuned to the likelihood of future
abuse."83 This description is not ideological gloss; it is grounded in fact.
Women in abusive relationships are the best predictors of their risk of re-
abuse. As discussed previously, victims outscore every metric designed
by social scientists to assess future risk. 84
It is not only risk of re-abuse (in an already abusive relationship)
that poses a danger to women. It is the existence of the intimate relation-
ship itself. Relationships, like sex, can be dangerous.85 When women
choose, in the face of such risk, to both enter into and to preserve their
relationships for love, perhaps it is because they value love more than, or
at least as much as, physical safety. To remain relevant, feminist legal
scholars must grasp the importance of love and intimate relationships in
women's lives.86
IV. CONCLUSION
Feminist legal scholars are stuck on love in the context of intimate
partner violence. This stuckness presents an opportunity to become un-
stuck if we accept it instead of chalking it up merely to false conscious-
ness or some other conversation stopper.87 If we do not take the oppor-
tunity to consider the importance of love, then we will base the laws,
policies, and decisions we make about intimate partner violence on seri-
ously incomplete or erroneous information. But if we examine, rather
80. Id. at 144.
81. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 90; ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 71-73 (2000) (discussing the importance of accounting for wom-
en's particular experiences when crafting law and policy); see also Linda C. McClain, Toward a
Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1225-32 (2000)
(discussing two different forms of feminist critique within the context of constitutional theory and
empiricism).
82. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 5
(1987).
83. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 100.
84. For a review of empirical work illustrating that women are the best predictors of future
violence, see Margaret Johnson, supra note 4, at 559-60.
85. See Baker, supra note 16, at 1475 ("Relationships of any kind-platonic, sexual, or famil-
ial-can be emotionally and physically dangerous, but they may also be inevitable or at least desira-
ble.").
86. Id. at 1460-61 (reviewing SCHNEIDER, supra note 81).
87. See SCALES, supra note 1, at 120-21.
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than deny via the vehicle of false consciousness, the importance of love,
we could better dismantle the notion that women who stay in abusive
relationships are helpless or crazy. Scales's dismantling and reinterpreta-
tion of the concept of false consciousness provides feminist legal schol-
ars with this opportunity.
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Ann Scales's scholarship on masculinities in relation to sexual as-
sault and militarism prompted us to consider exactly how power is dis-
tributed by assumptions about what is masculine. For instance, men priv-
ileged by association with hegemonic masculinities-those most domi-
nant and preferred-are sometimes excused for acts of violence against
people who are denigrated as unmasculine or excessively masculine. In
one set of examples, communities excuse football players for sexual as-
saults on grounds that "boys will be boys." The implication is that boys
should be allowed to act out before taking on adult responsibilities, and
that they need to do so in order to become men. Moreover, the "boys will
be boys" narrative suggests the victims were asking for it. In another set
of examples, certain types of men are granted exemptions from the nor-
mal rules of self-defense because they are seen as manly protectors of
their communities. Men such as George Bush and George Zimmerman
are allowed to preemptively strike men such as Saddam Hussein and
Trayvon Martin because the latter's denigrated masculinities suggested
they were asking for it. Scholars should continue to explore the ways
such hierarchies of masculinities distribute privileges and vulnerabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES THEORY
THROUGH THE PRISM OF ANN SCALES
Masculinities distribute power. One way to demonstrate this fact is
to ask a few questions: Who must fear walking alone in secluded places
at night? Who must fear encounters with the police? Who is thought to
look like a corporate leader? The answers-women,' poor minority
men,2 upper-class white men,3 respectively-are revealing. Women and
minorities are disempowered by their vulnerabilities while majority men
are empowered by their status identities.4 Being a woman or a certain
type of man is disempowering. Being a man, especially a specific type of
man, has material benefits. Assumptions about what behavior is appro-
priately manly distribute power by creating and reinforcing hierarchical
relationships among people.
One scholar who understood the importance of masculinities was
Ann Scales. Before the live portion of this Symposium, we knew Ann
and her work but had not yet felt the full force of her presence. Hearing
Ann's close friends speak at this Symposium gave us a sense of Ann's
deep but impish intellectual curiosity. She would, therefore, have been
proud of this Symposium. It was that most rare of occasions where pro-
found analytical rigor was met with equal parts of emotional caring. We
feel lucky to have been invited to speak about Ann's work on masculini-
ties and have learned much in the process.
Scales's scholarship helps us understand both why men act in ag-
gressive ways and why some men are more likely to be granted exemp-
tions from criminal law sanctions while other men are more likely to be
victims of those exemptions. In Student Gladiators and Sexual Assault:
1. See, e.g., ESTHER MADRIZ, NOTHING BAD HAPPENS TO GOOD GIRLS: FEAR OF CRIME IN
WOMEN'S LIVES passim (1997) (discussing women's beliefs that they can avoid harm by being
good).
2. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man? ": Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 676 (2009) (discussing conflicts between police
and male suspects).
3. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Michelle Obama: Perform-
ing Gender, Race, and Class on the Campaign Trail, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 709, 712 (2009) (discuss-
ing why leadership looks masculine).
4. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, II J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701, 707 (2001) (distinguishing status identities from performative identities).
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A New Analysis of Liability for Injuries Inflicted by College Athletes, she
explores sexual assaults on female college students by football players,
and the courts' and society's reaction to them.5 In Soft on Defense: The
Failure to Confront Militarism, she concludes that military values that
derive from concepts of masculinity provide certain men with exemp-
tions from the usual rules.6 Scales's analyses are consistent with the prin-
ciples of multidimensional masculinities theory that we helped develop
in our edited collection, Masculinities and the Law: A Multidimensional
Approach.7
In the edited collection, we explained that "multidimensional mas-
culinities theory assumes that law distributes power by relying upon as-
sumptions about human behavior that reproduce preexisting social rela-
tions."8 This theory draws from masculinities scholarship, which has its
origins in sociology and social psychology. It also draws from critical
race theory, feminist legal theory, and multidimensionality theory.9 The
original masculinities scholars were men who responded to feminist ar-
guments by examining men's identities. They agreed with the premise of
feminists that society views women as inferior to men, but they believed
that feminists often see men as an undifferentiated mass.'0 They posited
that it was incorrect for feminists to see men as undifferentiated because
not all men fully adopt the hegemonic, or dominant, form of masculini-
ty,"1 and men are not equally privileged by that masculinity. 2 The hege-
monic masculinity in U.S. society has generally reflected the types of
masculinity embodied by well-educated, middle-class, straight, white,
Christian men.' 3 Most men, however, cannot fully achieve this type of
hegemonic masculinity.14 Their inability to live up to the expectations of
hegemonic masculinities puts them in a penalty status5 and leads to at-
tempts to perform masculinity in a way that compensates for their penal-
ty status.' 6 Since masculinity is not a biological imperative but a social
5. Ann Scales, Student Gladiators and Sexual Assault: A New Analysis of Liability for Inju-
ries Inflicted by College Athletes, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 205 passim (2009).
6. Ann Scales, Soft on Defense: The Failure to Confront Militarism, 20 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 369, 379, 389 (2005).
7. MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank Rudy Cooper
& Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012).
8. Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Introduction to MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW:
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 7, at 1, 1.
9. Id. at2.
10. Id at 3-4.




15. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-racialism and the Gates Controversy: The
False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, I I NEV. L.J. 1, 22 (2010) ("Penalty status is the
condition of already having something about your identity that makes your masculinity suspect.").
16. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimila-
tion, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 900 (2006) (discussing
effect of being "one down" in hierarchies); Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mech-
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construct, men can craft their masculine identities through behaviors,
albeit while subjected to societal pressure to perform in particular ap-
proved ways.17 In light of their observation of the pressures men are un-
der to perform their masculinities in hegemonic ways, masculinities
scholars accepted that men as a group are powerful, but also saw that
individual men often feel powerless.18 This powerlessness, they argued,
comes not from women or feminism, but from societal pressure on men
to compete to prove their masculinity to themselves and others. 
19
In the West, the most important proofs of masculinity have been
showing that one is not feminine and not gay.20 One means of asserting
those qualities, and thereby promoting one's masculine esteem, has been
by demonstrating sexual prowess. Women often become props or
pawns in this proof.22 Young men engage in group homosocial behaviors
that use women as sexual objects to bond with other men. For instance,
Michael Kimmel explains that some young men watch pornographic
videos together23 and others engage in group sexual assaults or harass-
24ment of women. Men's acquisition of women can also be used to gain
masculine esteem relative to other men.25 Moreover, groups of young
men engage in hazing, harassment, and even sexual assault of other
young men in order to establish group norms, enforce loyalty, secure
silence about aberrant behavior, or force weak or effeminate males out of
26the group. Especially in neighborhoods and workplaces where achiev-
ing the hegemonic masculinity is nearly impossible, members of the
community might engage in hyper-masculine behaviors such as sexual
harassment or fighting in order to prove their masculinity.27 Whereas
those who can perform a preferred masculinity are privileged, those
whose performances of masculinity are denigrated become more vulner-
able to violence.
Multidimensional masculinities theory recognizes that concepts of
masculinity interact with other identity concepts in different ways in var-
anisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 291-92 (2002)
(discussing partly-denigrated men's temptation to engage in compensatory subordination of others).
17. NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 60
(2010).
18. Id. at 63.
19. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 8, at 3-4.
20. DOWD, supra note 17, at 62.
21. See MICHAEL KIMMEL, GUYLAND 206-07 (2008) (discussing how "hooking up" is an
effort to determine a man's status compared to other men).
22. McGinley & Cooper, supra note 8, at 3-4.
23. KIMMEL, supra note 21, at 186-87.
24. Id. at 237-40; Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment
"Because of Sex," 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1218-19 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 693 (1999)
(arguing that some young men are so intent on proving their masculinity through sexual conquest
that the woman's consent becomes irrelevant to them).
26. McGinley, supra note 24, at 1219-30.
27. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 8, at S.
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ious legal contexts.28 Identities are intertwined and co-constituted.29 We
are all simultaneously gendered, raced, classed, and so on. The intersect-
ing nature of our identities means that being male and white and rich can
be very different from being male and black and poor, even in the same
social context. Moreover, what is deemed masculine changes as one
moves within different social groups or social spheres.
Part II of this Essay analyzes the law's and society's reactions to
sexual assaults, which often include the "boys will be boys" narrative.
That is, people sometimes assume it is natural for boys to be raucous,
and use that assumption as a basis for excusing anti-social and even
criminal behavior. Part II also considers how these reactions construct a
narrow, hegemonic form of masculinity that governs the appropriate re-
sponse to victims of sexual assault and harassment. Part III then discuss-
es the law of self-defense in international law and domestic criminal law.
It demonstrates that exemptions from the usual rules are deployed based
on concepts of preferred and denigrated masculinities that are not only
gendered, but also raced and classed. Our prime example is (presump-
tively) white30 neighborhood watch captain George Zimmerman's slay-
ing of unarmed black teenager Trayvon Martin. Part IV concludes that
masculinities protect some-mostly upper-class white-men and victim-
ize other-often poor, racial-minority-men.
II. "Boys WILL BE Boys"
Ann Scales understood that men sometimes commit assaults to
boost their own or their group's masculine esteem and that men and
women sometimes forgive that behavior because of their assumptions
about what it means to be masculine. In Student Gladiators and Sexual
Assault: A New Analysis of Liability for Injuries Inflicted by College
Athletes, Scales discusses the problem of members of athletic teams
(primarily football teams) gang raping young women.3' She debates the
possibility of legal liability of universities for the behavior of the student
32athletes. She demonstrates that Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, which prohibits gender discrimination in education, has onerous
standards to meet, and that it is nearly impossible to get injunctive relief
under Title IX.3 3 Her solution is to use state constitutional law, especially
in states with equal rights amendments, to find universities liable for
encouraging the rape culture in athletic programs.34 Student Gladiators is
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id.
30. Zimmerman is technically half Latino. He is white-skinned and, we would contend, white-
acting.
31. Scales, supra note 5, passim.
32. Id. at 236.
33. Id. at 236-37, 239.
34. Id. at 261-69.
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an interesting article in particular because of its acknowledgement of the
cause of gang rape by football players: societal norms of masculinity.
35
A. Societal Norms of Masculinity: Simpson v. University of Colorado
36
Scales focuses on the story of Simpson v. University of Colorado, a
case where the plaintiffs-female students at the university-alleged that
they were raped repeatedly by football team members and recruits.37 Ac-
cording to the allegations, the plaintiffs decided to stay at home one
evening. A roommate, who was also a tutor for the football team, invit-
ed a group of football team members and recruits to their apartment for a
party.39 Simpson, who knew none of the players, was allegedly raped by
multiple football players in her room while simultaneously another
roommate, who was too drunk to consent, was harassed and assaulted by
three other players and recruits.40 After the two women publicized their
rape allegations to the university community, they faced hostility and
threats that led to Simpson dropping out of college and the other plaintiff
taking a year's leave of absencea.4  The complaint also alleged that the
football coach had for years refused to change recruiting practices that
included heavy use of alcohol and access to strip shows, lap dances, and
prostitutes because of the fear that such limitations would lead to a re-
cruiting disadvantage.42 The federal district court granted summary
judgment to the defendant university, concluding that there was insuffi-
cient evidence for the plaintiffs to meet the Title IX standards: that the
university knew about the behavior and that it exhibited deliberate indif-
ference to it.43 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the grant of summary judgment.44 The case settled for more than $2.8
million to the two plaintiffs.45
There are many cases alleging that groups of boys or men engaged
in assault or harassment of girls or of weaker, gender-non-conforming
boys.46 Frequently, the attackers belong to the same athletic team.47 And,
35. Scales, supra note 5.
36. 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
37. Scales, supra note 5, at 213-14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Scales, supra note 5, at 213; Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1180.
41. Scales, supra note 5, at 213-14; Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1180.
42. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1181-84.
43. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1245 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd, 500 F.3d
1170; see Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646-47 (1999) ("[R]ecipients of
federal funding may be liable for 'subject[ing]' their students to discrimination where the recipient is
deliberately indifferent o known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser is
under the school's disciplinary authority." (alteration in original)); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998) ("[lI]t would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title LX to permit a damages
recovery against a school district ... without actual notice to a school district official.").
44. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1185.
45. Scales, supra note 5, at 216.
46. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996); Shafer v. Kal Kan
Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2005).
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frequently, authority figures cover up the alleged wrongdoing or dimin-
ish its importance.4 8 The assaultive behaviors themselves are horrific, but
the responses afterwards by adults who are neither drunk nor acting in
the heat of passion are inexplicable.
B. Social Construction of Masculinity in Our Guys
It is our theory that much of group sexual assault that occurs, and
community responses thereto, result from the social construction of mas-
culinity. That is, masculinities theorists conclude that masculinity is not a
natural result of biology. Rather, it is performed by individuals in re-
sponse to societal or group pressure. Masculinities scholars note that the
most important indicator of manliness is that one is neither gay nor a
girl.49 Boys and young men in group situations use penetration of the
vagina, the anal cavity, and the mouth as means of degrading a victim
and of proving their own membership in the group. Masculinities schol-
ars explain that masculinity is such a fragile commodity that boys and
young men often engage in competitive behavior in order to prove their
manhood to other boys and men.5 ° It is this competition and a need to
impress others that impels men and boys who act in groups to commit
gang rapes and other sexual assaults. "Running a train" (gang rape) is
one means of demonstrating the superior masculinity of the rapists.
These rapes are often normalized by the community. When a young
woman is a victim, it is her fault for being in the wrong place at the
wrong time or for being intoxicated.5 1 If the victim is a man, the behavior
is just "horseplay.,52 The victim is ridiculed for not taking it "like a man"
and ostracized for reporting the violation to the authorities.53 Our under-
standing of the community responses to sexual assault as reflecting as-
sumptions about masculinity is supported by the cases. For instance, the
Simpson facts resemble a case described in Our Guys by Bernard Lefko-
witz, which we use in our book, Masculinities and the Law: A Multidi-
47. See, e.g., Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1172; Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1229; BERNARD LEFKOWITZ,
OUR GuYs: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE OF THE PERFECT SUBURB 16 (Vintage
Books 1998).
48. See LEFKOWITZ, supra note 47, at 284-86.
49. See id. at 1163- 64.
50. See McGinley, supra note 24, at 1163-67.
51. See, e.g., Warner Todd Huston, Fmr Pres of Local Chapter of Ohio NAACP: Steubenville
Rape Victim Was 'Drunk and Willing,' WIZBANG (Apr. I, 2013),
http://wizbangblog.com/2013/04/01/fmr-pres-of-local-chapter-of-ohio-naacp-steubenville-rape-
victim-was-drunk-and-willing (discussing the culpability of the young woman from Steubenville,
Ohio who was raped after she passed out at a party).
52. See, e.g., Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that the plaintiff did not have a case even though the defendant's employee had committed four
serious sexual violations against him); Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.
2003) (affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment where the plaintiff was backhanded
repeatedly in the scrotum because the behavior did not occur "because of sex" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
53. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
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mensional Approach, to illustrate the concept of "boys will be boys. 54 In
Our Guys, a group of high school football players enticed a teenage girl
whom they knew was mentally impaired to the basement of the home of
two of the players.55 Once she was there, they demanded that she remove
56
her clothing and perform oral sex on one of the players. The behavior
escalated when a number of the boys inserted a broom handle, a baseball
bat, and a stick into her vagina.57 At the time, there were between thir-
teen and sixteen boys in the basement.58 A few of the boys left when they
saw what was happening, but not one of them reported the rape.59 And,
although rumors of the rape abounded in the school, it took weeks before
one student finally reported the rape to a school official. 60 The book de-
scribes the trial of the boys who were charged with rape and sexual as-
sault. The crime itself was heinous, and the book's study of how the
town normalized the boys' behavior and shifted blame to the victim is at
once fascinating and startling. Moreover, the defense lawyers' depictions
of their clients' behavior as normal and the teenage girl as a promiscuous
"Lolita" 61 demonstrates how law can be perverted to the ends of preserv-
62
ing dominant assumptions about masculinity.
The boys described in Our Guys were a group of athletes who lived
in the suburban, white-collar town of Glen Ridge, New Jersey, about
forty minutes from Manhattan. The town was proud of its schools, its
children, and of the community.63 This particular group of boys had en-
gaged in pranks and even criminal behavior for years, but they had never
been subject to more than fleeting discipline. Some of them had been
caught stealing money from the girls' purses at a dance;64 many engaged
in weekend parties where there was plenty of alcohol.65 Most attended
the parties and had sex with willing young girls while other boys
watched from inside the closet, "a practice they called 'voyeuring.
' 66
The boys relived these bad acts by talking about them incessantly and
alluding to them in their high school yearbooks.67 The boys watched por-
68
nography as a group and may have engaged in group masturbation.
54. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 8, at 9.
55. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 47, at 13-23.
56. Id. at 23-24.
57. Id. at 25.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id. at 23-24.
60. Id. at 29.
61. "Lolita" is a common term for a young woman who may be a seductress. See VLADIMIR
NABOKOV, LOLITA (Van Rees Press 1955) (creating the concept in the now-canonical novel); see,
e.g., THE POLICE, DON'T STAND SO CLOSE TO ME (A&M Records 1980) (referencing the book in a
popular song about a potential teacher-student sexual relationship).
62. See LEFKOWITZ, supra note 47, at 361-62.
63. See id. at 5-6.
64. Id. at 177-81.
65. Id. at 138-39.
66. Id. at 184.
67. Id. at 185.
68. Id. at 183.
[Vol. 9 1:1
HOW MASCULIN1TIES DISTRIBUTE POWER
From the time he was in middle school, one of the boys spent much of
his time in class masturbating and revealing his penis to the other stu-
dents.69 A number of the boys used racial epithets to refer to a football
player who played on an opposing team, including in front of the only
black member of their own football team.y° Other boys who were mar-
ginal members of the group were thrilled to be invited to the parties and
were unwilling to sacrifice their invitations by not going along with the
behavior.
71
Girls who Lefkowitz calls the "Little Mothers" took care of the
boys. These girls were friends whom they did not date, but the girls
decorated the boys' bedrooms before games, made food for the parties,
and tutored them when they needed help in school.73 Even when the par-
ties were over, the group of boys would arrive at one Little Mother's
home and pull food out of the refrigerator and leave her to clean up their
mess.7 4 There was one girl who was an outsider who invited the school to
her house for a party. The group totally destroyed the girl's home.5 She
was so upset that she threatened to commit suicide by jumping off a bal-
cony. They urged her to jump.
76
The boys' behavior was not hidden. It occurred over many years,
and yet the adults in the town, parents and teachers alike, allowed it to
occur.77 The boys were lauded for being "the guys," treated as heroes
because they were athletes, and never held accountable for their actions.
After the rape occurred, the Little Mothers came to their defense. They
told reporters that the victim was a "slut. 7 8 In other words, she "asked
for it." Few adults had sympathy for the victim either. The school district
hid behind a screen of neutrality, never willing to express judgment or to
allow students to judge "the guys' acts.79 In fact, many members of the
community expressed sympathy for the boys and regret that the publicity
in the media would destroy their property values.80 Many in the commu-
nity even treated the boys as victims.81 The rape victim and her family
were, for many, invisible.82 For instance, the father of one of the boys
who inserted the broomstick into the victim's vagina reportedly stated,
69. Id. at 90, 166-67.
70. Id. at 137-38.
71. See id. at 24, 143.
72. Id. at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 144-45.
74. Id. at 150-51.
75. Id. at 153-59.
76. Id. at 158.
77. Id. at 167-71.
78. See id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 270-71.
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when his son was offered a plea agreement of one year in prison, "I can't
see Kevin doing a year for this.
83
C. Our Guys as an Example of the "Boys Will Be Boys " Attitude
The community's reaction was the classic "boys will be boys" atti-
tude. This attitude is an important constructor of masculinity.84 The idea
is that boys are young, naturally aggressive, competitive and physically
active, that they will engage in pranks and even criminal behavior, but
that they will outgrow this immature behavior.85 It is as though adulthood
is a burden for which boys should be compensated in advance: "This is
the best time in their lives," the adults say, "let them go." "Soon, they
will be saddled with a job, a family, and a mortgage. Let them have some
fun before they grow up." With these types of comments, adults normal-
ize behaviors that would never be tolerated from girls as biological re-
sponses to the boys' growing bodies. And girls are made responsible for
the boys' behaviors. If a girl whose IQ is only 49 is enticed to the boys'
basement by one boy who promises that his popular brother will date
her,86 she deserves what she gets. She wanted it. Even though the "it" is a
painful prodding with a baseball bat, a broom handle, and a stick.
While a number of the boys were ultimately convicted, their law-
yers, who are agents of the law, also constructed their behaviors as nor-
mal masculine behavior. One of the defense lawyers, Michael Querques,
repeatedly impugned the victim's reputation, calling her "Lolita" and
arguing that the boys were helpless when put up against the seductress.
87
In his view, the boys needed protection from her; it was not the other
way around. "Boys will be boys," he said.88 "Pranksters. Foolarounds.
Do crazy things. Experiment with life and disregard their parents. Boys
will be boys."89 And, despite the presence of a New Jersey Rape Shield
Law, the judge ruled that much of the victim's sexual history was admis-
sible evidence to prove whether she was capable of consenting to the
behavior that occurred in the basement.90 The court thus welcomed the
"she asked for it" defense. This ruling led the way to the introduction of
much humiliating evidence that destroyed the victim's reputation.91
In the trial and outside the courtroom, the defense lawyers engaged
in misogynist behavior that mirrored that of their clients. Outside the
courtroom, defense attorney Tom Ford referred to a distinguished female
83. Id. at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 8, at 9 (claiming "they learned from their parents and
the community that their behavior was acceptable").
85. Id. (noting the assumption that "the boys will outgrow it").
86. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 47, at 20.
87. Id. at 361-62, 396, 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 334.
91. Id. at 334-35, 377, 382.
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prosecutor as a "[b]ush," a crude reference to the female anatomy.' He
also commented on the testimony of a female police investigator: "See
what a witch she is. Did you see the slit in her skirt? Did you see her
blouse? She just used those looks to seduce that poor kid., 93 Querques
also referred to the female detective as "[t]hat bitch" and stated, "Who's
gonna believe her?"94 Outside the courtroom, Querques called the victim
a "pig" and contended that the boys needed protection from her.95 In
court, he opened and spread his legs because he wanted "to show the
jurors how she was enjoying it."' 96 A newspaper covering the trial report-
ed that some of the defense attorneys referred to two representatives of
the National Organization of Women (NOW) who attended the trial as
the "Twin C-S. ' 97 This behavior by the defense attorneys, combined with
the judge's ruling, demonstrates a strong attitude that boys (at least
white, suburban boys) should not be bothered by cases like this.
D. Similarities between Our Guys and Scales's Description ofSimpson
v. University of Colorado
Coach Barnett also displayed the "boys will be boys" attitude at the
University of Colorado. According to Scales's account, Barnett tolerated
or covered up a number of incidents of sexual harassment and alleged
rapes during his career.98 Perhaps the most interesting is the story of a
team member, Katie Hnida, who "was recruited by Barnett's predeces-
sor" as a place kicker for the all-male team.99 Hnida was subject to sexu-
al harassment, about which her father complained, and after the rapes
were alleged, Hnida came forward to allege that she too had been raped
by another team member. °° Subsequently, Coach Barnett demeaned her
in a news conference, in which he was discussing the alleged rapes on
the team, stating that "Katie was a girl, and not only was she [] a girl, she
was terrible."" As Scales implies, this is an odd response to a rape alle-
gation. 02 Perhaps by discrediting Hnida as a player, Barnett believed that
he established her as a liar. More likely, by claiming that Hnida was a
bad kicker, the coach was distancing her from the real boys; the real
players who sexually assaulted her to prove their masculinity. Both in the
Colorado cases and in the Glen Ridge case, adults who should know bet-
ter-teachers, superintendents, parents, coaches, and defense lawyers-
92. Id. at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to the victim as the "poor kid" and
asserting that the female police officer used her charms on the victim to encourage her to lie about
the assault (internal quotation mark omitted)).
94. Id. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 446 (internal quotation mark omitted).
97. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
98. Scales, supra note 5, at 214.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 215.
102. See id
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minimized the bad behavior of the responsible male athletes and blamed
the female victims.
0 3
E. Male Victims and Social Construction of Masculinity
We observe similar adult responses when young men are the vic-
tims of a group of male harassers. When young women are victims,
adults blame the victim: "she shouldn't have been at that party"; "she
shouldn't have been wearing that outfit"; "she shouldn't have had so
much to drink." In essence, it was the young woman's fault that she was
assaulted.1°4 She invited the assault. She wanted it. In the male victim
cases, the victim is expected to endure the attack and not complain about
it because the attack was merely hazing or roughhousing. ' 5 The attack of
young men by a group of other young men is, in essence, a way of im-
posing group values on the weakest or newest member of the group. In
these cases, the male victim of sexual assault, rape, or harassment is ridi-
culed for not being a "real man." He is expected to "take it like a man"
and not complain. If he does complain, he proves that he is a girl, not a
real man.
In Seamons v. Snow,106 for example, the plaintiff, Brian Seamons,
was a football player at a Utah high school.10 7 In full view of the entire
team, five of his upper-class teammates assaulted Seamons in the high
school locker room.0 8 They grabbed Seamons "as he came out of the
shower, forcibly restrained" him, and bound him, nude, "to a towel rack
with adhesive tape." 9 They also taped Seamons's genitals."0 A team-
mate then brought Seamons's former girlfriend "into the locker room to
view him.""' Seamons complained to the coach, other administrators,
and the high school principal. 12 "The coach brought Brian before the"
whole team and demanded that he apologize to his teammates for betray-
ing them by reporting their behavior."13 When he refused, Seamons was
dropped from the team.14 The five players who taped "Brian were per-
103. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 47, at 7-8, 492-93.
104. See, e.g., Alexander Abad-Santos, The Steubenville Rape Case is Back-Are Parents at
Party Houses to Blame?, WIRE (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/04/steubenville-parties-suits/63995/; Huston, supra note 51.
105. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Deborah L. Brake,
Sport and Masculinity: The Promise and Limits of Title IX, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 7, at 207, 218-23 (describing cases where groups of
male athletes sexually assaulted women and/or men).
106. 84 F.3d 1226.
107. Id. at 1229.
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mitted to play in the next football game."' 15 Finally, the school board
cancelled the last game of the season, a playoff game.1"6
Seamons brought suit for violation of his civil rights and for viola-
tions of Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimination in education.
Most likely because of the strict standard for institutional liability under
Title IX-proof of notice and deliberate indifference to the violation of
the individual's federal rights-Seamons's suit focused on the behavior
of the coaches and the administration in response to the physical at-
tack.117 Courts applying Title VII hold that discrimination based on a
person's failure to live up to stereotypes attached to one's gender is dis-
crimination occurring "because of [] sex."1 8 There was good reason to
assume the Seamons courts would apply this definition to the Title IX
cases as well.119 The lower court granted the defendants' motion to dis-
miss the Title IX cases and concluded that the coach and administrators
did not create a hostile educational environment because their behavior
did not occur because of sex. 1
2 The Tenth Circuit agreed. 121
In concluding that Seamons's harassment was not "because of sex,"
both the lower court and the court of appeals ignored key evidence that
Seamons's treatment was the result of assumptions about masculinities.
Seamons's complaint alleged that the coach had told Seamons that the
behavior was "hazing" and that "boys will be boys."'122 Moreover, Sea-
mons alleged that the other administrators treated Seamons poorly be-
cause of his failure to live up to male stereotypes. According to the com-
plaint, they told him that he "should have taken it like a man."'1 23 None-
theless, the Seamons courts, and the law in general, implicitly construct
the appropriate masculine behavior by determining that sports team har-
assment is legitimate and resistance to it is not.
Media reports on the incident reveal that the adult community also





118. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting
City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (concluding that
it would be discrimination because of sex to refuse to promote the plaintiff because she was too
aggressive for a female).
119. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 636, 647 (1999) (concluding
that school districts may be liable for sexual or gender-based harassment of their students); see also
Erin Kate Ryan, Note, A "Queer'" by Any Other Name: Advocating a Victim-Centered Approach to
Title VII and Title IX Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 227, 237-38
(2004) (arguing that Davis indicated its intent to incorporate the Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping
standard into Title IX cases).
120. Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1230-31.
121. Id. at 1232-33.
122. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 1230 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Vaughn Roche, Football Hazing Penalty Splits Tiny Utah Town: Student Is Threatened
After His Complaint Ends His Team's Season, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, MN, at 5.
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Although there was support for Seamons, he was the object of criticism
and threats. Just as assumptions about appropriate masculinities distrib-
uted cultural power in Glen Ridge and at the University of Colorado,
masculinities distributed cultural and legal power in the Seamons cases.
For example, one woman called his home repeatedly to tell him that she
planned to bum down his house.'25 When the police tapped the phone,
they discovered that the caller was the grandmother of another football
player. 126 Many adults may feel a strong sense of injustice when boys'normalized behaviors are disrupted.
But let us complicate this narrative a bit. The "boys will be boys"
attitudes may excuse criminal behavior of white, middle-class football
players living in a New Jersey suburb or Utah. They may even extend to
athletes and recruits at the University of Colorado who are not white, but
they will not protect boys growing up in poor neighborhoods in Latino or
black communities who have not been accepted as members of university
athletic teams. Instead, even as potential victims, boys with a denigrated
masculine identity often find their victimhood questioned because of
their failure to perform their masculinity in a preferred way. Seamons
evidently performed his masculinity inadequately because he did not
demonstrate appropriate toughness: by reporting his assault to authori-
ties, he violated a code of masculinity. Black and Latino victims in poor
neighborhoods, too, have a denigrated masculinity, but unlike Seamons,
they perform their masculinity in a manner that is too intense. In fact, the
white community and the police often consider black and brown boys
who live in poor neighborhoods to be hyper-masculine and dangerous.
As potential perpetrators, then, they do not enjoy the same benefit of the
doubt granted by the "boys will be boys" narrative. This is said to cause
their own victimhood.
Ironically, then, black and Latino male victims may actually be
treated like girls who are victims of sexual assaults. By performing their
gender in an inappropriate way, they "ask for it." In this case, the "it" is
police harassment and brutality coupled with white indifference or even
tacit support. As legal scholar Ian Haney-L6pez notes, "For many Amer-
icans, racial disparities in the criminal justice system not only fail to
evoke a sense of moral outrage, but engender instead a belief in the basic
fairness of the world as currently organized."'' 27 The assumptions that
largely-racial-majority police forces act for good reasons and that racial
minorities are crime-prone are built into some people's understandings of
the world. The treatment of certain perpetrators as "our guys" and certain




127. Ian F. Haney-L6pez, Post-racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1064 (2010).
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III. MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES AND EXEMPTIONS FROM THE
USUAL RULES
One way of thinking about the "boys will be boys" narrative is that
it is a way that we justify a call for an exemption from the usual rules
when particular types of boys and men act out, especially if they do so
against girls or women or certain other types of boys and men. At the
University of Colorado, we were asked to deploy an exemption from the
normal rules of sexual assault and rape because football is a big business
operating in a very competitive environment. As one of Coach Barnett's
successors at Colorado, Dan Hawkins, famously screamed in response to
a claim that he did not give his players enough time off: "It's Division I
football! It's The Big 12! It ain't int[ra]murals!"'' 28 In other words, we
should excuse football players' misbehavior because football is really
important. In Glen Ridge, we were supposed to grant the same exemp-
tion because the boys were young and should be allowed to enjoy them-
selves before having to grow up. In Seamons, we were explicitly asked to
exempt the harassment and sexual assault because this is how boys be-
come men. These are, then, exemptions claimed in the name of masculin-
ity. This part of the Essay utilizes another Ann Scales essay to advance a
theory of masculine exemptions. It then uses the Zimmerman slaying of
Martin to show how certain privileged men are allowed to position them-
selves as protectors of the community. Those men are exempted from the
normal rules when they commit acts of violence against others whose
masculinities are denigrated.
A. A Theory of Masculine Exemptions
In addition to her use of masculinities theory in analyzing gang
rape, Scales criticizes the masculinist assumptions at the heart of Ameri-
can militarism. In her important essay, Soft on Defense: The Failure to
Confront Militarism, Scales defines militarism as "the manifestation at
every level of policy-military and otherwise-of the logic of war."'
129
That logic includes the idea that every policy of all kinds "must be meas-
ured by its effect on military capability and readiness.'30 We must win,
no matter the cost. Militarism, defined as the requirement that we win all
wars regardless of the means necessary, leads to the promulgation of a
set of exemptions from the normal rules. Dropping a nuclear bomb
would usually be seen as overkill, but it is deemed to have been neces-
sary to subdue the Japanese.'31 We usually try to balance liberty against
128. OptimumOO, Dan Hawkins, YouTUBE (Feb. 22, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9S3RbRifTSk (containing audio of Hawkins's rant as played on
an episode of The Best Damn Sport Show Period). Of course, by focusing on football, we do not
mean to suggest that sexual assault is not a pervasive problem elsewhere.
129. Scales, supra note 6, at 371.
130. Id.
131. See John Christoffersen, Hiroshima, Nagasaki Atom Bombs Was Right Decision Accord-
ing to Majority of Americans: Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2009, 1:54PM ET),
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security, but some believe that a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court became "loyal foot soldier[s]" in support of the War on Drugs.'
32
Preemptive strikes are usually deemed unjustified, but one was deemed
necessary in Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein from using weapons of
mass destruction.'33 And so on. The insidious power of this logic is that
"it is treasonous to notice it, much less question it."' 134 Militarism thus
operates like masculinities; it is an often-invisible assumption that drives
results.135
The point here is that, like the "boys will be boys" narrative, milita-
rism leads to the granting of an exemption from the normal rules. We see
precisely how the military exemption works when we consider criminal
law. Scales observes that "international law prescribes greater caution
and self-restraint than is required in [U.S.] criminal self-defense law."'
' 36
U.S. criminal law would normally say that if someone physically touches
another with the mental state of desiring to harm him, that touching con-
stitutes the offense of battery.'37 One defense to a battery charge is to
claim self-defense. The defendant argues that although the prosecution
can prove the elements of battery, the defendant can demonstrate that he
was not the aggressor, that he reasonably feared his victim was immi-
nently about to do him harm, and that he responded with proportionate
force.138 As Scales says, the United States' militarism is evident in its
creation of an exemption from the imminence requirement, as well as
international law, when it preemptively attacks countries like Iraq.
139
Scales demonstrated her courage as a scholar by speaking out against the
Iraq War well before it was considered appropriate to do so. Then, as
now, it was "treasonous to notice" U.S. militarism.'
40
The link between the granting of exemptions and norms of mascu-
linity is highlighted by reconsidering preemptive strikes. Why does the
United States grant itself an exemption from international law's ban on
preemptive strikes? As University of Denver legal scholar Nancy Ehren-
reich explains, we wish to bask in the "reflected masculinity" of the na-
tion.'4' Having our nation look masculine raises our own masculine es-
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/04/hiroshima-nagasaki-atom-
bn _251108.html?view-print&comm ref-false.
132. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court
has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime.").
133. See Scales, supra note 6, at 380-81 (criticizing the preemptive strike on Hussein).
134. Id. at 371-72.
135. See generally Michael Kimmel, Integrating Men into the Curriculum, 4 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 181, 183-85 (1997) (explaining how masculinities invisibly influence law and culture).
136. Scales, supra note 6, at 38 1.
137. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (2012).
138. See id. § 3.04 (stating requirements for self-defense); see also id. § 3.09 (requiring reason-
ableness for deadly force).
139. Scales, supra note 6, at 381.
140. Id. at 372.
141. Nancy Ehrenreich, Disguising Empire: Racialized Masculinity and the "Civilizing" of
Iraq, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 131, 132 (2005).
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teem, even if we are women. In the second Iraq War, President George
W. Bush implicitly acknowledged that he was going to war because Sad-
dam Hussein "tried to kill my dad."'' 42 We as a country go to war to pro-
tect the family that is the United States. Bush's reasoning is an extension
of the usual logic that we go to war to protect women and children.
Part of the reason it is treasonous to challenge militarism may be
that its call for an exemption from the usual rules is grounded in a need
to bask in the reflected masculinity of the nation. To challenge the ex-
emption is not just to challenge militarism, but also to challenge the
United States' symbolic manhood. After all, what kind of man does not
defend his family's honor? A "wimp." An accusation hurled at both
George H.W. Bush and his son, George W. Bush.143 Symbolically, when
the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, the United States'
family honor was attacked, as was the masculinity of the nation. We
were challenged and defeated by a small group of radicals from the Mid-
dle East. We could not maintain our masculinity as a nation without re-
taliating. That is why, even though there was no proof that Saddam Hus-
sein was involved in the September 11 attacks, we granted ourselves an
exemption from the normal rules of self-defense.
Let us now think about when an exemption from the usual rules is
not granted. Battered women sometimes attack their batterers, but rarely
do they satisfy the traditional self-defense standard. Normally physically
smaller and weaker than, as well as afraid of, their batterers, battered
women sometimes launch preemptive strikes. Those preemptive strikes
run afoul of self-defense law's imminence requirement.
If the United States can hypothecate weapons of mass destruction as
grounds for attack, why do battered women lose when they launch
preemptive strikes? Perhaps because, as legal scholar Susan Estrich and
others have pointed out, the self-defense requirements reflect "boys'
rules" in that they imagine a prototypical schoolyard fight.' 44 So self-
defense law rewards people for being appropriately manly. In the
schoolyard, people would think a boy is justified in flattening the local
bully if, and only if, the bully is threatening the boy right then and the
boy doesn't respond to a punch with a bazooka. Similarly, in the
schoolyard fight, boys are supposed to confront their bully face to face
(or expected to just "take it like a man," as in the Seamons case above).
When a battered woman instead stabs her batterer in the back or while he
142. HectorzHouse, Bush "This Is the Guy Who Tried to Kill My Dad, " YOUTUBE (Nov. 30,
2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-uL6OGwsp9_o.
143. Carl M. Cannon, Romney, Bush and Newsweek's "Wimp Factor," REAL CLEAR POL.
(Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/08/02/romneybush and-newsweeks wimpfactor.h
tml (critiquing the "wimp" accusation (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(coining the term "boys' rules").
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is sleeping, the harm is not deemed to be imminent. The requirement that
the harm one reasonably feared be imminent does not make sense when
imposed on battered women. Battered women are constantly, reasonably
in fear that they will soon be harmed again. So gender is certainly at
work in that the exemption from self-defense rules is granted to men in
battle with other men, either literally or figuratively, but not to women
unless they can make out a special battered women's syndrome de-
fense.145 Women are underprivileged, even when most obviously justi-
fied in using violence. Thus, exemptions are granted not only because
some men are privileged by the hegemonic masculinity, but also because
women and some other men are denigrated.
B. A Case Study: George Zimmerman Slays Trayvon Martin
To explore the interplay between privilege and denigration in the
granting of masculine exemptions, it is helpful to think about a compli-
cated example where the exemption is both granted and withheld based
on a combination of privileges and disabilities. George Zimmerman's
slaying of Martin provides such a case study. What we find is that Zim-
merman was privileged both by his race and the masculine role he was
playing, while Martin's race-gender combination made him more readily
available to be seen as having "asked for it." Shifting lenses, from the
difference gender makes to the difference race and gender make together,
allows us to see the utility of a multidimensional masculinities approach.
Consider the facts of George Zimmerman's alleged murder of Mar-
tin. Shortly before 7:15 p.m. on February 26, 2012, in Sanford, Florida,
white-skinned, half-Latino neighborhood watch captain George Zim-
merman called the police.146 He told the dispatcher there had been break-
ins in his gated community recently, so he was following a "real suspi-
cious guy. '147 When that guy, seventeen-year-old black youth Trayvon
Martin, started to run, the dispatcher told Zimmerman, "[W]e don't need
you to [follow Martin]., 148 Two minutes later, Zimmerman killed Martin
with one shot to the chest at close range.149 The Sanford police quickly
145. See Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV.
777, 790 n.47 (2000) ("The criminal doctrines of 'heat of passion' manslaughter and self-defense
provide insight into local and national cultures of male honor.").
146. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-
racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2013). Zimmerman's complicated racial identity is
noted by Sifat Azad. Sifat Azad, George Zimmerman Race: White, Latino, or Jewish? In the
Trayvon Martin Case, It Shouldn't Matter, POLICYMIC (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.policymic.com/articles/5925/george-zimmerman-race-white-latino-or-jewish-in-the-
trayvon-martin-case-it-shouldn-t-matter. For other insightful views on the Martin case, see L. Song
Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293,
316-17 (2012), and the materials cited in Trayvon Martin Case Bibliography, U. FLA. LEVIN C. L.,
http://www.law.ufl .edu pdf/academics/centers/csrrr/TrayvonMartin Bibliography by medium.pd
f (last visited Dec. 9, 2013).
147. Lee, supra note 146, at 1557 (internal quotation mark omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1557-58.
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released Zimmerman without charges under Florida's National Rifle
Association-created "Stand Your Ground" Law, which grants "im-
mun[ity]" from prosecution for shooting someone unless there is "proba-
ble cause" that the shooting was "unlawful." 150 A jury of his peers ac-
quitted Zimmerman on the state criminal charges. 
151
In this context, we see Zimmerman as having been granted an ex-
emption from the usual requirements of self-defense. There were at least
three ways the Sanford police could have found probable cause that
Zimmerman violated the self-defense rules. These bases should have
been obvious given the Supreme Court's definition of probable cause.
Probable cause is based upon a "common-sense" assessment when con-
sidering "the totality-of-the-circumstances.152 The quantum of evidence
required is that there is a "fair probability" that a crime is afoot and this
suspect is involved.53 A "fair probability" is a low standard.54 It can be
found even when there is a mere 33% chance of criminality. For in-
stance, in Maryland v. Pringle,155 the Court upheld a determination of
probable cause even when assuming that only one of three suspects
committed the crime and that each was equally likely to have done so. '
56
Zimmerman seems to fall within the probable cause standard be-
cause he admittedly shot Martin and seems to have violated the rules for
asserting self-defense. First, by pursuing Martin, Zimmerman violated
the rule that one not be the initial aggressor.57 While Florida does not
have a clear prohibition on being the initial aggressor, Zimmerman's
pursuit seems all the more unlawful in light of the dispatcher's instruc-
tion not to follow Martin. Moreover, Zimmerman could easily have been
found not to have been reasonably in fear of death or serious bodily harm
from the slighter and unarmed Martin, even after allegedly having been
knocked down (in what would surely be lawful self-defense by Martin
against his pursuer).158 Finally, Zimmerman's deadly response to the
knockdown seems not to have been a proportionate response. 159
Why, then, did the Sanford police refuse to charge Zimmerman with
Martin's murder, and thereby grant Zimmerman an exemption from the
usual self-defense requirements? It could have been a result of Zimmer-
150. Id. at 1559. See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012, 776.032 (2013) (providing immunity from prose-
cution for self-defense unless there is "probable cause" the response is "unlawful").
151. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1.
152. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Florida sets its criminal procedure law as
exactly the same as Supreme Court law. See State v. Hankerson, 65 So. 3d 502, 506 (Fla. 2011).
153. Gates, 426 U.S. at 238.
154. Blalock v. State, 98 So. 3d 118, 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
155. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
156. Id. at 368.
157. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (2012) (stating bar on being aggressor with
deadly force).
158. See id. § 3.09(2) (withholding imperfect self-defense from unreasonable attackers).
159. See id. § 3.04(2)(b) (limiting crimes warranting deadly force).
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man's privileged racial status. As legal scholar Cynthia Lee's insightful
article on the case says, "Had Zimmerman been an African American
man who followed and then shot an unarmed Caucasian teenager during
a fistfight, it is unlikely that police would have released Zimmerman
without any charges." 160 Lee thus proposes implicit racial bias as the
explanation for the exemption. Implicit bias is the set of subconscious
assumptions an observer draws because of the status of the subject.
16 1
Lee explicates the extensive evidence that most people's default position
is to assume that blacks are crime prone.'62 Unless police officers are
primed to acknowledge that race is a factor in their decision making, says
Lee, they will subconsciously explain the facts based on the black-man-
as-criminal stereotype.'
63
Another way that race played into Zimmerman's immediate release
was the geographical context. As legal scholar Bennett Capers has point-
ed out, there is a racialized policing of space.164 Black men in particular
are closely surveilled and often harassed when they are racially "out of
place.' 65 Zimmerman, as a watch captain, participated in the policing of
space. Gated communities, such as the one in which Zimmerman killed
Martin, are often especially vigilant about excluding people who are ra-
cially out of place.' 66 It should not surprise anyone that incidents like this
one occur more frequently in the U.S. South, which has traditionally
been more racist than other parts of the country.'67 Implicit bias against
blacks and the racialized policing of space go a long way toward explain-
ing the Sanford Police Department's uncritical acceptance of Zimmer-
man's fear of Martin as reasonable. Accordingly, Zimmerman's white
appearance, which probably matches his self-perception, might explain
his being granted an exemption from the normal self-defense rules.
160. Lee, supra note 146, at 1566.
161. See JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 1-2 (2009), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/un
it 3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf.
162. Lee, supra note 146, at 1569-86.
163. Id. at 1580-86. See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, We Are Always Already Imprisoned:
Hyper-incarceration and Black Male Identity Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1185 (2013) (arguing
attributed identity of black men as criminal in culture and law has led black men to incorporate the
possibility of being imprisoned into their self-identities).
164. See 1. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 43-47
(2009) (detailing police enforcement of segregated uses of space).
165. Id. at 69-70 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing
the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 969 (2002) (describing racialized police harass-
ment).
166. See Haney-L6pez, supra note 127, at 1037 (discussing racism in gated communities).
167. Anyone with knowledge of U.S. history and present culture should require no footnote
here. Consider, for instance, the White Citizen councils formed after the Brown decision threatened
to desegregate the South and the regional disparities in white voting for the first black major party
nominee for President. See also Tamara F. Lawson, "Whites Only Tree, " Hanging Nooses, No
Crime?: Limiting the Prosecutorial Veto for Hate Crimes in Louisiana and Across America, 8 U.
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 123, 144-55 (2008) (detailing racist use of space at a
Southern high school and the local District Attorney's racist treatment of its students).
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While several scholars have noted the operation of Zimmerman's
racial privilege, few have noted the way he benefitted from his gender
status. Here is where Zimmerman's role as "watch captain" should be
considered. He saw himself as the protector of his gated community. As
legal scholar Valorie Vojdik explains in her chapter in the book Mascu-
linities and the Law, men's role as protectors of women is constitutive of
the common understanding of the nation as masculine.168 As we noted
with respect to the bombing of Iraq, nations have often been seen as pro-
tectors in whose reflected masculinity we may all bask. At the micro-
level, the National Guard, the police, and even neighborhood watches
draw upon the legitimacy of their roles as masculine protectors. Zim-
merman's figurative likeness to the military and police for his communi-
ty could have subtly led the Sanford Police Department to grant him an
exemption from the normal self-defense rules.'69 That Zimmerman is
both male and (presumptively) white heightens the implication that the
Sanford Police saw him as a legitimate protector rather than a reckless
vigilante. In that sense, Zimmerman's gender privileged him in his con-
frontation with a racially distinct intruder. So Zimmerman was privileged
by race and gender; especially so in the context of a Southern, gated
community.
The identity of the person he was following also seems to have been
crucial in allowing Zimmerman not to act with restraint. As Lee says, "It
is unlikely that Zimmerman would have thought Martin was 'real suspi-
cious,' 'up to no good,' and 'on drugs or something' if Martin had been
[w]hite." 7 ° If Zimmerman's victim had been white, would the Sanford
Police have been as likely to set him free? Probably not. A study found
that there are racial disparities in how Florida's Stand Your Ground im-
munity is applied.'71 Zimmerman's exemption was relational; he could
be overprivileged because Martin was underprivileged.
Reinforcing the sense that Martin's race-gender combination made
him more readily accepted as the villain in Zimmerman's story is the fact
that Martin was acting appropriately. He was minding his own business
when Zimmerman started stalking him. Even in Zimmerman's narrative,
Martin only hit Zimmerman after Zimmerman chased him. In fact, this
sounds like a good scenario for Martin to have claimed self-defense
against Zimmerman. The cultural legitimacy of Martin's actions extends
as well to his exercise of masculinity. He was acting as we might expect
168. See Valorie K. Vojdik, Masculinities, Feminism, and the Turkish Headscarf Ban: Revisit-
ing $ahin v. Turkey, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra
note 7, at 270 (explicating masculine assumptions in the Islamic headscarf debate).
169. Perhaps the police were also granting him the exception because he was a quasi-lawman
based on his watch captain status.
170. Lee, supra note 146, at 1565-66.
171. See Rmuse, Stand Your Ground's Hideous Double Standard of Prosecuting African-
Americans, POLITICUSUSA (Apr. 15, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.politicususa.com/whites-only-
stand-your-ground.html (arguing that Stand Your Ground Laws are disparately applied).
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a man to do: walking where he pleased.172 Seeing Martin's actions as
inappropriate requires implicitly drawing on the idea that he was racially
out of place. Because he was a young black male, the Sanford Police
readily understood Martin's presence in a gated, white community as
questionable despite the appropriateness of his response to being pursued
by Zimmerman.
We can sum up the insights of this inquiry with another question:
Would Zimmerman have shot Martin if Martin had been a black girl?
The idea that Martin could be a girl is complicated, in large part because
some female masculinities involve girls looking like black boys. Consid-
er for example, Snoop from the critically acclaimed television show, The
Wire.173 She is a baggy-pants-wearing drug war assassin who presents as
very masculine. But assuming the female Martin was not that type of
girl, what result? It seems to us that the female Martin would not have
been shot. She might have been assumed to be a thief,174 but she would
not have pricked Zimmerman's masculine esteem. She would not have
been such a threat to the purity of Zimmerman's community. As a con-
sequence, Zimmerman would have been less likely to hunt her down and
shoot her. Nor would the Sanford Police have been as likely to credit
Zimmerman's self-defense claim. As a young black woman, the female
Martin would have faced other threats, but she would have been more
likely to live another day.
Thus, it seems that both the law and society did not give Martin the
benefit of any doubt about his intentions because he was a young black
male. The "boys will be boys" exemption did not apply to him. When
Zimmerman pulled the trigger, he was acting like a man by protecting his
neighborhood from an intruder. His behavior mirrored that of the U.S.
military when we preemptively attacked Iraq. In this sense, narratives
about preferred and denigrated masculinities empowered Zimmerman to
kill Martin in contradiction of the usual self-defense rules.
C. Similarities Between "Boys Will Be Boys" and Exemptions to Self-
Defense Rules
The assumption of Martin's wrongful presence brings us back to the
"boys will be boys" narrative. Some boys do not have the privileges of
the University of Colorado or Glen Ridge rapists. Some boys-black
boys, for example-are presumed criminal. The predominant narrative
about black boys is also based on a sociobiological narrative. Black boys
are presumed to be more agitated. An example of this presumption is the
172. As we noted in the Introduction, see supra p. 182, this is not a privilege that women have,
at least not without risking being depicted as having "asked" for harassment.
173. The Wire (HBO 2002-2008).
174. See Sherri Sharma, Beyond "Driving While Black" and "Flying While Brown": Using
Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
275, 280-93 (2003) (detailing racial profiling of women of color).
[Vol. 91:1
HOW MASCULINITIES DISTRIBUTE POWER
movement for teaching black boys separately from girls, which legal
scholars Verna Williams and David Cohen have criticized.7 5 We also
see this presumption in the ways that black boys are disproportionately
punished for initial infractions in school, which implies that even as
small children they are already incorrigible.'76 Another example of the
belief that black boys are presumed to be criminal is the disproportionate
punishment, instead of rehabilitation, that juvenile courts mete out to
boys of color, which University of Denver legal scholar Rashmi Goel has
documented.17 7 All of these assumptions depict black boys as presump-
tively bad and inherently dangerous.'78 They are "failed men" as Devon
Carbado describes it.179 Consequently, black boys are not accorded the
"boys will be boys" exemption.
Another link between the "boys will be boys" narrative and the
granting of exemptions from the self-defense rules is that, like women
who are in the wrong place, victims such as Hussein and Martin are de-
picted as having "asked for it." Racial otherness seems to have done the
work of blaming the victim in both cases. Like Seamons, they were seen
as performing their masculinity in an inappropriate manner. While Sea-
mons was insufficiently masculine, Hussein and Martin were presumed
to be excessively masculine. In all three cases, the denigrated masculini-
ties of the victims were crucial to the ability of privileged men to commit
violence against them.
IV. CONCLUSION: PREFERRED MASCULINITIES, RACE, AND CLASS
Ann Scales's work acknowledges the importance that our society
places on invisible concepts of masculinity when we judge individual,
group, and even our nation's actions. With reference to Scales's articles
and through the use of masculinities theories, we have analyzed the law's
and society's reactions to sexual assault of young women and men, as
well as the exemption that some boys receive from the usual rules for
criminal assaultive behavior through the "boys will be boys" narrative.
This narrative is particularly strong where the boys who are accused of
criminal sexual assault perform the most preferred form of masculinity.
Female victims are blamed for inviting the assault, whereas male victims
are blamed for not "taking it like a man." The assault, then, enhances the
175. See David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist Myth
of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 174 (2009); Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-
Sex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 15, 21 26 (2004).
176. See Ruth Zweifler & Julia De Beers, The Children Left Behind. How Zero Tolerance
Impacts Our Most Vulnerable Youth, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 191, 201-02, 204-07 (2002) (citing
statistics on disproportionate school punishment of blacks).
177. See Rashmi Goel, Delinquent or Distracted? Attention Deficit Disorder and the Construc-
tion of the Juvenile Offender, 27 LAW & INEQ. 1, 28-40 (2009).
178. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 857-59 (explicating bipolar black masculinity thesis).
179. Devon W. Carbado, Masculinity by Law, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 7, at 51, 53 (discussing the social construction of black
men as having "surplus" or "failed" masculinity (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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masculinity of the perpetrators by demonstrating their superiority over
the victims-both male and female. But the "boys will be boys" narrative
is available only to those boys who behave consistently with the pre-
ferred modes of masculinity. Racial minority boys and men, especially
those living in poor communities, are considered to perform a dangerous,
hyper-masculine identity that precludes them from the benefit of the
doubt expressed in the "boys will be boys" narrative. And, because of the
presumption of dangerousness of some males, white males may enjoy
exemptions from the self-defense rules if they harm people with deni-
grated masculinities.
Ann Scales reminds us that this distribution of power occurs in a
similar way when we consider military and national power. Even though
the U.S. military has significantly more might than its Iraqi and other
Middle Eastern opponents, we presume that our weaker foes are exceed-
ingly dangerous, and we take an exemption from the rules by engaging in
preemptive strikes. As Zimmerman's killing of Martin shows, the ex-
emption results from both the privileging of some boys and men as well
as the denigration of women and certain other men. We may not use the
term "boys will be boys" when condoning preemptive strikes, but we
excuse masculine demonstrations of power based on our fear of "the
other." Power, then, is distributed to and among men based on race,
class, and the performance of masculinity. Scales's work reminds us that
when masculinities distribute power, lives stand in the balance.
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ON SURVIVING LEGAL DE-EDUCATION: AN ALLEGORY* FOR
A RENAISSANCE** IN LEGAL EDUCATION
* Use of an allegory sits squarely at the intersection of critical race theory and critical femi-
nist jurisprudence. Critical race theory "is characterized by frequent use of the first person, storytell-
ing, narrative, allegory, interdisciplinary treatment of law, and the unapologetic use of creativity."
Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899 (1995). This
technique was used most famously by Professor Derrick Bell, one of the founders of critical race
theory, in writings throughout his career. See, e.g., id. As Professor Bell explained in the introduc-
tion to And We Are Not Saved, his seminal collection of the "Chronicles" of a lawyer-heroine dedi-
cated to civil rights and equal justice, there is "an ancient tradition in using fantasy and dialogue to
uncover enduring truths." Bell's examples range from Plato, to noted legal philosopher Lon Fuller
(who used a series of hypothetical appellate cases in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers to exam-
ine whether settled legal principles can adequately address situations beyond the imagination of
lawmakers), to every other law professor who today engages in Socratic dialogue to "effectively
illuminate[] essential principles." DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 6 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; see Lon L. Fuller, The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). Professor Kimberl Crenshaw
wrote that
allegory offers a method of discourse that allows us to critique legal norms in an ironical-
ly contexualized way. Through the allegory, we can discuss legal doctrine in a way that
does not replicate the abstractions of legal discourse. It provides therefore a more rich,
engaging, and suggestive way of reaching the truth.
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra, at 6 (quoting Kimberld Crenshaw, From Celebration to
Tribulation: the Constitution Goes to Trial (unpublished manuscript)). Critical race feminism also
relies on "a technique of storytelling and narrative analysis to construct alternative social realities."
Adrien K. Wing & Christine A. Willis, From Theory to Praxis: Black Women, Gangs, and Critical
Race Feminism, 4 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1,3 (1999). Critical race feminism "stresses conscious
consideration of the intersection of race, class, and gender by placing women of color at the center of
the analysis and reveals the discriminatory and oppressive nature of their reality." Id. at 4. Several
excellent sources that cover the origins of critical race theory include CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) and CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000). For
additional information on critical race feminism, see generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003).
** In Surviving Legal De-Education, Professor Ann Scales deconstructed why law school
can be so disorienting and foreign for students who are outsiders-students of color, women, and
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender students-and prescribed seven ways that someone who is
not a member of the majority in law school can survive an experience that she described as a "white
male encounter group." Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT.
L. REV. 139, 144 (1990). At least, that was what the article did on the surface. In fact, Surviving
Legal De-Education was more than a rallying cry for outsiders to unite, more than a list of sugges-
tions for ways that outsiders could navigate law school with their identities intact. By the time Pro-
fessor Scales published her article in 1990, law schools had become much more diverse. As she
reported in the article, the proportion of women had risen from 3% to 42%, and the proportion of
people of color had risen from less than 2% to 13%. Id. at 139. In 2013, twenty-three years after
Professor Scales's article, the statistics were these: women were 46.7% of law students, and people
of color were 25.8%. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT
GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current-glance-statistics-feb2013.a
uthcheckdam.pdf, First Year JD. and Total J.D. Minority Enrollment for 1971-2012, A.B.A. SEC.
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS B.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damaba/administrative/lega education and admissions to th
e_bar/statistics/jdenrollment lyrtotal minority.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
Her ideas, examined in three dimensions, provided a blueprint for what legal education might look
like if, in Professor Scales's words, it was changed from a highly "effective funnel of society's
resources into the pockets of the already rich" that was "designed by white men for white men" to a
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They had done it. After three long years, three of the members of
the graduating class of 2035 of Denver Law sat together over burgers at
Crimson & Gold, the local student hangout that had sustained them
through countless hours of studying, memorizing, outlining, and learn-
ing. Geneva Johnson' could not believe that she had just graduated from
law school. Just a few hours earlier, she walked across the stage in the
auditorium, shook the Dean's right hand, accepted her diploma in her
left, turned her tassel, and walked off the stage. For years after, whenever
her mother would crow to anybody who would listen about her daugh-
ter's law school graduation, her mother would say, "We were in the
nosebleed seats in the stadium, so when Geneva walked across the stage,
all we could see were four-inch heels and a huge smile."
All three of the students at the table had jobs. The reforms2 that had
swooped in to save legal education from the crises that threatened to
cripple it in the first quarter of the twenty-first century made sure of
that.3 To address the crisis in legal employment, or "The Rock," as it was
model that successfully accommodated every student, regardless of difference. Scales, supra, at 139,
155. With its seven suggestions, Surviving Legal De-Education was as subversive a piece as any law
professor could publish. The combination of Professor Scales's wit (imagining "a megalomaniacal
official deciding on the basis of his level of intoxication, what he had for breakfast, and--oh no-his
unfettered subjectivity. 'Sure! You can have five strikes if you want!'), pull-no-punches attitude
(assailing sports metaphors with "I am sorry, sports fans, but law is just more serious than base-
ball"), and inimitable voice (describing that by the end of the first year of law school, the outsiders
"have the sensation of acid slowly dripping on their souls") made for the apotheosis of persuasion.
Scales, supra, at 142, 150-51. The article made a radical argument in such an engaging way that
even those who might have disagreed listened. Indeed, in this allegory recounting the graduation day
conversation between Geneva, John, and Teresa, the results of the reforms stemming from Ann's
article are reified. See id.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Heartfelt thanks
to Professor Nancy Ehrenreich and the Denver University Law Review for inviting me to participate
in this Symposium. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Denver Law and in particular the
participants in the Rocky Mountain Collective on Race, Place & Law (RPL). I would like to express
special appreciation to Professors Christopher Lasch, Nantiya Ruan, and Lindsey Webb. Kasey
Baker and Christopher Linas provided superlative research assistance. Finally, I would like to extend
my abiding gratitude to Mickey and Jeannie Klein for their generous support, keen and thoughtful
interest, and gracious encouragement.
1. Ms. Johnson was named after Geneva Crenshaw, the brave African-American civil rights
attorney whose experiences were most famously chronicled by Professor Derrick Bell in several
seminal works of critical race theory, including AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 7 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED], FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM ix (1992), and AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 7 (1998). Moved
after reading And We Are Not Saved, Ms. Johnson's mother would later name her only daughter
Geneva.
2. Many of these reforms were inspired by Professor Ann Scales's Surviving Legal De-
Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REV. 139 (1990), first published in the Vermont Law
Review in 1990.
3. Starting in 2011, the New York Times was only the most high-profile of a host of periodi-
cals to publish a scathing series of articles spotlighting the shortcomings of legal education and, with
increasingly foreboding language, sounding the death knell for legal education as it then existed.
See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Law Schools' Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, at A l; Ethan Bronner, A Call for Drastic Changes in Educating New Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at Al1; Adam Cohen, Just How Bad Off Are Law School Graduates?:
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dubbed in an infamous and scathing July 2017 New York Times article
titled Scylla, Charybdis, and the Fall of Legal Education, schools shifted
their focus from preparing students to work in law firms to preparing
students to take public interest jobs in under-served areas that would
mean substantial oan forgiveness.4 To slow the skyrocketing costs of
legal education, dubbed "The Whirlpool," schools found ways to cut
costs and lower tuition.
But these were just the beginning of the improvements. Law schools
across the country shifted their focus, so that learning to practice like a
lawyer became as important as learning to think like a lawyer. Some
schools converted their third-year curriculum into an all-experiential
year, so that students could start practicing the day after they were sworn
in to the bar.5 Many more schools redoubled their efforts to make sure
their students were prepared to take and pass the bar.6 Slowly enrollment
crept back up, classes filled, and legal education had pulled off one of the
best comeback stories of the century.
Each of these three excited students, in his or her own way, was a
product of this shift. John was set to move to the Western Slope to work
for the Farmworker Alliance. Geneva was going to the Colorado Public
Defender's Office. And Teresa, one of the few students in their class
Faced with a Dismal Job Market, the Legal Profession May Be Undergoing Fundamental Change,
TIME (Mar. 11, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/03/1 1/just-how-bad-off-are-law-school-
graduates/; David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BUI; David
Segal, What They Don't Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at Al; Maura
Dolan, A Thin Jobs Docket for Law Grads: As Technology Has Reduced Openings, Some Graduates
Have Sued Schools over Employment Claims, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at 1; Debra Cassens Weiss,
Judge Allows Suit Against Widener Law School over Job Stats, Cites 'Thread of Plausibility,'
A.B.A. J. (Mar. 25, 2013, 06:30 CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/udge allows suit claimingwidener law school-posted_
misleadingjob stats c/; Jordan Weissmann, Law School Applications Are Collapsing (as They
Should Be), ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2013, 13:19 EST),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/01/law-school-applications-are-collapsing-as-
they-should-be/272729/.
4. In 2013, much of the crisis in legal employment arose not from a lack of demand, but
from a lack of lucrative jobs. For example, due to a "chronic undersupply" of lawyers in rural areas,
South Dakota passed a law subsidizing lawyers who live and work in rural areas. Ethan Bronner, No
Lawyer for 100 Country Miles, So One Rural State Offers Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2013, at Al.
Furthermore, there were "millions of middle class and indigent Americans who need[ed] but c[ould]
not afford legal assistance," but crushing student debts financially discouraged lawyers from taking
such jobs even when they were available. Chris Fletcher, A Message to Aspiring Lawyers: Caveat
Emptor, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2013, at All. In New Jersey, ninety-nine percent of defendants in
landlord-tenant disputes were unrepresented in 2012. John J. Farmer, Jr., To Practice Law, Appren-
tice First, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at Al 7.
5. Washington and Lee University's law school adopted such a curriculum beginning with
its class of 2010. Daniel de Vise, Third-Year Law Students Trade Class for Court, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 2009, at B I. In addition, in 2013 Denver Law launched its Experiential Advantage Curricu-
lum, which allows Denver Law students to spend a full year of their law school career in real or
simulated legal practice. For more information, see http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/experiential-
advantage.
6. Michelle Weyenberg, Diversity Part I: What Law Schools Are Doing, NAT'L JURIST
(July 12, 2010), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/diversity-part-ii-what-law-schools-are-doing.
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going into for-profit work, was headed to Hogan & Hartson on a two-
year fellowship meant to encourage students to return to corporate law.
Smiling from ear to ear, Geneva thought back to her first year. "I
remember meeting you on the first day of our first year when we sat to-
gether." John replied, "I remember, too. It was a Monday, and the class
was Jurisprudence." Teresa dded, "I remember Mondays and Wednes-
days were killer that first semester. We had Jurisprudence, Human Be-
havior in the Law, and Professional Responsibility Lab on Mondays,
Wednesdays, and Fridays, and then on Tuesdays and Thursdays we had
Lawyering Process and From Idea to Law." John nodded his head in
agreement and said, "I remember Professional Responsibility Lab the
most because that class immediately made me realize that being a lawyer
meant more than knowing what terms to use in a contract or what case to
refer to in an argument. That's where I started to think about the kind of
lawyer I want to be-to develop a professional identity." John added, "I
also remember Professional Responsibility because it was at the end of
the day. Our schedule was just brutal!"
Teresa said, with a mouth full of fries, "Second semester first year
wasn't much better. We had Preventive Law and Constitutional Law on
Mondays and Wednesdays, Social Justice Lawyering and Lawyering
Process on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and Client Counseling Lab on Fri-
days. I loved Client Counseling Lab. I remember when I first read that it
was co-taught by a professor and a former client of the professor's, I was
worried, but hearing from a client firsthand about his experiences with
the legal system, and having my professor show us-and not just tell
us-that we should always be ready to learn from our clients gave me a
better understanding of the lawyer-client relationship. I understood on a
deeper level that we should work in partnership with a client instead of
just thinking that the lawyer's job is to tell the client what to do."
Teresa went on, "Preventive Law was one of my favorite classes. It
was so interesting to think of my role as broader than that of a legal ad-
viser who parachutes in once the crisis has happened-a lawyer can also
think of ways to head off crises. The readings were so varied. In one as-
signment we would have a poem like The Ambulance Down in the Val-
ley,7 a report from an advocacy organization about, say, the school-to-
7. The version of this poem read in Teresa's class included the original anonymous poem
along with a second part contributed by Joe Galano in 1988. Tribute to George Albee, WM. &
MARY, http://www.wm.edu/as/psychology/faculty/facultydirectory/galano retires/poem/index.php
(last visited Nov. 16, 2013). This reform, including many different kinds of reading sources, was
inspired by the example Professor Scales provided in Surviving Legal De-Education, relying on
typical sources like law review articles and case law, and other sources as varied as Audre Lorde's
The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House and a commencement address by
Adrienne Rich. Scales, supra note 2; Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the
Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES BY AUDRE LORDE 110 (Nancy K.
Bereano ed., 1984); Adrienne Rich, Commencement Address at Smith College: What Women Need
to Know (1979).
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prison pipeline,8 a law review article or two,9 a case about trying to end
it, l° and then a writing assignment encouraging us to come up with our
own proposal about how to end it. The topics we talked about in that
class-especially whether the lawyer's role is to be proactive or reac-
tive-helped me realize that the lawyer's role is so broad that there is
room for me to be the kind of lawyer I'd like to be, instead of being the
kind of lawyer people might expect me to be."
John added, "Don't forget-we also had an elective. That Status
Regime Modernization seminar was really eye-opening. That class radi-
calized me!" Geneva laughed, "No kidding. Every time we had that class
you came into the classroom ready for a sit-in chanting 'What do we
want? JUSTICE! When do we want it? NOW!."' Laughing as well, John
offered, in his defense, "I wasn't the only one. The readings in that class
were amazing. What a concept-that social institutions recycle them-
selves in ever more acceptable forms. This seems to be true across so
many areas. We studied status regime modernization in gender rela-
tions,' in race relations in the criminal justice system,12 and in race rela-
tions in immigration policy.'3 What energized me in that class was learn-
ing that status regime modernization has an equal and opposite foe in
status regime revolution-that the same way that a status regime sheds
its skin to become more socially acceptable, civil rights reform changes
shape to meet it. Between that and Lawyer as Hero, I knew I was headed
for public service."
8. School to Prison Pipeline, NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND,
http://www.naacpldf.org/case/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
9. See, e.g., Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOw. L.J. 343,
345 (2011); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color:
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 385 (2013).
10. Harris et a]. v. Atlanta Independent School System: Atlanta Alternative School Case,
ACLU (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/harris-et-al-v-atlanta-independent-school-
system; B.H. et al v. City of New York (Challenging the NYPD's School Safety Policies and Prac-
tices), NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/case/bh-et-al-v-city-of-new-york-challenging-nypds-school-
safety-policies-and-practices (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
11. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2179 (1996) (defining status regime modernization as a phenomenon in which "status
relationships will be translated from an older, socially contested idiom into a newer, more socially
acceptable idiom," and discussing how civil rights reform "modernizes the rules and rhetoric" that
reinforce the status hierarchy instead of"abolish[ing] a status regime").
12. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 14-15 (2010) (drawing parallels from United States chattel slavery to convict
leasing, to Jim Crow, and then to mass incarceration to demonstrate "the ways in which systems of
racialized social control have managed to morph, evolve, and adapt to changes in the political,
social, and legal context over time").
13. See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (drawing the connection between present-day immigration rendition and antebellum fugitive
slave rendition); Kevin R. Johnson, Protecting National Security Through More Liberal Admission
ofImmigrants, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 157, 185 (2007) (linking the United States' undocumented
immigrant population to "the days of slavery and Jim Crow in the United States, with a racial caste
of workers subject to exploitation and abuse in the secondary labor market").
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Geneva said, "Lawyer as Hero was great. We just read biographies,
including the biographies of Nelson Mandela,14 Mahatma Gandhi,15 Bry-
an Stevenson,16 Ann Scales,7 Catharine MacKinnon,'8 Abraham Lin-
coln,19 Sonia Sotomayor,
20 Thurgood Marshall,2' Barbara Babcock,
22
14. Before becoming South Africa's first democratically-elected president, Nelson Mandela
spent twenty-seven years as a prisoner for his activities as an anti-apartheid revolutionary. The Life
and Times of Nelson Mandela: Biography, NELSON MANDELA FOUND.,
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). At his sentenc-
ing, and facing possible execution, Mandela declared the following:
I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I
have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live togeth-
er in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to
achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Like many new lawyers, Gandhi had difficulty finding employment upon graduation.
Mahatma Gandhi, HISTORY, http://www.history.co.uk/biographies/mahatma-gandhi (last visited
Nov. 16, 2013). He became employed on a short-term contract with an Indian law firm in South
Africa. Id. Setting the precedent for many members of Geneva's generation, Gandhi proceeded to
enter the public interest field. Id. He stayed in South Africa for twenty-one years, during which time
he founded a political movement known as the Natal Indian Congress. Id. Upon returning to India,
Gandhi became a leader in the movement to liberate India from British rule, practicing non-violent
civil disobedience until he was assassinated in 1948. Id.
16. Bryan Stevenson is a New York University School of Law professor, founder of the Equal
Justice Initiative, and a lifelong advocate for capital defendants and death row prisoners in the Deep
South. Bryan A. Stevenson, N.Y.U L.,
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?section=bio&personlD=20315 (last visited Nov.
16, 2013).
17. Ann Scales was a founder of the field of feminist legal theory. Ann C. Scales (1952-
2012), U. DENY. STuRM C.L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/ann-scales (last visited Nov.
1, 2013). Her innumerable accomplishments include arguing a "case in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court became the first" state high court to recognize an equality right to abortion funding,
founding the Harvard Women's Law Journal, and inspiring countless students and colleagues. Id.
She was also an incredible example as an educator, who was known to refer to teaching as a sacra-
ment. Brilliant, funny, irreverent, fearless, and kind, she was loved by her students and colleagues
alike.
18. Professor MacKinnon is a pioneer in legal feminism. She was instrumental in developing
the legal claim for sexual harassment, and her theories have influenced rulings by the Canadian
Supreme Court on equality, pornography, and hate speech. MacKinnon, Catharine A., MICH. L.,
http://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FaclD=camtwo (last visited Nov. 16,
2013).
19. Posterity remembers Lincoln as among the greatest American presidents and a central
figure in the abolition of slavery. Lincoln was also a self-taught lawyer, having learned the law
primarily through reading William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. Abraham
Lincoln, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/abraham-lincoln-9382540?page=2 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2013).
20. Justice Sotomayor was born in the South Bronx area of New York City to parents of
Puerto Rican descent. Sonia Sotomayor, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/sonia-
sotomayor-453906?page=1 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). Although she entered the illustrious Prince-
ton University, she struggled initially and pursued extra help with her English and writing skills. Id.
Thanks to her hard work, she graduated summa cum laude and proceeded to Yale Law School. Id.
Her pro bono work in private practice caught the attention of U.S. senators, leading to her appoint-
ment as a U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York. Id. In 2009, Sonia So-
tomayor became the first Latina United States Supreme Court Justice. Id.
21. The great-grandson of a slave, Thurgood Marshall worked as legal counsel for the
NAACP. Thurgood Marshall, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/thurgood-marshall-
9400241?page=l (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). There, he won many landmark civil rights cases, the
most famous of which was Brown v. Board of Education. Id. In 1967, he was sworn in as the first
African-American Supreme Court Justice. Id.
22. Barbara Babcock is the first woman appointed to the regular faculty at Stanford Law
School. Barbara Babcock, STAN. L. SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/profile/barbara-babcock (last
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Barbara Jordan,23 and, of course, Geneva Crenshaw.2 4 They were all he-
roes in different ways-politicians, jurists, scholars-but all activists in
the sense that they used the law to make the world better for more peo-
ple. Every class was so inspiring.'
25
Geneva laughed, "Remember Constitutional Law? We started out
with Marbury v. Madison,26 and the professor cold-called Julie and asked
her the significance of the case. Julie said the significance of the case
was that it demarcated the limits of Article III judicial review, and the
professor said no, that's the holding. Then Julie said the significance of
the case was that the Court decided it could not force Secretary of State
Madison to deliver Marbury his commission. The professor said no,
that's the ruling. Then the professor explained the significance was that
the Court installed judicial review to keep the Court out of the fight over
the expansion of slavery between slave states and free states.,
27
Teresa laughed along with her, "That's when I knew law practice
was about real issues and real problems." John said, "And the professor
stopped at that point to teach us the skill of briefing cases with five sec-
tions," and they all said together, "Issue, Facts, Holding, Ruling, Signifi-
cance !,,28
visited Nov. 16, 2013). She served as the first Director of the Public Defender Service of the District
of Columbia and Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division in the Carter Administration. Id.
23. Barbara Jordan was a civil rights leader who became the first African-American con-
gresswoman from the Deep South, as the first woman elected to the Texas Senate. Barbara Jordan,
BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/barbara-jordan-9357991 (last visited Nov. 16,
2013).
24. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 1, at 42.
25. "Law school gets characterized as characterless, as impersonal and cold. But I don't think
that is right. In fact, legal education tells a very emotional story, over and over again." Scales, supra
note 2, at 142.
26. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). In the years immediately preceding Marbury, slavery was a
hotly contested issue of national prominence. For more on this topic, see BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED, supra note 2, which contains a partially-imagined debate at the Constitutional Convention.
Bell's advocate, Geneva Crenshaw, debates the delegates at the Convention, and much of the lan-
guage in favor of slavery is drawn from the actual debates themselves. Id. John Kaminski's A Neces-
sary Evil?: Slavery and the Debate over the Constitution is an edited collection of primary materials
from the late eighteenth century, documenting not only the Constitutional Convention but also the
regional debates about slavery. A NECESSARY EVIL?: SLAVERY AND THE DEBATE OVER THE
CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski, ed. 1995). Finally, Marshall Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan?
Reactionary? has additional information that might be helpful. Jean Edward Smith, Marshall Mis-
construed: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1109 (2000).
27. Professor Robin Walker Sterling, a contemporary of Geneva's mother, told Geneva that,
when Professor Walker Sterling was lucky enough to take Constitutional Law with Professor Der-
rick Bell at New York University School of Law, Professor Bell began his Constitutional Law class
with this description of the import of Marbury.
28. Scales wrote:
[We substitute] "policy" for "justice" in legal discourse. You know what "policy" is: It is
everything that isn't law, and it is amazing how quickly law students can be taught to de-
value everything that isn't law.
We teach that policy arguments are supplements to legal argument, and often as the last
resort. We teach that policy is epistemologically and persuasively inferior to law. Con-
sider what that division assumes: that the law is necessarily separate from morality and
politics, that the law is better than morality and politics, that it is largely worthless to en-
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John added, "We chased that case with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion29 and Keyes v. School District No. 1.30 I'm glad we started with such
interesting cases. I particularly liked when we read cases along with the
cases they'd overturned. So, when we first read McCleskey v. Kemp,
32
and then we read the case that overturned it, Johnson v. Gleason,33 it
made me feel very hopeful about how we as lawyers can effect social
change."
Geneva added, "My mother told me the first year of law school used
to be very different from that-you would take Torts, Property, Con-
tracts, Criminal Law, and Civil Procedure." John said, "That's weird.
How do you know how to think critically about any of those subjects
unless you've had Jurisprudence? I mean, you need a context for things."
Teresa added, "No labs? Why go a whole year before you start working
with people? It's a service profession!" John remarked, "That description
of law school sounds terrible! Why'd you go?" Geneva answered, "My
mother admired a famous civil rights attorney. I guess that's what hap-
pens when you have role models who seem happy in their work-you
follow in their footsteps."
Wistfully, Geneva said, "I loved my first-year classes so much, I
wished we had first-year grades. I understand why we don't,34 but we
gage in the discourse of morality and politics because we can never agree on anything
anyway, and that human beings are horrid aggressive creatures who will only be persuad-
ed, ultimately, by coercion.
Scales, supra note 2, at 145 (footnote omitted).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
31. According to Scales,
Studying constitutional law could be engaging and fun. But no. Before students can get
to the inherently interesting parts, they have to trudge through McCullough v. Maryland
and the interminable implications of the [C]ommerce [C]lause .... Why not start law
school with Brown v. Board of Education, or Roe v. Wade, or Bowers v. Hardwick?...
In the conventional format, students learn that the Constitution, or at least the important
stuff, is not about rights, or even about people.
Scales, supra note 2, at 156 (footnotes omitted).
32. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
33. In Johnson v. Gleason, the Court held that statistical evidence of "racially disproportion-
ate impact" at any of the discretion points in the criminal justice system-including arrest, indict-
ment, plea offers, and sentencing-can win relief for the individual petitioner, even in the absence of
a showing of a "racially discriminatory purpose." 685 U.S. 322, 328 (2027) (quoting McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 298) (explaining the outcome of this case). The case was brought by a Denver Law alumna
who said, in an interview, that she had been looking for the case that would overtum McCleskey
since she discussed it in a law school seminar where the professor gave the class an assignment. The
professor said,
You have homework. I'll give you about 15 years to complete it. The assignment is to
find the case that will convince the Court that the McCleskey Court was wrong to give up,
because "[a]pparent [racial] disparities in sentencing are" not "an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system," and move the Court past eradicating overt, first-generation rac-
ism, to addressing covert, second-generation racism, like implicit bias.
Interview with alumna of Denver Law 2018 (quoting one of her law professors at Denver Law
(quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312)).
34. According to Scales,
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were all so excited to be learning these new things. I can't remember a
time when I felt more engaged and empowered as a leamer!" Teresa
added, "Yeah, first year was great! Man, those were good times. In fact,
law school has been great. I have always felt right at home and never
doubted that there's a place in the law for me. I've loved law school. I'd
do it all over again. I am so happy and excited to start my career. I hope
everyone feels this way about law school and about law practice."
35
Tired of reminiscing, the students picked up their belongings and
went off to join their families for the law school's community-service trip
in honor of the students' graduation.
First year grades are stupid, even stupider than other grades, for we do not teach discrete
subject matters in law school. Rather, law is a language, a way of thinking, and a culture.
It is ridiculous, therefore, to expect that one can have "gotten it" by the end of four or
nine months.... [F]irst year grades cannot measure anything "learned" in that year. Ra-
ther, the grades can discern only who already knows the stuff, and are therefore unfair to
the rest of us.
Scales, supra note 2, at 141.
35. There is a vast amount of information about law students, lawyers, and how miserable
they were before the recent trends in legal education. The most widely cited study analyzed the
prevalence of depression in 104 different occupations to find that lawyers were the most depressed
occupation when adjusted for socio-demographic factors. See William W. Eaton et al., Occupations
and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1080, 1085
tbl.3 (1990). According to this study, lawyers were 3.6 times as likely to be depressed as members of
the general population. See id at 1083. An article published in a Yale journal almost twenty years
later focused on law students to find that although law students entered school with normal levels of
psychological distress, their distress dramatically increased and continued to increase over the three
years of law school. See Todd David Peterson & Elizabeth Waters Peterson, Stemming the Tide of
Law Student Depression: What Law Schools Need to Learn from the Science of Positive Psychology,
9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 357, 367 (2009). "One study found that 44% of law students"
had "clinically significant levels of psychological distress." Id. at 359. The switch to experiential
learning had the lucky benefit of making happier law students. A 2023 study that set out to document
why the majority of law students were choosing public interest work over private work found that
schools' increased focus on experiential learning produced the epiphenomenon of happier law stu-
dents. Students who were able to be rewarded for leaming in new ways, and to be connected each
day with the reasons that they went to law school, were ultimately happier in law school and in their
careers.

